thedrifter
07-04-03, 04:25 PM
The U.S. Military and the Persian Gulf War
The Military Response
The map above shows the theater, and operations, as reproduced in the U.S. Army's West Point Atlas of United States Wars. I will not try to make a long accounting of the action, that has already been done superbly elsewhere. I highly recommend the online book "The Whirlwind War", courtesy of the U.S. Army's Center for Military History; the book "Certain Victory", the U.S. Army's official history of the campaign, and the book "Desert Victory: The War for Kuwait" by Norman Friedman, and published by the Institute for Naval History Press. All 3 books give good accounts, including small unit actions, and all 3 have excellent supporting maps. I will only provide a brief sketch of events here.
Desert Shield
The initial response of CENTCOM (codenamed "Desert Shield") was to dispatch the XVIII Airborne Corps to Saudi Arabia to support Saudi forces in the event that Iraqi forces continued into the oil field region along the Saudi east coast (the first units deployed were the 3/502 Infantry, 2nd Brigade, 101st Airborne Division, and 4/325 Infantry, 2nd Brigade, 82nd Airborne Division). Eventually the entire XVIII Airborne Corps was deployed, consisting of the 101st Airborne Division, the 82nd Airborne Division, the 24th Mechanized Infantry Division, the 1st Armored Cavalry Division, and the 3rd Armored Cavalry Regiment. Along with these U.S. ground forces, the United Kingdom deployed their 7th Armoured Brigade from its forward base in Germany, and the French deployed their heavily reinforced 6th Light Armored Division. These forces were joined by Kuwaiti & Saudi units, and eventually by units from several other nations, notably Egypt and Syria.
The Desert Shield deployment was designed to block Iraqi forces from proceeding to attack the Saudi oil fields, most of which run along the Saudi east coast, a straight drive south from Kuwait. But this force was inadequate to serve as an offensive force to drive the Iraqis out of Kuwait. Iraqi forces had dug in along the Kuwaiti border, and had virtually all of the armored units in the Iraqi army in support.
Under pressure from the Secretary of Defense (Richard Cheney), Gen. Schwarzkopf developed a plan to use XVIII corps to attack Kuwait, which consisted of a frontal assault by Army and Marine forces, with a flanking maneuver by the 1st Armored Cavalry Division along the Wadi Al-Batin. However, Gen. Schwarzkopf also declared his own plan doomed to failure, and made sure everyone knew that it wasn't his idea to come up with such a plan anyway (Gen. Schwarzkopf was instructed by Gen. Powell to remain in Saudi Arabia and have his staff present the plan, no doubt due to Gen. Schwarzkopf's legendary and not always diplomatically correct temper).
With this documentation in hand, Gen. Powell and Secretary Cheney got approval from President Bush to deploy additional heavy elements from U.S. forces in Europe. VII Corps headquarters deployed with units from both VIII and V corps, including the 1st and 3rd Armored Divisions, the 1st Mechanized Infantry Division, and most of the 2nd Armored Division, as independent brigades or round-out units. With these heavier units in hand, Gen. Schwarzkopf had no doubt that he could engage the heavy armored units of the Iraqi army (including the much vaunted Republican Guard), and evict Iraqi forces from Kuwait.
Instant Thunder
Prior to launching any ground assault on Iraqi forces, an air campaign to weaken Iraqi forces in the field, and to destroy command & control capabilities was tailored for the situation by Air Force planners. Ever since its inception as the U.S. Army Air Corp, and later the U.S. Army Air Forces, the Air Force (an independent service since 1947) has been dominated by the strategic ideas of Giulio Douhet. Douhet was an Italian general during WWI, and in 1920 wrote the first book on strategic air warfare, "Command of the Air". Douhet advocated the strategic bombardment of civilian populations as a means pf breaking the will of the nation to wage war. Douhetism dominated the strategic air warfare of WWII, which saw massive bombing campaigns against cities from both sides of the conflict.
Massive destruction of civilian targets is no longer politically acceptable, but that has not dulled the Douhetist regime of the U.S. Air Force. Just as during WWII, they remain convinced that a properly planned air warfare campaign, against military and national strategic targets, will force the enemy to surrendur without the involvement of ground combat troops (an idea roundly rejected by classical infantry officers, including Gen. Schwarzkopf). The Air Force saw that Instant Thunder Campaign as their best chance to prove the Douhetist ideal, and set about the construction of a whole new breeed of air campaign unlike any ever seen before.
The Air Force Campaign, conducted by Lt. Gen Horner and Brig. Gen. Glosson (but originally conceived by Col. John Warden, USAF), was built around a computer generated Air Tasking Order (ATO). The ATO was hundreds of pages thick, and specified the exact details of operation for every aircraft in the campaign. Ingress and egress routes were defined to control traffic and avoid collisions. Targets were designated, and force packages designed for each target. Because the ATO was computer generated, the aircraft making up a force package did not all need to come from the same air station, but only to arrive at the target at the same time. That ATO also coordinated ground attack with their high altitude fighter covering forces.
The strength of such a system is that it allows for an enormous number of aircraft to be over enemy air space at any one time, and allows for continous 24 hour bombardment. This in turn means maximum damage in minimum time. However, the weak side of this method is that it is rigid and inflexible, targets must be selected 48 hours ahead of the actual attack. Iraqi armored units were able to move fully exposed, but unmolested, right under the noses of ATO controlled pilots, who could do nothing about it. It also created a friction between air planners who wantd maximum coverage for strategic assault, and army corps & division commanders, who wanted control of the air space in front of their units for tactical operations. In the event that ground units move fast (as in fact they did), the need to constently shift the boundary between ATO and ground tactical air space created major problems for both services.
For a more detailed description of the Instant Thunder ATO and the campaign, I recommend Norman Friedman's book "Desert Victory".
http://www.tim-thompson.com/desert-storm.html
Sempers,
Roger
:marine:
The Military Response
The map above shows the theater, and operations, as reproduced in the U.S. Army's West Point Atlas of United States Wars. I will not try to make a long accounting of the action, that has already been done superbly elsewhere. I highly recommend the online book "The Whirlwind War", courtesy of the U.S. Army's Center for Military History; the book "Certain Victory", the U.S. Army's official history of the campaign, and the book "Desert Victory: The War for Kuwait" by Norman Friedman, and published by the Institute for Naval History Press. All 3 books give good accounts, including small unit actions, and all 3 have excellent supporting maps. I will only provide a brief sketch of events here.
Desert Shield
The initial response of CENTCOM (codenamed "Desert Shield") was to dispatch the XVIII Airborne Corps to Saudi Arabia to support Saudi forces in the event that Iraqi forces continued into the oil field region along the Saudi east coast (the first units deployed were the 3/502 Infantry, 2nd Brigade, 101st Airborne Division, and 4/325 Infantry, 2nd Brigade, 82nd Airborne Division). Eventually the entire XVIII Airborne Corps was deployed, consisting of the 101st Airborne Division, the 82nd Airborne Division, the 24th Mechanized Infantry Division, the 1st Armored Cavalry Division, and the 3rd Armored Cavalry Regiment. Along with these U.S. ground forces, the United Kingdom deployed their 7th Armoured Brigade from its forward base in Germany, and the French deployed their heavily reinforced 6th Light Armored Division. These forces were joined by Kuwaiti & Saudi units, and eventually by units from several other nations, notably Egypt and Syria.
The Desert Shield deployment was designed to block Iraqi forces from proceeding to attack the Saudi oil fields, most of which run along the Saudi east coast, a straight drive south from Kuwait. But this force was inadequate to serve as an offensive force to drive the Iraqis out of Kuwait. Iraqi forces had dug in along the Kuwaiti border, and had virtually all of the armored units in the Iraqi army in support.
Under pressure from the Secretary of Defense (Richard Cheney), Gen. Schwarzkopf developed a plan to use XVIII corps to attack Kuwait, which consisted of a frontal assault by Army and Marine forces, with a flanking maneuver by the 1st Armored Cavalry Division along the Wadi Al-Batin. However, Gen. Schwarzkopf also declared his own plan doomed to failure, and made sure everyone knew that it wasn't his idea to come up with such a plan anyway (Gen. Schwarzkopf was instructed by Gen. Powell to remain in Saudi Arabia and have his staff present the plan, no doubt due to Gen. Schwarzkopf's legendary and not always diplomatically correct temper).
With this documentation in hand, Gen. Powell and Secretary Cheney got approval from President Bush to deploy additional heavy elements from U.S. forces in Europe. VII Corps headquarters deployed with units from both VIII and V corps, including the 1st and 3rd Armored Divisions, the 1st Mechanized Infantry Division, and most of the 2nd Armored Division, as independent brigades or round-out units. With these heavier units in hand, Gen. Schwarzkopf had no doubt that he could engage the heavy armored units of the Iraqi army (including the much vaunted Republican Guard), and evict Iraqi forces from Kuwait.
Instant Thunder
Prior to launching any ground assault on Iraqi forces, an air campaign to weaken Iraqi forces in the field, and to destroy command & control capabilities was tailored for the situation by Air Force planners. Ever since its inception as the U.S. Army Air Corp, and later the U.S. Army Air Forces, the Air Force (an independent service since 1947) has been dominated by the strategic ideas of Giulio Douhet. Douhet was an Italian general during WWI, and in 1920 wrote the first book on strategic air warfare, "Command of the Air". Douhet advocated the strategic bombardment of civilian populations as a means pf breaking the will of the nation to wage war. Douhetism dominated the strategic air warfare of WWII, which saw massive bombing campaigns against cities from both sides of the conflict.
Massive destruction of civilian targets is no longer politically acceptable, but that has not dulled the Douhetist regime of the U.S. Air Force. Just as during WWII, they remain convinced that a properly planned air warfare campaign, against military and national strategic targets, will force the enemy to surrendur without the involvement of ground combat troops (an idea roundly rejected by classical infantry officers, including Gen. Schwarzkopf). The Air Force saw that Instant Thunder Campaign as their best chance to prove the Douhetist ideal, and set about the construction of a whole new breeed of air campaign unlike any ever seen before.
The Air Force Campaign, conducted by Lt. Gen Horner and Brig. Gen. Glosson (but originally conceived by Col. John Warden, USAF), was built around a computer generated Air Tasking Order (ATO). The ATO was hundreds of pages thick, and specified the exact details of operation for every aircraft in the campaign. Ingress and egress routes were defined to control traffic and avoid collisions. Targets were designated, and force packages designed for each target. Because the ATO was computer generated, the aircraft making up a force package did not all need to come from the same air station, but only to arrive at the target at the same time. That ATO also coordinated ground attack with their high altitude fighter covering forces.
The strength of such a system is that it allows for an enormous number of aircraft to be over enemy air space at any one time, and allows for continous 24 hour bombardment. This in turn means maximum damage in minimum time. However, the weak side of this method is that it is rigid and inflexible, targets must be selected 48 hours ahead of the actual attack. Iraqi armored units were able to move fully exposed, but unmolested, right under the noses of ATO controlled pilots, who could do nothing about it. It also created a friction between air planners who wantd maximum coverage for strategic assault, and army corps & division commanders, who wanted control of the air space in front of their units for tactical operations. In the event that ground units move fast (as in fact they did), the need to constently shift the boundary between ATO and ground tactical air space created major problems for both services.
For a more detailed description of the Instant Thunder ATO and the campaign, I recommend Norman Friedman's book "Desert Victory".
http://www.tim-thompson.com/desert-storm.html
Sempers,
Roger
:marine: