U.S.: Let's farm, not fight, in Afghanistan

[thedrifter]

U.S.: Let's farm, not fight, in Afghanistan
By Jim Landers
DALLAS MORNING NEWS
Sunday, Feb. 08 2009

FORWARD OPERATING BASE GHAZNI, Afghanistan — Fifty-two Texas National Guard men
and women are planning an attack on a Taliban stronghold near here that other
Army units estimate would take thousands of U.S. and Afghan soldiers to capture.

The Texans plan to win the battle of Khajanoor Farms without firing a shot.

This is not a plot for a Chuck Norris thriller about "One riot, one Ranger."
Instead, it's an example of the U.S. military's new counterinsurgency strategy,
where winning friends and providing government-backed services are more
important than pulling triggers.

A Texas National Guard Agribusiness Development Team plans to defeat the
Taliban's hold on the big wheat-seed farm at Khajanoor by building a larger,
quality seed farm in the high mountain plains of Ghazni province.

If approved, and if the climate at 10,000 feet can be mastered, the Nawur Farm
could free Ghazni's wheat farmers from Taliban-approved suppliers and lousy
products imported from Pakistan.

"It could also save lives," said Col. Stan Poe of Houston, commander of the
Texas agribusiness team.

Seven years on, the war in Afghanistan is not going well for the American
military. There are fewer than 150,000 U.S., allied and Afghan army forces here
fighting an insurgency spread across a country the size of Texas.

Defense Secretary Robert Gates told Congress last week that the Obama
administration wants to concentrate on tracking down the leadership of al-Qaida
and other terrorist groups, while easing back on nation building.

"If we set ourselves the objective of creating some sort of Central Asian
Valhalla over there, we will lose because nobody in the world has that kind of
time, patience or money, to be honest," Gates told a congressional panel.

Still, the counterinsurgency tactics that worked in Iraq — helping villagers
find a life free of intimidation, blunting enemy propaganda, eliminating
insurgent leaders and boosting loyalty to the central government — are
reshaping the Afghanistan war.

"For seven years, we've been chasing the Taliban. They literally just come
back," said Illinois National Guard Col. David Matakas. "We can go in and kill
a lot of people and do no good. It's more important that we push forward with
training the Afghan forces and focus on turning a district, a tribe or a
village away from the Taliban, one at a time."

The Taliban and other groups, including al-Qaida and Lashkar-e-Taiba, the gang
blamed for December's terrorist attacks in the Indian city of Mumbai, roam at
will between much of Afghanistan and the tribal frontiers of neighboring
Pakistan.

They do not stand and fight U.S. forces and their allies from Britain, Canada,
Poland and other countries. That strategy has cost the insurgents thousands of
dead fighters.

Instead, they plant roadside bombs. They rocket and mortar military bases. Most
of all, they attack lightly defended, mud-walled villages where they shoot and
behead mayors, police and tribal leaders. They provide a form of law and order,
winning some backers while coercing the loyalty of others. And their influence
is spreading across the southern and eastern parts of the country.

"The risk of where we are in Afghanistan right now, in terms of outcomes, is
pretty high right now, because it's not going well," Adm. Mike Mullen, chairman
of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, said in Washington last week. "And it hasn't been
going well for a significant period of time."

U.S. commanders in Afghanistan want more troops. The Marines are preparing to
ship as many as 22,000 troops to fight in the southern provinces of Kandahar
and Helmand.

One new unit, the 3rd Brigade Combat Team of the 10th Mountain Division,
arrived in Afghanistan a couple of weeks ago to bring the total U.S. troops to
36,000.

Five of the 19 districts of Ghazni province are coded red by the U.S. military,
signifying a strong Taliban presence. One district in the far south of the
province, Nawa, is coded black, indicating the Taliban own the area. All six
districts are largely populated by Pashtun tribes, the mainstay of Taliban
support.

Polish Army Col. Rajmund T. Andrzejczak, whose task is to control security in
Ghazni province, has fewer than 1,600 Polish troops under his command and
admits that's not enough. His brigade's priority is securing the highway that
runs through Ghazni province and connects Kabul and Kandahar.

Taking control of red and black districts would require a far larger force just
to clear the areas, and then still more troops to man forts that would have to
be built to keep the Taliban from returning.

"My philosophy is less aggressive," Andrzejczak said. "We are not an
anti-terrorist brigade. We are a brigade supporting the people of Ghazni."

The same philosophy guides the National Guard's Agribusiness Development Teams.
Texas, Nebraska and Missouri have teams working in Afghanistan. Indiana,
Kentucky and Oklahoma are preparing to send teams as well.

The Texas team has Ghazni province. Khajanoor Farms is in the code-red Andar
District. A large force of Taliban fighters controls the 2,500 acres of wheat
fields and subsistence plots from caves in mountains overlooking the farm.

The Texas agribusiness team, 12 farming specialist soldiers plus a headquarters
and security force of 40, arrived in Ghazni in May. They are the first of five
teams from the Texas Guard pledged to work agricultural issues in Ghazni
province through 2013.

When the Texans arrived, a U.S. regiment then in command of security in the
province asked them to evaluate the importance of Khajanoor Farms, and the two
military groups brainstormed about how to recover them.

"We were estimating — guesstimating, really — it would take at least two U.S.
battalions (about 1,600 men), the Afghan National Army and maybe some outside
forces to take and hold that," said Maj. Conan Martin of Boerne, Texas.

Facing those requirements, a military assault on Khajanoor Farms was shelved.
Securing Highway 1 was a higher priority; attacks on highway convoys last
summer forced the U.S. Army for a time to parachute bottles of water to the
2,000 troops and civilians stationed at Forward Operating Base Ghazni.

The Afghan National Army said it could not spare the troops for an assault on
Khajanoor, either.

Martin helped draft some of the first agreements arming Sunni tribesmen in Iraq
to expel al-Qaida, a strategy that helped defeat the terrorist organization in
that country. Martin worked out another novel approach for Ghazni — build a
new, rival seed farm. His colleague Maj. Devin James, an ardent Texas A&M fan
who, in civilian life, works for LCR Contractors of Dallas, was enthusiastic as
well.

The Texans had visited wheat farms in the far north Nawur district, an area
known as Hazaris, populated by descendants of Genghis Khan. Some of the Hazari
farms were at elevations of 10,000 feet. Trees were growing at elevations 1,500
feet higher than you'd find in North America or Europe.

The Ghazni provincial government owns vast tracts of land in Nawur.

There's plenty of water stored in a vast snowmelt playa called Daste Nawur.

Martin and James thought this offered a way to defeat the Taliban at Khajanoor
Farms. They designed a giant, 20,000-acre wheat seed farm north of Daste Nawur
that could provide seeds for most of Afghanistan's wheat farmers.

The Hazaris were eager to help the Texans and willing to learn how to run a
large farm.

"One Hazari leader told us, 'While the Pashtun fight and kill each other, we
are educating ours,'" James said.

Martin worked up a plan to put Nawur Farms in production by fall 2010. The cost
of the project was estimated between $7.5 million and $9 million.

Martin estimated the cost of a military assault, occupation and rehabilitation
of Khajanoor Farms at $12 million to $18 million.

It may not work. The right type of wheat has to be found to survive the high
altitude and extreme winter conditions of Nawur, where some of the mountains
are more than 13,000 feet high. Then, the farm has to find ways to move the
seed to markets across a weak road system.

Lt. Col. Al Perez of San Antonio is the agribusiness team's market specialist.
He's been in the military for 23 years, both in the regular Army and the Texas
National Guard.

"This is way much better than pulling the trigger," he said. "Way, way better."

Ellie