Weapons Lube Issued by Army May be Costing Lives in Iraq

[thedrifter]

Weapons Lube Issued by Army May be Costing Lives in Iraq

By Jim Hoffer
(New York-WABC, November 18, 2003) — In a four-month investigation that reaches from the sands of Iraq to the halls of the Pentagon, we found that weapons given to tens of thousands of U.S. soldiers may not work in the desert. All because of a defective product.

And it could be putting American troops at risk. The Investigators' Jim Hoffer is here with his findings.

The key to surviving any war is to have a weapon that works. To that end a good, reliable gun lubricant is critical.

But our investigation has found that a lubricant supplied by the military may be actually causing guns to jam. What's worse, soldiers say they were blocked from getting a better lubricant at a time when they needed it the most.

A Purple Heart does little to heal the aching heart of a mother who's lost her son to war.

Arlene Walters, Mother: "He was conscientious about everything."

Sgt. Donald Walters was in the same convoy as Private Jessica Lynch when Iraqis ambushed it, killing Walters and 10 other soldiers. A Pentagon report on the attack shows that many of the soldiers could barely fight back because of multiple "weapons malfunctions."

Pfc. Jessica Lynch: "When we were told to lock and load. That's when my weapon jammed."

The report suggests their weapons failed perhaps because of "inadequate individual maintenance". In other words, the Army says that the soldiers may have neglected to clean their guns.

Arlene Walters: "That shouldn't happen to everybody. It seems that it's a fault of something that they are using not the fault of the soldier that he didn't clean the gun."

Ret. Lt. Col. Robert Kovacic, Firearms Trainer: "They would stop and jam."

Kovacic, a retired lieutenant colonel who trained thousands of soldiers for the Iraqi invasion, says this grieving mother's suspicions are right on target.

Ret. Lt. Col. Robert Kovacic: "Those weapons if properly lubricated will work better than anybody else's. But they have to be properly lubricated, CLP is not the proper lubrication."

Col. Kovacic contacted Eyewitness News outraged that the military was equipping soldiers with a government-issued lubricant known as CLP.

Ret. Lt. Col. Robert Kovacic: "It didn't work when I was a tank commander and it's not working now."

Eyewitness News obtained a copy of a general's "lessons learned" report which details weapons performance in Iraq. The report says soldiers repeatedly stated that "CLP was not a good choice for weapon's maintenance", claiming it "attracted sand to the weapon."

We heard similar complaints about the lubricant from some New Jersey Marine reservists back from Iraq:

Corporal Steven Gentle, Montclair NJ: "I used it as little as possible.

Jim Hoffer: "You used it as little as possible? Why?"

Corporal Steven Gentle: "Because the CLP attracted the sand. It made the sand stick to the weapon and clot up, causing the weapon to jam."

In telephone conversations and e-mails from soldiers we heard numerous complaints about CLP. One sergeant told me it is a commonly known fact that the military-issued gun lubricant doesn't work in the desert. We've learned that some soldiers have been so desperate for a lubricant that works they're writing their families for help.

Art Couchman, Father [reading from letter]: "'Dad, that Militec is working great!' ..."

Art Couchman sent his son, a soldier in Iraq, a commercial lubricant called Militec. A firearms trainer for police in New York, Couchman became quite concerned when his son told him that the military-issued lubricant attracted dirt and sand to his gun. That's when Couchman sent him bottles of Militec.

In a recent letter, his son thanks his dad for the shipment of Militec, calling the lube, "pretty amazing stuff."

Art Couchman: "I think it could probably save some lives if they had more of this stuff."

Even that "lessons learned" report put out by the Pentagon states that soldiers considered "Militec to be a much better solution for lubricating weapons" than the military's CLP.

And now many are questioning why just as the war began, the military cancelled all troop orders for Militec.

Brad Giordani, Militec: "They were unable to get the product after the orders were cancelled."

The commercial lubricant's inventor says he knows why. Because the military invested millions of dollars developing CLP, Brad Giordani says Army bureaucrats feared their product would be outshined.

Brad Giordani: "(The orders) were cancelled by civilians within the Defense Department that realized our orders were getting to be such large quantities that if they would have allowed these orders to go through we would now be the standard lubricant within the army."

The Army declined an interview but in a statement to U.S. admits that in the middle of the war, it stopped filling orders for Militec. It doesn't explain why.

The Army says Militec is now available, and further states that because of "mixed reports on the performance ... of lubricants" it plans to "rapidly evaluate ... and test" various products for possible future use.

Colonel Kovacic says Militec is already proven in desert combat. And as long as CLP remains the government product of choice, he says, then that's what most troops will get, leaving the better lube on the shelf and soldiers lives on the line.

Ret. Lt. Col. Robert Kovacic: "There's a better product. I say we give the kids the best we can give them. I'm telling you CLP is not the best weapons lubricant, they even said that in a report."

For nearly seven months, the military blocked soldier's orders for the rival Militec. Only in October, in the middle of our investigation, did the Army again begin to fill orders for Militec.

http://abclocal.go.com/wabc/news/inv...03gunlube.html


Sempers,

Roger

[mrbsox]

What ever happened to LSA ??

[kentmitchell]

They could try this--http://www.bernies-sports.com/specials/ballistol.html. Damn stuff works miracles.

[greensideout]

I've used the CLP on many different weapons with very good results?

The key to that lube is to totally dry (remove) the lube when the weapon is clean, but that is true with all weapon lubes.

Maybe the training is lacking and some troops are not drying their weapons. If true, it doesn't matter what they use.

[greybeard]

I''d be curious to see a comparison between the different units as far as how much jamming each is having. Both the Marines, and the Army's 3rd Inf seemed to have few problems, compared to the smaller units, such as the now infamous 507th maint Co. I believe it is more the fault of the individual units-either never recieving or just not sticking with their training re weapons maintenance. Specifically non infantry Army uinits. To be honest, I can't remember the name of the lube we used in 1970, but I never had any weapon jam on me. BUT, I kept the 60, the 50 cal and my 16 clean-every day!.38 sidearm? well, I was less conscientious about that thing. As far as I was concerned it only had to fire one round. Obviously, itt never came to that. I ran across a purported 'blind test' involving militec and CLP. It may well be biased toward militec tho. Take it for what it's worth folks.

http://www.militec1.com/histresstest1.html

I would be interested also, to know exactly what company makes CLP. Anyone know?

[greensideout]

graybeard,

The first time that I used CLP was in the mid 80's. I don't know when it was first issued, but have not heard these complaints about it before. It's been around for a long time.

[montana]

my m14 never jamed in nam wether in sand or mud LSA worked great....dont remember m16s of the other grunts jaming eather....iff it wored why did they have to change it

[greybeard]

Montana-like myself, you arrived in Vietnam after they fixed the m16 jamming problem. As now, the first to be blamed was improper cleaning methods. They did some work in the buffer, and a couple other things, but that did not help. The problem was fixed, but it had little to do with the rifle or the people using it. I haven't considered it before, but perhaps the old problem has returned due to the large numbers of combat deployed troops world wide, resulting in a huge increase in the of M-16 used-as well as large amts of ammo expended. If this turns out to be the case-a lot of apologies are due, including some from me.
Lemme find the link to explain what the actual problem was back in '66.

[greensideout]

The first M-16s did not have the forward assist to stuff the round into a hot, (reduced size) chamber, so they had "failure to feed"----a jambed weapon. With the M1/M14 you simply hit the bolt handle with the heel of your hand.

[greybeard]

True GSO-I knew that, but had forgotten it.
I've got problems with understanding how a chamber shrinks when hot. Most tubulars expand when heated, both in length and inside/outside diameter, but there's a lot I don't understand in the world
I can't find the link I was looking for, but read it just a couple of days ago. Written by a retired Army Gen, The gist of it is, and I'm writting this from a nearly used up memory:

The original m-16's pretty well worked as advertised at first introduction, except for the 'cleaning not needed in the field' concept. When the rifles began jamming in the mid 60's, 66 I believe the article said, the blame was directed at the users, not keeping them clean enough. Extraction problems, which of course resulted in feed problems. Several 'fixes' were implemented but failed to help much. The culprit turned out to be the ammo, specifically, the powder. There was a huge surplus of powder, ball powder, from artillery rounds I believe it said. Against the rifle makers advice, the US military decided to use up this powder, in ammo for the 16. It burned 'dirty' and at higher temps, which resulted in swelling of the casing, and fouling of the chamber. The Army was forced into an investigation by congressional members, and discovered the ammo problem. It was quietly taken care of by switching to the type powder the manufactorer recommended in the 1st place. This didn't become public knowledge for years.

I'm wondering if the DOD hasn't let the low bidder get by with some bad powder again. Having read about several instances of soldiers in Iraq having to use the cleaning rod to dislodge the empty brass, it seems once again there is an extraction/feed problem, resulting in a fine weapon being a single shot capability only. he one that comes to mind is one of the surviving 507th maint co, that pinned down an Iraqi mortar crew, firing one shot @ a time.

[mrbsox]

From memory also, and NOT my direct experience.

There is an article somewhere, or History channel, stating that Colt recommended chrome plating the chambers, which the Govt. rejected. It would have cost an additional $1.25 per rifle I think.

That was one one the final fixes, which makes sense to me, with the dirty powder.

Also, I remember having a 'well used A1 version in '76, not early 80's as is printed in the other thread about doing away with the 16.

Terry

[greensideout]

graybeard,

You are right about the chamber medal expanding when it gets hot, but think about what that tube is doing. The OD gets larger and the ID gets smaller as the thickness of the medal grows. Hope that helps.

Interesting about the powder, that would explain alot.

[greybeard]

My profile sez machinist. I know what a tube does when it heats up. Ever had to put a bushing on something-or a bearing with a shrink fit, of say .003? You heat them up a litttle, they expand a few thousanths, and you drop slip them on the shaft. When they cool down, they're on for eternity and you either have to cut them off or heat them up to remove them. I guarantee, no matter how thick or thin-both the id and the od expand. I've done it on bushings for shafts as large a 6"dia and as small as .125 dia.(1/8") But, this is getting off subject.

Never did find the exact page I saw the other day, but I found plenty more nearly as detailed.

"Eugene Stoner, a WWII Marine, was the designer of the AR-15 and at the time he worked for Armalite. He also designed the AR-10, AR-16, AR-18, and Stoner 63 rifles. “AR” stood for Armalite Rifle. He was originally working on a 7.62mm version of the AR-15 called the AR-10 in 1955-56. It failed Infantry board tests against the M-14 and FN-FAL prototypes. CONARC (Continental Army Command) put out a spec in 1957 for a .22 cal lightweight rifle. Eugene Stoner then scaled down his AR-10 to create the AR-15 in .223 cal. in 1957. The weapon was a ground breaking design making the first use of Aerospace aluminum and plastics on a rifle. He first designed the cartridge by slightly modifying the civilian .222 Remington Magnum cartridge. He loaded it with IMR (Improved Military Round) powder and used a 1 turn in 14 in twist to stabilize the 55 grain bullet.

Colt acquired the AR-15 from Armalite in 1959. They immediately began to try to sell it to the US Military. Around 1960-61 the Army bought a few to send over to Vietnam for evaluation with SF and advisors to ARVN with the intent that it would make an excellent rifle for the small statured Vietnamese. Really enthusiastic reports came back from SF personnel and advisors. The high velocity (3,250 ft/sec) round would cause horrific wounds at close range because the bullet usually fragmented inside the body. There were even reports of blowing entire limbs off of VC at close range.

Around 1962, Colt showed the rifle to USAF Gen. Curtis Le May and Sec. Of Defense Robert McNamara. At the time Gen. Le May was looking for a replacement for the aging M-1 and M-2 carbines that the USAF security forces used. The USAF bought 50,000 AR-15s and type classified it the “M-16”. During arctic testing, the USAF requested and received a change to the rifling to 1 turn in 12 in. from the 1 turn in 14 in. originally used. This was because in cold weather, the 1 turn in 14 in. twist was not enough to stabilize the bullet for sufficient accuracy using cartridges loaded with ball propellant. The US military had started loading 5.56mm cartridges with ball propellant instead of the IMR powder the cartridge and gun was designed around. This later caused many large problems in Vietnam.

Around this same time Sec. Of Defense Mc Namara closed down the US Army's Springfield Arsenal due to their gross mismanagement of the whole M-14 rifle program. They basically had spent over 15 years and many hundreds of millions of dollars to come up with a slightly product improved M-1 Garand that could not be built with existing M-1 Garand tooling as originally promised. So in 1963, with M-14 production discontinued and M-14s in very short supply, Mc Namara ordered the US Army to buy 300,000 M-16 rifles. Starting in 1963, the US Army began issuing ball propellant loaded 5.56mm ammunition to units while allowing Colt to continue acceptance testing their finished rifles at the factory with IMR loaded ammunition.

The Army’s light Infantry began receiving the rifles in 1964. SF, the 82nd ABN, the 101st ABN, the 173d ABN, and the 1st Cavalry (Airmobile) were issued this first order of 300,000 rifles. The 82nd had M-16s during Operation Power Pack in Santa Domingo in early ’65. The main problems with the M-16 were caused by the US Army and how it rushed the M-16 into combat. First and foremost they changed the cartridge propellant from IMR to ball propellant without asking Colt, Armalite, or Eugene Stoner before doing so. Secondly they issued the rifles without cleaning kits for them. Thirdly they trained soldiers in boot camp with the M-14 and then handed them an M-16 when they first arrived in Vietnam. (Greybeard can attest to this firsthand)

The weapon was originally designed around IMR because it burns much quicker and cleaner than ball propellant. This was important because of the weapons unique gas system which routed propellant gasses throughout the mechanism of the rifle. The ball propellant burned much slower and as a result was still burning when it reached the bolt and bolt carrier. This resulted in unwanted and unplanned for carbon fouling. To make matters worse, the US Army was loading ball propellant with calcium at the time as an additive to help lube machingun barrels to make them last loner during automatic fire. This calcium also fouled up the mechanism. Another unwanted side effect of the ball propellant was that it increased the cyclic rate from 700 rpm to over 1,000 rpm. This caused parts to break. The only real deficiency in the rifle itself was that it lacked a chrome plated bore and chamber and this caused rust which caused cartridges to stick in chambers in the humid climate in Vietnam. The technology to chrome plate a .223 bore did not yet exist. The US Army later developed the technology to do this.

Late in 1965, after some leg units were experiencing difficulties with the M-16, Colt sent over a contact team to find out why the rifle was failing and to recommend changes to the rifle. The largest problems they found in units having problems were lack of cleaning kits, lack of training, and lack of discipline in cleaning the rifles regularly. The elite units in Vietnam were still having relatively few problems with the rifle. As a result of this trip several changes were recommended for the rifle. The US Army for some reason did not want to go back to IMR loaded cartridges so changes to the rifle had to be made. However they did remove the calcium additive from the ball propellant.

The first thing that was done was the issuing cleaning kits for the rifle and a large training campaign on how to clean and care for the rifle in the field. Then the following changes were made to the rifle:

1) The bore and chamber were hard chrome plated
2) The buffer assembly was made heavier for use with ball powder
3) A forward assist handle was added to manually close the bolt
4) The 3 prong flash suppressor was changed to the bird cage style because soldiers were warping the 3 prong design by breaking the bands on C-rat cases with them.
5) Trap door buttstock with room for cleaning kit.

This product improved M16 was released as the XM-16E1 early in 1966. This rifle was later type classified the M16A1 in 1967 and became limited Army standard. In 1971 it became worldwide Army Standard. In 1967-68, the US Marine Corps adopted the M16A1. Also in 67-68, the US Congress had a congressional query into the problems with the M16 in Vietnam. What they had to say about the Army’s handling of the M-16 rifle program was not nice. They accused the US Army of gross negligence just short of criminal negligence and wondered if the rest of US Army programs were that FUBAR and mismanaged."

Rather than post another lengthy report, I'll just post the link to this one.

http://jdumong.net/delta/m-16Part2.htm

[digger]

Gotta agree with greybeard on the expanding metal thing. A heated cylinder will expand in thickness, ID, and OD (my background is mechanical engineering).
I don't recall the problem being after starting to fire, I thought the problem was just chambering the first round. That kinda makes sense too because that's when the chamber would be smallest.
I remember opening C-rat crates with the 3 prong suppressor too, you had to rotate the right way or it would unthread. Never saw before that the barrel suppressor change was due to that, I always thought it was to minimize the chance of getting mud stuck in the barrel.

[TheJester]

The question I would ask during this whole situation is why is the Army, out of all the Armed Forces that use the M-16, The only one who is complaining?

I know the Marines were in the same sand at the same time, using similar gear and weapons. How come we have no Marines that will facilitate this claim?

I'm only a boot but I would guess, just as stated above, that the fault is in the training, not the weapon.