thedrifter
06-19-05, 07:05 AM
Brothers In Arms
In Fallujah, U.S. Marine advisers are trying to develop a few good men
By Julian E. Barnes
FALLUJAH, IRAQ--For two nights in a row, shadowy gunmen took a few potshots at the Iraqi soldiers that 1st Lt. Khalid Abdul Rahman Muhamad sent on patrol through Fallujah's Jolan district. That's hardly an uncommon occurrence, and typically, Muhamad would just report the incidents to U.S. marines tasked with securing the northwest section of this restive city. But this time, for the first time, Muhamad turned to Marine Corps Maj. Larry Huggins and offered his own plan to rout out the insurgents with a nighttime raid.
That may not seem like much of a development, but even such a nascent show of initiative is taken as evidence of progress. It is just what the U.S. military is hoping to encourage through a nationwide experiment that is putting small deployments of American troops alongside their Iraqi counterparts to provide around-the-clock training, support, and encouragement. In fortified outposts here, for the past four months, Huggins and his team of advisers have lived and worked with the jundi , Arabic for soldiers, of the 2nd Brigade of the Iraqi Intervention Force, a division of the Iraqi Army. The concept is that having marines constantly work with Iraqis will build up strong Iraqi forces faster than can be done through the conventional combination of classroom training, exercises, and occasional joint patrols. And since the Bush administration links U.S. military withdrawal to the readiness of Iraqi defense forces, U.S. soldiers and marines see success in this style of training as America's best hope for a ticket out of Iraq.
Still, no one should underestimate the challenges. While some former Saddam Hussein-era soldiers have joined the force, many Iraqi recruits have no military background. In any event, American officers are trying to create a fresh mind-set along with a functional structure. Under Saddam, for instance, there was no seasoned corps of noncommissioned officers, the senior enlisted soldiers who enforce discipline and direct training for lower-ranking soldiers. In the old Army, officers gave orders, unresponsive to feedback from below. The Americans hope to model the new Iraqi Army on the U.S. military, yet that adds to the enormity of the task.
Training wheels. The past four months, the Marine advisers in Fallujah acknowledge, have been a slow crawl. Even the simple things--like getting Iraqis to pay attention on guard duty or refrain from shopping while on patrol--have been difficult to accomplish. So Muhamad's initiative was regarded as something of a breakthrough; it was the first time that one of the company leaders had identified a problem and proposed a solution. Huggins agreed with Muhamad's assessment: There was a likely problem with insurgents in the Jolan district. Huggins urged Muhamad to refine the plan with his platoon leaders and then take it to the commander of the 2nd Battalion, Col. Raed Jasem Edan. Behind the scenes, Huggins was working to get backing for Muhamad's plan--a fairly basic nighttime operation that would establish a line of jundi and then send a patrol to draw fire and flush the gunmen from their positions toward the waiting cordon of soldiers. "This is the first time the training wheels will be coming off," Huggins says.
All Army recruits, including the Fallujah force, go through a basic six-week training course. The military claims it has so far trained and equipped 169,000 soldiers with a goal of having a 240,000-man Army a year from now. But "trained" is a relative term in Iraq. The marines in Fallujah say the "trained" recruits are very raw. Indeed, they run them through another two weeks of training in Fallujah before putting them on the street. In other parts of the country, Iraqi troops have reported that they face suspicions from American soldiers. But in Fallujah, the Iraqi jundi who speak English say they believe they get respect from the Americans, at least the ones living at their bases. First Lt. Kahdim Ali Kahdim, a battalion surgeon, cites a strong friendship with the Marine advisers. "I am trying to learn how the American officers think," he says. "I follow their suggestions, and I suggest things too. We try to find the best way for success for all."
There are two groups of marines that work with the Iraqi military in Fallujah: the Marine advisers, like Huggins, who live in the Iraqi compounds with the jundi; and the Marine rifle companies that have formal responsibility for securing Fallujah. Huggins has the fit physique and military haircut of a central casting marine, but he has an easy, if sometimes wry, smile that puts his Iraqi tutees at ease. Whenever something involving the Iraqi military goes out of kilter, he smiles and says: "You just can't make this stuff up." He possesses the most important attribute for a military adviser: patience. The Marine riflemen split their attention between conducting their own operations and training the Iraqis, and some advisers complain that the training mission sometimes gets shortchanged. Often infantrymen will not include Iraqis while they plan operations--for fear that advance word will leak out. And the riflemen may show less patience and understanding than the advisers.
In the morning sun last week, a group of Marine combat engineers, part of the rifle company, trained a group of Iraqi jundi to erect fences made of sharp concertina wire. It is the first class the engineers have taught for the Iraqis, and these marines are not impressed. "The biggest problem is the work ethic. I am used to working with marines, and marines have a different attitude," says 1st. Lt. Robert Spalla. "In the afternoon when it gets hot, the Iraqis start to whine. It is a challenge."
Night shift. By western standards, many of the raw Iraqi recruits are slackers. But there is a cultural difference at play. In the Middle East, activity stops during the hottest part of the day. And at midnight, when the primary Marine Corps shift is heading to bed, the Iraqi command posts are frequently abuzz with activity. Staff Sgt. Tom McCarty, one of the American advisers, says it is hard for many of the marines to grasp that there is an Iraqi way of doing things. Some Iraqi habits, McCarty says, should be discouraged, even if they cannot be stopped--like slipping away from post to shop at the market. But in some cases, McCarty says, the marines could learn something from the Iraqis. Though marines refuse to allow any civilians to walk past a foot patrol, the Iraqi Intervention Force patrols refuse to stop women or children. "In some ways I think the IIF have the right idea," McCarty says. "You want to interfere with the local populace as little as possible." Proximity has earned the Iraqi troops some measure of respect: "These guys are about the bravest guys around," McCarty says as he walks on patrol with the jundi . "Most guys don't see that because of the ugly-American mentality. Some guys never get beyond the bad Iraqi BO or the fact that these guys eat with their hands. But here, it's me and one other marine; my life depends on them. And I sleep good at night knowing these guys will protect me."
McCarty says the marines would be better off just giving the Iraqi military formal control of Fallujah. But Marine officers like Huggins and Col. Mark Gurganus, who oversees military operations around Fallujah, disagree. The Iraqis need more skills before control is handed over to them. Move too fast, they say, and that will set up the Iraqis for failure.
Fallujah is very much still a scarred city trying to rebuild after last November's intense battle between U.S. forces and Sunni insurgents. While the bulk of the Iraqi Army's efforts go into conducting patrols and manning checkpoints, there is the occasional modest humanitarian relief mission. As about 250 schoolgirls looked on last week, the jundi unloaded supplies from the back of a Marine humvee including Beanie Babies, jump-ropes, notebooks, and pens into a classroom for the teachers to distribute. Of course, nothing in Iraq is simple: The next day, parents complained that the teachers didn't distribute the supplies and instead took them home. "You can't make this stuff up," says Huggins. "I'd like to think the semester is coming to an end and the teachers decided to save it for the fall, but I am not so naive."
continued..........
In Fallujah, U.S. Marine advisers are trying to develop a few good men
By Julian E. Barnes
FALLUJAH, IRAQ--For two nights in a row, shadowy gunmen took a few potshots at the Iraqi soldiers that 1st Lt. Khalid Abdul Rahman Muhamad sent on patrol through Fallujah's Jolan district. That's hardly an uncommon occurrence, and typically, Muhamad would just report the incidents to U.S. marines tasked with securing the northwest section of this restive city. But this time, for the first time, Muhamad turned to Marine Corps Maj. Larry Huggins and offered his own plan to rout out the insurgents with a nighttime raid.
That may not seem like much of a development, but even such a nascent show of initiative is taken as evidence of progress. It is just what the U.S. military is hoping to encourage through a nationwide experiment that is putting small deployments of American troops alongside their Iraqi counterparts to provide around-the-clock training, support, and encouragement. In fortified outposts here, for the past four months, Huggins and his team of advisers have lived and worked with the jundi , Arabic for soldiers, of the 2nd Brigade of the Iraqi Intervention Force, a division of the Iraqi Army. The concept is that having marines constantly work with Iraqis will build up strong Iraqi forces faster than can be done through the conventional combination of classroom training, exercises, and occasional joint patrols. And since the Bush administration links U.S. military withdrawal to the readiness of Iraqi defense forces, U.S. soldiers and marines see success in this style of training as America's best hope for a ticket out of Iraq.
Still, no one should underestimate the challenges. While some former Saddam Hussein-era soldiers have joined the force, many Iraqi recruits have no military background. In any event, American officers are trying to create a fresh mind-set along with a functional structure. Under Saddam, for instance, there was no seasoned corps of noncommissioned officers, the senior enlisted soldiers who enforce discipline and direct training for lower-ranking soldiers. In the old Army, officers gave orders, unresponsive to feedback from below. The Americans hope to model the new Iraqi Army on the U.S. military, yet that adds to the enormity of the task.
Training wheels. The past four months, the Marine advisers in Fallujah acknowledge, have been a slow crawl. Even the simple things--like getting Iraqis to pay attention on guard duty or refrain from shopping while on patrol--have been difficult to accomplish. So Muhamad's initiative was regarded as something of a breakthrough; it was the first time that one of the company leaders had identified a problem and proposed a solution. Huggins agreed with Muhamad's assessment: There was a likely problem with insurgents in the Jolan district. Huggins urged Muhamad to refine the plan with his platoon leaders and then take it to the commander of the 2nd Battalion, Col. Raed Jasem Edan. Behind the scenes, Huggins was working to get backing for Muhamad's plan--a fairly basic nighttime operation that would establish a line of jundi and then send a patrol to draw fire and flush the gunmen from their positions toward the waiting cordon of soldiers. "This is the first time the training wheels will be coming off," Huggins says.
All Army recruits, including the Fallujah force, go through a basic six-week training course. The military claims it has so far trained and equipped 169,000 soldiers with a goal of having a 240,000-man Army a year from now. But "trained" is a relative term in Iraq. The marines in Fallujah say the "trained" recruits are very raw. Indeed, they run them through another two weeks of training in Fallujah before putting them on the street. In other parts of the country, Iraqi troops have reported that they face suspicions from American soldiers. But in Fallujah, the Iraqi jundi who speak English say they believe they get respect from the Americans, at least the ones living at their bases. First Lt. Kahdim Ali Kahdim, a battalion surgeon, cites a strong friendship with the Marine advisers. "I am trying to learn how the American officers think," he says. "I follow their suggestions, and I suggest things too. We try to find the best way for success for all."
There are two groups of marines that work with the Iraqi military in Fallujah: the Marine advisers, like Huggins, who live in the Iraqi compounds with the jundi; and the Marine rifle companies that have formal responsibility for securing Fallujah. Huggins has the fit physique and military haircut of a central casting marine, but he has an easy, if sometimes wry, smile that puts his Iraqi tutees at ease. Whenever something involving the Iraqi military goes out of kilter, he smiles and says: "You just can't make this stuff up." He possesses the most important attribute for a military adviser: patience. The Marine riflemen split their attention between conducting their own operations and training the Iraqis, and some advisers complain that the training mission sometimes gets shortchanged. Often infantrymen will not include Iraqis while they plan operations--for fear that advance word will leak out. And the riflemen may show less patience and understanding than the advisers.
In the morning sun last week, a group of Marine combat engineers, part of the rifle company, trained a group of Iraqi jundi to erect fences made of sharp concertina wire. It is the first class the engineers have taught for the Iraqis, and these marines are not impressed. "The biggest problem is the work ethic. I am used to working with marines, and marines have a different attitude," says 1st. Lt. Robert Spalla. "In the afternoon when it gets hot, the Iraqis start to whine. It is a challenge."
Night shift. By western standards, many of the raw Iraqi recruits are slackers. But there is a cultural difference at play. In the Middle East, activity stops during the hottest part of the day. And at midnight, when the primary Marine Corps shift is heading to bed, the Iraqi command posts are frequently abuzz with activity. Staff Sgt. Tom McCarty, one of the American advisers, says it is hard for many of the marines to grasp that there is an Iraqi way of doing things. Some Iraqi habits, McCarty says, should be discouraged, even if they cannot be stopped--like slipping away from post to shop at the market. But in some cases, McCarty says, the marines could learn something from the Iraqis. Though marines refuse to allow any civilians to walk past a foot patrol, the Iraqi Intervention Force patrols refuse to stop women or children. "In some ways I think the IIF have the right idea," McCarty says. "You want to interfere with the local populace as little as possible." Proximity has earned the Iraqi troops some measure of respect: "These guys are about the bravest guys around," McCarty says as he walks on patrol with the jundi . "Most guys don't see that because of the ugly-American mentality. Some guys never get beyond the bad Iraqi BO or the fact that these guys eat with their hands. But here, it's me and one other marine; my life depends on them. And I sleep good at night knowing these guys will protect me."
McCarty says the marines would be better off just giving the Iraqi military formal control of Fallujah. But Marine officers like Huggins and Col. Mark Gurganus, who oversees military operations around Fallujah, disagree. The Iraqis need more skills before control is handed over to them. Move too fast, they say, and that will set up the Iraqis for failure.
Fallujah is very much still a scarred city trying to rebuild after last November's intense battle between U.S. forces and Sunni insurgents. While the bulk of the Iraqi Army's efforts go into conducting patrols and manning checkpoints, there is the occasional modest humanitarian relief mission. As about 250 schoolgirls looked on last week, the jundi unloaded supplies from the back of a Marine humvee including Beanie Babies, jump-ropes, notebooks, and pens into a classroom for the teachers to distribute. Of course, nothing in Iraq is simple: The next day, parents complained that the teachers didn't distribute the supplies and instead took them home. "You can't make this stuff up," says Huggins. "I'd like to think the semester is coming to an end and the teachers decided to save it for the fall, but I am not so naive."
continued..........