Sparrowhawk
04-05-03, 01:35 AM
http://www.msnbc.com/news/1852432.jpg
Beirut, 1983: The deadly bombing of the U.S. Marine Operations Center was one in a spate of attacks that prompted U.S. forces to leave Lebanon
Amin Gemayel used his ties to Baghdad and Washington to try to avert war in Iraq. The former Lebanese president discusses his back-channel mediation efforts, his friendship with Donald Rumsfeld and Saddam Hussein’s plans to defend himself
By Rana Ballout
NEWSWEEK WEB EXCLUSIVE
April 4 — The parallels between the current Iraq invasion and Israel’s 1982 invasion of Lebanon are striking. In 1982, a quick armored strike through Shiite territory led to the siege of an Arab capital.
THE GOAL WAS to remake the political landscape—to drive out the Palestine Liberation Organization and install a right-wing Christian Lebanese leader prepared to sign a peace deal with Israel. But Operation Peace for Galilee ended in failure.
Lebanese and Palestinian guerrillas armed with RPGs and AK-47s put up a fierce resistance—an important psychological breakthrough for Arabs conditioned to defeat at Israeli hands. Israel’s drawn-out occupation in South Lebanon fostered Shiite suicide attacks. The president Israel installed, Bashir Gemayel, was assassinated by a car bomb, to be replaced by his older brother. The Reagan administration pulled out of Lebanon after a spate of suicide attacks on its troops and embassies as well as kidnappings targeting intelligence officers, diplomats and journalists. Under Syrian pressure, President Amin Gemayel abrogated the peace deal with Israel. In the end, Israel lost more than 1,000 soldiers—more than in any other war—by the time it fully withdrew from Lebanon in May 2000.
Given that history, former president Gemayel—who returned to Lebanon from 12 years of self-imposed exile in France shortly after Israel’s withdrawal—has a unique window on today’s events in Iraq. He has retained close ties to Reagan-era Mideast specialists and knows Saddam Hussein well. Indeed, in the final weeks before the fighting began, the embattled Iraqi leader turned to Gemayel as a back-channel envoy to Washington in an effort to avoid attack. Lebanese journalist Rana Ballout interviewed the former president for NEWSWEEK in his Beirut office last week. Excerpts:
NEWSWEEK: What led you to open a communications channel between the Iraqi and American leadership before the invasion of Iraq?
http://www.msnbc.com/news/1852430.jpg
Former Lebanese president Amin Gemayel
Amin Gemayel: My wife and I were invited to a dinner in June 2002 at the home of my old friend Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld. Also there was Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz. Even though it was a family dinner, we talked about several issues. I have known Don for a long time now, since [before he assumed the post of] U.S. President Ronald Reagan’s special envoy to the Middle East in the 1980s. I also have permanent contacts with the Iraqi leadership under President Saddam Hussein. On coming back from my trip to the U.S. I was approached by some Iraqi friends to talk about my visit to Washington and my meetings with several people there ... At the end of January and early February of this year, the contacts with the Iraqis became more intense, and I felt that they were feeling a threat from the U.S. So, I was invited to visit Baghdad and met with Saddam Hussein in order to discuss the whole situation and the Iraqi-U.S. and Iraqi-European relations.
What was your impression of Saddam Hussein?
I found President Saddam Hussein to be very determined, very calm and building an efficient system to resist the U.S.-led military coalition against Iraq.
How was he doing that?
He was counting on several elements to build his defensive strategy. One is the Iraqi Army. The army has much experience [of war] and is very well trained. The second element is the Republican Guard, a presidential unit that is very well equipped and trained. Third is the paramilitary branch of the Baath Party. They are also highly motivated and devoted to the Baath ideology and they are determined to defend the regime. Fourth, there are the tribes. And here Saddam Hussein did something very interesting ... He gave them some power and a kind of autonomy in their domestic affairs. Since then, most of the tribes became more sympathetic to the regime because they were given privileges they did not previously enjoy. That is why Saddam Hussein can count on these tribes. Their role should not be underestimated. They are spread all over Iraq and in the remote areas. This may explain some of the resistance we see against the coalition forces.
Did Saddam Hussein ask you to relay a message to the Bush administration?
I need to be clear about this. I do not hold any initiative from the Iraqis to the West and vice versa. It was not up to me to deliver messages. But because of my close ties with some influential people in Washington and my friendship with Iraq, the endeavor was an attempt after several meetings in Iraq, the U.S., Europe and the Vatican to try and find a possible common ground and ideas for a proposal.
Which party presented the most obstacles toward a compromise?
I felt that both parties were determined to go to war. The United States, they were really reluctant to start negotiations toward a compromise. And Saddam was very determined to resist and to fight. He was confident that he could do so. I can say that my impression of the mood in Iraq and the United States was not favorable for a compromise and a peaceful initiative.
Did you find that any common ground existed?
The main problem [was that] Saddam Hussein was very cooperative and open to discussing United Nations Resolution 1441. By contrast, the Bush administration considered that their previous experiences with Saddam Hussein were not encouraging; they had no confidence that he would disarm. It is really a problem of trust—the Bush administration does not trust the Iraqi leadership ... Also, my feeling was that the United States wanted to get rid of the whole Iraqi military strategy. A perception in the United States, I felt, was that the Iraqi Army was too big and too numerous in number for such a small country and such a delicate region.
How do you respond to the view that Washington’s Middle East policy-makers are neoconservatives who are waging the war against Iraq to protect Israel? Was this ever brought up during your meetings in Washington?
I have heard this in Washington ... [Virginia Congressman Jim] Moran pointed it out. And for sure that Israel will be the first beneficiary of this war.
Did it ever come up in your conversations with Donald Rumsfeld and Paul Wolfowitz that Iraq’s army should be reduced to pose less of a threat to Israel?
I am not willing to give any indication of the people that I met in Washington. It is very well known that I met Mr. Rumsfeld in June, you don’t need to mix all the meetings together. I don’t at all want to mention whom I met during my last trip to Washington in February [because] it is very embarrassing for these people to conduct any kind of negotiations while they are engaged in military operations.
(continued)
Beirut, 1983: The deadly bombing of the U.S. Marine Operations Center was one in a spate of attacks that prompted U.S. forces to leave Lebanon
Amin Gemayel used his ties to Baghdad and Washington to try to avert war in Iraq. The former Lebanese president discusses his back-channel mediation efforts, his friendship with Donald Rumsfeld and Saddam Hussein’s plans to defend himself
By Rana Ballout
NEWSWEEK WEB EXCLUSIVE
April 4 — The parallels between the current Iraq invasion and Israel’s 1982 invasion of Lebanon are striking. In 1982, a quick armored strike through Shiite territory led to the siege of an Arab capital.
THE GOAL WAS to remake the political landscape—to drive out the Palestine Liberation Organization and install a right-wing Christian Lebanese leader prepared to sign a peace deal with Israel. But Operation Peace for Galilee ended in failure.
Lebanese and Palestinian guerrillas armed with RPGs and AK-47s put up a fierce resistance—an important psychological breakthrough for Arabs conditioned to defeat at Israeli hands. Israel’s drawn-out occupation in South Lebanon fostered Shiite suicide attacks. The president Israel installed, Bashir Gemayel, was assassinated by a car bomb, to be replaced by his older brother. The Reagan administration pulled out of Lebanon after a spate of suicide attacks on its troops and embassies as well as kidnappings targeting intelligence officers, diplomats and journalists. Under Syrian pressure, President Amin Gemayel abrogated the peace deal with Israel. In the end, Israel lost more than 1,000 soldiers—more than in any other war—by the time it fully withdrew from Lebanon in May 2000.
Given that history, former president Gemayel—who returned to Lebanon from 12 years of self-imposed exile in France shortly after Israel’s withdrawal—has a unique window on today’s events in Iraq. He has retained close ties to Reagan-era Mideast specialists and knows Saddam Hussein well. Indeed, in the final weeks before the fighting began, the embattled Iraqi leader turned to Gemayel as a back-channel envoy to Washington in an effort to avoid attack. Lebanese journalist Rana Ballout interviewed the former president for NEWSWEEK in his Beirut office last week. Excerpts:
NEWSWEEK: What led you to open a communications channel between the Iraqi and American leadership before the invasion of Iraq?
http://www.msnbc.com/news/1852430.jpg
Former Lebanese president Amin Gemayel
Amin Gemayel: My wife and I were invited to a dinner in June 2002 at the home of my old friend Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld. Also there was Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz. Even though it was a family dinner, we talked about several issues. I have known Don for a long time now, since [before he assumed the post of] U.S. President Ronald Reagan’s special envoy to the Middle East in the 1980s. I also have permanent contacts with the Iraqi leadership under President Saddam Hussein. On coming back from my trip to the U.S. I was approached by some Iraqi friends to talk about my visit to Washington and my meetings with several people there ... At the end of January and early February of this year, the contacts with the Iraqis became more intense, and I felt that they were feeling a threat from the U.S. So, I was invited to visit Baghdad and met with Saddam Hussein in order to discuss the whole situation and the Iraqi-U.S. and Iraqi-European relations.
What was your impression of Saddam Hussein?
I found President Saddam Hussein to be very determined, very calm and building an efficient system to resist the U.S.-led military coalition against Iraq.
How was he doing that?
He was counting on several elements to build his defensive strategy. One is the Iraqi Army. The army has much experience [of war] and is very well trained. The second element is the Republican Guard, a presidential unit that is very well equipped and trained. Third is the paramilitary branch of the Baath Party. They are also highly motivated and devoted to the Baath ideology and they are determined to defend the regime. Fourth, there are the tribes. And here Saddam Hussein did something very interesting ... He gave them some power and a kind of autonomy in their domestic affairs. Since then, most of the tribes became more sympathetic to the regime because they were given privileges they did not previously enjoy. That is why Saddam Hussein can count on these tribes. Their role should not be underestimated. They are spread all over Iraq and in the remote areas. This may explain some of the resistance we see against the coalition forces.
Did Saddam Hussein ask you to relay a message to the Bush administration?
I need to be clear about this. I do not hold any initiative from the Iraqis to the West and vice versa. It was not up to me to deliver messages. But because of my close ties with some influential people in Washington and my friendship with Iraq, the endeavor was an attempt after several meetings in Iraq, the U.S., Europe and the Vatican to try and find a possible common ground and ideas for a proposal.
Which party presented the most obstacles toward a compromise?
I felt that both parties were determined to go to war. The United States, they were really reluctant to start negotiations toward a compromise. And Saddam was very determined to resist and to fight. He was confident that he could do so. I can say that my impression of the mood in Iraq and the United States was not favorable for a compromise and a peaceful initiative.
Did you find that any common ground existed?
The main problem [was that] Saddam Hussein was very cooperative and open to discussing United Nations Resolution 1441. By contrast, the Bush administration considered that their previous experiences with Saddam Hussein were not encouraging; they had no confidence that he would disarm. It is really a problem of trust—the Bush administration does not trust the Iraqi leadership ... Also, my feeling was that the United States wanted to get rid of the whole Iraqi military strategy. A perception in the United States, I felt, was that the Iraqi Army was too big and too numerous in number for such a small country and such a delicate region.
How do you respond to the view that Washington’s Middle East policy-makers are neoconservatives who are waging the war against Iraq to protect Israel? Was this ever brought up during your meetings in Washington?
I have heard this in Washington ... [Virginia Congressman Jim] Moran pointed it out. And for sure that Israel will be the first beneficiary of this war.
Did it ever come up in your conversations with Donald Rumsfeld and Paul Wolfowitz that Iraq’s army should be reduced to pose less of a threat to Israel?
I am not willing to give any indication of the people that I met in Washington. It is very well known that I met Mr. Rumsfeld in June, you don’t need to mix all the meetings together. I don’t at all want to mention whom I met during my last trip to Washington in February [because] it is very embarrassing for these people to conduct any kind of negotiations while they are engaged in military operations.
(continued)