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Thread: military science
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11-07-02, 12:52 PM #1
military science
http://catalog.arizona.edu/1995-97/d.../mlsnsmla.html
There are a number of threads and posts on this site that would otherwise be considered under the heading of military science. Don't neglect them because of the title of this thread. There is a wealth of information for both the 'amateur' and the professional.
Last edited by wrbones; 03-10-03 at 02:56 AM.
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11-16-02, 10:54 AM #2
site for links
http://www.library.ucsb.edu/subj/military.html
you'll drool over this one folks.....
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11-16-02, 10:58 AM #3
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11-18-02, 12:27 AM #4
This one will keep ya busy fer awhile! LOL
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11-18-02, 12:31 AM #5
line upon line.....
This should give you an idea of which areas to study.....
http://216.239.37.100/search?q=cache...=en&ie=UTF-8#2
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11-18-02, 12:37 AM #6
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11-18-02, 12:44 AM #7
more links to keep ya busy
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03-09-03, 11:23 PM #8
Some areas of study?
This list was compiled by an author. It looks like it might be worth the trouble to take a look at.
THE TRIGGER Digital Reference Library
The following sites collectively made a significant contribution to the factual and sociological background for the writing of The Trigger. Almost every perspective on firearms is represented, including the extremes represented by those who celebrate them and those who abhor them.
This list will not be kept current, and likely already contains some dead links.
0604270A Electronic Warfare (EW) Development
1996 National Gun Policy Survey
1997 Annual Report Table of Contents
1998 Statistical Abstract of the United States
349 - M61A1 Vulcan 20mm Gun
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A Nation Without Guns
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Ammunition Overview Index
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California Police Chiefs' Position Paper on Junk Guns
Can Gravity be Induced?
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Cavity QED (Quantum Electrodynamics)
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CNN - U.S. agrees to soften stance on land-mine ban - September 15, 1997
Coalition for Gun Control
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Coalition for Gun Control - Killers are licenced shooters
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Gun Control and the New World Order
Gun Control Network
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Guns Save Lives
Handbook for Physics Majors and Minors
Handgun Control, Inc. - CCW
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Handgun Control, Inc. and The Center To Prevent Handgun Violence
Hawk Surface-to-Air Missile System
HCI Space Central
Houston Chronicle special section
High Energy Physics Concepts
High Explosives Science & Technology (DX-2)
Homicide Statistics
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ICI Explosives
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Institute for Advanced Study - Unsolved Problems in Astrophysics
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International Space Station
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Joint Chiefs of Staff
continued
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03-09-03, 11:23 PM #9
Justice Information Center (NCJRS)
Justice Information Center (NCJRS): Research and Evaluation Documents
KEK Welcome
Land Warfare Systems
Land-mines: A deadly inheritance
Law Enforcement Product News - Events Schedule
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Lockheed Martin Photo Archives - A to Z
Los Alamos National Laboratory Science and Technology Resources and References
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Lott/Mustard Gun Control Study
Luxor Las Vegas
M1A1 Abrams Tank Characteristics
Mac's LCAC Web Page.html
Major Range Test Facilities Base
MapQuest! Interactive Atlas
Matters of Gravity: The newsletter of the APS TIG on Gravitation
Medieval Archery Research Project
Metropolitan Police South Norwood & Croydon Division
Military Aircraft Database
Military Equipment of the Former USSR & Russia
MineWeb Home Page
Missile Proliferation - India
Missile Proliferation Summary
Mother Jones - Additional Resources on Guns and Gun Violence
Mother Jones - Reverse FIRE
Mother Jones - Who We Kill
National Center for Juvenile Justice
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Naval Air Warfare Center Weapons Division
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Oregon Live: Thurston High School Shooting
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Second Amendment Foundation Online
Solid Rocket Boosters
Sourcebook of Criminal Justice Statistics
Special Forces of the World
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Stanford Linear Accelerator Center
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The Fire & Arson Investigation Information Website - C.I.S.
The Gun Page
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Go to Trigger Annex Go to K-Mac's Home Page || Last Revised: November 12, 1999
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03-09-03, 11:29 PM #10
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03-09-03, 11:29 PM #11
Please make a tax-deductible donation to GlobalSecurity.org - Click Here
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
The MAGTF Weak Link - Rear Area Security
CSC 1984
SUBJECT AREA National Security
THE MAGTF WEAK LINK -
REAR AREA SECURITY
Submitted to
United States Marine Corps
Command and Staff College
Quantico, Virginia
in Partial Fulfillment of Requirements
for Written Communication
Major B. M. Youngs
United States Marine Corps
April 6, 1984
THE MAGTF WEAK LINK -
REAR AREA SECURITY
Outline
Thesis statement: To be victorious in future conflicts the
Marine Corps must increase its awareness
of the threat to rear areas, improve
training methods in rear area security
and organize the MAGTF with adequate
resources to provide for its rear area
security.
I. Introduction
II. The Threat
A. World War II historical examples
B. Airborne, Reconnaissance and Division Units
C. Recent Developments - OMG, Air Assault Brigades
and Spetsnaz
III. Current Doctrine
A. Army view - FM 31-85 and FM 100-5
B. Marine Corps view - LFM 02 and FMFM 6-1
C. Problem areas in Marine Corps doctrine
IV. Proposals
A. Threat awareness
B. Combat training for CSS personnel
C. Establish a rear area security force
V. Conclusion
THE MAGTF WEAK LINK - REAR AREA SECURITY
It is generally accepted that the U. S. Marine Corps must
be capable of defeating enemies that will outnumber it in
future conflicts. The next conflict will indeed provide the
Marine Corps with significant challenges and questions. A
major issue is the question of rear area security: Who pro-
vides it and how should it be accomplished? Presently, rear
area security has no clearly articulated doctrine.
"An army marches on its stomach,"1 and indeed it may have
in 1814 when Napoleon allegedly wrote these words, but surely
even the brilliant Napoleon would be amazed were he to see all
the logistical support required by our Marine Air Ground Task
Force (MAGTF). In his last posture statement as Commandant
of the Marine Corps, General R. H. Barrow stated, "The Marine
Corps remains ready to respond to all missions....forward
deployed Marine Air Ground Task Forces (MAGTF's) are the root
source of our versatility, flexibility and readiness."2
The capability of the Marine Corps to win future con-
flicts will depend largely upon not only how well we fight,
but more importantly, how well we can logistically sustain
ourselves. MAGTF's are by their nature equipment heavy and
require large logistic support systems. The MAGTF rear area,
from which the logistic support operates, is potentially our
"achilles heel".
Rear area security has been a continuing problem for
armies throughout history. Today is no different; the capa-
bility of the Soviet Union to inflict damage to our rear
areas is a serious threat. Those threats and actions within
the MAGTF rear area which impede or deny the orderly flow of
supplies and services to the forward maneuver elements affect
directly the ability of those maneuver elements to accomplish
their mission.
The U. S. Army's FM 100-5, Operations, considered to be
the capstone publication for U. S. maneuver warfare, specifi-
cally warns:
"Just as we plan to fight in the enemy's rear
area, so he plans to fight in ours. The enemy
will carefully coordinate his attack in our
rear area with his actions in the main battle
area....the object of these rear area attacks
is to destroy critical links, to cause disrup-
tion, and to degrade the capability of forces
dedicated to support or reinforce the main
effort."3
To be victorious in future conflicts, the Marine Corps must
increase its awareness of the threat to rear areas, improve
training methods in rear area security and organize the MAGTF
with adequate resources to provide for its rear area security.
Perhaps at the outset, some terms should be defined.
The rear area is the area in the rear of the combat and
forward areas.4 Rear area security (RAS) is defined as those
measures taken prior to, during, and/or after an enemy
airborne attack, sabotage action, infiltration, guerrilla
action, and/or initiation of psychological or propaganda
warfare to minimize the effects thereof.5 Rear area protec-
tion (RAP) includes all measures taken to prevent interrup-
tions of combat support (CS) and combat service support (CSS)
operations.6
A historical review of rear area operations reveals that
the Soviet Union has traditionally been successful in
employing forces in the enemy's rear area. These rear area
operations were conducted to disrupt or destroy enemy combat
support and combat service support operations and as economy
of force measures to force enemy commanders to divert tactical
or frontline units in defense of their rear areas. Successful
rear area operations in military history serve to emphasize
the importance and magnitude of the rear area security
problem.
In 1943, two nights prior to the Russian counteroffensive,
Russian partisan forces cut the German rail lines of communi-
cations in over 8,400 places. This operation rendered nearly
7,000 miles of rail lines useless for the needed movement of
German reinforcements during the critical phase of the German
defense. Also, in Byelorussia, during the summer of 1944 the
Russian Army organized a partisan force of over 370,000 men;
to counter this problem, the German Army was forced to employ
nearly 13 divisions in a rear area security role.7
More recently, in Vietnam, essential manpower requirements
were pulled from combat support and combat service support
units to occupy static defensive positions. Armored combat
power and air assets were diverted from offensive operations
to provide convoy security and line of communication (LOC)
security. Even with the dedication of vast combat resources,
the North Vietnamese and Viet Cong guerrillas succeeded in
harrassing, disrupting and, on occasion, destroying rear area
support operations.
continued
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03-09-03, 11:31 PM #12
continued
These historical examples have pointed out some interesting
and supportive facts about rear area operations: (1) rear area
security has often failed to receive command attention propor-
tionate to the threat; (2) rear area operations have histori-
cally been an effective tactic; (3) rear area operations are
relatively constant and are conducted to disrupt logistical
support, to withdraw combat troops from operations against
opposing regular forces, and to commit reserves to the extent
that they cannot influence regular operations.
The Soviet Army has had tremendous experience with rear
area operations and is cognizant of their effectiveness.
Having stated the historical significance of rear area opera-
tions, it is now appropriate to examine briefly the threat
imposed by our most likely enemy in future conflicts.
Undoubtedly, there are those who doubt that the Marine Corps
will ever be engaged in combat against Soviet or Warsaw Pact
forces. They may be correct. However, a cursory review of
Marine Corps contingency plans reveals the possibility of
Marines supporting naval campaigns in Norway or protecting
critical choke points, i.e., the La Peruse Straits or
guarding U. S. availability to Middle East oil assets. The
fact remains, there are numerous instances where Marines
could reasonably find themselves facing Soviet or Warsaw
Pact forces or their trained surrogates.8 If the Marine Corps
does fight Soviet forces or their surrogates, it will be
facing a definite threat to its rear areas and must be
prepared to engage and defeat this threat.
The lessons of World War II are still vivid in the minds
of the Soviet military hierarchy. The two principles of war
which seem to dominate Soviet military doctrine are:
offensive and mass. Western strategists and tacticians are
continuously working on methods to defeat or counter these
Soviet capabilities.
The immediate question should be, "What is the threat
today?" The principles of war, economy of force (the recipro-
cal of mass) and the offensive, are the driving factors in the
importance of rear area operations as a force multiplier in
Soviet doctrine today.
The evolution of Soviet doctrine for the employment of
ground forces developed rapidly in post World War II. Soviet
conventional ground forces were trained and equipped to
maneuver motorized rifle and tank units in seizing objectives
deep in the enemy rear areas. Soviet doctrine continues to
emphasize the offensive and high-speed penetration of enemy
defenses and combat formations to seize deep objectives.
The Soviet desant concept9 advocates employing forces
in the enemy rear areas or flanks. This concept is a consol-
idation of Soviet thinking in the employment of airborne,
heliborne, and amphibious forces in economy of force opera-
tions to disrupt the enemy rear area. The desant concept is
an accessory to the principle of the offensive because its
primary purpose is to support the advance of the Soviet
regular ground forces.
The Soviet forces involved in rear area operations would
be drawn primarily from three sources: airborne units, long-
range reconnaissance units from tank and motorized rifle
units, and designated combined arms units (also called forward
detachments) from tank and motorized rifle units.10
The Soviet Union maintains the world's largest airborne
force which is organized into seven active divisions.11 The
most important feature of these airborne divisions and their
subordinate units is that, once landed, they are a light-
armor mechanized force. The BMD is the airborne equivalent
of the Soviet Infantry combat fighting vehicle BMP, and, as
such, provides Soviet airborne forces a significant mobility
and firepower capability.
Soviet doctrine assigns three basic missions to airborne
forces: (1) strategic; (2) operational; and (3) tactical.12
The primary difference in these missions is the depth of
operation and the nature of the objectives. Of importance
to this paper are the operational and tactical missions.
Operational missions in support of the Front (largest Soviet
fighting organization) are executed under the control of the
Front commander. These missions include seizing bridgeheads,
airfields, road junctions, as well as destruction of enemy
logistical facilities. Operating in the enemy rear areas,
these units prevent the effective and timely employment of
reserve forces and generally disrupt the enemy's offensive
and defensive posture. Standard procedure for operational
missions of this nature would involve dropping a regimental-
sized unit up to 300km beyond the FEBA in support of a Front
offensive. Ground forces linkup would occur within two to
three days with the airborne forces.
The tactical mission concept includes battalion to
regimental-sized operations up to 100km beyond the FEBA in
support of an Army offensive. Linkup in these operations is
planned within 48 hours. The tactical mission has objectives
similar to operational missions, but on a smaller scale.
Tactical long-range reconnaissance units are found in
reconnaissance battalions of motorized rifle and tank
divisions, The mission of these units is to conduct ground
reconnaissance of the enemy rear area up to 100km beyond the
FEBA. These battalions are capable of operating in an area
of 50-60km wide on three or four axes. Six to eight armored
reconnaissance squads, each consisting of two to three BRDM's
and/or BMP-R's and motorcycles, are used. Their primary
mission is reconnaissance, but they may attack small targets
of opportunity or even conduct sabotage operations against
logistic units. In addition, long-range reconnaissance
patrols are often flown by helicopter. They can operate
throughout a rear area to locate both reserve force and
command post locations and to recon possible avenues of
approach.13
continued
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03-09-03, 11:33 PM #13
continued
The special combined arms unit, also called a forward
detachment, is typically composed of a motorized rifle
battalion with tanks, self-propelled artillery, and air
defense weapons. This detachment is a small, highly mobile
and firepower intensive unit. These forward detachments take
advantage of a gap in the enemy front and penetrate deep into
the enemy rear area. The objectives of these small independent
units vary according to the situation. These detachments are
key elements in the successful linkup with airborne and heli-
copter forces.14 How valid a threat is a forward detachment?
According to Victor Suvorov, author of Inside the Soviet Army,
one battalion in each Soviet regiment is held ready to assume
the mission of a forward detachment at all times.15
In conjunction with the Soviet forces previously mentioned
three additional organizations have been recently identified
as having the primary mission of operating in an enemy's rear
area. The three organizations are: the Spetsnaz; Air Assault
Brigades; and the Operational Maneuver Group (OMG).
The Spetsnaz are the special purpose or unconventional
warfare forces of the Soviet Union. Each Combined Arms Army
and Tank Army has a Spetsnaz Company totalling approximately
105 personnel. Depending upon its assigned mission, the
company can operate as an entity or it can be fragmented into
smaller groups and teams. In addition, each Front has a
Spetsnaz Brigade of approximately 1300 highly-skilled, elite
troops.16 Spetsnaz troops are all volunteers and are superbly
trained to operate in a clandestine manner behind enemy lines.
The Soviets consider that Spetsnaz operations can only be
successful if they take place simultaneously on a massive
scale with other operations. Spetsnaz units are placed in
areas where there are numerous high-value targets (i.e.,
command posts, logistical facilities).
The Soviet Air Assault Brigades represent a significant
increase in the Front level combat capability. These brigades
have a combination of battalions which are parachute and BMD-
equipped. The air assault brigade is capable of undertaking
a myriad of missions because of its unique structure, mobility,
and firepower. The brigade consists of three battalions with
approximately 2,500 personnel; the battalions are employed by
airborne drop or by helicopter. The missions assigned the
heliborne battalions include neutralization of command posts,
seizure of key terrain, and destruction of logistics sites.17
Soviet doctrine for the employment of heliborne forces states
that those forces can be inserted anywhere in the tactical
depth of the enemy's defense or combat formations up to 50km
from friendly forces.
The Operational Maneuver Group (OMG) appears to be a
large one-way raiding force, composed of infantry, tanks,
artillery, air defense and a heavy air assault component.18
The Soviets believe that successful OMG operations could
severely disrupt the enemy rear area, thereby increasing the
chances of maintaining the rapid advance of Army and Front
level forces. The OMG is a specially tailored combat force
with no fixed structure. The OMG has three main missions,
all of which are directed at the enemy's rear area: (1)
destruction of enemy weapons systems; (2) destruction of the
enemy's in-depth defense or offensive combat formation
(actions by the OMG would include destruction of command and
control positions, logistics assets and surprise attacks on
flank and rear area units); (3) seizure of deep key terrain
and critical objectives.
It should be readily apparent that the Soviet threat to
rear area security is quite significant. Soviet operations
in the rear area will not of themselves be of sufficient scale
to bring about a Soviet victory. One major function of all
the forces mentioned is to reduce the enemy's capacity to
resist, thus making it easier for the main attacking forces
to accomplish their missions.
Having described the Soviet threat to rear areas, it would
be appropriate to review what current doctrine provides
the conduct of rear area security operations.
U. S. Army doctrine is found in FM 31-85, Rear Area
Protection (RAP) Operations. Though issued in 1970, it does
provide a basic philosophy of RAS and eight principles which
are still valid: austerity, command, economy of force, inte-
grated protection, offensive, responsiveness, supervision, and
priority of risks.19
The cornerstone of Army doctrine is FM 100-5, Operations,
which provides information on Rear Area Protection and gives
a concise and meaningful resume of the threat as it is
projected and adequately outlines responsibilities for rear
and combat operations (RACO).
Very little mention is to be found in any Marine Corps
FMFMs or Operational Handbooks (OH's) about rear area security
operations. The "cornerstone document" of the Marine Corps
MAGTF, FMFM 0-1, Marine Air-Ground Task Force Doctrine, makes
no mention of rear area security or rear area combat opera-
tions. It is this author's impression that the problem of
rear area security has been wished away by continually denying
the existence of a formidable threat and by giving the
responsibility for rear area security to the CSS commander;
the CSS commander, however, does not have the means to accom-
plish this mission.
continued
-
03-09-03, 11:34 PM #14
continued
Having described the Soviet threat to rear areas, it would
be appropriate to review what current doctrine provides
the conduct of rear area security operations.
U. S. Army doctrine is found in FM 31-85, Rear Area
Protection (RAP) Operations. Though issued in 1970, it does
provide a basic philosophy of RAS and eight principles which
are still valid: austerity, command, economy of force, inte-
grated protection, offensive, responsiveness, supervision, and
priority of risks.19
The cornerstone of Army doctrine is FM 100-5, Operations,
which provides information on Rear Area Protection and gives
a concise and meaningful resume of the threat as it is
projected and adequately outlines responsibilities for rear
and combat operations (RACO).
Very little mention is to be found in any Marine Corps
FMFMs or Operational Handbooks (OH's) about rear area security
operations. The "cornerstone document" of the Marine Corps
MAGTF, FMFM 0-1, Marine Air-Ground Task Force Doctrine, makes
no mention of rear area security or rear area combat opera-
tions. It is this author's impression that the problem of
rear area security has been wished away by continually denying
the existence of a formidable threat and by giving the
responsibility for rear area security to the CSS commander;
the CSS commander, however, does not have the means to accom-
plish this mission.
The subject of rear area security in an amphibious
operation is addressed in Landing Force Manual (LFM)02,
Doctrine for Landing Forces. The overall responsibility for
the security of the rear area of the landing force is the
commander of the landing force (CLF). He is responsible for
the integration of local security plans into the overall area
plan. This is clearly oriented for defensive operations.
Rear area security is also addressed in FMFM 6-1, The
Marine Division. This source discusses in detail the concept
of rear area security, the planning procedures and responsi-
bilities for rear area security, forces available and organi-
zation of forces for rear area security. Even though the
above areas are addressed, the primary focus of the information
provided is on amphibious landing and defensive situations;
nothing is mentioned about security for logistic elements
during offensive operations.
The MAGTF is not a permanent organization; it is task
organized for a specific mission. Forward deployed MAGTF's
are capable of rapid response to a number of contingencies
and provide a measured application of power to prescribed
contingency situations. The composition of MAGTF's may vary,
but the organizational structure will include a single command
element with a ground combat element, aviation combat element,
and combat service support element as subordinate co-equal
elements.20
The Marine Corps is tasked with responding to contin-
gencies throughout the world against numerous possible
adversaries. The most significant threat is the Soviet Union
and its combined arms force. If the Marine Corps is to
survive and win future conflicts against combined arms threats,
we must utilize all our combat assets. The Marine Corps
Combined Arms Task Force (MCATF) is the employment of tank
assets with infantry to accomplish a specific mission.21
The MCATF is anticipated to operate independently for long
periods and should be more or less self-sufficient. Because
the MCATF is a mechanized operation, it is characterized by
the rapid pace of operations and a reliance on machines; it,
therefore, implies increased logistical requirements and
combat service support operations take on increased importance.
As stated previously, the MCATF's are formed from the
MAGTF, primarily from the ground combat element (GCE), but
also contain two other elements, the combat service support
element (CSSE) and the air combat element (ACE). The ACE may
provide helicopter support to the MCATF and also a detachment
to the CSSE. The MAGTF CSSE provides service support
direclty to the MCATF or forms a Mobile Combat Service Support
Detachment (MCSSD) to move with and support the MCATF.
In 1977 a series of exercises were initiated after the
Commandant of the Marine Corps approved the concept of mobile
assault regiments which would be task-organized as needed
(MCATF's).22 In January 1981, a MCATF-Phase IV exercise was
conducted at Twenty-Nine Palms, California. The Phase IV
exercise was to validate and improve the current MCATF
doctrine. A major deficiency identified during the exercise
was the sustainability, survivability and mobility of the CSS
forces.23
"Supply lines are particularly sensitive,
since all petrol and ammunition, indispensable
requirements for the battle, must pass along
them. Hence everything possible must be done
to protect one's own supply lines and to upset
or better still, cut the enemy's. Operations
in the enemy's supply [rear] area will lead
immediately to his breaking off the battle
elsewhere, since as I have indicated supplies
are the fundamental premise of the battle and
must be given the priority of protection."24
continued
-
03-09-03, 11:35 PM #15
continued
As Rommel pointed out, the security of the lines of
communications and logistics elements is a key factor to
survivability on the battlefield. It is obvious that the
MCATF today must devote attention to protecting its logistics
tail.
Other findings from the Phase IV exercise which indicate
problems for MCATF's in future conflicts are:
1. Security forces must be provided and trained in the
protection of CSS elements.
2. A command and control capability is required by the
MCSSD in order to request supporting arms and to
coordinate an attachment of security forces if separated
from the maneuver element (GCE).
3. In mechanized operations there will likely be no
secure rear area. Sinde CSS elements will continue to
be forward to react to CSS requirements, these elements
(MCSSD) are vulnerable to encountering enemy, especially
specialized units with missions to attack rear areas.25
After examining the threat to rear areas and comparing the
threat to present Marine Corps doctrine and philosophy, the
following problem areas surfaced:
1. The "threat" to rear areas is not perceived as a
significant problem.
2. CSS personnel do not receive sufficient combat
training to defend themselves effectively.
3. The plan to use combat forces from Marine Corps
forward maneuver units as rear area security severely
reduces forward combat power.
4. Plans to effect rear area security normally occurs
only when units are in a defensive posture.
5. The plan to use the reserve force as the rear area
security force relegates the effectiveness of the
reserve force employment.
To make Marine Corps rear area security a distinct
advantage instead of the weak link it is presently, the
following proposals must be implemented, the threat posed
to rear areas is formidable. An education and threat aware-
ness training program must be instituted immediately. The
first step in solving a problem is acknowledging that the
problem exists. Acknowledgement that a rear area threat
exists in offensive operations as well as defensive operations
is mandatory.
CSS personnel comprise the majority of rear area manpower
assets. The CSS units' success and survival on the battle-
field will be directly proportional to the knowledge and
skills learned in basic infantry training and honed in subse-
quent field exercises. The present lack of field combat
training for CSS units is attributable to command desires to
keep CSS personnel involved in their primary jobs (i.e.,
mechanic, logistics clerk, etc.) and state that sufficient
time is unavailable for combat training: "It is not my
mission to fight." A reasonable balance of combat training
and military occupational specialty (MOS) training is required
to ensure that CSS personnel can survive and carry out their
battlefield missions.
Combat training for CSS personnel must receive a positive
endorsement at the highest command levels. One policy, if
instituted, which would have an immediate, positive impact
is to require all Marines (regardless of their MOS) to attend
infantry training school subsequent to recruit training. For
survival it is time to make the old adage "Every Marine is a
rifleman," a reality.
continued
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Ghost Of Iwo Jima
04-04-24, 11:35 PM in Open Squad Bay