thedrifter
04-13-07, 09:11 AM
April 13, 2007
A word from Sergeant Honeycutt
Power Line, MN
Sergeant Mike Honeycutt responds to our post here and the linked Patterico post:
I understand that there is predictable and responsible skepticism about my views, position, and biases. I completely understand and respect that since this is the internet after all. That’s why I’m writing from my army account in case there is any doubt of my identity.
As has been pointed out by commenters, what is true in my area is not true in all areas. Absolutely correct, and on that note, one thing I would like to point out is that the most optimistic assessments are consistently from Anbar province where the Marines are doing things that the Army isn’t doing. Namely working with the local sheiks and militias (an important note specific to Anbar is that some militias are actually fighting our common enemy which makes them at least a temporary ally). Multiple accounts have noted that Shia IA units are fighting admirably in that Sunni province and I don’t doubt that. I have worked with some good and motivated IA troops on numerous joint missions here. The problem is with judging prospects for success on individual missions and interactions. I could relay many stories of motivating personal interactions with Iraqis, but just as you can’t take experiences in the south and apply them to the west, you can’t take personal interactions and apply them to the whole.
While I am frustrated by the extension, the issues I bring up are not based specifically on my unit, or on individual villages or cities or officials. Some things are based on my experience with this brigade’s mobilization and specifically our training, but I interact with other army units as well as various three letter agencies and branches of service. I really try to base my observations on things that I see as bigger picture problems as I have experienced them. Does my personal frustration at micro level things taint my view? Of course, but I’m not the only one. Many many soldiers are frustrated by the same things so I try not to speak only for myself.
An important note to understand is that our support of the new central government undermines the traditional power of the tribal sheiks. Where Saddam largely left the tribal system to its own devices to settle disputes, we tell people to go to the police and politicans or tell us about terrorist activity. Also of note is that JAM has turned the tribal system on its collective head. No longer is it one tribe or the other who is powerful or negotiating amongst themselves; now JAM is the biggest most powerful tribe and the sheikhs have little recourse when dealing with infractions such as having a tribe member murdered. It’s no longer individuals belonging to one tribe or another. People are JAM members who also happen to belong to a tribe to the traditional corrective measures do not apply. In Anbar they are fighting a largely foreign entity in Al Queda which alleviates much of the internal conflicts. It isn’t hard to get Iraqi’s to unite against a foreign presence.
The problem with the central government I began to describe is that it is dominated by Shia religious parties. Where someone in Anbar doesn’t see the results of that, at least directly, they do see Sunnis who don’t buy into the political process as a result of the Shia domination but that’s a different problem. In Babil Province and across Southern Iraq we see local and provincial governments actually run by JAM and Badr. There are 30+ Sadrist CoR members. City and provincial politicians are almost always SCIRI but when they’re not they’re Sadrists. Even when a “neutral” or unaffiliated official such as a police chief is put in place, it is quickly made clear that they will play ball or they and/or their families will be killed.
I don’t think it’s well understood how significant it is that Sadr has 30+ CoR members and (I believe four) governmental ministries. When I said to imagine having Crips and Bloods in the government, I wasn’t kidding. That’s really what it’s like. How can you have JAM death squads killing and displacing Sunnis at the same time there are JAM politicians in the government? How can you have Sadr calling for attacks on Americans while he controls government mistires? How can we tell people to go to the police to report a JAM related crime when JAM controls the police? As an aside, most militia activity is directed against the population in the form of kidnappings, extortion, robberies and old fashioned intimidation.
The situation here is extremely complex and it’s impossible to address fully in anything resembling a brief fashion. Almost every paragraph above could easily spawn at least a page of explanation. I’ll try to respond elsewhere as time permits.
Sincerely,
Mike Honeycutt
a/k/a H
Sergeant Honeycutt's observations are consistent with the pessimistic assessment provided by the soldier serving with our hometown heroes in Iraq.
Ellie
A word from Sergeant Honeycutt
Power Line, MN
Sergeant Mike Honeycutt responds to our post here and the linked Patterico post:
I understand that there is predictable and responsible skepticism about my views, position, and biases. I completely understand and respect that since this is the internet after all. That’s why I’m writing from my army account in case there is any doubt of my identity.
As has been pointed out by commenters, what is true in my area is not true in all areas. Absolutely correct, and on that note, one thing I would like to point out is that the most optimistic assessments are consistently from Anbar province where the Marines are doing things that the Army isn’t doing. Namely working with the local sheiks and militias (an important note specific to Anbar is that some militias are actually fighting our common enemy which makes them at least a temporary ally). Multiple accounts have noted that Shia IA units are fighting admirably in that Sunni province and I don’t doubt that. I have worked with some good and motivated IA troops on numerous joint missions here. The problem is with judging prospects for success on individual missions and interactions. I could relay many stories of motivating personal interactions with Iraqis, but just as you can’t take experiences in the south and apply them to the west, you can’t take personal interactions and apply them to the whole.
While I am frustrated by the extension, the issues I bring up are not based specifically on my unit, or on individual villages or cities or officials. Some things are based on my experience with this brigade’s mobilization and specifically our training, but I interact with other army units as well as various three letter agencies and branches of service. I really try to base my observations on things that I see as bigger picture problems as I have experienced them. Does my personal frustration at micro level things taint my view? Of course, but I’m not the only one. Many many soldiers are frustrated by the same things so I try not to speak only for myself.
An important note to understand is that our support of the new central government undermines the traditional power of the tribal sheiks. Where Saddam largely left the tribal system to its own devices to settle disputes, we tell people to go to the police and politicans or tell us about terrorist activity. Also of note is that JAM has turned the tribal system on its collective head. No longer is it one tribe or the other who is powerful or negotiating amongst themselves; now JAM is the biggest most powerful tribe and the sheikhs have little recourse when dealing with infractions such as having a tribe member murdered. It’s no longer individuals belonging to one tribe or another. People are JAM members who also happen to belong to a tribe to the traditional corrective measures do not apply. In Anbar they are fighting a largely foreign entity in Al Queda which alleviates much of the internal conflicts. It isn’t hard to get Iraqi’s to unite against a foreign presence.
The problem with the central government I began to describe is that it is dominated by Shia religious parties. Where someone in Anbar doesn’t see the results of that, at least directly, they do see Sunnis who don’t buy into the political process as a result of the Shia domination but that’s a different problem. In Babil Province and across Southern Iraq we see local and provincial governments actually run by JAM and Badr. There are 30+ Sadrist CoR members. City and provincial politicians are almost always SCIRI but when they’re not they’re Sadrists. Even when a “neutral” or unaffiliated official such as a police chief is put in place, it is quickly made clear that they will play ball or they and/or their families will be killed.
I don’t think it’s well understood how significant it is that Sadr has 30+ CoR members and (I believe four) governmental ministries. When I said to imagine having Crips and Bloods in the government, I wasn’t kidding. That’s really what it’s like. How can you have JAM death squads killing and displacing Sunnis at the same time there are JAM politicians in the government? How can you have Sadr calling for attacks on Americans while he controls government mistires? How can we tell people to go to the police to report a JAM related crime when JAM controls the police? As an aside, most militia activity is directed against the population in the form of kidnappings, extortion, robberies and old fashioned intimidation.
The situation here is extremely complex and it’s impossible to address fully in anything resembling a brief fashion. Almost every paragraph above could easily spawn at least a page of explanation. I’ll try to respond elsewhere as time permits.
Sincerely,
Mike Honeycutt
a/k/a H
Sergeant Honeycutt's observations are consistent with the pessimistic assessment provided by the soldier serving with our hometown heroes in Iraq.
Ellie