thedrifter
06-24-07, 04:53 PM
06-24-2007
Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs), Pod-Equipped Jets, and Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs): What is the Ground Truth?
By Matthew Dodd
“Using unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) and pod-equipped combat jets to find improvised explosive devices (IEDs) is often a misuse of time and resources...It’s a waste...”
According to a June 21, 2007 Aerospace Daily & Defense Report article, those opinions were presented in a June 20, 2007 speech by U.S. Air Force General Ronald Keys, commander of Air Combat Command (ACC), at the “Transformation Warfare 07” conference and exhibit in Virginia Beach, Va.
In comparison, below are excerpts from the March 25, 2006 US Central Command (CENTCOM) Air Forces Public Affairs article, “Fighter jets proving effective in 'non-traditional' role,” that contradict General Keys’ opinions:
“The concept of using fighter aircraft with targeting pods to monitor the battlespace is known as nontraditional intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance [NTISR]...With the production and development of traditional ISR capabilities such as the unmanned Predator aircraft struggling to keep pace, leveraging fighters, bombers and air-mobility aircraft in a similar role is helping to ensure information dominance..."Before NTISR, we had fighter aircraft with surveillance capabilities burning holes is the sky, just waiting to be tasked by ground commanders," said Maj. Marco Fiorito, deputy chief of collections management at the Combined Air Operations Center here. "Instead of wasting these resources, we've begun to use them to fill some of the gaps in our traditional ISR operations"..."The majority of the time, NTISR aircraft aircrews communicate directly with ground units. This fosters a greater understanding of what ground units are looking for and thinking"..."These aircraft can scout ahead of convoys, looking for possible ambush sites or any other threat"...NTISR also has the potential to be a player in the fight against improvised explosive devices. ‘We're working around the clock to find a good way of employing NTISR and other assets to the counter-IED fight’”
Which perspective is correct, or most accurate? Keys’ comments are much more recent, which implies they are based on the most current information not available back in 2006. Also, Keys is the four-star commander of ACC, so he has a need and a responsibility to know about UAVs and pod-equipped combat jets. The 2006 article was written by a staff sergeant from the CENTCOM Air Forces Public Affairs office, which is expected to publish positive pieces about air operations.
As a retired Marine officer with neither tactical nor operational experience using UAVs and pod-equipped combat jets to help counter IED threats, I am tempted to accept Keys’ perspective, except for one thing: from all I have read, heard, and understand, I agree with the perspectives in the staff sergeant’s article. I had not heard that UAVs and pod-equipped jets were practically worthless in helping to counter the IED threats faced by our ground forces.
I decided to re-read the Aerospace article and do some analysis to help me determine which perspective to believe. Let me share my thoughts and observations with you....
“Often, requests for airborne surveillance are based on the assumption that such aircraft help find IEDs and save ground forces from such attacks, he said. Certain military leaders feel they need the full-motion video feeds to locate the explosives. The truth, he said, is much different.
Based on Air Force analysis, the number of IEDs found by UAVs, surveillance aircraft or combat jets outfitted with advanced targeting pods per 100,000 flight hours is very low, according to Keys. "It's a waste," Keys said....”
Dodd Comments: Keys is saying that airborne surveillance does not help find IEDs. He is also saying that many ground commanders share belief in the assumption that airborne surveillance does help protect troops from IEDs. I sense that he is a bit condescending towards his ground force counterparts who he thinks are falsely believing an incorrect assumption. What troubles me most about Keys’ assertions is that it appears he is basing his conclusions on an air force flight hours study. While I think that that study does have some value in the airborne surveillance versus IEDs discussion, it is literally and figuratively only half of the story. Keys’ comments beg the obvious question: What do the guys on the ground have to say about the value of airborne surveillance versus IEDs?
“Unfortunately, the military is basing some of its decisions on anecdotes instead of real metrics, he said. Indeed, the only metric being used is whether the Air Force is meeting certain tasking orders, instead of making sure those assets and flights are effective and the best use of time and aircraft. "This is no way to fight a war," he said.”
Dodd Comments: I once again sense in Keys’ comments a bit of condescension towards ground force decision-makers for basing their decisions on anecdotes and ineffective metrics. If he feels that strongly that his flight hours study is a significant factor to consider, then why has it not gotten enough acceptance to help the ground commanders make better decisions?
“Keys said ACC has developed a "concept of deployment" to help fight IEDs that is air-centric "to a certain point." Without going into specifics, he said, "We ought to be attacking the system - to the left of 'the bang,'" meaning the process before the IED is emplaced. What needs to be looked at is the network, "not the thing that's buried out there," he said.
Flying pod-outfitted F-16s up and down streets no one will be on for another 12 hours will not help the IED fight, he said. Looking for buried IEDs in Iraq in that fashion is not the best way to stop attacks. "It's a junkyard out there," he said, adding there are too many false positives.”
Dodd Comments: I agree with Keys that waiting until IEDs are emplaced and ready to be used against our ground forces to start countering them is too late. The ideal is to take out the insurgents and their IEDs before they can set up their ambush sites. But, just as it is foolish to wait until IED ambush sites are set up to begin worrying about them, it is equally foolish to stop using airborne surveillance to help counter those established IED ambush sites. I find it hard to believe, as Keys implies, that we are not actively working on actions “to the left of 'the bang'" in our counter IED efforts.
Keys brought up a good point about airborne surveillance problems with too many false positives. However, that problem is something that should be addressed through training and technology, and not used as proof that airborne surveillance does not work. Again, not getting a ground guy’s perspectives makes Keys’ comments less relevant.
As I researched further, I discovered the following quote from Lt. Gen. David A. Deptula, Deputy Chief-of-Staff for Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance at Headquarters, U.S. Air Force from a Congressional breakfast on April 27, 2007. He was talking about the Air Force’s high-priced F-22 Raptor:
“It’s a flying ISR sensor that will allow us to conduct network-centric warfare inside adversary battlespace from the first moments of any conflict in addition to its vast array of attack capabilities; and, the fact that it’s not opposed by like fighters means we can make use of those robust capabilities all the more!”
So, we have Keys saying that pod-equipped jets are a waste in NTISR environments, and Deptula calling the newest jet a flying ISR sensor. So, is Keys calling the F-22 Raptor a waste, or does he have the same condescending opinion of Deptula as he apparently has for ground commanders?
As I continued my internet research, I found many more statements and endorsements for airborne ISR missions and UAVs in the counter-IED fight.
Following my gut-instincts that Keys’ comments were not accurate (despite a lot of information to the contrary), I wondered why he would make those comments, and came up with three possibilities. One possibility is that he was simply completely ignorant of the situation on the ground. A second possibility is that his comments were an effort to downplay tactical relevance of airborne reconnaissance to bolster the USAF 'power-play' for UAV executive agency, see my May 11, 2007 DefenseWatch article. The last possibility is that he was trying to begin making the case for downsizing air force presence and involvement in this ‘ground-centric’ war effort.
In all fairness to Keys, he may be right on target about using UAVs and pod-equipped jets in the counter-IED fight. If he is, then his comments deserve the widest dissemination so we do not continue to waste our precious time and resources. Also, if he is right, I recommend that he do a better job of presenting his thoughts from a joint perspective (including the ground perspective).
Whatever the reason(s) for his comments, I find it irresponsible for Keys to speak at a joint military transformation conference and present at best an incomplete and air force-centric perspective about airborne ISR support to ground operations. He either misled conference attendees, or he did a poor job of identifying and correcting misperceptions. Either way, he has left me wondering: What is the ‘ground truth’ about UAVs and pod-equipped jets versus IEDs?
Matthew Dodd is a Senior Editor of DefenseWatch. He can be reached at mattdodd1775@hotmail.com. Please send Feedback responses to dwfeedback@yahoo.com.
Ellie
Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs), Pod-Equipped Jets, and Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs): What is the Ground Truth?
By Matthew Dodd
“Using unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) and pod-equipped combat jets to find improvised explosive devices (IEDs) is often a misuse of time and resources...It’s a waste...”
According to a June 21, 2007 Aerospace Daily & Defense Report article, those opinions were presented in a June 20, 2007 speech by U.S. Air Force General Ronald Keys, commander of Air Combat Command (ACC), at the “Transformation Warfare 07” conference and exhibit in Virginia Beach, Va.
In comparison, below are excerpts from the March 25, 2006 US Central Command (CENTCOM) Air Forces Public Affairs article, “Fighter jets proving effective in 'non-traditional' role,” that contradict General Keys’ opinions:
“The concept of using fighter aircraft with targeting pods to monitor the battlespace is known as nontraditional intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance [NTISR]...With the production and development of traditional ISR capabilities such as the unmanned Predator aircraft struggling to keep pace, leveraging fighters, bombers and air-mobility aircraft in a similar role is helping to ensure information dominance..."Before NTISR, we had fighter aircraft with surveillance capabilities burning holes is the sky, just waiting to be tasked by ground commanders," said Maj. Marco Fiorito, deputy chief of collections management at the Combined Air Operations Center here. "Instead of wasting these resources, we've begun to use them to fill some of the gaps in our traditional ISR operations"..."The majority of the time, NTISR aircraft aircrews communicate directly with ground units. This fosters a greater understanding of what ground units are looking for and thinking"..."These aircraft can scout ahead of convoys, looking for possible ambush sites or any other threat"...NTISR also has the potential to be a player in the fight against improvised explosive devices. ‘We're working around the clock to find a good way of employing NTISR and other assets to the counter-IED fight’”
Which perspective is correct, or most accurate? Keys’ comments are much more recent, which implies they are based on the most current information not available back in 2006. Also, Keys is the four-star commander of ACC, so he has a need and a responsibility to know about UAVs and pod-equipped combat jets. The 2006 article was written by a staff sergeant from the CENTCOM Air Forces Public Affairs office, which is expected to publish positive pieces about air operations.
As a retired Marine officer with neither tactical nor operational experience using UAVs and pod-equipped combat jets to help counter IED threats, I am tempted to accept Keys’ perspective, except for one thing: from all I have read, heard, and understand, I agree with the perspectives in the staff sergeant’s article. I had not heard that UAVs and pod-equipped jets were practically worthless in helping to counter the IED threats faced by our ground forces.
I decided to re-read the Aerospace article and do some analysis to help me determine which perspective to believe. Let me share my thoughts and observations with you....
“Often, requests for airborne surveillance are based on the assumption that such aircraft help find IEDs and save ground forces from such attacks, he said. Certain military leaders feel they need the full-motion video feeds to locate the explosives. The truth, he said, is much different.
Based on Air Force analysis, the number of IEDs found by UAVs, surveillance aircraft or combat jets outfitted with advanced targeting pods per 100,000 flight hours is very low, according to Keys. "It's a waste," Keys said....”
Dodd Comments: Keys is saying that airborne surveillance does not help find IEDs. He is also saying that many ground commanders share belief in the assumption that airborne surveillance does help protect troops from IEDs. I sense that he is a bit condescending towards his ground force counterparts who he thinks are falsely believing an incorrect assumption. What troubles me most about Keys’ assertions is that it appears he is basing his conclusions on an air force flight hours study. While I think that that study does have some value in the airborne surveillance versus IEDs discussion, it is literally and figuratively only half of the story. Keys’ comments beg the obvious question: What do the guys on the ground have to say about the value of airborne surveillance versus IEDs?
“Unfortunately, the military is basing some of its decisions on anecdotes instead of real metrics, he said. Indeed, the only metric being used is whether the Air Force is meeting certain tasking orders, instead of making sure those assets and flights are effective and the best use of time and aircraft. "This is no way to fight a war," he said.”
Dodd Comments: I once again sense in Keys’ comments a bit of condescension towards ground force decision-makers for basing their decisions on anecdotes and ineffective metrics. If he feels that strongly that his flight hours study is a significant factor to consider, then why has it not gotten enough acceptance to help the ground commanders make better decisions?
“Keys said ACC has developed a "concept of deployment" to help fight IEDs that is air-centric "to a certain point." Without going into specifics, he said, "We ought to be attacking the system - to the left of 'the bang,'" meaning the process before the IED is emplaced. What needs to be looked at is the network, "not the thing that's buried out there," he said.
Flying pod-outfitted F-16s up and down streets no one will be on for another 12 hours will not help the IED fight, he said. Looking for buried IEDs in Iraq in that fashion is not the best way to stop attacks. "It's a junkyard out there," he said, adding there are too many false positives.”
Dodd Comments: I agree with Keys that waiting until IEDs are emplaced and ready to be used against our ground forces to start countering them is too late. The ideal is to take out the insurgents and their IEDs before they can set up their ambush sites. But, just as it is foolish to wait until IED ambush sites are set up to begin worrying about them, it is equally foolish to stop using airborne surveillance to help counter those established IED ambush sites. I find it hard to believe, as Keys implies, that we are not actively working on actions “to the left of 'the bang'" in our counter IED efforts.
Keys brought up a good point about airborne surveillance problems with too many false positives. However, that problem is something that should be addressed through training and technology, and not used as proof that airborne surveillance does not work. Again, not getting a ground guy’s perspectives makes Keys’ comments less relevant.
As I researched further, I discovered the following quote from Lt. Gen. David A. Deptula, Deputy Chief-of-Staff for Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance at Headquarters, U.S. Air Force from a Congressional breakfast on April 27, 2007. He was talking about the Air Force’s high-priced F-22 Raptor:
“It’s a flying ISR sensor that will allow us to conduct network-centric warfare inside adversary battlespace from the first moments of any conflict in addition to its vast array of attack capabilities; and, the fact that it’s not opposed by like fighters means we can make use of those robust capabilities all the more!”
So, we have Keys saying that pod-equipped jets are a waste in NTISR environments, and Deptula calling the newest jet a flying ISR sensor. So, is Keys calling the F-22 Raptor a waste, or does he have the same condescending opinion of Deptula as he apparently has for ground commanders?
As I continued my internet research, I found many more statements and endorsements for airborne ISR missions and UAVs in the counter-IED fight.
Following my gut-instincts that Keys’ comments were not accurate (despite a lot of information to the contrary), I wondered why he would make those comments, and came up with three possibilities. One possibility is that he was simply completely ignorant of the situation on the ground. A second possibility is that his comments were an effort to downplay tactical relevance of airborne reconnaissance to bolster the USAF 'power-play' for UAV executive agency, see my May 11, 2007 DefenseWatch article. The last possibility is that he was trying to begin making the case for downsizing air force presence and involvement in this ‘ground-centric’ war effort.
In all fairness to Keys, he may be right on target about using UAVs and pod-equipped jets in the counter-IED fight. If he is, then his comments deserve the widest dissemination so we do not continue to waste our precious time and resources. Also, if he is right, I recommend that he do a better job of presenting his thoughts from a joint perspective (including the ground perspective).
Whatever the reason(s) for his comments, I find it irresponsible for Keys to speak at a joint military transformation conference and present at best an incomplete and air force-centric perspective about airborne ISR support to ground operations. He either misled conference attendees, or he did a poor job of identifying and correcting misperceptions. Either way, he has left me wondering: What is the ‘ground truth’ about UAVs and pod-equipped jets versus IEDs?
Matthew Dodd is a Senior Editor of DefenseWatch. He can be reached at mattdodd1775@hotmail.com. Please send Feedback responses to dwfeedback@yahoo.com.
Ellie