thedrifter
08-18-06, 06:30 AM
Marines ask: To kill or not?
With insurgents hiding among ordinary Iraqis, decisions often must be made in a split second
By Julian E. Barnes
Tribune Newspapers
August 18, 2006
RAMADI, Iraq -- Pfc. Phillip Busenlehner still thinks about his choice. Unbidden, in quiet moments, it creeps into his head.
The 20-year-old Marine from Birmingham, Ala., was standing guard at a combat outpost in central Ramadi when he saw a man 400 yards away.
"He was popping around the corner, back and forth, back and forth," Busenlehner remembered. "He was observing the post. But that far back, how much could he really be observing?"
Was he trying to figure out if it was safe to move? Or was he plotting an attack? Hand near the trigger, Busenlehner faced the most difficult choice a soldier or Marine must make in a war: To kill or not?
With insurgents hiding among ordinary Iraqis, that decision often must be made in a split second. The wrong choice could mean a guerrilla gets a chance to lay a roadside bomb. Or it could mean an innocent Iraqi dies at the hands of Americans and a whole neighborhood turns against U.S. forces.
Busenlehner, one year into his four-year stint with the Marines, radioed his squad leader. He got permission to shoot. Now, the choice was his.
In another part of the city, near one of the most dangerous intersections in Ramadi--the military calls it "Firecracker"--two squads of Marines gathered in an Iraqi family's living room. The neighborhood had seen some spectacular firefights between insurgents and Americans. It was also a prime area for improvised explosive devices, or IEDs, the roadside bombs that have proved deadly to U.S. troops in Iraq.
The platoon had been visiting families in the area, knocking on doors, trying to collect information and build goodwill, the first step toward trying to take the area back from insurgent domination.
The conversation wound down, but the Marines remained, waiting for other military units to move through the area. The Iraqi homeowner began flipping channels on his television set. He settled on an English-language movie with Arabic subtitles. Lt. Ryan Hub, the platoon leader, turned toward the television and groaned. It was showing American soldiers under attack.
"`Black Hawk Down,'" said Hub, 25, originally from Calhoun County, S.C. "It's not a good sign, man."
`It's a difficult decision'
Moments later, Marines on top of the house sent down an urgent message: A few blocks away, they spotted two men on another roof that overlooked the Firecracker intersection.
Hub ran upstairs. The Marines' night-vision equipment gave them a clear view of the men. They could be IED triggermen. But the night was hot, and many homes in the neighborhood had no power. Families stayed cool any way they could. Some chose to sleep on their roofs.
Hub faced a choice.
"It's a difficult decision," Hub said, as his Marines kept watch on the two men. "More than likely if they were to do anything, they would trigger an IED. But there is no way we could confirm that from here. We can't just shoot these two people. And that is one of the problems of urban war."
A poster has been hung at Marine outposts around Ramadi. Titled the "Roadmap to Success," the poster outlines the tenets of the fight in Iraq, as the Marine Corps sees them.
"The Iraqi people are not our enemy, but our enemy hides amongst them," the fifth tenet reads.
Below that line, the poster lists two corollaries.
"You have to look at these people as if they are trying to kill you but you can't treat them that way," one says.
"Be polite, be professional, have a plan to kill everyone you meet," the other says.
A raid and a theory
Around the Firecracker intersection, Hub's platoon had to tread carefully. There was no way to tell whether the two men on the other rooftop had hostile intentions. So Hub and his platoon made a plan to move quickly and silently through the streets to try to catch the pair.
The Marines ran toward the house, but when they were less than 200 feet away a barking dog gave them away.
The platoon burst into the home. Two men were sleeping in the living room. The Marines raced up the stairs to the roof. No one was there.
There were no blankets or pillows. No evidence anyone was sleeping. A break in the wall around the rooftop would allow easy access to adjoining buildings. There were escape routes and places to get a good view of vehicles driving through the Firecracker intersection.
Cpl. Thomas Wolabaugh, 22, one of the platoon's squad leaders, developed a theory. There was a four-man team. On the adjoining roof, out of view of the first house where the Marines were, one or two people lay down watching the intersection. On the other roof were the two people spotted by the platoon. Those men were the security element, listening for dogs barking and looking for approaching troops, Wolabaugh said.
Hub nodded. The theory seemed right. But it was only theory.
"You have everything but the concrete evidence," Hub said. "It is very frustrating."
So what choice did Pfc. Busenlehner make when he saw the man looking at the guard post?
"We had two people standing on post," Busenlehner recalled. "He fired the first time, and I fired the second time. Both shots hit. And yes, we got him."
Busenlehner's description was almost clinical.
"After you get the OK, you try to stop thinking of them as a person and start thinking of them as a target," Busenlehner said. "It makes it easier."
Ellie
With insurgents hiding among ordinary Iraqis, decisions often must be made in a split second
By Julian E. Barnes
Tribune Newspapers
August 18, 2006
RAMADI, Iraq -- Pfc. Phillip Busenlehner still thinks about his choice. Unbidden, in quiet moments, it creeps into his head.
The 20-year-old Marine from Birmingham, Ala., was standing guard at a combat outpost in central Ramadi when he saw a man 400 yards away.
"He was popping around the corner, back and forth, back and forth," Busenlehner remembered. "He was observing the post. But that far back, how much could he really be observing?"
Was he trying to figure out if it was safe to move? Or was he plotting an attack? Hand near the trigger, Busenlehner faced the most difficult choice a soldier or Marine must make in a war: To kill or not?
With insurgents hiding among ordinary Iraqis, that decision often must be made in a split second. The wrong choice could mean a guerrilla gets a chance to lay a roadside bomb. Or it could mean an innocent Iraqi dies at the hands of Americans and a whole neighborhood turns against U.S. forces.
Busenlehner, one year into his four-year stint with the Marines, radioed his squad leader. He got permission to shoot. Now, the choice was his.
In another part of the city, near one of the most dangerous intersections in Ramadi--the military calls it "Firecracker"--two squads of Marines gathered in an Iraqi family's living room. The neighborhood had seen some spectacular firefights between insurgents and Americans. It was also a prime area for improvised explosive devices, or IEDs, the roadside bombs that have proved deadly to U.S. troops in Iraq.
The platoon had been visiting families in the area, knocking on doors, trying to collect information and build goodwill, the first step toward trying to take the area back from insurgent domination.
The conversation wound down, but the Marines remained, waiting for other military units to move through the area. The Iraqi homeowner began flipping channels on his television set. He settled on an English-language movie with Arabic subtitles. Lt. Ryan Hub, the platoon leader, turned toward the television and groaned. It was showing American soldiers under attack.
"`Black Hawk Down,'" said Hub, 25, originally from Calhoun County, S.C. "It's not a good sign, man."
`It's a difficult decision'
Moments later, Marines on top of the house sent down an urgent message: A few blocks away, they spotted two men on another roof that overlooked the Firecracker intersection.
Hub ran upstairs. The Marines' night-vision equipment gave them a clear view of the men. They could be IED triggermen. But the night was hot, and many homes in the neighborhood had no power. Families stayed cool any way they could. Some chose to sleep on their roofs.
Hub faced a choice.
"It's a difficult decision," Hub said, as his Marines kept watch on the two men. "More than likely if they were to do anything, they would trigger an IED. But there is no way we could confirm that from here. We can't just shoot these two people. And that is one of the problems of urban war."
A poster has been hung at Marine outposts around Ramadi. Titled the "Roadmap to Success," the poster outlines the tenets of the fight in Iraq, as the Marine Corps sees them.
"The Iraqi people are not our enemy, but our enemy hides amongst them," the fifth tenet reads.
Below that line, the poster lists two corollaries.
"You have to look at these people as if they are trying to kill you but you can't treat them that way," one says.
"Be polite, be professional, have a plan to kill everyone you meet," the other says.
A raid and a theory
Around the Firecracker intersection, Hub's platoon had to tread carefully. There was no way to tell whether the two men on the other rooftop had hostile intentions. So Hub and his platoon made a plan to move quickly and silently through the streets to try to catch the pair.
The Marines ran toward the house, but when they were less than 200 feet away a barking dog gave them away.
The platoon burst into the home. Two men were sleeping in the living room. The Marines raced up the stairs to the roof. No one was there.
There were no blankets or pillows. No evidence anyone was sleeping. A break in the wall around the rooftop would allow easy access to adjoining buildings. There were escape routes and places to get a good view of vehicles driving through the Firecracker intersection.
Cpl. Thomas Wolabaugh, 22, one of the platoon's squad leaders, developed a theory. There was a four-man team. On the adjoining roof, out of view of the first house where the Marines were, one or two people lay down watching the intersection. On the other roof were the two people spotted by the platoon. Those men were the security element, listening for dogs barking and looking for approaching troops, Wolabaugh said.
Hub nodded. The theory seemed right. But it was only theory.
"You have everything but the concrete evidence," Hub said. "It is very frustrating."
So what choice did Pfc. Busenlehner make when he saw the man looking at the guard post?
"We had two people standing on post," Busenlehner recalled. "He fired the first time, and I fired the second time. Both shots hit. And yes, we got him."
Busenlehner's description was almost clinical.
"After you get the OK, you try to stop thinking of them as a person and start thinking of them as a target," Busenlehner said. "It makes it easier."
Ellie