thedrifter
06-03-08, 06:59 AM
MAIN STREET
By WILLIAM MCGURN
Did Scott McClellan Miss the Surge?
June 3, 2008; Page A19
In the media week that has been Scott McClellan, my former colleague has had his motives questioned, his character impugned, and his own book dismissed as something he could not possibly have written himself.
Yet in the midst of the storm, the press has largely skipped over what is at once Scott's central claim, and his silliest argument: that the president's big mistake was to embrace the "permanent campaign" and that this led to a strategy that meant "never reflecting, never reconsidering, never compromising. Especially not where Iraq was concerned."
The decisions on Iraq that followed Scott's departure tell a much different story. Whether you agree with the surge or not, that decision was one of the defining acts of his presidency. And what Scott apparently still has not recognized is that his own heave-ho was the prelude to exactly the kind of reconsideration he says was impossible in the Bush White House.
Exhibit A is the sacking of Don Rumsfeld immediately after the 2006 elections that gave the Democrats control of Congress. The "after" is critical, because the president was blasted for his timing by many in his own party. Arlen Specter complained that he would still be chairman of the Senate Judiciary Committee if the president had made the move before the elections. Former House Speaker Newt Gingrich said that the president's timing probably cost Republicans control of the Senate and 10 to 15 seats in the House.
These men had a point. But the timing also said something about George W. Bush: A president who makes a decision knowing that it could cost his party control of Congress can be accused of many things, but subsuming all his decisions to the "permanent campaign" cannot seriously be one of them.
The president's decision to replace his Defense secretary was followed by an even more thorough rethink of his war policy. Anyone who has spent time in government knows that changing a major policy midstream is like trying to make a U-turn with an aircraft carrier. And anyone who was in the White House in late 2006 knows that the dramatic shift in Iraq that we now almost take for granted was the result of one man: George W. Bush.
Scott and the other critics accuse the president of stubbornness. In my experience, when the pundits accuse you of being stubborn, often all it means is that you don't accept the conventional wisdom of the Beltway establishment – and that you are unwilling to run up the white flag and bow to their superiority.
The president I served had concerns that were far removed from this audience. Constantly he would remind his speechwriting team to keep in mind how his words would be heard by others. By an enemy who believed Iraq was theirs for the taking. By Iraqi families being asked to stand up and have faith in the United States. And by some second lieutenant in some godforsaken town in Iraq about to lead other Americans into battle.
So for several intense weeks, my colleague Chris Michel and I isolated ourselves in a tiny room in the West Wing, trying to capture the new policy in a coherent draft. Early one Saturday, Dan Bartlett came by to check on our progress.
Dan is a straight shooter. He knew that the new policy risked losing the support of the few remaining hawks, because they wanted many more troops than the five brigades the president would be proposing. He also knew that most everyone else in America wanted to hear that our men and women in Iraq were coming home. Dan did not kid himself – or us – about how it would go down, at least in the short term. "No one wants to hear what this speech is going to tell them," he told us.
The president understood this too. But he also understood that the moral and strategic purposes of the U.S. demanded a president willing to stand up and do the unpopular thing – no matter what the polls or pundits were saying.
So on the evening of Jan. 10, 2007, Mr. Bush looked into the television cameras and gave the speech nobody wanted to hear. He told the American people that the central policy of his administration was not working, he took all responsibility for the mistakes, and he offered a fix that he knew many would regard with skepticism. It is hard to imagine any presidential act more removed from "the permanent campaign."
Of course, only a mind that was not completely closed to "rethinking" or "reconsidering" or "reflecting" on Iraq (or George W. Bush) could appreciate the magnitude of what the president did that January night. And as Scott more than proves, in today's Washington that kind of mind is all too rare.
Ellie
By WILLIAM MCGURN
Did Scott McClellan Miss the Surge?
June 3, 2008; Page A19
In the media week that has been Scott McClellan, my former colleague has had his motives questioned, his character impugned, and his own book dismissed as something he could not possibly have written himself.
Yet in the midst of the storm, the press has largely skipped over what is at once Scott's central claim, and his silliest argument: that the president's big mistake was to embrace the "permanent campaign" and that this led to a strategy that meant "never reflecting, never reconsidering, never compromising. Especially not where Iraq was concerned."
The decisions on Iraq that followed Scott's departure tell a much different story. Whether you agree with the surge or not, that decision was one of the defining acts of his presidency. And what Scott apparently still has not recognized is that his own heave-ho was the prelude to exactly the kind of reconsideration he says was impossible in the Bush White House.
Exhibit A is the sacking of Don Rumsfeld immediately after the 2006 elections that gave the Democrats control of Congress. The "after" is critical, because the president was blasted for his timing by many in his own party. Arlen Specter complained that he would still be chairman of the Senate Judiciary Committee if the president had made the move before the elections. Former House Speaker Newt Gingrich said that the president's timing probably cost Republicans control of the Senate and 10 to 15 seats in the House.
These men had a point. But the timing also said something about George W. Bush: A president who makes a decision knowing that it could cost his party control of Congress can be accused of many things, but subsuming all his decisions to the "permanent campaign" cannot seriously be one of them.
The president's decision to replace his Defense secretary was followed by an even more thorough rethink of his war policy. Anyone who has spent time in government knows that changing a major policy midstream is like trying to make a U-turn with an aircraft carrier. And anyone who was in the White House in late 2006 knows that the dramatic shift in Iraq that we now almost take for granted was the result of one man: George W. Bush.
Scott and the other critics accuse the president of stubbornness. In my experience, when the pundits accuse you of being stubborn, often all it means is that you don't accept the conventional wisdom of the Beltway establishment – and that you are unwilling to run up the white flag and bow to their superiority.
The president I served had concerns that were far removed from this audience. Constantly he would remind his speechwriting team to keep in mind how his words would be heard by others. By an enemy who believed Iraq was theirs for the taking. By Iraqi families being asked to stand up and have faith in the United States. And by some second lieutenant in some godforsaken town in Iraq about to lead other Americans into battle.
So for several intense weeks, my colleague Chris Michel and I isolated ourselves in a tiny room in the West Wing, trying to capture the new policy in a coherent draft. Early one Saturday, Dan Bartlett came by to check on our progress.
Dan is a straight shooter. He knew that the new policy risked losing the support of the few remaining hawks, because they wanted many more troops than the five brigades the president would be proposing. He also knew that most everyone else in America wanted to hear that our men and women in Iraq were coming home. Dan did not kid himself – or us – about how it would go down, at least in the short term. "No one wants to hear what this speech is going to tell them," he told us.
The president understood this too. But he also understood that the moral and strategic purposes of the U.S. demanded a president willing to stand up and do the unpopular thing – no matter what the polls or pundits were saying.
So on the evening of Jan. 10, 2007, Mr. Bush looked into the television cameras and gave the speech nobody wanted to hear. He told the American people that the central policy of his administration was not working, he took all responsibility for the mistakes, and he offered a fix that he knew many would regard with skepticism. It is hard to imagine any presidential act more removed from "the permanent campaign."
Of course, only a mind that was not completely closed to "rethinking" or "reconsidering" or "reflecting" on Iraq (or George W. Bush) could appreciate the magnitude of what the president did that January night. And as Scott more than proves, in today's Washington that kind of mind is all too rare.
Ellie