thedrifter
09-08-03, 10:27 PM
Tactical Lessons for Peacekeeping: U.S. Multinational Force in Beirut 1982-1984.
Author: Major Ronald F. Baczkowski, USMC
Research Question: Were the Marine Amphibious Units (MAUs) employed in Beirut, Lebanon from August 1982 to February 1984 properly trained, equipped, and organized to conduct peacekeeping operations? If so, were there tactical reasons for the 24th MAU's failure? What are the tactical lessons learned for future peacekeeping forces?
Discussion:
The U.S. Multinational Force (USMNF) operated in Beirut, Lebanon from 25 August 1982 to 26 February 1984. During this period four different MAUs served as peacekeepers. The USMNF was initially successful; but, as the strategic and tactical situations changed, the peacekeepers came increasingly under fire. On 23 October 1983, a lone terrorist destroyed the headquarters building of BLT 1/8, killing 241 Marines and sailors and wounding over 100 others.
This study examines the tactical situation and how it changed. It analyzes how the training before employment may have assisted or prevented the tactical-level forces from operating effectively. It examines both positive and negative lessons learned through critical analysis. It provides many details concerning the actual tactical situation so the reader can conduct his or her own critical analysis and come to their own conclusions.
Conclusions:
MAUs can be used in peacekeeping operations if the mission is carefully defined, the situation is fairly constant, and the operation is relatively short duration. By extension to their modern equivalents, forward-deployed and rapid-deployment combat forces can also be used in peacekeeping operations under the same conditions. These type forces have the equipment, personnel, and discipline required to conduct short duration peacekeeping operations.
However, peacekeeping operations are normally decentralized and are conducted in a constantly changing environment over a long duration. Under these conditions, forward-deployed units lack the specialized training and education necessary to conduct peacekeeping operations. Combat forces, which are not trained in peacekeeping theory and tactics, are restricted to operate in a predictible set-piece pattern as directed by their higher headquarters. This pattern creates a vulnerability in the peacekeeping force that can be exploited by parties hostile to the force. Additionally, when faced with unfamiliar stressful situations combat forces, which are not specially trained for peacekeeping, tend to respond as they would in conventional combat and not the way they should respond in peacekeeping. Excessive force makes the peacekeepers a party to the conflict instead of a neutral third party.
If forward-deployed combat forces are the initial rapid-response force committed to peacekeeping operations, they should be replaced by specially trained peacekeeping forces as soon as possible.
Tactical Lessons for Peacekeeping:
U. S. Multinational Force in Beirut 1982-1984
CHAPTER ONE
Introduction
At approximately 0622 on Sunday, 23 October 1983, the Battalion Landing Team (BLT) Headquarters building in the Marine Amphibious Unit (MAU) compound at Beirut International Airport was destroyed by a terrorist bomb. This catastrophic attack took the lives of 241 U. S. military personnel and wounded over 100 others. The bombing was carried out by a lone terrorist.
The spectacular loss of life at so little cost to terrorists led to two separate investigations concerning the security of the U. S. Multinational Force (USMNF) positions in Beirut before the end of 1983. The U. S. Department of Defense Commission on the Beirut International Airport Terrorist Act, also known as the Long Commission, focused on the force's ability to operate in a terrorist environment. Among its findings it concludes "that the USMNF was not trained, organized, staffed, or supported to deal effectively with the terrorist threat in Lebanon." The day before the release of the Long Commission report, the U. S. House of Representatives' Investigations Subcommittee published a separate report, which focused on the adequacy of Marine security. While both reports conclude the security of the tactical-level forces was inadequate at the time of the bombing, they focus primarily on measures taken to protect against the specific threat of terrorism. They pay little attention to the other aspects of the peacekeeping mission.
In an interview conducted almost five months before the terrorist attack, the MAU Commander, Colonel Timothy J. Geraghty, stated the greatest threat to the USMNF was terrorism. Tactical-level commanders recognized the possibility of a terrorist threat and took what they considered appropriate action against this threat. However, they also had to consider many other factors besides terrorism while carrying out their mission. The Long Commission came close to recognizing these other factors in its conclusion:
That although it finds the BLT and MAU Commanders to be at fault, it also finds that there was a series of circumstances beyond their control that influenced their judgment and their actions relating to the security of the USMNF.
Tactical-level commanders misjudged the relative importance of terrorism as a factor as compared to other factors affecting their mission.
Since the release of the Long Commission report, the USMNF in Lebanon has been studied from many different perspectives. The U. S. Naval War College uses the Beirut failure as a case study to analyze national and strategic- level decisionmaking. The commitment of U. S. military force and subsequent catastrophe receive credit in part for the development of the Weinberger Doctrine that outlines the criteria for the use of U. S. military force in a crisis. Several analyses conducted by students at the U. S. Army Command and General Staff College and U. S. Naval War College examine the USMNF's performance from the perspective of operational art.
The one thing all these analyses have in common is that they focus on higher-level decisionmaking. This emphasis is understandable given Clausewitz's concept that "[w]ar is a continuation of politics by other means." Failed strategy will never achieve political objectives whereas tactical-level failure may still result in strategic success if the strategy is sound. While the Long Commission and House Subcommittee's reports highlight the reality of terrorism at the tactical-level, most of the lessons learned about peacekeeping have been at higher levels. Small-unit tactical lessons about peacekeeping have received little to no attention.
Ironically, battalion-sized units are the most likely units to get involved in future peacekeeping operations. Furthermore, the latest developments in communications technology link tactical-level activities more closely than ever to the strategic-level as government, public, and military leaders see tactical-level developments at the same time. With the recent increase in peacekeeping operations, tactical lessons learned from past operations are receiving more and more attention. Unfortunately, at the tactical-level, the tendency is to over-simplify lessons learned from the USMNF and focus primarily on force protection.
As a result of this tendency and the previous high-level focus of analysis, many complex and subtle tactical lessons learned from the USMNF are being lost. The latest U. S. Army manual on the subject, FM 100-23 Peace Operations, uses seventeen "historical perspectives" to reinforce its points, but not one example is from the USMNF. While some of the lessons learned by the USMNF are in this manual, they are "disguised" as text appearing more like a list of "do's and don'ts." The USMNF experience in Beirut provides numerous examples that illustrate the "why" of peacekeeping, not just the "how."
Peacekeeping has some general principles, but every operation must accurately account for its own unique circumstances. The complexity, diversity, and unique characteristics of peacekeeping operations warrant detailed analysis to get an appreciation for the challenges facing peacekeepers. The Marines and commanders of the USMNF operated in a confusing environment under numerous restraints while executing a mission, which even today is not a primary mission nor fully understood. Over a period of eighteen months, thousands of decisions were made by four different MAU commanders, five different BLT commanders, and over 5,000 individual Marines and small-unit tactical leaders. Even though some decisions ultimately can be linked to the bombing of the BLT Headquarters, many good tactical-level decisions were made. The thought and rationale behind those decisions offer numerous lessons to future peacekeeping forces. Furthermore, while some decisions contributed to the loss of life and failure, those decisions were made with the thought that they were the best decisions given the situation and resources available at the time. Hindsight allows perfect judgment of past decisions. However, valuable lessons can be learned by analyzing decisions made by members of the USMNF with consideration for the situation as it existed at the time.
continued..........
Author: Major Ronald F. Baczkowski, USMC
Research Question: Were the Marine Amphibious Units (MAUs) employed in Beirut, Lebanon from August 1982 to February 1984 properly trained, equipped, and organized to conduct peacekeeping operations? If so, were there tactical reasons for the 24th MAU's failure? What are the tactical lessons learned for future peacekeeping forces?
Discussion:
The U.S. Multinational Force (USMNF) operated in Beirut, Lebanon from 25 August 1982 to 26 February 1984. During this period four different MAUs served as peacekeepers. The USMNF was initially successful; but, as the strategic and tactical situations changed, the peacekeepers came increasingly under fire. On 23 October 1983, a lone terrorist destroyed the headquarters building of BLT 1/8, killing 241 Marines and sailors and wounding over 100 others.
This study examines the tactical situation and how it changed. It analyzes how the training before employment may have assisted or prevented the tactical-level forces from operating effectively. It examines both positive and negative lessons learned through critical analysis. It provides many details concerning the actual tactical situation so the reader can conduct his or her own critical analysis and come to their own conclusions.
Conclusions:
MAUs can be used in peacekeeping operations if the mission is carefully defined, the situation is fairly constant, and the operation is relatively short duration. By extension to their modern equivalents, forward-deployed and rapid-deployment combat forces can also be used in peacekeeping operations under the same conditions. These type forces have the equipment, personnel, and discipline required to conduct short duration peacekeeping operations.
However, peacekeeping operations are normally decentralized and are conducted in a constantly changing environment over a long duration. Under these conditions, forward-deployed units lack the specialized training and education necessary to conduct peacekeeping operations. Combat forces, which are not trained in peacekeeping theory and tactics, are restricted to operate in a predictible set-piece pattern as directed by their higher headquarters. This pattern creates a vulnerability in the peacekeeping force that can be exploited by parties hostile to the force. Additionally, when faced with unfamiliar stressful situations combat forces, which are not specially trained for peacekeeping, tend to respond as they would in conventional combat and not the way they should respond in peacekeeping. Excessive force makes the peacekeepers a party to the conflict instead of a neutral third party.
If forward-deployed combat forces are the initial rapid-response force committed to peacekeeping operations, they should be replaced by specially trained peacekeeping forces as soon as possible.
Tactical Lessons for Peacekeeping:
U. S. Multinational Force in Beirut 1982-1984
CHAPTER ONE
Introduction
At approximately 0622 on Sunday, 23 October 1983, the Battalion Landing Team (BLT) Headquarters building in the Marine Amphibious Unit (MAU) compound at Beirut International Airport was destroyed by a terrorist bomb. This catastrophic attack took the lives of 241 U. S. military personnel and wounded over 100 others. The bombing was carried out by a lone terrorist.
The spectacular loss of life at so little cost to terrorists led to two separate investigations concerning the security of the U. S. Multinational Force (USMNF) positions in Beirut before the end of 1983. The U. S. Department of Defense Commission on the Beirut International Airport Terrorist Act, also known as the Long Commission, focused on the force's ability to operate in a terrorist environment. Among its findings it concludes "that the USMNF was not trained, organized, staffed, or supported to deal effectively with the terrorist threat in Lebanon." The day before the release of the Long Commission report, the U. S. House of Representatives' Investigations Subcommittee published a separate report, which focused on the adequacy of Marine security. While both reports conclude the security of the tactical-level forces was inadequate at the time of the bombing, they focus primarily on measures taken to protect against the specific threat of terrorism. They pay little attention to the other aspects of the peacekeeping mission.
In an interview conducted almost five months before the terrorist attack, the MAU Commander, Colonel Timothy J. Geraghty, stated the greatest threat to the USMNF was terrorism. Tactical-level commanders recognized the possibility of a terrorist threat and took what they considered appropriate action against this threat. However, they also had to consider many other factors besides terrorism while carrying out their mission. The Long Commission came close to recognizing these other factors in its conclusion:
That although it finds the BLT and MAU Commanders to be at fault, it also finds that there was a series of circumstances beyond their control that influenced their judgment and their actions relating to the security of the USMNF.
Tactical-level commanders misjudged the relative importance of terrorism as a factor as compared to other factors affecting their mission.
Since the release of the Long Commission report, the USMNF in Lebanon has been studied from many different perspectives. The U. S. Naval War College uses the Beirut failure as a case study to analyze national and strategic- level decisionmaking. The commitment of U. S. military force and subsequent catastrophe receive credit in part for the development of the Weinberger Doctrine that outlines the criteria for the use of U. S. military force in a crisis. Several analyses conducted by students at the U. S. Army Command and General Staff College and U. S. Naval War College examine the USMNF's performance from the perspective of operational art.
The one thing all these analyses have in common is that they focus on higher-level decisionmaking. This emphasis is understandable given Clausewitz's concept that "[w]ar is a continuation of politics by other means." Failed strategy will never achieve political objectives whereas tactical-level failure may still result in strategic success if the strategy is sound. While the Long Commission and House Subcommittee's reports highlight the reality of terrorism at the tactical-level, most of the lessons learned about peacekeeping have been at higher levels. Small-unit tactical lessons about peacekeeping have received little to no attention.
Ironically, battalion-sized units are the most likely units to get involved in future peacekeeping operations. Furthermore, the latest developments in communications technology link tactical-level activities more closely than ever to the strategic-level as government, public, and military leaders see tactical-level developments at the same time. With the recent increase in peacekeeping operations, tactical lessons learned from past operations are receiving more and more attention. Unfortunately, at the tactical-level, the tendency is to over-simplify lessons learned from the USMNF and focus primarily on force protection.
As a result of this tendency and the previous high-level focus of analysis, many complex and subtle tactical lessons learned from the USMNF are being lost. The latest U. S. Army manual on the subject, FM 100-23 Peace Operations, uses seventeen "historical perspectives" to reinforce its points, but not one example is from the USMNF. While some of the lessons learned by the USMNF are in this manual, they are "disguised" as text appearing more like a list of "do's and don'ts." The USMNF experience in Beirut provides numerous examples that illustrate the "why" of peacekeeping, not just the "how."
Peacekeeping has some general principles, but every operation must accurately account for its own unique circumstances. The complexity, diversity, and unique characteristics of peacekeeping operations warrant detailed analysis to get an appreciation for the challenges facing peacekeepers. The Marines and commanders of the USMNF operated in a confusing environment under numerous restraints while executing a mission, which even today is not a primary mission nor fully understood. Over a period of eighteen months, thousands of decisions were made by four different MAU commanders, five different BLT commanders, and over 5,000 individual Marines and small-unit tactical leaders. Even though some decisions ultimately can be linked to the bombing of the BLT Headquarters, many good tactical-level decisions were made. The thought and rationale behind those decisions offer numerous lessons to future peacekeeping forces. Furthermore, while some decisions contributed to the loss of life and failure, those decisions were made with the thought that they were the best decisions given the situation and resources available at the time. Hindsight allows perfect judgment of past decisions. However, valuable lessons can be learned by analyzing decisions made by members of the USMNF with consideration for the situation as it existed at the time.
continued..........