thedrifter
02-10-04, 06:47 AM
It’s Déjà Vu All Over Again
by Col T.X. Hammes
While the opportunity presents itself, let’s reorganize our
infantry units to better support both MEU(SOC) and the UDP.
Once again the Marine Corps is struggling to reestablish both the Marine expeditionary unit (special operations capable) (MEU(SOC)) and unit deployment program (UDP). The exact same thing happened after Operation DESERT STORM (ODS) in 1991. Then, like now, the Marine Corps had to make major efforts to get forces back into the deployment cycle. Then, as now, the commitment to the war and the maintenance of forces in Asia tied up all regular Marine forces and a large portion of our Reserves. Then, like now, the Marine Corps was faced with choosing which of the currently deployed forces would have to remain deployed, which would have a very short turnaround from return from war to deployment overseas, and which would have a full cycle to prepare for deployment.
There is one major difference so far. In 1992, just about the time we had reestablished the deployment cycle, the Somalia crisis came up. With it came a requirement to commit to a major force for an indeterminate period of time. Planning in that crisis was driven to a large degree by an effort to maintain the deployment cycle that had been so painstakingly rebuilt. No one wanted to repeat the pain that breaking the deployment cycle would inflict. The result was some hard and fast restrictions imposed on which forces could be sent to Somalia. Frankly, the forces about to deploy, in effect the most ready forces, were fenced off, and we were forced to select from less ready forces.
With luck we won’t be facing another major crisis in the next 12 months. . . . or will we?
It is strange that 13 years after ODS, we find ourselves struggling to once again reestablish the deployment cycle. The obvious question is why? The answer is fairly simple. The entire Marine Corps remains in the deployment cycle. To maintain the three deployed MEU(SOC)s and the forward deployed forces on Okinawa, virtually all Operating Forces are in the deployment cycle. This is the most visible and measurable problem with our current approach to providing for forward naval presence.
Less visible and less measurable, but much more dangerous, is its impact on the readiness of the Marine Corps’ combat organizations to engage in a major regional contingency. Over the years there has been a continuing dialogue in the Marine Corps Gazette about the impact of MEU(SOC) and UDP deployment requirements on our readiness to respond to a major contingency. Some authors argue that the demands deployments place on our forces directly reduce their ability to respond to a major contingency. Others reply that while that may be true, we have always responded to major contingencies and will always find a way to muddle through.
In fact, we have always responded. Unfortunately, with 100 percent of our forces committed to the deployment cycle, we have at times been forced to use those battalions that are least ready. Our most ready forces are those already deployed. The next most ready are those units that are just about to deploy or those that have just returned from deployment. In some cases, to honor end of active service (EAS) dates, protect the deployment cycle, and avoid the pain of reestablishing it yet again, we have chosen not to use units in either of these two categories.
To clarify the problem, consider just infantry battalions. When a major contingency comes up we have to select the battalions that will deploy. If we use those about to deploy for the MEU(SOC) or UDPs, another battalion must train up on very short notice to fill those deployment windows. If we use a unit that has just returned from the MEU(SOC) or UDP, we must request stop loss because a very large number of the enlisted Marines are coming up on their EAS. This is simply a fact of life given the deployment cycle and the 4-year enlistment. Thus, when we choose to protect the deployment cycle and honor the EASs (our past record indicates this is our default position), only those battalions just starting their workup cycle—our least ready units—are available for the contingency. Since every infantry battalion is in the deployment cycle, we do not have any other options.
Despite this inadequacy, we have succeeded in each crisis—so far. Yet we have been very lucky. In both ODS and Operation IRAQI FREEDOM (OIF) we had a long time to train the forces after their arrival in theater. In Somalia we faced an enemy who did not fight and gave us time to train on the ground while conducting operations. We cannot count on our luck holding. Next time we may face a “come as you are” fight.
So the question becomes, “can we find a way to maintain a forward presence and still have trained regiments available for major contingencies?” I think we can.
First, we need to acknowledge that the situation that drove us to the UDP has changed. When we started UDP we had 6 of 27 infantry battalions on Okinawa. Today we have 4 of 24 infantry battalions there.
Because of these changed circumstances we can change the way we do business. Instead of every infantry battalion in the Marine Corps supporting Okinawa and the MEUs, we can use fewer than half the Corps’ infantry regiments to meet these requirements and dedicate the others to training for contingencies and major theater war (MTW.) With this system we can continue to maintain highly trained units forward deployed and still have uniformly ready regiments available for major contingencies and wars. Then, when we inevitably deploy forces to another major contingency, we will not tie ourselves in knots trying to reestablish the deployment cycle. Four regiments can provide sufficient forces for all contingencies short of MTW.
We do it as follows:
First, stop UDP.
Next, reduce 4th Marines to two infantry battalions and make those battalions permanent change of station battalions. With the new 2-year unaccompanied tours, these battalions will have stability very similar to those of the continental U.S. battalions. Even if we choose to return to 1-year unaccompanied tours, we can designate selected battalion billets as 3-year tour billets to provide for stability. Assign all other personnel on 1-year unaccompanied tours. This is how we man our non-rotating forces in Okinawa today.
Next, task 3d Marines to provide the ground combat element (GCE) for 31st MEU(SOC). Relieve 5th Marines of that tasking.
With the additional battalion freed up by reducing 4th Marines to two battalions, permanently increase 1st Marines to four battalions. 1st Marines will keep its current organization (1st Battalion, 1st Marines (1/1); 2/1; 3/1; and 1/4) and continue to provide the GCE for the west coast MEU.
To provide the GCE for the east coast MEU, increase 2d Marines to four battalions (1/2, 2/2, 3/2, and 1/8).
Thus, three regiments (1st, 2d, and 3d Marines) fulfill our MEU(SOC) requirements—a battalion landing team (BLT) for 31st MEU(SOC) and BLTs for the east and west coast MEU(SOC)s.
With the standing up of 1/9 as an antiterror battalion, 8th Marines will be relieved of its mission to provide a battalion to 4th Marine Expeditionary Brigade (Antiterrorism) (4th MEB (AT)). This means we will have five infantry regiments available to train for major contingencies and war. 6th and 7th Marines will remain designated as the east and west coast maritime prepositioning squadron (MPS) regiments—MPS–1 and MPS–2, respectively. 5th Marines will assume the Western Pacific (WestPac) MPS mission (MPS–3). 4th Marines will focus on major contingencies in Asia with emphasis on Korea. Once relieved of its mission to provide the AT battalion and nucleus of 4th MEB staff, 8th Marines will be available to deploy via air or amphibious shipping.
Finally, 1st Marines and 2d Marines will fill the amphibious regiment roles for the operation plans. Both currently do so.
In summary:
• Three regiments will be focused on the deployment cycle—1st and 2d Marines for east and west coast MEU(SOC)s, 3d Marines for 31st MEU(SOC).
• 4th Marines as the forward deployed regiment on Okinawa will focus on MTW in Korea and other Asian contingencies.
• Three regiments (5th, 6th, and 7th) will be focused on maritime prepositioning force (MPF) operations—our most probable and fastest method of deploying to a major fight.
• One regiment—8th Marines—will be available to deploy via strategic lift.
• Finally, 1st and 2d Marines will cover the amphibious mission. Their battalions will conduct amphibious training as an integral part of their MEU(SOC) training. The regimental staffs will provide the GCE for any major amphibious exercise.
Table 1 shows the organization and alignment of the regiments if we terminate UDP and adopt this proposal.
Infantry regiments sourcing forward deployed units:
1st Marines (1/1, 2/1, 3/1, 1/4):
Provide GCE for west coast MEUs
Amphibious force for west coast
2d Marines (1/2, 2/2, 3/2, 1/8):
Provide GCE for east coast MEUs
Amphibious force for east coast
3d Marines (1/3, 2/3, 3/3):
Provide GCE for 31st MEU(SOC)
4th Marines (2/4, 3/4):
Assigned to 3d MarDiv on Okinawa—prep for MTW in Korea and contingencies in Asia
Infantry regiments providing forces for MTW and major contingencies:
5th Marines (1/5, 2/5, 3/5): GCE for MPS–3 (Guam)
6th Marines (1/6, 2/6, 3/6): GCE for MPS–1 (Mediterranean)
7th Marines (1/7, 2/7, 3/7): GCE for MPS–2 (Diego Garcia)
8th Marines (2/8, 3/8): prepared for deployment via strategic lift
continued....
by Col T.X. Hammes
While the opportunity presents itself, let’s reorganize our
infantry units to better support both MEU(SOC) and the UDP.
Once again the Marine Corps is struggling to reestablish both the Marine expeditionary unit (special operations capable) (MEU(SOC)) and unit deployment program (UDP). The exact same thing happened after Operation DESERT STORM (ODS) in 1991. Then, like now, the Marine Corps had to make major efforts to get forces back into the deployment cycle. Then, as now, the commitment to the war and the maintenance of forces in Asia tied up all regular Marine forces and a large portion of our Reserves. Then, like now, the Marine Corps was faced with choosing which of the currently deployed forces would have to remain deployed, which would have a very short turnaround from return from war to deployment overseas, and which would have a full cycle to prepare for deployment.
There is one major difference so far. In 1992, just about the time we had reestablished the deployment cycle, the Somalia crisis came up. With it came a requirement to commit to a major force for an indeterminate period of time. Planning in that crisis was driven to a large degree by an effort to maintain the deployment cycle that had been so painstakingly rebuilt. No one wanted to repeat the pain that breaking the deployment cycle would inflict. The result was some hard and fast restrictions imposed on which forces could be sent to Somalia. Frankly, the forces about to deploy, in effect the most ready forces, were fenced off, and we were forced to select from less ready forces.
With luck we won’t be facing another major crisis in the next 12 months. . . . or will we?
It is strange that 13 years after ODS, we find ourselves struggling to once again reestablish the deployment cycle. The obvious question is why? The answer is fairly simple. The entire Marine Corps remains in the deployment cycle. To maintain the three deployed MEU(SOC)s and the forward deployed forces on Okinawa, virtually all Operating Forces are in the deployment cycle. This is the most visible and measurable problem with our current approach to providing for forward naval presence.
Less visible and less measurable, but much more dangerous, is its impact on the readiness of the Marine Corps’ combat organizations to engage in a major regional contingency. Over the years there has been a continuing dialogue in the Marine Corps Gazette about the impact of MEU(SOC) and UDP deployment requirements on our readiness to respond to a major contingency. Some authors argue that the demands deployments place on our forces directly reduce their ability to respond to a major contingency. Others reply that while that may be true, we have always responded to major contingencies and will always find a way to muddle through.
In fact, we have always responded. Unfortunately, with 100 percent of our forces committed to the deployment cycle, we have at times been forced to use those battalions that are least ready. Our most ready forces are those already deployed. The next most ready are those units that are just about to deploy or those that have just returned from deployment. In some cases, to honor end of active service (EAS) dates, protect the deployment cycle, and avoid the pain of reestablishing it yet again, we have chosen not to use units in either of these two categories.
To clarify the problem, consider just infantry battalions. When a major contingency comes up we have to select the battalions that will deploy. If we use those about to deploy for the MEU(SOC) or UDPs, another battalion must train up on very short notice to fill those deployment windows. If we use a unit that has just returned from the MEU(SOC) or UDP, we must request stop loss because a very large number of the enlisted Marines are coming up on their EAS. This is simply a fact of life given the deployment cycle and the 4-year enlistment. Thus, when we choose to protect the deployment cycle and honor the EASs (our past record indicates this is our default position), only those battalions just starting their workup cycle—our least ready units—are available for the contingency. Since every infantry battalion is in the deployment cycle, we do not have any other options.
Despite this inadequacy, we have succeeded in each crisis—so far. Yet we have been very lucky. In both ODS and Operation IRAQI FREEDOM (OIF) we had a long time to train the forces after their arrival in theater. In Somalia we faced an enemy who did not fight and gave us time to train on the ground while conducting operations. We cannot count on our luck holding. Next time we may face a “come as you are” fight.
So the question becomes, “can we find a way to maintain a forward presence and still have trained regiments available for major contingencies?” I think we can.
First, we need to acknowledge that the situation that drove us to the UDP has changed. When we started UDP we had 6 of 27 infantry battalions on Okinawa. Today we have 4 of 24 infantry battalions there.
Because of these changed circumstances we can change the way we do business. Instead of every infantry battalion in the Marine Corps supporting Okinawa and the MEUs, we can use fewer than half the Corps’ infantry regiments to meet these requirements and dedicate the others to training for contingencies and major theater war (MTW.) With this system we can continue to maintain highly trained units forward deployed and still have uniformly ready regiments available for major contingencies and wars. Then, when we inevitably deploy forces to another major contingency, we will not tie ourselves in knots trying to reestablish the deployment cycle. Four regiments can provide sufficient forces for all contingencies short of MTW.
We do it as follows:
First, stop UDP.
Next, reduce 4th Marines to two infantry battalions and make those battalions permanent change of station battalions. With the new 2-year unaccompanied tours, these battalions will have stability very similar to those of the continental U.S. battalions. Even if we choose to return to 1-year unaccompanied tours, we can designate selected battalion billets as 3-year tour billets to provide for stability. Assign all other personnel on 1-year unaccompanied tours. This is how we man our non-rotating forces in Okinawa today.
Next, task 3d Marines to provide the ground combat element (GCE) for 31st MEU(SOC). Relieve 5th Marines of that tasking.
With the additional battalion freed up by reducing 4th Marines to two battalions, permanently increase 1st Marines to four battalions. 1st Marines will keep its current organization (1st Battalion, 1st Marines (1/1); 2/1; 3/1; and 1/4) and continue to provide the GCE for the west coast MEU.
To provide the GCE for the east coast MEU, increase 2d Marines to four battalions (1/2, 2/2, 3/2, and 1/8).
Thus, three regiments (1st, 2d, and 3d Marines) fulfill our MEU(SOC) requirements—a battalion landing team (BLT) for 31st MEU(SOC) and BLTs for the east and west coast MEU(SOC)s.
With the standing up of 1/9 as an antiterror battalion, 8th Marines will be relieved of its mission to provide a battalion to 4th Marine Expeditionary Brigade (Antiterrorism) (4th MEB (AT)). This means we will have five infantry regiments available to train for major contingencies and war. 6th and 7th Marines will remain designated as the east and west coast maritime prepositioning squadron (MPS) regiments—MPS–1 and MPS–2, respectively. 5th Marines will assume the Western Pacific (WestPac) MPS mission (MPS–3). 4th Marines will focus on major contingencies in Asia with emphasis on Korea. Once relieved of its mission to provide the AT battalion and nucleus of 4th MEB staff, 8th Marines will be available to deploy via air or amphibious shipping.
Finally, 1st Marines and 2d Marines will fill the amphibious regiment roles for the operation plans. Both currently do so.
In summary:
• Three regiments will be focused on the deployment cycle—1st and 2d Marines for east and west coast MEU(SOC)s, 3d Marines for 31st MEU(SOC).
• 4th Marines as the forward deployed regiment on Okinawa will focus on MTW in Korea and other Asian contingencies.
• Three regiments (5th, 6th, and 7th) will be focused on maritime prepositioning force (MPF) operations—our most probable and fastest method of deploying to a major fight.
• One regiment—8th Marines—will be available to deploy via strategic lift.
• Finally, 1st and 2d Marines will cover the amphibious mission. Their battalions will conduct amphibious training as an integral part of their MEU(SOC) training. The regimental staffs will provide the GCE for any major amphibious exercise.
Table 1 shows the organization and alignment of the regiments if we terminate UDP and adopt this proposal.
Infantry regiments sourcing forward deployed units:
1st Marines (1/1, 2/1, 3/1, 1/4):
Provide GCE for west coast MEUs
Amphibious force for west coast
2d Marines (1/2, 2/2, 3/2, 1/8):
Provide GCE for east coast MEUs
Amphibious force for east coast
3d Marines (1/3, 2/3, 3/3):
Provide GCE for 31st MEU(SOC)
4th Marines (2/4, 3/4):
Assigned to 3d MarDiv on Okinawa—prep for MTW in Korea and contingencies in Asia
Infantry regiments providing forces for MTW and major contingencies:
5th Marines (1/5, 2/5, 3/5): GCE for MPS–3 (Guam)
6th Marines (1/6, 2/6, 3/6): GCE for MPS–1 (Mediterranean)
7th Marines (1/7, 2/7, 3/7): GCE for MPS–2 (Diego Garcia)
8th Marines (2/8, 3/8): prepared for deployment via strategic lift
continued....