Caught Off Guard

[thedrifter]

Phase I: Caught Off Guard

Pre-War:
An obscure country in the far reaches of Asia, Korea was forgotten by the American public and policymakers at the end of World War II. Despite ongoing clashes along the 38th parallel, and bellicose posturing by Kim Il Sung and Syngman Rhee, the U.S. withdrew its military forces from South Korea in June of 1949 -- leaving behind only a minuscule military advisory group of 500.

On January 12, 1950, in a speech to the National Press Club in Washington, Secretary of Sate Dean Acheson excluded South Korea from the U.S.'s security perimeter in Asia. A scant six months later, President Truman would commit American troops to free South Korean from Communist invasion.



No Time for Boot Camp

Barry R. McLean, Cpl, USMC
1950
Pico Rivera, California

I was 10 years old when WWII began, so war was a normal part of my life as I grew into my teens. In high school, I joined the Marine Corp Reserve, attended a few training sessions at Camp Pendleton where I learned to salute, peel potatoes and fire an M-1 rifle. I had learned to shoot a .22 rifle well as a teenager. Now I learned to shoot the Marine way. Charlie Battery was based in Pico Rivera. We trained on 105 howitzers. Scheduled for summer training on graduation, I was instead called to duty on the outbreak of the Korean War. "Boot Camp" instruction came on the voyage from San Diego to Kobe, Japan.

Source: Courtesy Artwork Publications, Korean Vignettes, Faces of War



Preparedness

Lt. Col. Lloyd Childers (ret.), USMC
June 1950
San Diego, California


When we left Southern California for Korea, we had a strong influx of reservists. A couple of them I had known from World War II, and had not flown for five years. What a rough situation they had. One of them killed himself flying a night mission, about his fifth or sixth one I think. He ran into a hill. And I remember specifically, I spent a couple of hours talking to him one afternoon. That night he was going to fly his first night mission, and I was trying to calm him down. I said, "Remember -- there's not a target in this country worth your life. Also, remember, when you're flying at night, you don't know how high the hills are below you for the simple reason that you don't know where you are. You think you know where you are, but you really don't. So, you pick an altitude that would be generally safe for that given area, and don't go below that given altitude."

Well, he didn't follow my advice, and he was pronounced missing in action after this mission when he didn't come home. A couple of days later one of our Marine Corps flights saw the tail of a Corsair sticking out of some trees at the top of a mountain. A helicopter driver removed his body.

We had a lot of reservists who were not professional Marines that were flying in that war.

.......................

The regulars were well trained, no doubt about it. And small wars should be fought by the regular forces: people that are ready to fight, and know how to do it, and have a chance of survival.

I had always thought that reservists were to be called in case of a national emergency, which Korea was not. But I understand that every Marine Corps aviator, pilot, from World War II was recalled to active duty. Most people don't realize that officers, after World War II, when they went home, they weren't discharged. They were released to inactive duty. So, they were still on the rolls, and the Marine Corps still had a handle on you.

When I mentioned that one friend had not flown an airplane in five years when he was recalled, that's the truth. In one case, I know that he was told to read a handbook on the Corsair, and then he would receive a cockpit checkout by an experienced pilot. And then, he straps into the cockpit, taxis out, and takes off.

He can't take an instructor with him because he's only got one seat in it. And that's the way it had to be. They should have given these people fifteen to twenty hours anyway, before they sent them to Korea, but they didn't. Somehow, they thought that the personnel situation was so drastic that they had to do it.

The so called Ready Reserves that had been flying every month would be much better off, but in a period of shortage of money for fuel and so forth, they probably didn't have much flight time either.

Then I became everything

Clarence Mehlhaff, 24th Division, 63rd Field Artillery, Camp Okata, Japan
June 1950
Fukuoka, Japan

When I got to the 24th -- it was in May -- they didn't have enough cooks, so I volunteered to be a cook ... There were six of us that prepared all of the meals for the guys. That's what I did until the Korean War broke out. Then I became everything. I was a gunner, a machine gunner, outpost -- whatever they told me to do, that's what I did.


From Housekeeping to Heavy Wounded

Donald "Lee" Aronhalt, E-6 (ret.) (at the time, Pfc), 24th Medical Battalion, 24th Infantry Division
1950
Kokura Kyusha, Japan

I was a 20 year old soldier, a couple of years older than most, on duty with 24th Medical Battalion of the 24th Infantry Division at a major dispensary hospital at Kokura Kyusha, Japan. Our training consisted of housekeeping jobs and a routine Saturday inspection. We received no formal medical training. My unit, HQ Company of the 24th Med Bn was shipped to Korea 30 June 1950. Two weeks later, in mid July, we were set up in Taejon, receiving heavy loads of wounded from the fighting 10 miles north of the city.

Source: Courtesy Artwork Publications, Korean Vignettes, Faces of War



From a Tijuana Bar Brawl with Robert Mitchum to the Seoul Embassy

John "Lucky" S. Graham, Cpl (then PFC), USMC, 1st Provisional Brigade
June 25, 1950
United States Embassy, Seoul, Korea

Before the Korean War, I had been stationed at Camp Pendleton in "Chesty" Puller's Bn. On a pay day, and with a week end pass in my pocket, I set off for Tijuana. Several of us sat in a bar having a beer when a group of noisy tourists barged in. One of our guys went to the head, leaving an empty chair at the table. This big guy came over and took the chair. I got up, put my hand on the chair to tell him it was taken. He gave me a shove. I shoved back. That started it. The barkeep called the Policia. When the dust settled we both had sore knuckles and I had a broken nose. The big guy turned out to be Robert Mitchum, not long out of the Army. The ruckus got me busted me to Pfc. I ended up a few weeks later as one of a sixteen man guard detachment at our Embassy in Seoul, Korea.

That's where I was on June 25, 1950 when the North Koreans crossed the parallel. The Embassy was closed. We went south and were flown to Japan. A few weeks later, I was back in Pusan and assigned to the First Provisional Brigade.

Source: Courtesy Artwork Publications, Korean Vignettes, Faces of War


We took all of our stuff with us - tennis racquets, golf clubs

Sherman Smith, 24th Infantry Regiment
July 7, 1950
Fukuoka, Japan

I was stationed in Japan with a Black infantry regiment called the 24th Infantry Regiment, which was part of the 25th division. I went to Japan in 1949 and joined this unit. My job at that particular time was that I was the regimental TO&E ... It was my job to get all the news and that sort of thing to the troops.

When the Korean conflict came along, they bundled up the 25th division and sent the entire group, including the 24th infantry that I belonged to -- I was in Headquarters and Headquarters Company, 24th infantry -- to Korea. We went to Korea with the impression that all we had to do was to show up over there and those guys would go on back across the border. In other words, they were going to be so frightened of American military power that they were not going to oppose us or anything. They were just going to bug out and go home.

As a result, when we went to Korea we took all of our stuff with us -- tennis racquets, golf clubs, items that had no military use whatsoever...But when we got to Korea we found out it wasn't quite that way ...


Far from ready

Colonel Harry G. Summers, Jr., (ret.), 24th Infantry Division
1950
Japan

We were as surprised as Stalin and Kim Il Sung at Truman's orders to go into action in Korea. For one thing, we were far from ready. I was then a corporal with the 24th Infantry Division's heavy tank battalion, only one company of which was activated -- and that unit was equipped not with heavy tanks but with M-24 Chaffee light reconnaissance tanks, armed with low-velocity 75mm guns, that proved to be no match for the North Koreans' Soviet-supplied T-34 85mm-gun medium tanks. Also inadequate were the infantry's 2.36-inch anti-tank rocket launchers. Radios did not work properly, and we were critically short of spare parts. Instead of the usual three rifle battalions, the infantry regiments had only two. And our field artillery battalions had only two of their three authorized firing batteries. Although our officers and sergeants were mostly World War II combat veterans, we were truly a "hollow force."

continued.......

[thedrifter]

Invasion:
In the early hours of June 25, 1950, a sleeping South Korea was invaded by 135,000 North Korean troops. With Soviet-designed invasion plans, the well-equipped and well-trained force shocked and overwhelmed the ill-equipped and scattered South Korean army.

Within three days, the North Korean People's Army (NKPA) captured Seoul and effectively destroyed South Korea's army. The American expatriate community -- which included a U.S. military advisory force of 500 -- was caught completely off guard, and forced to evacuate.



Urgent Press

United Press Correspondent Jack James
June 25, 1950
Seoul, Korea

URGENT PRESS UNIPRESS NEW YORK.

25095 JAMES FRAGMENTARY REPORTS EXTHIRTY EIGHT PARALLEL INDICATED NORTH KOREANS LAUNCHED SUNDAY MORNING ATTACKS GENERALLY ALONG ENTIRE BORDER. PARA REPORTS AT ZERO NINE THIRTY LOCAL TIME INDICATED KAESONG FORTY MILES NORTHWEST SEOUL AND HEADQUARTERS OF KOREAN ARMYS FIRST DIVISION FELL NINE AYEM STOP. ENEMY FORCES REPORTED THREE TO FOUR KILOMETERS SOUTH OF BORDER ON ONGJIN PENINSULA STOP. TANKS SUPPOSED BROUGHT INTO USE CHUNCHON FIFTY MILES NORTHEAST SEOUL STOP LANDING EXSEA ALSO REPORTED FROM TWENTY SMALL BOATS BELOW KANGNUNG ON EASTERN COAST WHERE REPORTEDLY OFFCUT HIGHWAY ENDITEM NOTE SHOULD STRESSED THIS STILL FRAGMENTARY AND PICTURE VAGUE.

SYET JAMES.



Disturbing Reports

Ambassador to Korea John Muccio
June 25, 1950
United States Embassy, Seoul, Korea

The morning of the 25th of June, I got a call from my deputy, [Everett Francis] Drumright, just about 8 o'clock, telling me that in the past hour KMAG [U.S. Korean Military Advisory Group] headquarters had been receiving reports from the several units along the front of an onslaught across the 38th parallel. He said he had held up calling me until he could get a better indication of what was really going on. (We had had so many reports of that kind in the two years prior, that it was hard to determine if these were just forays across the 38th parallel or whether it was something beyond that.) And I said, "Well, I'll meet you at the office right away."

I walked over, it was about a five minute walk from the residence to the chancery . . . . On the way over about 8:30, I ran into Bill James of the UP [United Press]. He apparently had had a restless night and was heading toward his office. And he said, "What are you doing stirring at this time of the morning?" It was Sunday morning.

And I said, "Oh, we've had some disturbing reports from activities on the 38th parallel, you might want to look into them."

And went up and Drum and I drafted a telegraphic report to Washington which was very carefully worded because we were not too -- it was not too clear yet just what was going on. But that was the first flash to Washington, which left the Embassy there just after 9:00 on the morning of the 25th (Korean time). Of course that whole day, Sunday, was filled with all kinds of rumors.

Source: Harry S. Truman Presidential Library




Follow-up Cable

United Press Correspondent Jack James
June 25, 1950
Seoul, Korea

PRESS UNIPRESS NEWYORK.

25103 JAMES ADD 25095 REPORTS SAID ATTACKS LAUNCHED IN HEAVY RAIN AFTER MORTAR ARTILLERY BARRAGES WHICH BEGAN FOUR AYEM SUNDAY MORNING STOP. KAESONG WHICH LIES PRACTICALLY ON PARALLEL ONLY MAJOR CITY REPORTEDLY TAKEN STOP. TANKS SUPPOSEDLY BROUGHT INTO PLAY THERE PARA KAESONG ABOUT FIFTY MILES ALONG ONE KOREAS BEST ROADS FROM SEOUL STOP.

MILITARYERS HERE HOWEVER SAID NORTHERN FORCES COULD PROBABLY STOPPED AT IMJIN RIVER WHICH CAN CROSSED BY VEHICLES EITHER ALONG SINGLE RAILWAY BRIDGE OR BY HANDPOWER FERRY PARA THERE APPARENTLY NONO ACTION DIRECTLY NORTH SEOUL AT CHOSONGNI WHICH PROVIDES SHORTEST ROUTE FOR INVASION SUDKOREAN CAPITAL AND IS ONE OF TRADITIONAL ROUTES THROUGHOUT KOREAN HISTORY STOP.

THERE SOME OPINION HERE THAT ATTACKS WHICH BEEN HEAVIEST IN EAST AND WESTERN PORTIONS OF PENINSULA MIGHT BE FEINTS DESIGNED DRAW SUDKOREAN STRENGTH AWAY FROM THIS ROUTE PARA NORTH KOREAS SUPERIOR AIRFORCE NOTNOT USED STOP. WEATHER TOO BAD IF USE INTENDED PARA OBSERVERS SEOUL SAY MAJOR ATTACK THIS TIME NOTNOT IN NORTHS FAVOR STOP. RAINY SEASONS JUST BEGINNING RICE PADDYS ARE FULL WATER ROADS CAN BECOME MORASS MAKING TRANSPORT SUPPLY AND OPERATIONS OF TANKS AND AIRFORCE DIFFICULT TO IMPOSSIBLE PARA STILL NOTNOT CERTAIN WHAT SCOPE OR STRENGTH OF ATTACKS ARE BUT ONE OFFICER SAID QUOTE THIS LOOKS LIKE THE REAL THING UNQUOTE. PARA THERE BEEN NONO UNUSUAL ACTIVITY REPORTED RECENTLY FROM NORTH OF PARALLEL REGARDING TROOP MOVEMENTS OR CONCENTRATIONS SUPPLYS WHICH WOULD INDICATE MAJOR ATTACK STARTING HOWEVER ENDS.

JAMES.



That's against the Charter of the United Nations!

Assistant Secretary of State for U.N. Affairs John Hickerson
June 25, 1950
State Department, Washington, DC

It was Saturday night, I guess about 10 o'clock. In those days night calls weren't unusual. . . . This call was from the watch officer of the Far Eastern Bureau, and said, "There's a development and I think that you would want to come in right away. I can't discuss it on the telephone."

... I thought it obviously was a Far Eastern development, because it was their watch officer who called. Interestingly enough, the thing I thought likeliest was that the Chinese Communists had attempted an invasion of Taiwan.

... Dean Rusk and one or two of his boys and I were the only ones at the time . . . Rusk and I talked it over and decided that obviously the first thing we'd do, while trying to find out what was possible, would be to raise the question in the UN. We put that up to Dean Acheson, and he said it sounded fine, but he wanted to check with the President, who was in Independence, and he did check. . . . And the President approved taking it up with the United Nations. . . .

Senator [Warren Robinson] Austin, was our permanent representative to the UN. I knew that the Senator was out of town, he had gone up to Vermont for the weekend. I knew there was no point in trying to get him and Ernest Gross was his deputy. I had a call put in for Gross' house. He was out for the evening. I left urgent word with one of his daughters to trace him if she knew where he was and have him call immediately. It took a little while. I don't know the age of this girl, and we just couldn't wait. Around midnight I decided that we just couldn't wait and I called Trygve Lie, Secretary General at his home, on the telephone, and told him what had happened. I told him that Gross would be in touch with him as soon as I could reach Gross, but I wanted to alert him, let him know what had happened.

He hadn't heard it, but by that time it was on the radio. He turned on his radio and yes, there it was. I never shall forget, Lie was quite the fellow. I liked him. He, of course, was Norwegian, spoke English very well, but with a pronounced accent. I told him what had happened and his first words were, "My God, Jack, that's against the Charter of the United Nations!" (in a strong Norwegian accent). I couldn't think of anything more original to say than, "You're telling me, Trygve, of course it is!"

Source: Harry S. Truman Presidential Library




Sunday was a very confused day

Ambassador to Korea John Muccio
June 25, 1950
United States Embassy, Seoul, Korea

Sunday was a very confused day and we were mainly spent in trying to find out what was really going on at the front. But by nightfall Sunday it had become evident that it was just a question of time [until Seoul fell]. . . . [W]e got word Sunday morning that they had not only attacked along the whole 38th parallel, but they made two landings on the east coast and that certainly couldn't be dismissed. But my first thought was the women and children. About midnight Sunday night we sent word for them to be ready to move. In the meantime we were checking on vessels that might be available in Pusan or Inchon.

Source: Harry S. Truman Presidential Library



Haven't been so badly upset since Greece and Turkey fell into our lap

President Harry Truman, to Bess Truman
June 26, 1950
Washington, DC

We had a grand trip back once we were in the air . . . . The crowd at the Washington Airport was made up of the Secretaries of State and Defense and Army, Navy, and Air. Had them all up to dinner [at Blair House] at eight . . . . My conference was a most successful one, and there is a chance that things may work out without the necessity of mobilization. Haven't been so badly upset since Greece and Turkey fell into our lap. Let's hope for the best. . . .

Lots and lots of love and many happy returns for the thirty-first year of your ordeal with me. It's been all pleasure for me.

Source: Harry S. Truman Presidential Library



continued.....

[thedrifter]

American Civilians Arrive in Japan

Clarence Mehlhaff, 24th Division, 63rd Field Artillery, Camp Okata, Japan
July 5, 1950
Fukuoka, Japan

At that time, when this broke, the KMAG people from Korea and their dependents, they were coming into Camp Okata. They coming in by plane and by boat out of Pusan ... They were landing at Itazuke Air Base, which was the other side of Fukuoka. They were coming up into our compound. We had to feed them, and we used all the men that we had on the post to ship them out, get them on the trains with their luggage. They took them up to Tokyo or Yokohama, one or the other, and they shipped them a lot of them back home. Because they were all civilians.

Then, we had to get out of our Quonset huts, because those people had to sleep in there, and it was right in the monsoon. Everything was wet and rainy, and we were out in the pasture in pup tents and squad tents, until it finally broke and lightened up and the sun came out, and then we got aboard two LSTs which they brought in from Fukuoka. Dropped the anchor out aways and then they rammed it up on the sand, and that's how we loaded up everything. There was two LSTs ... one was the 63rd and the other was ... the 52nd.




Task Force Smith:

General MacArthur intended Task Force Smith as "an arrogant display" of American military power. Numbering only 540 troops, most with little training and no combat experience, Task Force Smith was destroyed by NKPA troops who commanded a considerable advantage in numbers and armor.
For the next month, NKPA troops crushed small and inadequately prepared American troops and forced their retreat south. Despite the shocking losses of both men and morale, the U.S. contingent bought sufficient time for a troop buildup around the port of Pusan in the southeastern corner of the peninsula.



A funny noise coming down the road

Clarence Mehlhaff, 24th Division, 63rd Field Artillery
July 1950
South of Taejon

This buddy of mine and myself, we finally jumped out of the truck. I was so tired. It's hard to explain what you just went through -- of all the firing and that, and not getting hit. Everybody in the truck was shooting into the buildings and whoever was in the buildings was shooting at you. Once we got out of town, my buddy and I, we jumped off the truck because I couldn't go no more. I was so tired and I just wanted to go to sleep. I laid down behind a tree ... we laid down and fell asleep. It was around four o'clock when we heard a funny noise coming down the road, which woke us up. It was a 12 ton wrecker, an Army wrecker. They were coming out of Taejon also. It had big pipes on, and was making a lot of noise. The guy stopped, and he said, "Do you guys want a ride?" I said, "Yea, where are you going to?" He said, "Well, we're going to have to get out of here because the enemy is coming in the back here, they're probably 4 miles from here." So, we got on that wrecker and we took off . The next thing, we were back on the other side of the Naktong River...

The company I was in had lost everything, had lost probably -- I would estimate -- three quarters of their men. So we stayed on the riverbank until we got some more supplies. Then we were shipped down to Mayang.



Battle of Osan: They told us to get out of there

Clarence Mehlhaff, 24th Division, 63rd Field Artillery, Camp Okata, Japan
July 5, 1950
Osan

Took us 12 hours to get to Pusan. From Pusan, they put us on flat cars. From there, we left and we went to Taejon. When we got to Taejon, we had to get all of our equipment off the train, off the flat cars, and we had to move the vehicles up the road until we got up the next morning, which was on the 5th of July, to Osan.

That's where we put in two howitzers on the side of the roads, artillery howitzers. Some of us, I believe it was Wilson and myself, with two other guys -- the first sergeant gave us the bags of bazooka shells and the bazooka to go out a couple of hundred yards out in the front to see if and when the tanks were coming and if there was any infantry out there. We spent half a day out there until we got called back. The infantry was coming back at the same time. They told us to get out of there because they couldn't hold three division of North Koreans.

So we came back to a little village which had a school house. We spent the night at the school house. The next day, we moved on to P'yong Tek. That's where the real battle really started, Pyong Tek. We lost ten men the first night; they were FO [forward observer] parties. We moved back, we kept moving back because we couldn't hold them, until we got to the Kung river. We set up there. We were in that position three days, firing our howitzers. I'll tell you, they were hot. Not only the howitzers were hot -- the guys were all hot because the temperature was 120 degrees, and in fox holes and all that. We were there three days.

And then the enemy came across. The infantry could not hold because they had lost so many men already ... All the guys got slaughtered that way. This is why they started after us, being the artillery. We didn't know they were coming at us until it was too late. They hit us on two sides. Like I said, I was a machine gunner that day. I had two other guys with me. It was like an outpost. The guys across, over on the other hill -- it wasn't really a hill, it was just a bank, where the water flowed past the side of them there -- they had a hole dug there to set up their machine gun. That's where they hit those guys over there, when they swept around the whole company. When they hit, it wiped out quite a bit. They hit not only the howitzers; all the ammunition trucks were blowing up at the same time. It killed some of our men, and also it was killing the enemy. Because they really had come in too close. They threw mortars in and they blew up all the trucks. They went through A Battery and B Battery, and Headquarters; part of Headquarters and Service got out better than A and B Batteries. Because they had a better chance of getting out from where they were at.

... Col. Dawson was battalion commander at that time. The day before this happened, he got blood poisoning in his hand or something. They evacuated him, and Col. Dressler took over the battalion. When we got hit, he jumped into a foxhole and there was another corporal that jumped in from his CP right behind him. They both got killed in that battle.



So famous and distinguished a soldier

Syngman Rhee, President of South Korea
July 14, 1950
Pusan, Korea

Dear General MacArthur:

In view of the common military effort of the United Nations on behalf of the Republic of Korea, in which all military forces, land, sea and air, of all the United Nations fighting in or near Korea have been placed under your operational command, and in which you have been designated Supreme Commander United Nations Forces, I am happy to assign to you command authority over all land, sea, and air forces of the Republic of Korea during the period of the continuation of the present state of hostilities. Such command to be exercised either by you personally or by such military commander or commanders to whom you may delegate the exercise of this authority within Korea or in adjacent seas.

The Korean Army will be proud to serve under your command, and the Korean people and Government will be equally proud and encouraged to have the overall direction of our combined combat effort in the hands of so famous and distinguished a soldier who also in his person possesses the delegated military authority of all the United Nations who have jointed together to resist this infamous communist assault on the independence and integrity of our beloved land.

With continued highest and warmest feelings of personal regard,


Sincerely yours,
Syngman Rhee

continued.......

[thedrifter]

Battle of Taejon: We had no leader

Clarence Mehlhaff, 24th Division, 63rd Field Artillery
July 19-20, 1950
Taejon

After we left there we walked to Nan Sang that night. We got in about 1:30 or 2:00 o'clock in the morning. We met some of these other guys that had also fled, from the different companies. We all stayed there overnight, got some sleep and everything. Next day we went back out again with one howitzer. This is when we went into the Battle of Taejon.

Lt. Lombardi was in charge of that howitzer, and he took it as far as Taejon. From that time I got put into service company because they had more bodies than equipment. So I was in service company for two or three days. We'd load ammunition in trucks, and they'd haul it to the airstrip, the Taejon airstrip. C rations and things like that. ... On the night of the 19th of July the enemy brought in three tanks and they were set right up at the Y. Anything that would go by there, they would shoot them.

So, they had to knock out those tanks. That was the first time they had the 3.5 bazookas ... We had the small one, the 2.36. We'd call them "little stovepipes." It couldn't stop the tanks like that ...

We spent the 19th and the 20th in Taejon. It was on the 19th when we pulled in there around 2 o'clock in the afternoon...The next morning we were going out to the airstrip to deliver rations and ammunition, and there was one truck and a jeep that went out. There was a colonel and his driver. When they got up to the Y, that's when they got blasted by an enemy tank and it killed both of them. The one coming behind that had all the rations and ammunition was following them. There was a major and his driver in that truck going out to the airstrip. That also got blown up. The major made it back -- I don't even know his name -- and he said we have to move out of here, we have to get out of this compound, because they've got the T blocked up there with three tanks.

So we picked up our gear and everything; we had nine trucks. Some had ammunition, a few rations. Instead of turning to the right to go back the way they had gone, we went the other way, trying to get past. We just got out of town a little ways. There was a small steam running on the side of the road. We had stopped there because we didn't know which way to go. There were 3 enemy tanks coming up from the south with about 200 troops behind them. So we didn't know which way to go.

When this major got back, he was wounded .. he wanted to be left there. He said, "Won't you guys just leave all the trucks here and everything, and take off walking." He gave us a direction to the northeast. A lot of the guys didn't want to leave the trucks. We didn't know where we were going to. We had no leader. The leader was laying underneath the truck in the shade. He had dysentery really bad and he was wounded, and he didn't want to live anymore.

So a couple of guys went out to see what was in front, and what was on the side ... They had already moved in to the place we just left. We decided that we would throw the howitzer ammunition in the river -- so that's what we did. Everybody got into the trucks, laid down on the floor on each side, firing on each side as we went through town. We lost one truck, the lead truck. We had to push him into a house -- rammed the back and pushed him into a building. And we took off again and we got out of town, got out of Taejon.



Blew My Pants Bottom Out

Harley Coon, National President of the Korean War Veterans Association, Ohio Veterans Hall of Fame
August 1950
No Gun Ri

We set up a defensive position at Nogeun-ri in August 1950. There were about 30 troops marching into Nogeun-ri. I don't remember anyone just shooting civilians. We took weapons from civilians and considered them guerrillas if they had the weapons. We let the civilians through. We were operating with only about two-thirds of our company at that point. We took F Company hill and five of our guys were killed by artillery.

During one battle, I hadn't bloused my pant legs, probably part of the rebellion still in my nature. An artillery shell landed close by me. I saw arms and legs and other body parts flying all around me. I felt the blast of the repercussion from the shell landing as my leg hairs were singeing. I was pretty lucky. The only thing that happened to me was that the force of the repercussion blew my pants bottom out. I often wonder what would have happened if I'd had the pant legs bloused.

Source: Department of Defense



Defense of Pusan:

After a demoralizing progression of defeat and retreat, American forces found themselves trapped in the southeastern corner of Korea. But the tide was changing. UN troops and materiel were flowing through the port of Pusan, and the NKPA has stretched its resources too far.

Gen. Walton Walker deftly coordinated the Pusan Perimeter defense line against a six-week relentless assault by the NKPA. Facing total defeat, American troops held the line.


Keep the enemy awake

Lloyd Childers
July and August 1950
Itazuke Air Field, Japan

The problem when we first arrived there in the area was that the situation in Korea had gotten rather desperate. The North Koreans had pushed the Americans and South Korean troops into what was called the Pusan Perimeter, which wasn't very big at the time we got there.

So, at first, we didn't have a mission. We sat at Otomi, waiting to be ordered to do something. The thing that put us into action as quickly as we got there was that there was an Air force night fighter squadron already flying out of Itazuke. Itazuke is located on the Japanese side of what they call, I believe, the Pusan Channel. Pusan, Korea, on one side, and Itazuke, Japan, on the other.

What happened to this Air Force Squadron was because the weather was so bad, the CO of the squadron volunteered to try to fly some support missions in spite of the bad weather. He risked his life to get in, under the weather, to provide some support. He saw a column of trucks going down the road. He thought they were enemy, he strafed them, killed a bunch of them, and they happened to be Americans.

So he was relieved of his command, and his squadron was pulled out of combat quickly. That gave us an opportunity to move in because all of the sudden there's a need for a night fighter squadron...That's the way we operated for a while: out of Itazuke, flying missions in the Pusan perimeter area.

Most of the missions that I flew in that area were "hecklers," where we would go up at night and drone around. If we knew that we were in enemy territory, we would drop a bomb or do some strafing. I think the primary mission of a heckler designated flight was to keep the enemy awake. It was interesting to watch whenever we would fly toward an area -- we knew when they heard our airplane engine because the lights would start to go out. And the whole area would become dark. This we did for -- I don't know how long -- a few weeks. The situation changed drastically because of the Inchon landing in September.



continued........

[thedrifter]

The high water mark of the North Korean invasion

Logan "Fightin' Preacher" Weston (Colonel (ret.), at the time a Captain)
August 3, 1950
Western flank of Pusan Perimeter

3 August 1950 is a date many historians designate as the high water mark of the North Korean invasion launched 25 June 1950. Never again was victory so close. Much hard fighting was yet to come, but the tide had turned. My role in that event was a result of my many combat experiences against the Japanese in WWII. I had learned my profession as a combat soldier in the battles of Guadalcanal and Starvation Ridge on the island on New Georgia. Volunteering for "a dangerous and hazardous mission," I participated in the drive to open, from India across Burma, the Burma Road into China. This involved a regimental sized unit campaigning as a long range penetration unit behind enemy lines. It became known as Merrill's Marauders in lieu of the unwieldy Army designation of 5307 Composite Unit (Provisional). As platoon leader of the 3d Bn Intelligence and Reconnaissance Platoon I had many opportunities to renew my faith in the Lord as he guided my spirit and sheltered my soul. I learned that God not only wants us to put forth our best effort, but He also wants us to place our trust in Him.

That August day, our regiment was located at Masan, on the western flank of the Pusan Perimeter near the southern tip of Korea. The regimental commander had set up his HQ and aid station in a small schoolhouse, concentrating a Bn of his troops, his motor pool, tanks, medics, mortars and signal company in the school yard. My company, Able/27/25, had been ordered to patrol to Chinju, 23 miles to the west. We had done so, encountering scattered resistance. Reaching Chinju, we were ordered to return at once as an enemy column was reported moving south. We would be cut off if we did not return at once. My men were bone tired when we got back to the schoolyard CP. We were told not to dig in as we would soon be moving. My men bedded down on the southern slope of a long ridge over looking the school house. Uneasy about the situation, I could not sleep. I decided to climb the ridge, closer to the stars and to the Lord for inspiration to calm my uneasy spirit. My radio operator was at my side in accordance with army protocol. "Where the commander is, his radio operator is also."

As daylight dawned, my vigil of contemplation was interrupted by movement to the north. A long column of men, 76 by count, was on the road marching toward us, led by a farmer in white clothing. I told my radioman to contact the CP. He could raise no response. I sent him down with a message. He came back with the reply that it was probably a South Korean unit. I still didn't like the looks of the situation, nor did I like the looks of the Arasaki rifles they carried, topped with the long bayonet of the Japanese which I recalled from WWII experience. I sent my RTO down to the CP again. He returned again, same reassuring message. Still unsure, I sent him down for a third time. Same result. The farmer in white held out his hand to the column leader. The column broke into a line of skirmishers and began to swarm up the hill and onto a higher ridge to my right. Those in front began firing, I took a bullet in the right thigh. They sure were not South Koreans. As I returned fire, I yelled at my RTO to go down and get the company up here on the ridge. He left running. As they arrived, singly and in bunches, I placed them in skirmish line positions to return fire. The company aid men put a temporary compress on my thigh wound, told me it looked really bad, and to get down to the aid station pronto. I was so busy, the situation so desperate, that I delayed until more men arrived and were placed in position to repel the attack. I was standing erect in firing position when I heard Sgt Brown, one of the platoon sergeants, ask where I wanted his men. I looked down. He was prone, his head between my feet. A burst of MG fire from the ridge to the right shattered the stock of my rifle and tore into my right arm.

I knew I was bleeding badly as I began to feel a bit faint. I was aware that the bleeding must be stopped or I would be useless. I told Sgt Brown to take over, but when I looked at him he was dead, his head burst like a ripe melon. He had been hit by MG fire. I told another NCO to take over, and stumbled down to the aid station where the medics put compression bandages on me. On my way back up the hill I noticed a box of 24 frag grenades. I could not lift the box, so I dragged it uphill with my good arm. As I got there, I saw North Korean soldiers setting up a machine gun. I pulled the pins of two grenades with my teeth, and then with my left hand, one after another, lobbed the grenades. They were effective.

Gathering a dozen or so men from another platoon in my company, I went to the left flank and made a wide sweep, counterattacking the enemy on his right flank. I was hit a third time, this time in the right chest. We rolled them up, pushing them into the fires of the other platoons and eliminated their threat to the Regimental CP and its jammed schoolyard. From our new position, I could hear truck tailgates slamming. The rattle of equipment sounded as if a whole battalion were offloading from their transport. The sound came from just beyond the paddy where I had first noticed the 76 man column break out into their skirmish line. My RTO was able to establish communication with the 4.2 mortar company. We directed mortar fire onto the enemy. I learned later while in the hospital in Pusan that we had eliminated approximately 400 North Koreans and destroyed several of their trucks with our timely fire direction to the mortars. That number included the 27 enemy dead found at my personal positions and accredited to my actions, five of whom had died in hand-to-hand combat as they assaulted my position. With the breakup of the attack, it was time to take stock of the situation. Satisfied that my company's 23 wounded were being tended and evacuated to the aid station, it was time for me to take care of myself. For the second time, but this time with help of my men, I stumbled down to the aid station. They again bandaged me, said I needed surgical attention, and evacuated me to MASH in Pusan.

As they loaded me into the ambulance, I realized from the thud of bullets ripping into the thin metal of the ambulance that the battle had subsided, but was not yet over. Holes that let in daylight appeared. Nothing vital was hit. We soon sped out of range. I thanked the generosity of our Lord in sparing my life and giving me the strength to do my duty ... From Mash to Pusan, I was sent to Tokyo for additional surgery, then to Sendai for convalescence. I rejoined my regiment, "The Wolfhounds," 59 days later in Korea.

Source: Courtesy Artwork Publications, Korean Vignettes, Faces of War



Our mountain was their objective — seize and hold at all cost

Donald "Red" Krause, Captain (at the time, a 1st Lt)
September 3, 1950
Southern end of Pusan Perimeter

On 3 September 1950, the 5th Regimental Combat Team was anchoring the southern end of the Pusan Perimeter ... The North Korean 4th and 6th Divisions were in the area. We later learned from prisoners that our mountain was their objective -- seize and hold at all cost. Their approach to our positions was from the west and northwest. They had begun their attack earlier by sending North Korean soldiers infiltrating up the mountainside at night using balls of string to establish routes for the main attack to follow. During the several nights it took to accomplish the mission, the scouts would remain motionless during the day when movement could be spotted. They would continue their stealthy advance the next night.

G Company established defense positions, primarily 2 man foxholes. Like most rifle companies, we were under strength. The few replacements we received were poorly trained. We had occupied these positions for about one week with very little activity in our area. This unfortunately led to a laxness on the part of our troops, especially at night. The NCOs were diligent in their effort to maintain a strict guard, but it was not effective with our green replacements. We were all to pay the price. At dawn 4 September, elements of North Korean troops began their "Banzai" attack. They overran many of our 2 man foxholes on the perimeter. Many were caught asleep. The North Koreans kept coming, like the Charge of the Light Brigade -- without horses. My CP was on the back side of the position so that we could maintain communication with our 2nd Bn. With me, so that I could control their support, were the Forward Observers for the 555th FA and our HM Company. Our casualties were heavy. Some of our troops began to waver, some broke and ran. At this point SFC Fred Knowlton and I began to organize a counterattacking force with the few men of company headquarters and those men who had "bugged out" and been halted in flight. We numbered 27 men as we began our assault up hill. With the very able support of the HM FO, an NCO who did a brilliant job of bringing mortar fire onto the enemy about to overwhelm us, we were able to initiate a devastating counterattack which finally retook our positions.

The counterattack was not of classic military mold. It used men who a few minutes before had been running, and also men who had been wounded, but who summoned up grit and determination to add their support to those of us who were not.

Source: Courtesy Artwork Publications, Korean Vignettes, Faces of War

Sempers,

Roger