thedrifter
03-16-04, 07:34 AM
Marine Corps Gazette
March Editorial: Raise High the Caution Flag
Marines have long been known for their ingenuity. Through many wars and smaller conflagrations they have shown their mettle by being able to adjust on the fly. So it was in the recent combat in Iraq. Marines adapted through the short-fused process of procuring new equipment for Marines in the combat zone; through prehostility organization for combat, such as the formation of the MEF engineering group and the Marine Logistics Command; and through the innovative use of forces onhand to complete assigned tasks (using a reconnaissance battalion as a maneuver element and forming a task force using all three light armored reconnaissance battalions to liberate Tikrit).
A potential problem that we have as an institution lies in the desire to capitalize on our successes, and in so doing we may well find ourselves preparing to fight the last war. We have task organized our forces for so long and so effectively that we risk losing sight that having a robust organization to task organize from is perhaps our greatest strength of all.
A case in point relates back to reconnaissance in Operation DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM. During that conflict we found it difficult to employ dismounted reconnaissance elements in what was essentially a mechanized war in an area of operations with featureless terrain, against an enemy with fairly strong air defense assets—making it difficult to perform standard insertions and extractions. After the war the Corps decided that light armored vehicle units provided the best form of reconnaissance within the division, and ultimately we got rid of the division reconnaissance battalions. The unintended consequences for the Marine Corps in this questionable action was that it cost the Corps our primary source of ground dismounted reconnaissance experience, training management and supervision for those reconnaissance assets, and left a notably fragmented capability among the infantry regiments. It took us the better part of a decade to turn that questionable decision around.
Our recent experience in Operation IRAQI FREEDOM spawned a series of articles explaining how combat service support (CSS) was task organized to support the warfighting efforts of I MEF in Iraq. There was much attention paid to the formation of CSS groups to support elements of the MEF. There was additional discussion about the cumbersome organizations that are the peacetime force service support groups, to the effect that they are huge, unwieldy, and don’t lend themselves well to task organizing for combat. From the “supported” side of the house, it might seem seductive to have one’s own permanent CSS group to train alongside and go off to combat together. No organizational decisions have been made to this point that I’m aware of, but the discussions are ongoing.
And here is where we ought to raise the caution flag. If we were to break up the current CSS organizations so that we are task organized for combat on a relatively permanent basis, then we have lost something substantial—that is the luxury of manning, training, and equipping our Marines in larger formations so that they can train to perform their mission essential tasks. If we break everything out structurally ahead of time, then just like the fragmented reconnaissance elements in the infantry regiment, we abandon the ability to provide a single point for training, maintaining, and preparing the force for combat. In sum, it’s easier to break big things down to smaller things and much harder to group small entities into larger cohesive units.
An analogy might be the way we organize Marine artillery. We send a firing battery out on a float with a deploying MEU, but heaven protect us if we ever think we can do away with artillery battalion and/or regimental headquarters. If such were the case, it would be virtually impossible to mass fires, and massing fires showcases the real strength and flexibility of Marine artillery.
Our Corps is blessed with great strategic, operational, and tactical minds. They need to work together, think things through to logical conclusions on what is best for the Corps, and obviate the necessity to keep raising high the caution flag.
http://www.mca-marines.org/Gazette/edt.html
Ellie
March Editorial: Raise High the Caution Flag
Marines have long been known for their ingenuity. Through many wars and smaller conflagrations they have shown their mettle by being able to adjust on the fly. So it was in the recent combat in Iraq. Marines adapted through the short-fused process of procuring new equipment for Marines in the combat zone; through prehostility organization for combat, such as the formation of the MEF engineering group and the Marine Logistics Command; and through the innovative use of forces onhand to complete assigned tasks (using a reconnaissance battalion as a maneuver element and forming a task force using all three light armored reconnaissance battalions to liberate Tikrit).
A potential problem that we have as an institution lies in the desire to capitalize on our successes, and in so doing we may well find ourselves preparing to fight the last war. We have task organized our forces for so long and so effectively that we risk losing sight that having a robust organization to task organize from is perhaps our greatest strength of all.
A case in point relates back to reconnaissance in Operation DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM. During that conflict we found it difficult to employ dismounted reconnaissance elements in what was essentially a mechanized war in an area of operations with featureless terrain, against an enemy with fairly strong air defense assets—making it difficult to perform standard insertions and extractions. After the war the Corps decided that light armored vehicle units provided the best form of reconnaissance within the division, and ultimately we got rid of the division reconnaissance battalions. The unintended consequences for the Marine Corps in this questionable action was that it cost the Corps our primary source of ground dismounted reconnaissance experience, training management and supervision for those reconnaissance assets, and left a notably fragmented capability among the infantry regiments. It took us the better part of a decade to turn that questionable decision around.
Our recent experience in Operation IRAQI FREEDOM spawned a series of articles explaining how combat service support (CSS) was task organized to support the warfighting efforts of I MEF in Iraq. There was much attention paid to the formation of CSS groups to support elements of the MEF. There was additional discussion about the cumbersome organizations that are the peacetime force service support groups, to the effect that they are huge, unwieldy, and don’t lend themselves well to task organizing for combat. From the “supported” side of the house, it might seem seductive to have one’s own permanent CSS group to train alongside and go off to combat together. No organizational decisions have been made to this point that I’m aware of, but the discussions are ongoing.
And here is where we ought to raise the caution flag. If we were to break up the current CSS organizations so that we are task organized for combat on a relatively permanent basis, then we have lost something substantial—that is the luxury of manning, training, and equipping our Marines in larger formations so that they can train to perform their mission essential tasks. If we break everything out structurally ahead of time, then just like the fragmented reconnaissance elements in the infantry regiment, we abandon the ability to provide a single point for training, maintaining, and preparing the force for combat. In sum, it’s easier to break big things down to smaller things and much harder to group small entities into larger cohesive units.
An analogy might be the way we organize Marine artillery. We send a firing battery out on a float with a deploying MEU, but heaven protect us if we ever think we can do away with artillery battalion and/or regimental headquarters. If such were the case, it would be virtually impossible to mass fires, and massing fires showcases the real strength and flexibility of Marine artillery.
Our Corps is blessed with great strategic, operational, and tactical minds. They need to work together, think things through to logical conclusions on what is best for the Corps, and obviate the necessity to keep raising high the caution flag.
http://www.mca-marines.org/Gazette/edt.html
Ellie