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wrbones
02-07-03, 11:37 PM
resources


http://www.au.af.mil/au/aul/bibs/decwar/dwgen.htm


http://intellit.muskingum.edu/milintel_folder/milinteldec&el.html

wrbones
02-07-03, 11:39 PM
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Deception: An Integral Part Of Warfare

AUTHOR Major Jack L. Hughes, USMC

CSC 1990

SUBJECT AREA Foreign Policy


EXECUTIVE SUMMARY


Title: DECEPTION: AN INTEGRAL PART OF WARFARE


Thesis: The MAGTF commander must actively pursue deception
operations, not only as a force multiplier but also as an
integral part of warfare.


Issue: Deception as a principle of war has been around since
before the time of Sun Tzu. As a means of surprise,
deception has not held the U.S. military spotlight, partly
because a successful deception may never be revealed.
Extensive study and analysis of the 1973 Yon Kipper war
resulted in a major restructuring of the U.S Army toward the
Air Land Battle concept. Such an in-depth study failed to
heed the lesson of deception as a "force multiplier". The
Egyptians planned and executed a strategic deception on a
scale not seen since World War II, yet its contribution to
their initial success has been largely ignored.


Conclusions: Deception should be viewed as the perfect
"force multiplier". It can easily be tailored for the
operation, from one to several hundred men, depending on the
situation. The payoffs for surprise are almost always high,
it multiplies the chances for quick and decisive military
success. If the deception is ignored, at least the enemy has
spent his time evaluating the deception, and not planning his
course of action.


Recommendation: The decision to deceive rests with the MAGTF
Commander and he must employ deception as an integral part of
warfare.




DECEPTION: AN INTEGRAL PART OF WARFARE


Thesis: The MAGTF commander must actively pursue deception

operations, not only as a force multiplier but also as an

integral part of warfare.


I. History of Deception in Warfare

A. Gideon and the Midianites

B. Siege of Troy


II. Military Policies of Deception

A. Russia

B. U.S.


III. Elements of Deception

A. Categories of Deception

B. Principles of Deception

C. Means of Deception

D. Parts of Deception


IV. Planning the Deception

A. U.S. Army Deception Maximums

B. Ten Step Process




DECEPTION: AN INTEGRAL PART OF WARFARE


Though fraud in other activities be detestable, in
the management of war it is laudable and glorious,
and he who overcomes an enemy by fraud is as much
to be praised as he who does so by force. (7:XL)
Machiavelli

The use of deception and surprise is as old as warfare

itself. Concealment and camouflage are the primary methods

used to achieve surprise. Deception, as a means of surprise,

has not held the limelight of U.S. military study. Often a

successful deception is never revealed and as such is never

studied. It also may be that it is so infrequently or

intermittently practiced that it has never gained a firm foot

hold on formal doctrine. (22:3) In his exhaustive study of

deception in warfare, Stratagem, Barton Whaley could only

find seven exceptions to his generalization that deception

had become a mere staff function in the 20th Century. (22:7)

The MAGTF commander must actively pursue deception

operations, not only as a "force multiplier" but as an

integral part of warfare.

Deception appears to be one of those techniques of war,

like psychological warfare, that seems fated to cycles of

loss and resurgence despite the fact that they have been

around since the birth of time. Sun Tzu writes "All warfare

is based on deception!"(12:66) Writing around 500 B.C., Sun


Tzu was one of the first to envision it as a "principle of

war" but he was not the first to employ it. (12:11)

Legends, such as stories of Gideon and the Midianites,

and the Trojan Horse, lay testament to practice of deception

since man began waging war. (10:viii) In 1300 B.C., Gideon,

the wise Judge of the Israelites, is credited with a classic

coup in the annals of military deception when he outwitted

and defeated Israel's ancient foe, the Midianites. According

to the Old Testament Book of Judges, Gideon ordered a small

band of soldiers to raise such a clatter, by clanging

pitchers and sounding trumpets, that the enemy fled in alarm.

The illusion of a large attacking army had been created.

In 1200 B.C., the Greeks had besieged the city of Troy

for ten years, attempting to batter down their defenses. A

Greek warrior named Epeus finally hit upon the scheme of

concealing many soldiers inside a huge horse of wood,

positioning it outside the gates of Troy as a monument to

Athena, and departing by sea. They even warned the Trojans

not to take it inside their city lest a disaster befall them.

The horse was taken inside the city, the Greek soldiers

emerged, opened the gates for their comrades who had returned

from over the horizon, and Troy fell.

Doctrine is the bridge between practice and theory.

(22:24) It might be useful to examine the differences in

military doctrine on deception between the U.S. and the

U.S.S.R. to see how two countries came away from the same


war, WW II, with different philosophies.

The U.S. definition of "deception" is:

Those measures designed to mislead the enemy by
manipulation, distortion, or falsification of
evidence to induce him to react in a manner
prejudicial to his interests.(14:105)

The U.S.S.R. defines "deception" as the actual means for

achieving surprise. The doctrine of "maskirovka" supports

surprise by secretly:

...securing military operations and the routine
activity of troops, and (by) confusing the enemy
with regard to the presence and position of the
forces, military complexes, their position, level
of preparation and activity, as well as the plans
of the command structure. (9:25)

The U.S. entered WW II with only limited experience in

deception and was content with allowing the British to plan

and execute the allied deception plans. (22:52) By 1943,

Admiral Halsey and General MacArthur had re-instituted

deception in the Southwest Pacific Campaign. After the

successful Bodyguard and Fortitude plans to mask the Normandy

landing (Operation Overlord), JCS became interested and

planned the diversionary actions by Admiral Nimitz in the

Central Pacific theater and Lord Mountbatten in China-Burma

theater to play down MacArthur's invasion of the Philippines.

(22:53) The U.S. technique of deception emerging from WW II

was to set up one force that could strike in one of several

places to force the enemy to either split his forces or

choose to ignore one of the possible targets. (3:271)

Tactical deception was one of camouflage and concealment,


with concentrated efforts on dummy equipment.

The Russians had deception as a part of their doctrine

well before WW II, but were caught completely off guard by

the German Invasion in 1941, Operation Barbarossa. (3:217)

The Russians viewed this as a failure on the part of their

commanders to carry out Soviet regulations. After renewed

emphasis on the regulations, subsequent innovative

implementation of "maskirovka" in WW II proved the Soviets

had mastered the art. (3:244) The Russian equivalent of

"Overlord" was Bagration," an successful deception operation

aimed at massing four field armies and a tank army, the

largest groupment of forces in the history of the Patriotic

war, to recover Byelorussia in the summer of 1944. (3:259)

The Soviet technique is to deploy two or more forces,

and then make the main strike with only one. (3:271) Tactical

deception is stressed heavily as a commander's responsibility

and relies on dummy equipment, camouflage, and periods of

reduced visibility for implementation. (9:33)

Both the U.S. and U.S.S.R. have doctrines of continuous

efforts at tactical deception and camouflage, but curiously

enough, both largely confine their efforts in peacetime to

measures that can readily be applied to the training at

hand. (9:34 & 6) The Soviets have engaged in systematic

strategic deception since 1955, initially to hide their

weaknesses and subsequently to mask their capabilities. (4:90)

The latest resurgence of deception as a viable part of


the U.S. Army Air Land Battle doctrine appeared around 1985

during Gen. Otis' command of USAREUR. (6) Oddly enough, most

of the U.S. Marine Corps publications containing references

to deception were being rewritten during that period. (15-

16,l8-21) The result was the classification of deception as

a "force multiplier" to offset Soviet advantages in military

capabilities. (11:57) A second, and perhaps more useful,

result is that all the publications agree on terminology and

content.

wrbones
02-07-03, 11:41 PM
Strategic deception is military deception supporting our

national objectives. It is most often exercised at the

Unified Command or higher level. Operational deception is

the integration of two or more tactical deceptions to achieve

a common goal. This level would be exercised at the Joint

Task Force level. Tactical deception is the physical,

technical, and administrative actions to mislead the enemy

and induce him to act counter to his best interest. This is

deception at the MEF or ATF levels and below. This is the

aspect with which we should be most familiar.

It must be understood from the very start at whom the

deception plan is aimed. The enemy commander is the deception

target and the objective is the result desired from the

deception effort. Initially the deception target is the

enemy's intelligence organization. (3:8) The intelligence

analysts are the ones seeking and actively collecting

information to discern probable intentions or at least


capabilities. The secondary target is the enemy commander's

staff, since they are the ones screening information and

advising the commander. Total deception is a lofty goal; it

is necessary only to fool some of the staff to adversely

influence the enemy commander.

Deception is often treated as an isolated event or as a

precursor to the main battle. (22:3) For example, in JCS Pub

3-02, Joint Doctrine for Amphibious Operations, it discusses

deception in the chapter titled "Preassault Operations".

(15:15-3) The decision to employ deception as a "force

multiplier" is the Commander's. It should not be treated

separately from the basic scheme of maneuver, or relegated to

Appendix 7 to Annex C of the Operations Order.

Several principles contribute to deception. First, and

perhaps foremost, is security. Secrecy of both the deception

plan and the real plan is absolutely essential. General Hans

von Greiffenberg, one of the planners for Operation Barba-

rossa, wrote: "If the strictest secrecy is not observed, all

deception projects are condemned to failure from the very

start." (3:16) Deceiving our own troops and subordinate

leaders for the sake of security might be necessary and is a

normal byproduct of deception. (3:l6) There are two sides to

security in a deception plan. One side tries to protect the

truth about our intention in an upcoming operation; i.e., the

location of our main effort in an offensive assault. The

other side tries to protect the existence of the deception


effort. Attempting to deny the presence of a deception plan

seems futile, but it is one more way to add to the enemy's

fog of war. Inadvertent leaks of truthful information are

not fatal to the deception effort. Just because a piece of

information has been leaked does not guarantee that it will

either be detected or believed. In Stratagem, Whaley found

that of ten leaks reaching an opponent, where half were true

and half were false, all ten were accepted but four out of

five genuine leaks were discounted as too blatant to be

anything but deliberate leaks. (22:230) This initial

acceptance of all ten leaks is probably due to the plausi-

bility of the leaked events.

Plausibility is the second principle of deception. If

the deception you are trying to portray is not probable, then

you are wasting an enormous effort. The deception story must

fit within our likely courses of action, as predicted by

their study of our doctrine and tactics in a given situation.

It should be remembered that we are trying to fool him and

his intelligence apparatus, not our own apparatus. We

routinely exercise against "OPFOR", our own personnel,

attempting to simulate what we perceive as his apparatus.

Along with plausibility comes the need for credibility

of sources used to feed his intelligence apparatus. Analysts

routinely rank information according to the reliability of

the source. (3:19) The deception becomes more plausible when

it has been confirmed by a variety of reliable sources. This


should be not construed as a requirement to have all the

misinformation absolutely consistent. The deception will be

far better if some totally erroneous information is also

being fed to their sources. It should be cautioned that

information too consistent may alert the enemy that he is

being deceived. If the perceived truth seems to emerge from

many points, some of which are contradictory, then the enemy

is likely to believe he has found the real truth. As

Churchill stated, "Truth deserves a bodyguard of lies."

(10:132) Along the same line of reasoning, "Deception

requires a bodyguard of truth."

The third principle of deception is adaptability. No

matter how elaborate a deception plan you construct, it must

adapt to the changing situation. "As the truth changes, so

must the deception if the lie is to remain believable."

(4:170) If the deception plan is not adapted to the changing

situation, the inconsistencies will reveal the deception.

Timely response to these random events make it difficult for

the enemy to believe that he is being deceived. Sometimes

these events will be small, but once detected they must be

acted on. The successful German invasion of Russia in 1941,

Operation Barbarossa, was largely due to Hitler not deli-

vering an ultimatum of German demands prior to invading.

(4:171) The international rumor mill observed Hitler's

action prior to his invading Czechoslovakia and Poland and

had decided that two times-in-a-row constitute an always.


Hitler learned of this conclusion and cleverly adapted his

plan to take advantage of it.

Although international rumor worked for Hitler, accurate

intelligence of what the enemy intends to do and how he is

reacting to the deception is paramount. (3:21) It is this

intelligence feedback that allows a deception plan to be

tailored to the changing situation. The effort may be

stopped to protect valuable resources if either the deception

isn't working or has been discovered. The requirement for

feedback presents the deceiver with the same dilemma as the

enemy; is this information reliable? (3:21) Has the enemy

discovered my deception and am I now the target of a counter-

deception? LtGen Trainor said it quite succinctly, "He who

deceives is eager for the success of his deception. . .that

makes him vulnerable." (11:60)

The fourth principle of deception is integration. The

deception effort has to be integrated at all levels and with

all means. Integration, of both the deception means and the

collection means, is necessary to carry out a successful

deception. This implies a centralized effort. Review of any

of the deception references will either state it outright or

conclude it from case studies. (1-22) The reason is twofold.

First is the need to commit limited resources to the

deception effort. These are usually centrally managed.

Second is the need to maintain secrecy of what we are

revealing and what we are hiding. The MAGTF Commander is the


only one that can make these decisions within the framework

of his overall plan.

wrbones
02-07-03, 11:42 PM
The MAGTF Commander is using deception as a "force

multiplier" against his opponent commander. Deception can

cause the enemy to make mistakes. Three types of deception

are used to mislead or confuse an enemy on two basic

questions: What are my intentions and what are my

capabilities?

One type of deception attempts to misdirect the enemy's

attention, causing him to concentrate his forces in the wrong

place. In this type, the Commander is trying to get the

enemy to violate Clausewitz' principle of "concentration of

forces." (4:125) Another type attempts to cause the enemy to

waste his limited resources on non-existent targets. This is

a violation of Clausewitz' principle of economy of

force." (4:125) The third type of deception attempts to

surprise the enemy, it is often a combination of the first

two types. Its purpose is to create a situation that will

later catch the enemy off-guard. This is a result of a

varied and continuous effort to create the impression that

all is normal. A good example of this is Egypt's deception

effort prior to their attack in the Yon Kipper War of

1973. (3:323)

Every deception effort is comprised of only two basic

parts: hiding the real and revealing the false. (4-183 & 11-

60) Hiding the real is called dissimulation. It is the


covert part, that which is concealed from the enemy.

Revealing the false is called simulation. It is the overt

part, that which is falsely revealed to the enemy as truth.

Dissimulation and simulation are always present together in

any act of deception. (4:183)

The three procedures to hide the real are: masking,

repackaging, and dazzling. (4:183) Masking hides the real by

shielding it from the enemy's sensors. Operationally, this

translates into camouflage, concealing features or matching

them to surrounding characteristics. This method is most

familiar to the military and is heavily used at the tactical

level. Repackaging hides the real by disguising. It is done

by adding or subtracting characteristics for transformation

to a new object. Changing the numbers on ships is an easy

example. Dazzling hides the real by confusing. It is done

by partially obscuring an object or event to blur its

distinctive pattern. Encrypted radio traffic and military

codes are simple forms of dazzling.

The three procedures to reveal the false are mimicking,

inventing, and decoying. (4:185) Mimicking reveals the false

by imitating another real object. Operationally, it is done

by copying one or more distinctive characteristics of the

object being imitated. Inventing reveals the false by

displaying another reality. Unlike mimicking, which imitates

a real object, inventing creates something new by displaying

one or more characteristics. Decoying is revealing the false


by diverting attention. Misleading and distracting the enemy

are the objects of the its feints and diversions. It is done

by creating an alternate false pattern more acceptable than

the real.

During the U.S. Army's revitalized efforts for battle-

field deception, ten rules of conduct were deduced from game

theory, history, and deception writings. (6&13) These ten

maxims provide a good basis for planning a deception.

The maxims are:

1. Reinforce his beliefs (Magruder's Principle)-It
is generally easier to induce a target to maintain
an existing belief than to entice him to change his
beliefs.

2. Target his mind--There are limitations to human
information processing that are deceptively
exploitable.

3. Use multiple forms of surprise-- Surprise can
be achieved in the following categories: size,
activity, location, unit, time, equipment-(SALUTE)
intent, and style.

4. Feed all the enemy's sources (Jones' Dilemma)--
Deception becomes more difficult as the number of
sources available to confirm the real increases.

5. Create Noise only for a purpose--Too much
erroneous information can obscure the deception
effort.

6. Use deception selectively--It may be wise to
withhold the employment of deception capabilities
until the stakes are high.

7. Deception is continuous--Deception activities
should be sequenced to portray the deception for as
long as possible.

8. Feedback is a must--An intelligence collection
scheme should be employed to determined if the
deception is being adopted, rejected, or countered.


9. Focus on the enemy's action (The Monkey's Paw)-
Deception efforts may produce unwanted actions from
the enemy and friendly units.

10. Don't make it easy for him--If the target's
intelligence collection system has to work for the
indicators, the greater the chance he'll believe
them. (6 & 13)

wrbones
02-07-03, 11:43 PM
The actual process in planning the deception is not well

understood, nor is it an isolated event. The process of

deception can be broken down into ten steps.

First, the Commander must define his goals. This may be

to achieve a surprise invasion, or simply to insert and

retrieve a reconnaissance party from a hostile country with

limited casualties. These goals define the limits of the

deception. Second, the Commander must decide how he wants

the enemy to react. The question is: "What do you want him

to do?", and never "What do you want him to think?"

Third, only now can the Commander, by himself, decide

what he wants the enemy to think about the facts or impending

event; exactly what is it you want the enemy to perceive?

Fourth, what is to be hidden about the facts or events and

what is to be shown in their place. He should remember that

hiding and showing take place simultaneously; or else the

absence of one reveals the presence of the other.

Fifth, the Commander must analyze the pattern of the

real thing to identify its distinguishing characteristics.

Specifically, which characteristics must be deleted or added

to show a different pattern to suitably mask, repackage or

dazzle. Sixth, he does the same analysis for the false thing


to be shown in place of the real. Seventh, at this point,

the Commander has designed a desired effect together with its

hidden method. The means to present the effect to the enemy

is now explored. This may be limited to assets on hand.

This may require a return to step four.

Eighth, the planning phase is over and the operational

phase begins. The Commander has to turn the plan over to the

operational units to "sell" the package. This is not to say

that everyone can be told of the deception, just the ones

actually conducting the deception. Ninth, the false

information has to be delivered to the enemy's sensors. It

must reach the sensors the enemy is using; it doesn't do any

good to present a false picture to a blind enemy.

Tenth, and last, for the deception to succeed, the enemy

must "buy" the effect, not perceiving it as an illusion. The

deception will fail at this point if the enemy ignores it,

detects its method, or misconstrues its intended meaning.

Conversely, the enemy will:

*take notice, if the effect is designed to attract
his attention
*find it relevant, if the effect can hold his
interests
*perceive the false, if the presented patterns
match his experience
*ignore the real, if the real patterns are hidden
from his sensors

Effective deception planning must anticipate all four of

these contingencies. The wise Commander seeks feedback,

monitoring the enemy's responses to assure that these last

four contingencies are being met.


Deception should be viewed as the perfect "force

multiplier". It can easily tailored for the operation, from

one man to several hundred depending on the situation. The

payoffs for surprise are almost always high, it multiplies

the chances for quick and decisive military success. In his

study of deception operations, Stratagem, Whaley found a

successful deception has at least an 80% chance of yielding

surprise. (22:234) Deception can also induce the enemy to

divide his assets, thus making him less capable. If the

enemy ignores or misinterprets the deception, the MAGTF

Commander is no worse off. At the very least, the enemy has

spent time evaluating the deception, and not planning his

course of action.

The military methods of planning deception operations

are well documented in various publications. (13-16 & 18-21)

The ten steps previously outlined lay out a simple method for

the Commander to formulate and execute his deception plan.

The decision to deceive always resides with the Commander.

The MAGTF Commander must actively pursue deception operations

as an integral part of warfare. Warfare today is no

different today than in 500 B.C. when Sun Tzu wrote:

All warfare is based on deception. Therefore, when
capable, feign incapacity; when active, inactivity.
When near, make it appear that you are far away;
when far away, that you are near. Offer the enemy
a bait to lure him; feign disorder and strike him.
(12:66)




BIBLIOGRAPHY

1. Boyce, Earl J., Maj, USAF. Cover and Deceptions in
World War II-Its Lessons and Doctrine Implications.
Defense Technical Information Center, Air Command
and Staff College, Report 82-0355.

2. Daly, John H., Maj, USMC. "Tactical Deception Gives an
Edge." Marine Corps Gazette, (August 1983),24-26.

3. Daniel, Donald C. and Herbig, Katherine L., eds.
Strategic Military Deception. New York: Pergamon
Press, 1982

4. Gooch, John and Perlmutter, Amos, eds. Military
Deception and Strategic Surprise. Totowa, N.J.:
Frank Cass and Company Limited, 1982.

5. Hoopes, Roy. "World War II's Master of Deception.
The Retired Officer, (January 1986),36-41.

6. Kay, John, Maj, USA. "Battlefield Deception." Lecture
given at U.S. Marine Corps Command and Staff
College, January 1990.

7. Machiavelli, Niccolo. The Discourses, Tr. Walker
New Haven: Yale University Press, 1950.

8. Marsh, Henry S. & Stevens, Jennie A. "Part I: Surprise
and Deception in Soviet Military Thought," Military
Review, (June 1982), (2-11)

9. Marsh, Henry S. & Stevens, Jennie A. "Part II: Surprise
and Deception in Soviet Military Thought," Military
Review, (July 1982), (24-35).

10. Tangled Web, The. Editors of Army Times. New York:
Van Rees Press, 1963.

11. Trainor, Bernard E., LtGen, USMC(Ret). "Deception."
Marine Corps Gazette, (October 1986),57-61.

12. Tzu, Sun. The Art of War, Tr. Samuel B. Griffith.
New York: Oxford Press, 1971.

13. U.S. Army. Battlefield Deception, FM 90-2. Washington,
D.C., 1987.

14. U.S. DOD. Joint Chiefs of Staff. Dictionary of Military
and Associated Terms, JCS Pub 1-02. Washington,
D.C., 1986.


15. U.S. DOD. Joint Chiefs of Staff. Joint Doctrine for
Amphibious Operations, JCS Pub 3-02. Washington,
D.C., 1986.

16. U.S. DOD. Joint Chiefs of Staff. Joint Doctrine for
Landing Force Operations, JCS Test Pub 3-02.1.
Quantico, 1989.

17. U.S. Marine Corps. Warfighting, FMFM 1. Quantico, 1989.

18. U.S. Marine Corps. Marine Corps Development and
Education Command. Doctrine for Landing Forces,
LFM 02 (final draft). Quantico, 1989.

19. U.S. Marine Corps. Marine Corps Development and
Education Command. The Marine Air-Ground Task
Force, OH 2. Quantico, 1987.

20. U.S. Marine Corps. Marine Corps Development and
Education Command. Ground Combat Operations,
OH 6-1. Quantico, 1988.

21. U.S. Marine Corps. Marine Corps Development and
Education Command. Military Deception, OH 7-13.
Quantico, 1986.

22. Whaley, Barton. Stratagem: Deception and Surprise in
War. Advanced Research Projects Agency, DOD, 1976.

wrbones
02-07-03, 11:52 PM
http://www.thbookservice.com/bookpage.asp?prod_cd=C5946


http://209.132.68.98/authentication/pdf/psywar.pdf


lots of links here!

http://vikingphoenix.com/public/rongstad/military/artofwar/artofwar.htm

wrbones
02-08-03, 12:20 AM
Google: USMC's deception in warfare will give you some interesting information to track down.

FREDDY
02-08-03, 11:40 AM
blaa blaa blaa give me a rifle and point where they are

wrbones
02-08-03, 09:25 PM
To some extent I agree, Freddy!

I post most of that stuff fer the FNG's so that they have an idea of what's comin'. In addition we have students from VMI, the Naval Academy, OCS and other similiar establishments dropping by the site just for such information. I'm pretty certain I post stuff they don't see in school, or at least not the same material, anyway. If it were me, I'd want that butterbar to have a clue ahead of time that he ain't playin' in his own backyard with his childhood buddies! ;)

There comes a time to fight. Then it's gloves off and take it to them hard, fast and often.

One deception during the Gulf War was to have several brigades of Marines off the shore of Kuwait, in a pretense of an amphibious operation, which tied up several divisions of the Iraqi Republican Guard. This made other movements of U.S. Troops much easier when we attacked. The Iraqi's complimented us that way. They had several thousand more troops ready to meet the Marines than what was strictly necessary to defend the beach. Some of our guys got a free cruise and the Iraqi's didn't have the troops they needed to defend our other operations. win/win. ;)

When the Marines did move from other on shore positions, we were so far ahead of the Army that it kinda messed up the whole plan! LOL. Threw their timing off or something. LOL.

Deception has always been a part of any kind of warfare, at it's best, it saves unncessary loss of life, and wins the battles and the war.

At it's worst, you might set yerself up for a kick in the ass!