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thedrifter
10-18-02, 03:20 PM
Counting the dead, counting the wounded and counting the days ...

The Frustration of the Rocket Belt

Story by R. R. Keene

Retired Marine Colonel Roger H. Barnard, who had returned to Vietnam in September 1999 with Military Historical Tours, squinted to cut the glare of sun on the sandbanks of the Thu Bon River.

Up to two years ago, one could see the water-logged pilings of the old Liberty Bridge. Now, there were only sampans riding precariously low in the river, weighted to their gunnels with grain. Col Barnard's memory, with a little effort, reconstructed most of the missing and changed landscape. His memories also added shades of the people who had been there.

It was 1967, and then-Lieutenant Colonel Barnard, at age 37, was considered an old man by the 18- to 21-year-old leathernecks of 3d Battalion, Seventh Marine Regiment, which he commanded. Like most Marine officers, the regimen of the Corps had kept Barnard lean, sinewy and physically young. The native of Lincoln, Neb., had enlisted in 1948 and found the Corps so much to his liking that he eventually earned a commission. He was also a combat veteran of the Korean War where, 16 years earlier as a platoon commander, he had led Marines under fire. Consequently, the ugliness of war was not new to him.

Still, many things about this war were different, and he was not prepared for the emotion of seeing his first dead Marine in Vietnam.

"I remember the anger. He had been killed by a mine," said Barnard. "From then on when I saw enemy dead, I recall saying to myself, 'I do not feel sorry for you.' " He recalled thinking briefly that it probably would be best if everything that could help the communists was destroyed.

Viet Cong tactics against their own countrymen and women also fostered similar hate. In two savage attacks against district headquarters and refugee settlements at Duc Duc and Dai Loc, the VC murdered 34 unarmed civilians. Another 51 were never seen again.

The Marines reciprocated by launching a series of operations to drive the communists from the Rocket Belt. The most significant turned out to be Operation Foster conducted by LtCol Barnard's battalion. Foster was essentially a search and destroy mission into the river complex of the Dai Loc District and the flatlands and foothills north and east of An Hoa. Intelligence placed two battalions and a company of VC in these areas, and the Marines went to destroy them.

Operation Foster began at 0900, 13 November. Barnard's Marines jumped out of their helicopters and faded into the countryside northeast of An Hoa at a small island the Marines called "the football" near Dai Loc. They caught a few VC by surprise, mostly small bands trying too late to make good an escape.

Once the first few flushed, Marine reconnaissance and aerial observers spotted more. It became easier to call for artillery or air strikes than to pursue so many fleeing VC. Besides, Barnard's leathernecks had hit a jackpot of communist caches. They destroyed some 6,000 buildings, bunkers, tunnels and shelters, and captured 87 tons of rice. The Marine air-ground combination had killed 125 VC and captured eight. They also evacuated more than 11,500 refugees from the communist-dominated area.

"We evacuated the refugees and put them up in squad tents on Hill 37," said Barnard. "Marines cooked rice 24 hours a day. I don't know how much good it did to move them. We would haul them out, feed them and they'd slip back to their homes. I remember one old woman who was evacuated three or four times."

According to reports, it "annoyed the local communist leaders." They had lost their labor force. As the Marines challenged their hold on the people, communist terror attacks increased. As 1967 ended, it was obvious to everyone, especially the communists, that unless something was done to reverse the situation, they would lose control of the Que Son Basin.

Operation Foster and a companion operation, Badger Hunt, had cost the Marines too. Twenty-five had been killed and 136 wounded.

Barnard took stock: "I guess I shouldn't have been, but I was surprised at how good and dedicated the Marines were, especially against such an elusive enemy."

Barnard's confidence in the discipline of the Marines and their training was reinforced. "Initially, I thought, 'I didn't train these guys. How do I know if they know such things as how to move tactically, or if they know anything more than the basics?' Then I realized you had to have confidence that other Marines had done their jobs and that each man was properly trained."

He was also fortunate in his officers. "My executive officer was Major Bob Woeckener. He knew the book. He knew how to handle people. He was good!"

Barnard's company commanders were also good, and Company L's Captain Carl Shaver was the best in the battalion. "I didn't have to teach him anything. He came up with the ideas. In one operation near Hill 52, the night was so black that Capt Shaver used a large ball of knotted string to measure distance and guide his men. Morale in his company was so high, his men used to joke about leaving the Corps and together hire out as mercenaries."

Barnard also had learned that even a battalion commander does not know the "big picture" and that things often seem "nonsensical."

"The local population, which had no males in the daytime, was friendly, but then, they were friendly to everyone carrying weapons." Also, "black markings on the overlays of maps made the brass at division happy. The blacker the overlay the better."

Barnard recalled: "In January 1968, we noticed an increase in enemy patrols headed toward Da Nang. The number of enemy killed in ambushes rose. We now know they were staging for Tet [the Vietnamese Lunar New Year]."

Barnard was ordered to evacuate a company off Hill 52 and consolidate his forces. "We pulled out at night and detonated everything we couldn't carry."

With Tet, the communists hit. "At night, we watched the rockets headed for Da Nang and later learned about the attack on Hue in Northern I Corps. Marines who had been heloed to nearby Charlie Ridge saw a column of VC or North Vietnamese Army and called mortar fire on them."

Da Nang wasn't the only communist target in the area. Closer to Barnard's position, the 2d NVA Div moved the Da Nang-based R-20 VC Bn along with the 1st VC and the 3d NVA regiments toward Go Noi Island. Elements of the 368B NVA Rocket Artillery Regt dug firing positions to the west and north of 7th Marines. The 402d Sapper and V25 VC battalions, with other local forces, girded for combat.

In the Rocket Belt, the fighting continued after the Tet assaults with all their fury ended. Tactically, the Tet offensive was a defeat for the communists. Back in the States, however, television pictures of communists in South Vietnam's major cities were a harbinger of the end of American involvement. On 31 March 1968, President Lyndon B. Johnson announced a partial halt in the bombing of North Vietnam and then sent an additional 13,500 troops to South Vietnam. (Marine Corps force levels would reach 89,000.) President Johnson then declared he would not seek reelection due to the war and public unrest at home.

By April, operations conducted by 7th Marines centered 12 miles south of Da Nang on an island formed by the channels of the Thu Bon, Ky Lam and Ba Ren rivers known as Go Noi.

"Typical operations would last about five days," explained Barnard. "Intel would tell us where we were going. We'd go in with flak vests, helmets, carrying gas masks, two canteens each and one day of rations. Riflemen carried a standard load of ammunition, which included two bandoleers plus what was on our belts."

Barnard's command group was basically standard. Attached were artillery and air liaison officers.

"We also had a couple of Kit Carson Scouts [former VC who had volunteered to serve as guides]," Barnard said. "We'd move and search by day, resupply before dusk and set in for the night. On the small-unit level, enemy intelligence was very good because there was always at least one little guy in the village who was VC, and they always knew we were coming."

Even then, the Marines managed to find the enemy or the enemy found the Marines. Either way, it meant violent contact. Operation Jasper Square, conducted on western Go Noi from 10-14 April, killed 54 communists. The communists killed six Marines and wounded 30.

Meanwhile, leatherneck reconnaissance teams reported that the communists continued to improve their trails through Charlie Ridge into Happy Valley and also improved trails into Arizona Territory and Go Noi Island. The recon teams also directed artillery and air onto the enemy forces. On the morning of 7 April, a patrol spotted some 200 NVA in "the Arizona" wearing green utilities, helmets and flak jackets-communist infantry. The teams radioed for helicopter gunships and an artillery fire mission which killed 51 NVA regulars. Later, in nine sightings, they counted another 170 enemy troops. Even though they were responsible for killing an estimated 70 NVA regulars, reconnaissance teams continued to observe enemy movement and reported 17 sightings throughout the month with an estimated 370 enemy moving through the Thu Bon and Vu Gai river valleys. Although Marine supporting arms claimed to kill a reported 191, doubtless many infiltrators down the trails went undetected.

It was obvious that well-equipped NVA regulars were moving in force into the western and southern approaches to Da Nang. A series of preemptive strikes was ordered. These operations, according to one commander, reflected a III Marine Amphibious Force "change of emphasis ... to go after the enemy in his base camps rather than attempt to interdict him by patrols."

http://www.mca-marines.org/Leatherneck/rocketbeltarch.htm

Sempers,
Roger