thedrifter
11-15-08, 07:52 AM
Debate: Is COIN Focus Costing Army Future Wars?
[Steve Schippert]
My friend Dave Dilegge at Small Wars Journal sent a sneak peek at dueling Point/ Counterpoint articles that will be published in the December issue of Joint Force Quarterly. At odds are John Nagl (LTC, USA - Ret.), who says we should win the wars we are in, and Gian Gentile (COL, USA) who argues that a focus on COIN (counter-insurgency operations) is costing the Army future wars by allowing its tank-on-tank and artillery "big guns" capabilities to fall into neglect.
POINT: Let’s Win the Wars We’re In, by John Nagl
A stunning if predictable development in the military community over the past 2 years has been the backlash against the promulgation of counterinsurgency learning in the midst of the ongoing campaigns in Iraq and Afghanistan. These wars have spurred long-overdue changes in the way the U.S. military prepares for and prioritizes irregular warfare. These changes are hard-won: they have been achieved only after years of wartime trials and tribulations that have cost the United States dearly in money, materiel, and the lives of its courageous Service-members.
Yet despite the relatively tentative nature of such changes, there are already those who predict grim strategic outcomes for America if its military, particularly the Army, continues the process of adaptation. Gian Gentile, the vocal Army critic of counterinsurgency adaptation, has written that a “hyper-emphasis on counterinsurgency puts the American Army in a perilous condition. Its ability to fight wars consisting of head-on battles using tanks and mechanized infantry is in danger of atrophy.” He is not alone in his views. Three brigade commanders in the Iraq War wrote a white paper warning about the degradation of seldom used field artillery, declaring that the Army is “mortgaging [its] ability to fight the next war” by neglecting the requirements for combined arms operations. The Army Secretary, Pete Geren, and Chief of Staff, General George Casey, both assert that the Army is “out of balance” in part because of “a focus on training for counterinsurgency operations to the exclusion of other capabilities.” Prominent civilian thinkers in the academic community have presented similar arguments. With such dire warnings, one might forget that there’s a war on right now . . .
Lieutenant Colonel John A. Nagl, USA (Ret.), is a Senior Fellow at the Center for a New American Security.
COUNTERPOINT: Let’s Build an Army to Win All Wars, by Gian Gentile
The U.S. Army officer corps has not seriously debated the content of the many doctrinal field manuals (FM) published over the past 2 years (for example, FM 3–24, Counterinsurgency, FM 3–0, Operations, and FM 3–07, Stability Operations and Support Operations). Though these manuals have been successfully pushed through the bureaucratic lines of the Army’s senior leadership, few other officers raised questions about the wisdom of employing American military power to build nations where none exist or where an American military presence is not wanted. Instead, the Army has been steamrolled by a process that proposes its use as an instrument of nationbuilding in the most unstable parts of the world. Nationbuilding, rather than fighting, has become the core function of the U.S. Army.
The Army under the Petraeus Doctrine “is entering into an era in which armed conflict will be protracted, ambiguous, and continuous - with the application of force becoming a lesser part of the soldier’s repertoire.” The implication of this doctrine is that the Army should be transformed into a light infantry-based constabulary force designed to police the world’s endless numbers of unstable areas. The concept rests on the assumption that the much- touted “surge” in Iraq was a successful feat of arms, an assertion that despite the claims of punditry supporters in the press has yet to be proven. The war in Iraq is not yet over . . .
Colonel Gian P. Gentile, USA, is Director of the Military History Program at the United States Military Academy.
It is an important debate and worthy of your time to read and consider. It is not, however, an even debate in my view. I sent Dave Dilegge the following response, which explains how the debate essentially shakes out from my perspective and is perhaps worth sharing here.
Quick takes from here:
Now trumps Later w/o Ceding it so dramatically as Gentile & crew suggest.
Current Economic Crisis has already killed any expansion, so building to win "All" wars takes big hit regardless of current. [NRO readers may recall this.]
We don't get to choose (much) the types of wars presented. Aggressive enemies, historically, have chosen such.
Future warfare will be more irregular than regular by far, and we were very ill-equipped (hardware, tactics, strategy, anthropological awareness & social/cultural awareness) for the trend. Better now, not quite smashingly so, but getting there.
Hate nation building, but if we do not engage in it, we cede it to an enemy(s) which is empowered by such (Taliban, ICU in Somalia, Russia in over-run states (to a degree) et al).
Dos centavos.
John Nagl, incidentally, was an Obama supporter if memory serves correctly. What's more important to me is if president-elect Obama is a John Nagl supporter, and not the other way around.
Ellie
[Steve Schippert]
My friend Dave Dilegge at Small Wars Journal sent a sneak peek at dueling Point/ Counterpoint articles that will be published in the December issue of Joint Force Quarterly. At odds are John Nagl (LTC, USA - Ret.), who says we should win the wars we are in, and Gian Gentile (COL, USA) who argues that a focus on COIN (counter-insurgency operations) is costing the Army future wars by allowing its tank-on-tank and artillery "big guns" capabilities to fall into neglect.
POINT: Let’s Win the Wars We’re In, by John Nagl
A stunning if predictable development in the military community over the past 2 years has been the backlash against the promulgation of counterinsurgency learning in the midst of the ongoing campaigns in Iraq and Afghanistan. These wars have spurred long-overdue changes in the way the U.S. military prepares for and prioritizes irregular warfare. These changes are hard-won: they have been achieved only after years of wartime trials and tribulations that have cost the United States dearly in money, materiel, and the lives of its courageous Service-members.
Yet despite the relatively tentative nature of such changes, there are already those who predict grim strategic outcomes for America if its military, particularly the Army, continues the process of adaptation. Gian Gentile, the vocal Army critic of counterinsurgency adaptation, has written that a “hyper-emphasis on counterinsurgency puts the American Army in a perilous condition. Its ability to fight wars consisting of head-on battles using tanks and mechanized infantry is in danger of atrophy.” He is not alone in his views. Three brigade commanders in the Iraq War wrote a white paper warning about the degradation of seldom used field artillery, declaring that the Army is “mortgaging [its] ability to fight the next war” by neglecting the requirements for combined arms operations. The Army Secretary, Pete Geren, and Chief of Staff, General George Casey, both assert that the Army is “out of balance” in part because of “a focus on training for counterinsurgency operations to the exclusion of other capabilities.” Prominent civilian thinkers in the academic community have presented similar arguments. With such dire warnings, one might forget that there’s a war on right now . . .
Lieutenant Colonel John A. Nagl, USA (Ret.), is a Senior Fellow at the Center for a New American Security.
COUNTERPOINT: Let’s Build an Army to Win All Wars, by Gian Gentile
The U.S. Army officer corps has not seriously debated the content of the many doctrinal field manuals (FM) published over the past 2 years (for example, FM 3–24, Counterinsurgency, FM 3–0, Operations, and FM 3–07, Stability Operations and Support Operations). Though these manuals have been successfully pushed through the bureaucratic lines of the Army’s senior leadership, few other officers raised questions about the wisdom of employing American military power to build nations where none exist or where an American military presence is not wanted. Instead, the Army has been steamrolled by a process that proposes its use as an instrument of nationbuilding in the most unstable parts of the world. Nationbuilding, rather than fighting, has become the core function of the U.S. Army.
The Army under the Petraeus Doctrine “is entering into an era in which armed conflict will be protracted, ambiguous, and continuous - with the application of force becoming a lesser part of the soldier’s repertoire.” The implication of this doctrine is that the Army should be transformed into a light infantry-based constabulary force designed to police the world’s endless numbers of unstable areas. The concept rests on the assumption that the much- touted “surge” in Iraq was a successful feat of arms, an assertion that despite the claims of punditry supporters in the press has yet to be proven. The war in Iraq is not yet over . . .
Colonel Gian P. Gentile, USA, is Director of the Military History Program at the United States Military Academy.
It is an important debate and worthy of your time to read and consider. It is not, however, an even debate in my view. I sent Dave Dilegge the following response, which explains how the debate essentially shakes out from my perspective and is perhaps worth sharing here.
Quick takes from here:
Now trumps Later w/o Ceding it so dramatically as Gentile & crew suggest.
Current Economic Crisis has already killed any expansion, so building to win "All" wars takes big hit regardless of current. [NRO readers may recall this.]
We don't get to choose (much) the types of wars presented. Aggressive enemies, historically, have chosen such.
Future warfare will be more irregular than regular by far, and we were very ill-equipped (hardware, tactics, strategy, anthropological awareness & social/cultural awareness) for the trend. Better now, not quite smashingly so, but getting there.
Hate nation building, but if we do not engage in it, we cede it to an enemy(s) which is empowered by such (Taliban, ICU in Somalia, Russia in over-run states (to a degree) et al).
Dos centavos.
John Nagl, incidentally, was an Obama supporter if memory serves correctly. What's more important to me is if president-elect Obama is a John Nagl supporter, and not the other way around.
Ellie