December 10, 2005
U.S. Forces Rely on Local Informants in Ferreting Rebels in West Iraq
By KIRK SEMPLE

AL ASAD, Iraq - On the final day of a town-to-town military sweep in November along the Euphrates River, hundreds of men in Ar Rabit, a farming village, were rousted from their homes by American and Iraqi troops and shepherded into long rows on a harvested cornfield.

With the help of a group of locally recruited informants, most with their faces concealed by balaclavas and scarves, the troops pulled 12 suspected insurgents from the lineup, bound them in handcuffs and blindfolds, and took them away.

American military commanders have repeatedly hailed the contributions of the informant group, called the Desert Protectors, saying their help in recent weeks demonstrates the increasing willingness of local residents to cooperate in fighting guerrillas on Iraq's fiercely independent western fringe.

But even as they promote the Desert Protectors, apparently the first unit of its kind in Iraq, the commanders admit that the new alliance is, at present, little more than a marriage of convenience that could break apart at any time.

"This is the land of 'the enemy of my enemy is my friend,' " said Col. Stephen W. Davis, the Marine commander who oversees security for western Anbar Province from a base here. "The best friend you got today could be your enemy tomorrow."

That caution was echoed by Lt. Col. Dale Alford, commander of the Third Battalion, Sixth Marines, which is operating in the towns along the southern Euphrates riverbank.

"They're going to pick the side that allows them to get back to work," he said. "We just got to make sure it's us. As long as they're working on our side, that's all I care about."

With their heavy reliance on the Desert Protectors, American military officials have wandered into the complicated realm of Anbar tribal politics, which they admit they only partly understand. Officials working closely with these informants say they are aware that some could be acting on tribal grievances and implicating innocent people.

During the entire operation, which began on Nov. 5 and lasted more than two weeks, about 800 men were sent to detention camps for further questioning, according to Colonel Davis. Of those, more than 300 were sent to Abu Ghraib prison and the netherworld of the Iraqi detention system; the others were released.

In many cases, testimony from the Desert Protectors was the only evidence against suspects before they were taken away in trucks and helicopters for further interrogation.

One man, his face hidden, identified suspected insurgents in lineups by flashing a thumbs-down sign over their heads, providing the basis for the detentions of most of the 96 suspects captured along the northern side of the river, according to Army and Marine officials. Those included the 12 in Ar Rabit on Nov. 21.

One member of the Army's Tactical Human Intelligence Team, which chaperoned the informants during the sweep on the north side of the river, said his unit had felt it necessary to rein in the informants.

"They were fingering, like, 25, 30 at a time," recalled the soldier, Special Agent Timothy Price. "We said: 'No way. We need to have evidence.' They want to get everyone who's not their tribe."

The story of the formation of the group, as told by the Marine leadership in western Anbar, is simple. Far western Anbar was in recent years dominated by two tribes, both of which were participating in the anti-American insurgency, military officials said. This year, officials say, Al Qaeda in Mesopotamia, the group run by Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, struck an alliance with one tribe, the Salmanis. The partnership drove out the other tribe, the Abu Mahals, in a battle in Husayba last summer.

In late summer, members of the Abu Mahal tribe, many of whom had sought refuge in Akashat, a desert town 75 miles southwest of Husayba, approached the American military. In a program approved by Gen. George W. Casey Jr., the top American commander in Iraq, the Americans provided weapons and training to the men, some of whom, Colonel Davis said, had been trying to kill American marines only months before. The informants' main role in the operation would be to move with the troops and identify insurgents.

But the composition of the Desert Protectors is more complicated than the military account suggests. While officers and troops who work closely with the informants said the group was made up of Abu Mahals, several Desert Protectors said the membership was more varied, and even included Salmanis. The membership reflects a complex arrangement of new alliances that cut across tribal lines.

"We haven't really focused on figuring them out," a member of the Army's interrogation team said at a desert holding camp north of the Euphrates. Motioning toward a clump of detainees squatting on the sand, he added, "We've focused on figuring everyone else out."

Members of the Marines' Human Intelligence Exploitation Team, which worked with the Desert Protectors on the south side of the river, refused to be interviewed, as did the head of the intelligence unit for the Marines' Regimental Combat Team 2, which coordinated the sweep.

Military officers said that the informants were involved only in the first wave of field screening and that other evidence was also considered, including whether a suspect's name appeared on the military's lists of known insurgents.

Each case was further screened by intelligence experts and lawyers at military bases, they said, and more than 60 percent of the initial detainees were released.

Asked whether the American and Iraqi leadership might be losing potential allies by subjecting possibly innocent people to this harsh process, Colonel Davis replied: "Welcome to insurgency. You will find no finality except for death on this battlefield. There are no absolutes."

Ellie