thedrifter
04-22-07, 03:16 PM
Report: Navy can’t afford proposed fleet
By Andrew Scutro - Staff writer
Posted : Sunday Apr 22, 2007 15:51:32 EDT
An April 10 research report to Congress on assembling the modern fleet says the Navy’s latest shipbuilding plan cannot achieve its intent of a 313-ship future fleet, up from today’s 275-ship force.
“The Navy’s 30-year shipbuilding plan does not include enough ships to fully support all the elements of the 313-ship fleet consistently over the long run,” according to the report entitled “Navy Force Structure and Shipbuilding Plans: Background and Issues for Congress,” produced by the Congressional Research Service.
The Navy has estimated that it needs about $13.5 billion per year into the foreseeable future to build the required fleet. But according to the analysis by Ron O’Rourke, naval analyst at CRS, it’s not enough.
“If the Navy cannot meet its goals regarding overall level funding, non-shipbuilding expenditures and shipbuilding costs, the Navy’s shipbuilding plans may become difficult or impossible to execute, particularly after [2011],” he wrote.
Intended as accessible research for lawmakers, the report comes at a time when the Navy has several major problems with the ships of the future fleet.
Most notably, the third Littoral Combat Ship in a proposed 55-ship fleet of fast, modern, shallow-water combat ships was terminated by Navy Secretary Donald Winter on April 12 because of differences with contractor Lockheed Martin over cost increases. Now a program in serious trouble, the LCS had been the assumed cornerstone of the Navy’s future fleet.
Also in recent weeks, the first of the Navy’s new and increasingly expensive amphibious warfare ships has come under increased scrutiny after a top-to-bottom inspection. A Board of Inspection and Survey team’s visit to the amphibious transport dock San Antonio produced a scathing 20-page list of deficiencies, from faulty wiring to steering system breakdowns.
Meanwhile, outside-the-box options for the future fleet sit nearby.
On April 9, CRS released a collection of three previously completed studies on alternative force structures that offer fresh perspectives on how the future Navy might be configured.
One study, completed by the now disbanded Office of Force Transformation at the Defense Department, proposed a very different type of fleet, using less expensive hulls for “missile and rocket” ships, a “mother ship” to support a flotilla of small surface combatants, and a downsized catamaran flattop to carry an air detachment of Ospreys, Joint Strike Fighters and unmanned aircraft.
Another alternative force structure study, written by Robert Work, a defense analyst at the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, overturns current fleet configurations in the interest of taking a realistic approach amid rising ship costs.
Among ideas it proposes are converting the aging aircraft carrier Enterprise into an “afloat forward staging base” for special operations forces with embarked joint air wings. He also proposed converting four more Ohio-class ballistic missile submarines into multimission guided missile subs, for a force of eight SSGNs.
The CSBA study identifies a “Joint Expeditionary Era” in which the Navy will be responsible for contributions to the war on terrorism, must be ready for the nuclear-armed adversaries in certain regions and must maintain a “hedge against the possibility of a disruptive maritime competition with China.”
Work said that while the Navy has remained steadfast that the 313-ship plan is realistic and affordable, “there’s widespread skepticism outside the Navy that the plan is executable.”
Work noted, for example, the ever-diminishing profile of the Navy’s destroyer of the future, DDG 1000. The Navy’s earlier desire for 32 such ships has been whittled down to seven as cost estimates have climbed past $3 billion per ship. An earlier design with 128 vertical launch missile tubes now has 80 — fewer than current Arleigh Burke destroyers, he said. Likewise, gun magazines with desired capacity for 1,500 rounds of 155mm ammunition have been reduced to 600 rounds.
The capabilities have not been removed to make the ship more lethal, he noted, just more affordable.
“As the cost of the ships has gone up, the Navy has been able to afford fewer and fewer of them,” he said. “You lower the chance you’ll be able to have the ships you really want.”
The force structure alternatives have not been getting much attention in recent years because of ongoing land wars in the Middle East.
“This is an issue that may be readdressed when and if we pull out of Iraq,” Work said.
Ellie
By Andrew Scutro - Staff writer
Posted : Sunday Apr 22, 2007 15:51:32 EDT
An April 10 research report to Congress on assembling the modern fleet says the Navy’s latest shipbuilding plan cannot achieve its intent of a 313-ship future fleet, up from today’s 275-ship force.
“The Navy’s 30-year shipbuilding plan does not include enough ships to fully support all the elements of the 313-ship fleet consistently over the long run,” according to the report entitled “Navy Force Structure and Shipbuilding Plans: Background and Issues for Congress,” produced by the Congressional Research Service.
The Navy has estimated that it needs about $13.5 billion per year into the foreseeable future to build the required fleet. But according to the analysis by Ron O’Rourke, naval analyst at CRS, it’s not enough.
“If the Navy cannot meet its goals regarding overall level funding, non-shipbuilding expenditures and shipbuilding costs, the Navy’s shipbuilding plans may become difficult or impossible to execute, particularly after [2011],” he wrote.
Intended as accessible research for lawmakers, the report comes at a time when the Navy has several major problems with the ships of the future fleet.
Most notably, the third Littoral Combat Ship in a proposed 55-ship fleet of fast, modern, shallow-water combat ships was terminated by Navy Secretary Donald Winter on April 12 because of differences with contractor Lockheed Martin over cost increases. Now a program in serious trouble, the LCS had been the assumed cornerstone of the Navy’s future fleet.
Also in recent weeks, the first of the Navy’s new and increasingly expensive amphibious warfare ships has come under increased scrutiny after a top-to-bottom inspection. A Board of Inspection and Survey team’s visit to the amphibious transport dock San Antonio produced a scathing 20-page list of deficiencies, from faulty wiring to steering system breakdowns.
Meanwhile, outside-the-box options for the future fleet sit nearby.
On April 9, CRS released a collection of three previously completed studies on alternative force structures that offer fresh perspectives on how the future Navy might be configured.
One study, completed by the now disbanded Office of Force Transformation at the Defense Department, proposed a very different type of fleet, using less expensive hulls for “missile and rocket” ships, a “mother ship” to support a flotilla of small surface combatants, and a downsized catamaran flattop to carry an air detachment of Ospreys, Joint Strike Fighters and unmanned aircraft.
Another alternative force structure study, written by Robert Work, a defense analyst at the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, overturns current fleet configurations in the interest of taking a realistic approach amid rising ship costs.
Among ideas it proposes are converting the aging aircraft carrier Enterprise into an “afloat forward staging base” for special operations forces with embarked joint air wings. He also proposed converting four more Ohio-class ballistic missile submarines into multimission guided missile subs, for a force of eight SSGNs.
The CSBA study identifies a “Joint Expeditionary Era” in which the Navy will be responsible for contributions to the war on terrorism, must be ready for the nuclear-armed adversaries in certain regions and must maintain a “hedge against the possibility of a disruptive maritime competition with China.”
Work said that while the Navy has remained steadfast that the 313-ship plan is realistic and affordable, “there’s widespread skepticism outside the Navy that the plan is executable.”
Work noted, for example, the ever-diminishing profile of the Navy’s destroyer of the future, DDG 1000. The Navy’s earlier desire for 32 such ships has been whittled down to seven as cost estimates have climbed past $3 billion per ship. An earlier design with 128 vertical launch missile tubes now has 80 — fewer than current Arleigh Burke destroyers, he said. Likewise, gun magazines with desired capacity for 1,500 rounds of 155mm ammunition have been reduced to 600 rounds.
The capabilities have not been removed to make the ship more lethal, he noted, just more affordable.
“As the cost of the ships has gone up, the Navy has been able to afford fewer and fewer of them,” he said. “You lower the chance you’ll be able to have the ships you really want.”
The force structure alternatives have not been getting much attention in recent years because of ongoing land wars in the Middle East.
“This is an issue that may be readdressed when and if we pull out of Iraq,” Work said.
Ellie