thedrifter
07-20-07, 05:50 AM
07-19-2007
Generals are paid to Win Wars!
By Raymond Perry
Lieutenant Colonel Paul Yingling, US Army, published a critique within military circles critical of the Army’s performance in Iraq. He specifically cited the Army’s General Officer Corps for the failure of the Army to perform in combat.
It is as if the Army is supremely ready to fight the cold war and is hoping that, somehow, the Iraqi Insurgents will get the message and start fighting like the Soviet Union.
As Col Yingling notes in his article, that is just not in the cards.
The essence of warfare is finding the weakness of an enemy and then exploiting that weakness ruthlessly and relentlessly. What we see in Iraq is not the period of seesaw combat characterizing the middle of a war where one side slowly seizes the advantage leading to victory.
US Forces are not winning, period.
All the technology, pinpoint accuracy ordnance, and joint operations simply are not working. In another era President Lincoln shuffled generals repeatedly until he found one that could win.
We need to do the same.
In his seminal article, “A Failure in Generalship,” published in the Armed Forces Journal, Col Yingling addresses the fundamental characteristics required of generals. Courage, both physical and moral, is at the top.
Simply, generals must win wars.
Generals do this by envisioning the future and building an army ready to take on that future during times of peace. No one ever gets the future quite right, but if generals allow themselves to lapse into keeping control of the “status quo” then they end up building another Maginot Line.
It is an unfortunate element of Title 10 that there are enormous incentives for generals to “toe the line” of their political bosses. Our constitution is structured to ensure that military officers are indeed subordinate to civilian authority.
Yet Congress has a responsibility to ensure that laws governing generals enable them to provide candid opinions and to select as future generals those with “courage and creative intelligence.” (J.F.C. Fuller's "Generalship: Its Diseases and Their Cure.")
Our current laws strongly encourage status quo generalship.
In an article, “Critiques of Iraq War Reveal Rifts Among Army Officers,” Wall Street Journal, 29 June 2007, author Greg Jaffe analyzes how the Army is reacting to Col Yingling’s critical and cogent article.
Major General Jeff Hammond, commander of Fort Hood, Texas, summoned all Captains (most veterans of Iraq combat) to hear his rebuttal to Col Yingling’s article. He noted that generals are “dedicated, selfless servants.” He concluded that Col Yingling was not competent to judge generals because he has “never worn the shoes of a general.”
It is an accepted element of command in the submarine world that when the skipper of a submarine begins to speak in these terms he is on the brink of losing control of his crew.
Generals are paid to win, but the Generals just don’t get it.
There is a larger context to be considered. The need for the recent Special Commission on Violence and Sexual Harassment at the Service Academies should be seen as a bellweather. These institutions serve to prepare this nation’s future combat leaders. Failure will only be visible decades from now.
In his letter to academy graduates responding to this Commission’s Report, Rodney Rempt, the Superintendent, blames the midshipmen themselves for academy travails. He fails to understand the connection between his leadership and the performance of his people.
It is also accepted in submarine command circles that when a skipper begins to blame his people for poor performance he has lost control.
With a leader like this at the Navy’s premier institution of leadership can the Navy’s admirals be too far different from army generals?
As Col Yingling notes in his article, Congress must change the equation. Title 10, governing officer selection, promotion and tenure, must be changed. Second Secretary of Defense Gates must clean out the general and flag officer ranks. Finally the Pentagon process itself must be changed.
A recent article in USA Today, Pentagon Balked at Pleas from officers in the field for safer vehicles, regarding armored vehicles has been presaged by well over a decade of a failure of the Pentagon process to cope with real world evidence of the need for properly designed armored vehicles for a war like Iraq.
In an article published in March 2004, “Cold War Thinking Prevented Vital Vehicle from Reaching Iraq,” Wall Street Journal author Greg Jaffe addressed this specific issue. My follow-up article, How the System Shorted Armored Humvees, addressed the systemic causes for this failure.
Three vehicles were designed and brought up to an Engineering Development Model phase. The only thing needed to begin procurement and deployment was the “go ahead” order.
No substantial action has yet been initiated.
A wise old shipmate once noted that among any group of new admirals there were 1/3 selected because their record could not be denied, 1/3 that were chosen for a specific task, and 1/3 that had the brownest nose around.
That bottom third must be identified, there are likely about half of the middle third that are unproductive, and finally that top group probably includes a fraction that do not meet J.F.C. Fuller’s criteria of generalship.
All told there are probably about 60% of these officers who should be quickly retired and replaced.
There is much work to do and Congress must get on with it. Secretary of Defense Gates, not the Service Secretaries, can begin the process by restructuring and repopulating our general and flag officer corps. But the hard work belongs to our Congress.
The recent Body Armor scandal, the failure to understand the real world need for armored vehicles, and service academy scandals are the “canaries in the coal mine.” They confirm that the national defense establishment’s primary goal is maintaining control of resources when it should be to provide our troops the best leadership, training and equipment -- so that victory on the battlefield comes at the lowest possible cost.
This bureaucractic mind-set of our most senior military leaders must be changed, and changed now.
Lt. Raymond Perry USN (Ret.) is a DefenseWatch Contributing Editor. He can be reached at cos1stlt@yahoo.com. Please send Feedback responses to dwfeedback@yahoo.com.
Ellie
Generals are paid to Win Wars!
By Raymond Perry
Lieutenant Colonel Paul Yingling, US Army, published a critique within military circles critical of the Army’s performance in Iraq. He specifically cited the Army’s General Officer Corps for the failure of the Army to perform in combat.
It is as if the Army is supremely ready to fight the cold war and is hoping that, somehow, the Iraqi Insurgents will get the message and start fighting like the Soviet Union.
As Col Yingling notes in his article, that is just not in the cards.
The essence of warfare is finding the weakness of an enemy and then exploiting that weakness ruthlessly and relentlessly. What we see in Iraq is not the period of seesaw combat characterizing the middle of a war where one side slowly seizes the advantage leading to victory.
US Forces are not winning, period.
All the technology, pinpoint accuracy ordnance, and joint operations simply are not working. In another era President Lincoln shuffled generals repeatedly until he found one that could win.
We need to do the same.
In his seminal article, “A Failure in Generalship,” published in the Armed Forces Journal, Col Yingling addresses the fundamental characteristics required of generals. Courage, both physical and moral, is at the top.
Simply, generals must win wars.
Generals do this by envisioning the future and building an army ready to take on that future during times of peace. No one ever gets the future quite right, but if generals allow themselves to lapse into keeping control of the “status quo” then they end up building another Maginot Line.
It is an unfortunate element of Title 10 that there are enormous incentives for generals to “toe the line” of their political bosses. Our constitution is structured to ensure that military officers are indeed subordinate to civilian authority.
Yet Congress has a responsibility to ensure that laws governing generals enable them to provide candid opinions and to select as future generals those with “courage and creative intelligence.” (J.F.C. Fuller's "Generalship: Its Diseases and Their Cure.")
Our current laws strongly encourage status quo generalship.
In an article, “Critiques of Iraq War Reveal Rifts Among Army Officers,” Wall Street Journal, 29 June 2007, author Greg Jaffe analyzes how the Army is reacting to Col Yingling’s critical and cogent article.
Major General Jeff Hammond, commander of Fort Hood, Texas, summoned all Captains (most veterans of Iraq combat) to hear his rebuttal to Col Yingling’s article. He noted that generals are “dedicated, selfless servants.” He concluded that Col Yingling was not competent to judge generals because he has “never worn the shoes of a general.”
It is an accepted element of command in the submarine world that when the skipper of a submarine begins to speak in these terms he is on the brink of losing control of his crew.
Generals are paid to win, but the Generals just don’t get it.
There is a larger context to be considered. The need for the recent Special Commission on Violence and Sexual Harassment at the Service Academies should be seen as a bellweather. These institutions serve to prepare this nation’s future combat leaders. Failure will only be visible decades from now.
In his letter to academy graduates responding to this Commission’s Report, Rodney Rempt, the Superintendent, blames the midshipmen themselves for academy travails. He fails to understand the connection between his leadership and the performance of his people.
It is also accepted in submarine command circles that when a skipper begins to blame his people for poor performance he has lost control.
With a leader like this at the Navy’s premier institution of leadership can the Navy’s admirals be too far different from army generals?
As Col Yingling notes in his article, Congress must change the equation. Title 10, governing officer selection, promotion and tenure, must be changed. Second Secretary of Defense Gates must clean out the general and flag officer ranks. Finally the Pentagon process itself must be changed.
A recent article in USA Today, Pentagon Balked at Pleas from officers in the field for safer vehicles, regarding armored vehicles has been presaged by well over a decade of a failure of the Pentagon process to cope with real world evidence of the need for properly designed armored vehicles for a war like Iraq.
In an article published in March 2004, “Cold War Thinking Prevented Vital Vehicle from Reaching Iraq,” Wall Street Journal author Greg Jaffe addressed this specific issue. My follow-up article, How the System Shorted Armored Humvees, addressed the systemic causes for this failure.
Three vehicles were designed and brought up to an Engineering Development Model phase. The only thing needed to begin procurement and deployment was the “go ahead” order.
No substantial action has yet been initiated.
A wise old shipmate once noted that among any group of new admirals there were 1/3 selected because their record could not be denied, 1/3 that were chosen for a specific task, and 1/3 that had the brownest nose around.
That bottom third must be identified, there are likely about half of the middle third that are unproductive, and finally that top group probably includes a fraction that do not meet J.F.C. Fuller’s criteria of generalship.
All told there are probably about 60% of these officers who should be quickly retired and replaced.
There is much work to do and Congress must get on with it. Secretary of Defense Gates, not the Service Secretaries, can begin the process by restructuring and repopulating our general and flag officer corps. But the hard work belongs to our Congress.
The recent Body Armor scandal, the failure to understand the real world need for armored vehicles, and service academy scandals are the “canaries in the coal mine.” They confirm that the national defense establishment’s primary goal is maintaining control of resources when it should be to provide our troops the best leadership, training and equipment -- so that victory on the battlefield comes at the lowest possible cost.
This bureaucractic mind-set of our most senior military leaders must be changed, and changed now.
Lt. Raymond Perry USN (Ret.) is a DefenseWatch Contributing Editor. He can be reached at cos1stlt@yahoo.com. Please send Feedback responses to dwfeedback@yahoo.com.
Ellie