thedrifter
12-29-06, 07:13 AM
Subject: USMC perform atsame level or higher than comparable SOCOM units proven in head2head comparison: DET1
SCCOMarine 12/21/2006 7:01:59 PM
Strategy Page
Marine Corps Special Operations Command Detachment 1 (MCSOCom Det 1) was created with a charter to examine the issue of a permanent Marine Corps force contribution to the U.S. Special Operations Command (USSOCom). Formally referred to as a "proof of concept," Det 1 completed a successful deployment under the operational control of USSOCom, demonstrated that Marines are fully capable of operating at the level of our Nation's other special operations forces (SOF), and paved the way for the creation of a Marine component to the USSOCom. As we prepare to case the colors of Det 1 and stand up U.S. Marine Corps Forces Special Operations Command (MarSOC), it is appropriate to review and discuss what made Det 1 successful and any potential pitfalls to avoid as we move forward.
Although the idea of a Marine Corps force contribution to USSOCom had been discussed since USSOCom's inception in the mid-1980s, it came to fruition only with the renewed emphasis placed on special operations in the wake of the attacks on the World Trade Center and Pentagon in 2001. That fall, the Secretary of Defense (SecDef) directed the Commandant of the Marine Corps (CMC), Gen James L. Jones, and Commander, USSOCom (CdrUSSOCom), Gen Charles Holland, USAF, to explore ways for the Marine Corps and USSOCom to work more closely together in what came to be known as the global war on terrorism (GWOT). The subject of assigning a Marine Corps unit-a force contribution-to USSOCom was raised early in the discussions and took on added significance in many Marine leaders' eyes when two of the Marine Corps' "crown jewels"-the 15th and 26th Marine Expeditionary Units (Special Operations Capable) (MEU(SOC)s)-were forced to sit on the sidelines during the early stages of Operation ENDURING FREEDOM (OEF) in Afghanistan. Resistance from SOF commanders already on the ground and indifference from the Navy chain of command under which they were operating left the 15th MEU(SOC) languishing offshore for over a month. Even when these and later Marine units did make it ashore they were most often employed piece-meal in supporting roles to provide capabilities that SOF were deficient in or lacked altogether.
In October 2002 Gen Jones, in consultation with senior USSOCom decisionmakers, sought to answer the force contribution question and increase Marine Corps involvement in the GWOT by approving an initiative to establish a purpose-built Marine unit for employment by USSOCom. In a message to senior leaders in the Marine Corps, the CMC directed them to:
. . . develop a plan to provide forces to the Special Operations Command on a permanent basis in order to cement the relationship of our two organizations at the institutional level and provide our nation with an expanded special operations capability.1
In response to the CMC's message, the Deputy Commandant for Plans, Policies, and Operations (DC PP&O) established a working group tasked with creating a rough table of organization (T/O) and table of equipment (T/E). The T/O they developed included only 86 line numbers divided among 4 sections-a 30-man reconnaissance element, a 29-man intelligence element, a 7-man fires element, and a lean headquarters. The intelligence element was further broken down into a 9-man radio reconnaissance team (RRT), a 6-man human intelligence (HumInt) exploitation team (HET), and a 12-man all-source fusion team. (See Figure 1.) The final administrative requirement was met in February 2003 when DC PP&O signed a memorandum of agreement (MOA) with the Deputy Commander, USSOCom. The MOA was jointly drafted by the Marine Corps and USSOCom and established the parameters for the proof of concept, including the mission, command relationships, and resourcing for Det 1.
A ceremony held aboard Camp Pendleton on 19 June 2003 marked the official activation of Det 1. Execution of the detachment mission training plan began in earnest the week following the activation and culminated with a 3week capstone exercise at the Nevada Test Site and Indian Springs Auxiliary Air Field, NV in December 2003. After participating in an Navy special warfare (NSW) certification exercise and conducting additional sustainment training, Det 1 deployed to Baghdad for Operation IRAQI FREEDOM II (OIF II) in April 2004, just over 9 months after its activation. While operating as part of an NSW task group (NSWTG), Det 1 executed a number of direct action, coalition support, and battlefield shaping missions under the regional combined joint special operations task force (CJSOTF). By all accounts, Det 1 excelled and earned a reputation for professionalism, competence, and being "user friendly." A study conducted by the Joint Special Operations University (JSOU) found:
The operational effectiveness of the MCSOCOM Det was high. . . . The trial deployment demonstrated the MCSOCOM Det could effectively conduct Direct Action (DA) and Special Reconnaissance (SR) in conjunction with a Naval Special Warfare Task Group (NSWTG). Given their personnel qualifications, training and equipment it is reasonable to suggest the Detachment could also conduct or support Foreign Internal Defense (FID), Counter Terrorism (CT), Special Activities, selected Theater Security Cooperation Plans (TSCP), and other tasks as required.
In an August 2003 visit with the NSWTG and Det 1, CdrUSSOCom, GEN Bryan D. Brown, conceded as much and remarked, "There was never any question about your ability." In addition to the experience gained through the execution of the missions, the workups and deployment provided the detachment Marines with an unprecedented vantage point from which to observe and study Army, Navy, and Air Force SOF.
The memorandum of understanding specified that the Marine Corps and USSOCom would present a review of the proof of concept and recommendations for the way ahead to the SecDef by January 2005. Although the CMC, CdrUSSOCom, and SecDef met several times over the spring and summer of 2005, they were unable to reach an agreement on several key aspects of the long-term Marine Corps-USSOCom relationship until October. In the interim, Det 1 continued to train in anticipation of a subsequent deployment in support of Marine or SOF commanders. Numerous proposals were submitted-most notably one endorsed by I Marine Expeditionary Force to deploy as part of their spring 2006 OIF rotation-but all were rejected on the grounds that a MarSOC decision was imminent and that Det 1's Marines would be critical "seed corn" for its successful standup. In a puzzling and unexplained departure, however, Det 1 was notified in early December 2005 that it would be deactivated and the majority of its Marines dispersed throughout the Marine Corps.
Figure 1. Detachment organization.
Perhaps the most common misperception about Del 1 is that it was little more than a beefed up force reconnaissance platoon. While the reconnaissance element was comprised almost exclusively of Marines with a force reconnaissance background, reconnaissance Marines (0321s) made up less than one-third of the detachment strength (24 of 86). The remaining Marines and sailors were what made the detachment unique and truly set it apart from its SOF peers. The seasoned battlestaff, long-haul communications (the detachment T/E included a Trojan Spirit Lite), and robust intelligence capabilities-all permanently assigned under a single commander-enabled a multidimensional approach to potential missions. As one of the CJSOTF commanders the detachment served under noted, "They came in with a robust capability to conduct operations, perform C^sup 2^ [command and control], and support themselves."2
Det 1 was able to independently execute the entire cycle of operation-from target development through exploitation-and sustain itself with its organic forces and equipment. Although lacking an aviation element, Det 1 adhered to the Marine air-ground task force (MAGTF) philosophy that the whole of a properly trained and task-organized unit can be much greater than the simple sum of its parts, particularly when those parts train and operate together-day in and day out-under a single commander.
Through years of experience and rigorous training, the Marines of the reconnaissance element developed some of the best precision shooting skills outside the elite special mission units. They are also exceptionally adept at long-range ground reconnaissance. The fires element trained to control and coordinate fires in support of other maneuver elements or provide terminal guidance and battle damage assessment for ground directed interdiction missions. Neither of those elements operated in a vacuum however. Precision raids require precision intelligence, and Det 1's robust intelligence element was uniquely capable of collecting and analyzing information and producing required products. The organic HET and RRT Marines were engaged in the process from start to finish-with HET doing everything from running sources to assisting with sensitive site exploitation and interrogations, and RRT performing tasks ranging from researching national signals intelligence (SigInt) databases to providing realtime tactical indications and warnings on the objective. The fusion cell provided analytical and production support throughout, from sifting through and synthesizing mounds of multisource reporting to exploitation of national-level imagery to production of detailed battle maps, three-dimensional route fly-throughs, and objective area models. Finally, the seasoned battlestaff pulled the required pieces together through either deliberate or rapid planning and effected the internal and external coordination required to successfully execute sensitive, operational-level special operations missions.
The perception of most non-SOF personnel is that SOF have an unlimited "toy box" from which to draw whatever tools are required for a given mission. Although there are select SOF units that enjoy access to virtually unlimited resources, the majority face challenges not unlike those faced by their conventional counterparts. These "vanilla" SOF units lack routine access to many of the resources Det 1 (and in some cases even general-purpose Marine Corps units) enjoyed, relying instead on augments or assigning what we consider a primary duty to personnel as a collateral duty. The danger with augments is that the commander can never be sure what he's getting until they show up, and depending on the augments' operational tempo and the urgency of the mission, they may not show up until shortly before the mission is executed. The time to find out that your tactical SigInt collector (radio reconnaissance Marine) went to the staff academy instead of the mountain warfare package isn't as you're beginning a multiday movement to your observation post at 10,000 feet. Although there are fewer surprises with the collateral duty method, you still end up with a less capable organization. In most cases, if an individual is performing his collateral duty he will be unable to simultaneously execute his primary duty. He will also not be able to perform the collateral duty as well as someone for whom it's a primary duty. When your relatively small force needs indirect fire delivered to a very specific place at a very specific time (usually very close and very soon), would you rather rely on someone who brings the perspective of many years providing that service from the pit or battery position, or on someone whose primary qualification is that he attended a 2- or 3-week school somewhere along the line?
The NSW Command (NSWCom) (NSW, SEALs, and special boat units) and the U.S. Army Special Operations Command (USASOC) (special forces, rangers, special operations aviation regiment, civil affairs, and psychological operations) have learned valuable lessons over the course of OEF and OIF and are in the process of incorporating some of these into their organizations. NSW is still in the process of implementing and adjusting the "NSW 21" concept, one of the primary purposes of which was to improve the C^sup 2^ of deployed SEALs. Operations in Iraq were some of the first to employ an entire NSW squadron (SEAL team reinforced with communications and SigInt specialists, SeaBees, and other attachments) with a traditional battlestaff to assist with planning and coordination for subordinate task units (30- to 40-man elements, commanded by a major). While NSWCom has attempted to add many of the force multipliers-fires, tactical Siglnt, and HumInt, etc.-and beef up their intelligence sections on an ad hoc basis until the impact of the permanent changes can be evaluated, the lack of fleet sailors with relevant experience in ground combat operations presents significant challenges to accomplishing this goal. USASOC recognizes that its special forces battalions and groups lack the dedicated personnel required to plan and coordinate the plethora of lethal and non-lethal fires available and that there is a shortage of terminal controllers. To correct this deficit, they are in the process of standing up joint fires elements at each battalion and group, and are discussing options for integrating additional joint tactical air controllers with their operational detachment alphas. With its permanent MAGTF-like task organization, Det 1 was created with the intent that it be capable of executing stand-alone, "main effort" special operations. The Center for Naval Analysis (CNA) noted:
In several respects the DET was more robust than SEAL TUs [task units] or even the NSWTG or JSOTF staffs, and it demonstrated that it could operate independently in the SOF environment. Despite losing key personnel and capabilities to the task group and other task units, (the DET) built its own relationships and pursued its own targeting leads with adjacent SOF and conventional forces, then executed missions with an experienced assault element. It combined tactical intelligence capabilities (Radio Reconnaissance Team and HET) with its robust ability to link to theater- and national-level intelligence and on-scene topographic, imagery, and analysis capabilities.3
The "together for the mission" and collateral duty approaches favored by the SEALs and special forces (and accepted by some Marines) are in sharp contrast to the detachment model. This approach gives the commander control over all aspects of his Marines' training and the latitude to impart the skills required to participate in the full spectrum of operations. Based on his involvement with this training and other interaction with the Marines, he is able to make an informed decision on their suitability for demanding assignments, to include whether they are qualified to accompany a raid or reconnaissance force should the mission require it. The day-to-day interaction among elements and between "operators" and "support personnel" (distinctions the detachment's approach minimized) also contributes to a greater, more concrete appreciation of what is required to execute each type of mission.
What Next?
Now that the SecDef has directed the Marine Corps to establish a Marine Service component command to work alongside the existing USASOC, Air Force Special Operations Command, and NSWCom components under USSOCom, the Marine Corps has a tremendous opportunity. Unconstrained by legacy organizational models, we should apply the MAGTF philosophy and use a detachment-like unit as the basis for any future force contribution to USSOCom. If we create one-dimensional units with reconnaissance Marines under one commander, fire supporters under another, intel professionals under another, and logisticians under yet another, and no staff or communications systems capable of developing and coordinating a coherent plan, we will duplicate instead of complement existing SOF and marginalize the capability of the contribution. The issue is not whether it is possible to create a functional unit through an ad hoc, "come together for the deployment/mission" system; both the MEU maritime special purpose force (MSPF) and existing SOF are evidence that it can be done. The real question is why the Marine Corps would choose anything less than the most efficient, most capable model and stand up organizations with shortfalls that existing SOF have noted and are working diligently to correct.
Summary
When operations in Iraq eventually wind down and USSOCom's leading role in the GWOT becomes more distinct, these employment considerations will be critical in defining the Marine Corps of the 21st century. We spent the last decade of the 20th century untangling ourselves from serving as the Navy's gate guards and orderlies; without a credible force operating as a peer with other-Service SOF, we will likely assume a similar role for USSOCom-guarding forward operating bases, providing logistics and intel support, and otherwise freeing a SOF warrior to wage the "real fight." While that may be acceptable to some Marines (and hopefully to at least a few civilians considering becoming Marines), we will lose any claim to the "first to fight" and "every Marine a rifleman" ethos that have defined our Corps to this point.
The Marine Corps created Del 1 to assess the value of having similarly organized units serve as the Marine Corps' permanent contribution to USSOCom. The detachment completed a successful deployment, and the logic of its organization-a standing task-organized unit able to independently find, fix, and finish-was validated informally by those who observed and interacted with it and in studies commissioned by both Services. The USSOCom study conducted by the JSOU concluded:
Research and analysis strongly indicate that the initial force contribution was an overall success and should he continued. 'Hie Marine Corps successfully demonstrated the ability to intemperate with SOF during combat operations. . . . Findings of this study validate the operational effectiveness, critical attributes, organization and equipment produced by the initial [Marine Corps] force contribution.4
The study goes on to recommend, "Maintain current detachment structure with minor changes from lessons learned." The CNA study commissioned by the Marine Corps found:
It's clear that the DET can perform specific SOF missions. SOF personnel who worked alongside the DET acknowledge its capability and the fact that it operated at a level on par with and, in some cases, above comparable-sized SOF units. Its success was based on its combination of a highly experienced assault element, a robust intelligence element, fire support personnel, and logistics capabilities enabling independent operations.
Rather than pursue an untested concept or one that has been repeatedly rejected by USSOCom (as the MEU MSPF has been for 20 years), the Marine Corps should take advantage of the "once in a generation" opportunity to create new units from a clean sheet and apply the lessons learned from Det 1's proof of concept to any future force contribution.
Ellie
SCCOMarine 12/21/2006 7:01:59 PM
Strategy Page
Marine Corps Special Operations Command Detachment 1 (MCSOCom Det 1) was created with a charter to examine the issue of a permanent Marine Corps force contribution to the U.S. Special Operations Command (USSOCom). Formally referred to as a "proof of concept," Det 1 completed a successful deployment under the operational control of USSOCom, demonstrated that Marines are fully capable of operating at the level of our Nation's other special operations forces (SOF), and paved the way for the creation of a Marine component to the USSOCom. As we prepare to case the colors of Det 1 and stand up U.S. Marine Corps Forces Special Operations Command (MarSOC), it is appropriate to review and discuss what made Det 1 successful and any potential pitfalls to avoid as we move forward.
Although the idea of a Marine Corps force contribution to USSOCom had been discussed since USSOCom's inception in the mid-1980s, it came to fruition only with the renewed emphasis placed on special operations in the wake of the attacks on the World Trade Center and Pentagon in 2001. That fall, the Secretary of Defense (SecDef) directed the Commandant of the Marine Corps (CMC), Gen James L. Jones, and Commander, USSOCom (CdrUSSOCom), Gen Charles Holland, USAF, to explore ways for the Marine Corps and USSOCom to work more closely together in what came to be known as the global war on terrorism (GWOT). The subject of assigning a Marine Corps unit-a force contribution-to USSOCom was raised early in the discussions and took on added significance in many Marine leaders' eyes when two of the Marine Corps' "crown jewels"-the 15th and 26th Marine Expeditionary Units (Special Operations Capable) (MEU(SOC)s)-were forced to sit on the sidelines during the early stages of Operation ENDURING FREEDOM (OEF) in Afghanistan. Resistance from SOF commanders already on the ground and indifference from the Navy chain of command under which they were operating left the 15th MEU(SOC) languishing offshore for over a month. Even when these and later Marine units did make it ashore they were most often employed piece-meal in supporting roles to provide capabilities that SOF were deficient in or lacked altogether.
In October 2002 Gen Jones, in consultation with senior USSOCom decisionmakers, sought to answer the force contribution question and increase Marine Corps involvement in the GWOT by approving an initiative to establish a purpose-built Marine unit for employment by USSOCom. In a message to senior leaders in the Marine Corps, the CMC directed them to:
. . . develop a plan to provide forces to the Special Operations Command on a permanent basis in order to cement the relationship of our two organizations at the institutional level and provide our nation with an expanded special operations capability.1
In response to the CMC's message, the Deputy Commandant for Plans, Policies, and Operations (DC PP&O) established a working group tasked with creating a rough table of organization (T/O) and table of equipment (T/E). The T/O they developed included only 86 line numbers divided among 4 sections-a 30-man reconnaissance element, a 29-man intelligence element, a 7-man fires element, and a lean headquarters. The intelligence element was further broken down into a 9-man radio reconnaissance team (RRT), a 6-man human intelligence (HumInt) exploitation team (HET), and a 12-man all-source fusion team. (See Figure 1.) The final administrative requirement was met in February 2003 when DC PP&O signed a memorandum of agreement (MOA) with the Deputy Commander, USSOCom. The MOA was jointly drafted by the Marine Corps and USSOCom and established the parameters for the proof of concept, including the mission, command relationships, and resourcing for Det 1.
A ceremony held aboard Camp Pendleton on 19 June 2003 marked the official activation of Det 1. Execution of the detachment mission training plan began in earnest the week following the activation and culminated with a 3week capstone exercise at the Nevada Test Site and Indian Springs Auxiliary Air Field, NV in December 2003. After participating in an Navy special warfare (NSW) certification exercise and conducting additional sustainment training, Det 1 deployed to Baghdad for Operation IRAQI FREEDOM II (OIF II) in April 2004, just over 9 months after its activation. While operating as part of an NSW task group (NSWTG), Det 1 executed a number of direct action, coalition support, and battlefield shaping missions under the regional combined joint special operations task force (CJSOTF). By all accounts, Det 1 excelled and earned a reputation for professionalism, competence, and being "user friendly." A study conducted by the Joint Special Operations University (JSOU) found:
The operational effectiveness of the MCSOCOM Det was high. . . . The trial deployment demonstrated the MCSOCOM Det could effectively conduct Direct Action (DA) and Special Reconnaissance (SR) in conjunction with a Naval Special Warfare Task Group (NSWTG). Given their personnel qualifications, training and equipment it is reasonable to suggest the Detachment could also conduct or support Foreign Internal Defense (FID), Counter Terrorism (CT), Special Activities, selected Theater Security Cooperation Plans (TSCP), and other tasks as required.
In an August 2003 visit with the NSWTG and Det 1, CdrUSSOCom, GEN Bryan D. Brown, conceded as much and remarked, "There was never any question about your ability." In addition to the experience gained through the execution of the missions, the workups and deployment provided the detachment Marines with an unprecedented vantage point from which to observe and study Army, Navy, and Air Force SOF.
The memorandum of understanding specified that the Marine Corps and USSOCom would present a review of the proof of concept and recommendations for the way ahead to the SecDef by January 2005. Although the CMC, CdrUSSOCom, and SecDef met several times over the spring and summer of 2005, they were unable to reach an agreement on several key aspects of the long-term Marine Corps-USSOCom relationship until October. In the interim, Det 1 continued to train in anticipation of a subsequent deployment in support of Marine or SOF commanders. Numerous proposals were submitted-most notably one endorsed by I Marine Expeditionary Force to deploy as part of their spring 2006 OIF rotation-but all were rejected on the grounds that a MarSOC decision was imminent and that Det 1's Marines would be critical "seed corn" for its successful standup. In a puzzling and unexplained departure, however, Det 1 was notified in early December 2005 that it would be deactivated and the majority of its Marines dispersed throughout the Marine Corps.
Figure 1. Detachment organization.
Perhaps the most common misperception about Del 1 is that it was little more than a beefed up force reconnaissance platoon. While the reconnaissance element was comprised almost exclusively of Marines with a force reconnaissance background, reconnaissance Marines (0321s) made up less than one-third of the detachment strength (24 of 86). The remaining Marines and sailors were what made the detachment unique and truly set it apart from its SOF peers. The seasoned battlestaff, long-haul communications (the detachment T/E included a Trojan Spirit Lite), and robust intelligence capabilities-all permanently assigned under a single commander-enabled a multidimensional approach to potential missions. As one of the CJSOTF commanders the detachment served under noted, "They came in with a robust capability to conduct operations, perform C^sup 2^ [command and control], and support themselves."2
Det 1 was able to independently execute the entire cycle of operation-from target development through exploitation-and sustain itself with its organic forces and equipment. Although lacking an aviation element, Det 1 adhered to the Marine air-ground task force (MAGTF) philosophy that the whole of a properly trained and task-organized unit can be much greater than the simple sum of its parts, particularly when those parts train and operate together-day in and day out-under a single commander.
Through years of experience and rigorous training, the Marines of the reconnaissance element developed some of the best precision shooting skills outside the elite special mission units. They are also exceptionally adept at long-range ground reconnaissance. The fires element trained to control and coordinate fires in support of other maneuver elements or provide terminal guidance and battle damage assessment for ground directed interdiction missions. Neither of those elements operated in a vacuum however. Precision raids require precision intelligence, and Det 1's robust intelligence element was uniquely capable of collecting and analyzing information and producing required products. The organic HET and RRT Marines were engaged in the process from start to finish-with HET doing everything from running sources to assisting with sensitive site exploitation and interrogations, and RRT performing tasks ranging from researching national signals intelligence (SigInt) databases to providing realtime tactical indications and warnings on the objective. The fusion cell provided analytical and production support throughout, from sifting through and synthesizing mounds of multisource reporting to exploitation of national-level imagery to production of detailed battle maps, three-dimensional route fly-throughs, and objective area models. Finally, the seasoned battlestaff pulled the required pieces together through either deliberate or rapid planning and effected the internal and external coordination required to successfully execute sensitive, operational-level special operations missions.
The perception of most non-SOF personnel is that SOF have an unlimited "toy box" from which to draw whatever tools are required for a given mission. Although there are select SOF units that enjoy access to virtually unlimited resources, the majority face challenges not unlike those faced by their conventional counterparts. These "vanilla" SOF units lack routine access to many of the resources Det 1 (and in some cases even general-purpose Marine Corps units) enjoyed, relying instead on augments or assigning what we consider a primary duty to personnel as a collateral duty. The danger with augments is that the commander can never be sure what he's getting until they show up, and depending on the augments' operational tempo and the urgency of the mission, they may not show up until shortly before the mission is executed. The time to find out that your tactical SigInt collector (radio reconnaissance Marine) went to the staff academy instead of the mountain warfare package isn't as you're beginning a multiday movement to your observation post at 10,000 feet. Although there are fewer surprises with the collateral duty method, you still end up with a less capable organization. In most cases, if an individual is performing his collateral duty he will be unable to simultaneously execute his primary duty. He will also not be able to perform the collateral duty as well as someone for whom it's a primary duty. When your relatively small force needs indirect fire delivered to a very specific place at a very specific time (usually very close and very soon), would you rather rely on someone who brings the perspective of many years providing that service from the pit or battery position, or on someone whose primary qualification is that he attended a 2- or 3-week school somewhere along the line?
The NSW Command (NSWCom) (NSW, SEALs, and special boat units) and the U.S. Army Special Operations Command (USASOC) (special forces, rangers, special operations aviation regiment, civil affairs, and psychological operations) have learned valuable lessons over the course of OEF and OIF and are in the process of incorporating some of these into their organizations. NSW is still in the process of implementing and adjusting the "NSW 21" concept, one of the primary purposes of which was to improve the C^sup 2^ of deployed SEALs. Operations in Iraq were some of the first to employ an entire NSW squadron (SEAL team reinforced with communications and SigInt specialists, SeaBees, and other attachments) with a traditional battlestaff to assist with planning and coordination for subordinate task units (30- to 40-man elements, commanded by a major). While NSWCom has attempted to add many of the force multipliers-fires, tactical Siglnt, and HumInt, etc.-and beef up their intelligence sections on an ad hoc basis until the impact of the permanent changes can be evaluated, the lack of fleet sailors with relevant experience in ground combat operations presents significant challenges to accomplishing this goal. USASOC recognizes that its special forces battalions and groups lack the dedicated personnel required to plan and coordinate the plethora of lethal and non-lethal fires available and that there is a shortage of terminal controllers. To correct this deficit, they are in the process of standing up joint fires elements at each battalion and group, and are discussing options for integrating additional joint tactical air controllers with their operational detachment alphas. With its permanent MAGTF-like task organization, Det 1 was created with the intent that it be capable of executing stand-alone, "main effort" special operations. The Center for Naval Analysis (CNA) noted:
In several respects the DET was more robust than SEAL TUs [task units] or even the NSWTG or JSOTF staffs, and it demonstrated that it could operate independently in the SOF environment. Despite losing key personnel and capabilities to the task group and other task units, (the DET) built its own relationships and pursued its own targeting leads with adjacent SOF and conventional forces, then executed missions with an experienced assault element. It combined tactical intelligence capabilities (Radio Reconnaissance Team and HET) with its robust ability to link to theater- and national-level intelligence and on-scene topographic, imagery, and analysis capabilities.3
The "together for the mission" and collateral duty approaches favored by the SEALs and special forces (and accepted by some Marines) are in sharp contrast to the detachment model. This approach gives the commander control over all aspects of his Marines' training and the latitude to impart the skills required to participate in the full spectrum of operations. Based on his involvement with this training and other interaction with the Marines, he is able to make an informed decision on their suitability for demanding assignments, to include whether they are qualified to accompany a raid or reconnaissance force should the mission require it. The day-to-day interaction among elements and between "operators" and "support personnel" (distinctions the detachment's approach minimized) also contributes to a greater, more concrete appreciation of what is required to execute each type of mission.
What Next?
Now that the SecDef has directed the Marine Corps to establish a Marine Service component command to work alongside the existing USASOC, Air Force Special Operations Command, and NSWCom components under USSOCom, the Marine Corps has a tremendous opportunity. Unconstrained by legacy organizational models, we should apply the MAGTF philosophy and use a detachment-like unit as the basis for any future force contribution to USSOCom. If we create one-dimensional units with reconnaissance Marines under one commander, fire supporters under another, intel professionals under another, and logisticians under yet another, and no staff or communications systems capable of developing and coordinating a coherent plan, we will duplicate instead of complement existing SOF and marginalize the capability of the contribution. The issue is not whether it is possible to create a functional unit through an ad hoc, "come together for the deployment/mission" system; both the MEU maritime special purpose force (MSPF) and existing SOF are evidence that it can be done. The real question is why the Marine Corps would choose anything less than the most efficient, most capable model and stand up organizations with shortfalls that existing SOF have noted and are working diligently to correct.
Summary
When operations in Iraq eventually wind down and USSOCom's leading role in the GWOT becomes more distinct, these employment considerations will be critical in defining the Marine Corps of the 21st century. We spent the last decade of the 20th century untangling ourselves from serving as the Navy's gate guards and orderlies; without a credible force operating as a peer with other-Service SOF, we will likely assume a similar role for USSOCom-guarding forward operating bases, providing logistics and intel support, and otherwise freeing a SOF warrior to wage the "real fight." While that may be acceptable to some Marines (and hopefully to at least a few civilians considering becoming Marines), we will lose any claim to the "first to fight" and "every Marine a rifleman" ethos that have defined our Corps to this point.
The Marine Corps created Del 1 to assess the value of having similarly organized units serve as the Marine Corps' permanent contribution to USSOCom. The detachment completed a successful deployment, and the logic of its organization-a standing task-organized unit able to independently find, fix, and finish-was validated informally by those who observed and interacted with it and in studies commissioned by both Services. The USSOCom study conducted by the JSOU concluded:
Research and analysis strongly indicate that the initial force contribution was an overall success and should he continued. 'Hie Marine Corps successfully demonstrated the ability to intemperate with SOF during combat operations. . . . Findings of this study validate the operational effectiveness, critical attributes, organization and equipment produced by the initial [Marine Corps] force contribution.4
The study goes on to recommend, "Maintain current detachment structure with minor changes from lessons learned." The CNA study commissioned by the Marine Corps found:
It's clear that the DET can perform specific SOF missions. SOF personnel who worked alongside the DET acknowledge its capability and the fact that it operated at a level on par with and, in some cases, above comparable-sized SOF units. Its success was based on its combination of a highly experienced assault element, a robust intelligence element, fire support personnel, and logistics capabilities enabling independent operations.
Rather than pursue an untested concept or one that has been repeatedly rejected by USSOCom (as the MEU MSPF has been for 20 years), the Marine Corps should take advantage of the "once in a generation" opportunity to create new units from a clean sheet and apply the lessons learned from Det 1's proof of concept to any future force contribution.
Ellie