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  1. #1

    Future of the Marine Corps

    General Charles C. Krulak, US Marine Corps, "Joint Civilian Orientation Conference" - 5. Mai 1997.

    US Marine Corps

    Future of the Corps
    USMC for the 21st Century

    Good morning Ladies and gentlemen. I am General Chuck Krulak, Commandant of the Marine Corps. It is my pleasure to be with you this morning and to talk about my favorite subject -- the US Marine Corps. For over 221 years our Corps has done two things for this great Nation -- We Make Marines and We Win Battles.

    Each of the services brings a host of capabilities to the table. It is important, however, to have a focus, a strategic concept. A well defined strategic concept is vital to ensuring that we properly organize, equip and train the forces which we provide. The 82d Congress of the United States outlined this strategic concept for the Marine Corps. We have been and will continue to be, "The most ready when the Nation is least ready." In addition to this enduring task, we also perform one other function.... "Such other duties as the president may direct."

    "Such other duties as the president may direct." This task has, historically, kept us the busiest. It is this very important mission that requires us to be ready for commitment across the full spectrum of operations. It is from here that we get sent to the Mogadishus, the Haitis and to participate in the nation's wars.

    As a maritime nation the United States has global interests and we must contend with unchanging strategic geography and the tyranny of distance. Only Marine and Naval forces with their strategic reach can assure the country access to markets, resources, and alliances.

    Seventy percent of the world's population lives within 200 miles of a coast, and 80% of the world's capitals are located within 300 miles of a coast. This urbanization of the world's littoral regions means that operations from the sea provide the nation with an enduring means to influence and shape the evolving international environment.

    Naval expeditionary forces -- America's Navy - Marine Corps Team -- provides the NCA something very important with their unique form of forward presence. Our ability to maintain a sustained presence, free from issues of sovereignty because of our sea-basing, allows us to respond to a crisis with the kind and amount of capability that the NCA chooses. We can turn up ... or down ... the heat as required. This istruly unique to naval expeditionary forces. Conducting an air strike can only provide one "temperature" if you will ... HOT. Naval expeditionary forces, the Navy-Marine Team, forward deployed, can stay in the presence mode, provide humanitarian aid, conduct demonstrations, do raids, strike operations or even forcible entry operations and the occupation of foreign soil ... as required, when required. We are a rheostat for the NCA. Turn us up or down as required. We are the only force that provides this capability.

    This is our recent track record. Strategic geography and our position in the world requires that Marine and Navy forces remain engaged across the globe. This is what the American people pay for with just 6 cents of their defense dollar.

    We send our Fleet Marine Forces around the world in a never ceasing rotation of deployments. Your Marines, forward deployed throughout the world, ready, watchful and capable. Here is where we are deployed today. Currently, there are 24.130 Marines forward deployed, separated from home and family, ready to answer their country's call if needed.

    This is what the Marine Corps looks like from a structural point of view. We are a force of 174.000 active Marines. We have a turnover of about 38 to 40.000 Marines a year. Please note that of our 174.000 we have 108.500 in the Fleet Marine Force ... the combat units. Another 2.200 provide external security, such as with the State Department and another 2.900 are at various joint activities. (External Security includes Ship detachments, all the MSGs and the misc. Such as CIA billets. Joint Activities includes all personnel assigned to the non-DON supporting establishment, including joint billets and all the defense agencies.)

    And as I mentioned earlier, here is what the nation gets for its money. As you can see you get all this 911 force, rheostatic response, and all the other capabilities of the world's premier expeditionary force in readiness for just 6% of the defense budget. The Marine Corps is one of the best bang-for-buck deals in the United States Government.

    Ladies and gentlemen, thank you for your time and this opportunity to talk about our nation's Force - In - Readiness.

  2. #2

    Some reading material

    Budget justification sheet, pdf

    Indirect fire support


    Navy/USMC concepts
    (everything ya wanted to know and then some! )


  3. #3

    The Principles Of War - A Look Back To The Future

    AUTHOR Major J. P. Niblett, Royal Marines

    CSC 1989

    SUBJECT AREA - History



    I. Purpose: To illustrate the value of the study of the Principles of War in

    an historical context and to describe their relevance and application for

    commanders in future conflicts.

    II. Problem: During the current year at the USMC Command and Staff College (CSC),

    students have been exposed to a wealth of professional military education.

    Although war-fighting has been well-illustrated by campaign analyses and strategy

    seminars, there has been no attempt to illustrate military history by applying

    the established and accepted Principles of War. More importantly, however, their

    application to likely future conflicts has been neglected.

    III. Data: The recent passage of the 'Goldwater - Nicholls' Bill has confirmed

    the importance of operations in a joint arena by all Services of the US Armed

    Forces. It also highlighted the implications these operations will have for

    officer career patterns and assignments, and significantly the Bill has

    re-emphasised the value of Professional Military Education. By re-introducing

    the study of military history to the core curriculum at CSC this year, students

    have been given valuable lessons on the value of the study of military history.

    The study has been presented through a series of seminars, a History of the

    Armed Forces symposium, and a number of campaign analyses. Students are strongly

    encouraged to supplement the formal teachings by additional private study and

    research. In parallel with this syllabus, the College has defined the Principles

    of War in a separate lecture and also discussed at length the new MAGTF Master

    Plan and it's implications for the Corps.

    IV. Conclusions: The syllabus and instruction have emphasised the importance

    of the study of military history but there has been no attempt to apply the

    well-proven Principles of War to past events nor to project them to likely

    future conflicts for the USMC.

    V. Recommendations: Rather than study past military events in a purely

    historical sense, efforts should be made to identify lessons and to apply

    them to the study of the future. The MAGTF Master Plan is a comprehensive

    guide for the future of the USMC. A greater understanding of the relevance

    of the Principles of War and their application can only serve future commanders

    well in their understanding of war-fighting.


    Thesis: The study of military history is an important method of understanding

    the relevance of lessons learnt through the actions of past military

    commanders on the battlefield. The application of these lessons

    which reinforce the fundamental Principles of War, is a valuable tool

    in the study of likely future conflicts.

    I. Current Teaching

    A. Importance of Professional Military Education

    B. Study of military history at the Command and Staff College

    II. The Principles of War

    A. Framework for the conduct of War

    B. Their significance

    C. Current accepted Principles of War

    III. The Nature and Spectrum of Conflict

    A. Definition

    B. Low Intensity Conflict Operations

    C. Mid-Intensity Conflict

    D. High Intensity Conflict

    IV. The Principles of War

    A. Definitions of the `MOUSE MOSS' Principles

    B. Historical examples of successful application

    V. Summary

    A. Relevance to Manoeuvre Warfare

    B. Importance of continued study

  4. #4

    Examples from history make everything clear, and in addition they

    afford the most convincing kind of proof in the empirical fields

    of knowledge. This applies more to the art of war than to anything


    Since World War Two, US military forces have increasingly operated

    in a joint warfare environment. Following the recent passage of the

    `Goldwater-Nicholls' Bill there were implications not only for officer

    career patterns and assignments, but perhaps more importantly for

    professional military education (PME). During this current year at the

    USMC Command and Staff College (CSC), students have been exposed to a

    wide variety of professional reading and seminars designed to create a

    greater awareness of the importance of PME. Just one aspect of this

    has been the return of the study of military history to the core

    curriculum which has sought to give the students an understanding of

    the value of study of military history and to gain an appreciation for

    the fact that contemporary events have a valid history; it is

    important as military scholars to know our history and to have a

    proper perspective of where and what we are today.

    It is also important early on to understand how the study of

    military history should be undertaken. It is easy to approach history

    in the wrong manner and to draw lessons which are then used to prove a

    point or theory. Superficial study can furnish arguments in support of

    any theory or opinion. Similarly, attempts to study history to

    determine principles can be equally misleading. Too much focus or

    adherance to the `Principles of War' can lead to formula warfare as it

    has been described, or conflict by the rules which can lead to

    disaster. Finally, it is important to remember that any study of the

    past with contemporary values, opinions and knowledge leads to

    distortion, false analysis and mis-interpretation.

    During this year at CSC, students have been privileged to hear

    many talented military historians. Without exception, however, no-one

    has attempted to illustrate military history by applying the

    established and accepted Principles of War. Apart from a separate

    lecture early on in the course there has been no link made between the

    understanding of the Principles of War and lessons learned from

    campaign analyses. A study of the history of war reveals that its

    conduct is influenced by certain broad precepts which have come to be

    recognised as Principles of War. OH 6-1 2 emphasises the doctrinal

    Principles as follows:

    Mass Manoeuvre

    Offensive Objective

    Unity of Command Security = `Mouse Moss`

    Surprise Simplicity

    Economy of Force

    The conduct of war is an art, a skill requiring a combination of

    judgement to weigh up the factors which can seldom be quantified

    precisely. The principles influencing the conduct of war are

    especially relevant at the strategic level where they predicate a

    number of criteria against which courses of action affecting the

    national interest or the planning of a campaign may be tested. Most of

    them have a direct application at lower levels where they provide a

    guide for the planning and conduct of operations on the battlefield.

    However, they are not like the laws of natural science, where the

    observance of specific conditions produces a predictable result; nor

    are they like the rules of a game, a break of which entails a

    prescribed penalty. Rather they are guides to action or fundamental

    tenets forming a basis for appreciating a situation and planning; but

    their relevance, applicability and relative importance change with the

    circumstances. In the past their application with judgement and

    commonsense has led to victory. Blatant disregard for them involves

    risk and could lead to failure. With a perceptive eye for the impact

    of technology on the modern battlefield, Sir Basil Liddell Hart in

    1944 expressed it this way:

    The aim of military study should be to maintain a close watch upon the

    latest technical, scientific, and political developments, fortified by

    a sure grasp of the eternal principles upon which the great captains

    have based their contemporary methods, and inspired by a desire to be

    ahead of any rival army in securing options for the future.3

    The purpose of this paper is to encourage the reader to look a

    little way beyond the `MOUSE MOSS' acronym and to develop an awareness

    of the value of study of the Principles of War and their relevance and

    application for commanders in future conflicts. Firstly though, it is

    important to remind ourselves of the established Principles. The

    present variations in the number and name of the Principles of War

    leads to doubt in their credibility, and a study of military history

    in this frame of mind is dangerous. With a knowledge of the

    fundamental Principles, the reasons for failures or successes in

    military history and the relationship of the circumstances to these

    Principles will provide confidence in their validity and help any

    student gain an informed opinion of their application.

  5. #5
    In the words of General Macarthur:

    In no other profession are the penalties for employing untrained

    personnel so appalling or so irrevocable as in the military.4

    OH 6-1 lists the following table showing the comparison of

    Principles of War used by various nations. All the Principles,

    however, are interrelated and can, depending on the circumstances,

    reinforce one another or be in conflict. As a result, the degree of

    application of any specific Principle will vary with the situation.

    United States Great Britain France

    Objective Selection and maintenance -

    of the aim -

    Offensive Offensive action -

    Mass Concentration of force Concentration of effort

    Economy of force Economy of effort -

    Manoeuvre Flexibility -

    Unity of command Co-operation -

    Security Security -

    Surprise Surprise Surprise

    Simplicity - -

    - Maintenance of morale -

    - Administration -

    Against this introduction and background, this paper will study

    the Nature and Spectrum of Conflict in likely future operations for

    the USMC and then to illustrate the accepted Principles with

    historical examples in order to better understand their application

    and relevance.

    Recent history has shown that there are certain types of

    operations where military forces may be employed across the whole

    Spectrum of Conflict. The Nature of Conflict, however, within the same

    Spectrum is really the definition of those operations. Distinctions

    between the levels of conflict and the different types of operations

    in each level are not easy to define, particularly when some

    operations can easily fall within other parts of the Spectrum.

    In the MAGTF Master Plan,5 illustrations show that since World War

    Two the trend has been for conflicts to appear in the lower end of the

    Spectrum, called Low Intensity Conflict(LIC). The following section

    briefly describes the most likely types of operation for the USMC

    MAGTF through the year 2000.



    It is planned that MAGTFs will conduct a wide variety of

    operations in LIC but centered mainly around either limited objective

    operations or stability operations. The former usually involves the

    employment of military forces to achieve specific military or

    political goals while stability operations assist friendly or allied

    governments to maintain internal stability and public welfare. Two

    major differences set these two types of operations apart. Limited

    objective operations normally employ force from the outset whereas in

    stability operations offensive action is less likely.

    STABILITY OPERATIONS. These comprise seven types of operations.

    1. Show of Presence. Normally a presence is achieved by way of a

    joint exercise or bilateral deployment designed to simulate

    wartime operations and improve levels of training.

    2 Humanitarian Assistance. This can be provided in response to

    natural disasters, through bilateral agreements and as civic

    action projects within exercises. CSS support is particularly

    important in these missions.

    3. Mobile Training Teams(MTT). MTTs perform a useful role through

    the use of military personnel in a benign environment. They are

    co-ordinated through and approved by the Department of State who

    control their deployment and employment.

    4. Peacekeeping Operations. US forces conduct peacekeeping

    operations as pact of a combined or international force and would

    normally aim to employ the minimum of force to achieve their aims.

    5. Security Operations. These normally involve the protection of

    US lives and property as well as offering protection to a friendly


    6. Counter-Insurgency. Counter-Insurgency operations are most

    likely to occur in the higher end of the Spectrum of Conflict for

    LIC involving direct action with insurgent forces.

    7. Counter-Narcotic Operations. This remains a sensitive area and

    any MAGTF support is likely to be restricted to providing

    individual military skills and operational planning assistance to

    interagency task forces.


    These operations will cover Peacetime Contingency Operations and

    Counter-Terrorism. In the former, MAGTFs can be employed to seize

    airfields or ports through amphibious raids and to provide protection

    or evacuation of non-combatants(NEO). Additional missions include

    reinforcement of committed national or international forces and

    clandestine operations to recover aircraft, equipment and personnel.

    Counter-Terrorism operations are designed to prevent, deter and

    respond to terrorism in whatever form it takes. MAGTFs could support

    these operations with amphibious raids to hit known terrorist targets,

    recovery raids to recover hostages or sensitive material, or

    diversionary raids to support national counter-terrorist operations.

    In both stability and limited objective operations the MAGTF

    flexibility to task-organize and respond as the situation and

    circumstances demand is a unique capability which makes the MAGTF

    well-suited for employment in low-intensity conflict.


    These conflicts encompass anything from short but intense regional

    conflicts to protracted counter-revolutionary operations. In these

    situations a MAGTF is most likely to be deployed as part of a larger

    naval, joint or combined force. The MAGTF organic support will be

    considerably enhanced by other Services to provide a viable operating

    force for both land and sea campaigns. Since mid-intensity conflict is

    more often regional than global, some of the most likely missions may

    be amphibious landings, raids, extractions or protracted land



    General War is large-scale all-out conflict between major powers

    on an international scale. As the nation's most ready force, the USMC

    will play a key role in the early stages of a general war before

    nuclear operations commence. As in mid-intensity operations, MAGTFs

    can be employed as amphibious forces or in land campaigns. In either

    case, the MAGTF current capabilities and forthcoming over-the-horizon

    deployment potential further reinforce the large number of likely

    operations in which they can be employed.

    Finally, in addition to all the operations previously mentioned,

    MAGTFs may also be employed in a number of other operations across the

    Spectrum of Conflict. These include tactical military deception,

    psychological operations and civil affairs, as well as unconventional

    warfare. It is clear therefore that the USMC has to be prepared to

    conduct a very wide variety of operations across the whole Spectrum

    but with priority on LIC.

  6. #6
    Having now reviewed the Nature and Spectrum of Conflict and how the

    USMC is most likely to be employed, it is easier to give a perspective

    to the application of the Principles of War by citing historical

    examples. The length of this paper does not permit a fully detailed

    account of each chosen example so in each case the Principle will be

    defined and then an historical example given to show where a Principle

    was successfully applied or otherwise.



    Concentrate combat power at the decisive place and time.6

    Military success will normally result from the concentration of

    superior force at the decisive time and place, whether material or

    psychological or a combination of both. Concentration does not imply

    that there should never be dispersion. A carefully organized

    distribution of troops and firepower, accompanied by feints and a

    convincing deception plan, helps to balance our own forced and confuse

    the enemy. Knowing when to concentrate and when to disperse is a

    matter of timing and judgement depending on a careful appreciation of

    the situation

    Success and failure - Stalingrad, June 1942 - January 1943.

    Successive errors led to the halting of the summer offensive

    and Soviet deceptions at Moscow prevented the Germans from creating an

    effective concentration to meet the Russian counter-offensive at

    Stalingrad. The subsequent encirclement of 20 German divisions

    effectively ended Hitler's Soviet campaign in the winter of 1942/43,

    and the Russians escaped destruction west of the Don. The dispersion

    of his two Army Groups left Hitler with too little strength to occupy

    the Black Sea coast, the Baku oilfields and Stalingrad. The final

    concentration at Stalingrad at the end of a 1200 mile line of

    communication with poorly protected flanks was fatal. The Russians

    committed sufficient forces to encircle the Germans, while the Germans

    signally failed to concentrate enough troops for a breakout.

    Concentration, or Mass, and the lack of it, were amongst the most

    important reasons for the Russian success and the German failure.


    Direct every military operation towards a clearly defined objective.7

    In the conduct of war as a whole, and in every military operation,

    it is essential to choose a clearly defined, decisive and attainable

    objective. The ultimate aim may be absolute or it may be more limited.

    Within the political framework set by his government a commander may

    have a choice of courses of action, each of which would fulfil the

    aim. The commander's initial appreciation will determine which of the

    courses is most likely to succeed. This will be expressed as a mission

    and an outline plan of campaign. Although the campaign will comprise a

    number of operations it is the selection and maintenance of an

    objective that remains all-important to a commander.

    Success - General Tal's breakthrough at Rafa, 1967

    General Tal was the tank expert in the Israeli Defence Force

    and in June 1967 he commanded one of the tank Ugdas or groups tasked

    with conducting an armoured attack through the Egyptian defences in

    the Eastern Sinai. Although the Egyptian defences turned out to be far

    stronger than anticipated, Tal achieved his aim by sheer perseverance

    and skill as a tank commander. This operation, despite the errors

    regarding all arms co-ordination has few equals in modern warfare and

    is a fine example of the successful and determined pursuit of an aim.


    For every objective, ensure unity of effort under one responsible

    commander. 8

    Military operations are joint enterprises involving co-operation

    between all arms and Services and entails the co-ordination of all

    activities to achieve the optimum combined effort. Ideally one

    commander is made responsible for the conduct of operations and the

    desired efficiency between arms, Services and allies comes from a

    thorough understanding of each other's capabilities and limitations

    obtained during peacetime training.

    Success - El Alamein, 1942

    Although many things went wrong at El Alamein, Montgomery

    succeeded through a combination of determination, concentration and

    co-operation. The 8th Army had enjoyed numerical superiority before

    but this was the first major action since Sidi Barrani when all arms

    co-operated successfully in an offensive battle. Montgomery's

    insistence that the division of all arms should be the basic fighting

    formation paid off. Of the many factors which contributed to the 8th

    Army's victory, co-operation between all arms at every level and

    co-operation between the three fighting Services at the strategic,

    operational and tactical levels were amongst the most important.


    Strike the enemy at a time or place, or in a manner, for which he

    is unprepared.9

    Surprise is a potent psychological weapon causing confusion and

    paralysis in the enemy's chain of command whilst destroying the

    cohesion and morale of his troops. Surprise may be accomplished

    strategically, operationally and tactically, either by a ruse or by

    exploiting new equipment and techniques. The essential elements of

    surprise are secrecy, concealment, deception, originality, audacity

    and speed. Because it is such an important condition for victory,

    commanders must always seek to achieve it in their planning.

    Success - Inchon Landings, 1950

    Although the operation was to be over-shadowed by nearly three

    more years of war, the landings were an undoubted success. In spite of

    press speculation the landings achieved surprise. By the time the

    naval bombardment and concentrated air attacks began at Inchon two

    days before the landings, it was too late for the North Koreans to

    react. Inchon was the one place where a decision could be gained but a

    landing in such a difficult area had been discounted by the enemy.


    Allocate minimum essential combat power to secondary efforts.10

    The corollory of concentration of force is economy of effort or

    force. It is impossible to be strong everywhere and if decisive

    strength is to be massed at the critical time and place there must be

    no wasteful dispersal of resources or expenditure of effort where they

    cannot significantly affect the issue. This necessarily involves a

    degree of risk. The application of this Principle may be summed up as

    planning for a balanced deployment combined with a prudent allocation

    of resources which are strictly related to the aim of the operation.

    Success - Von Manstein's Winter Campaign, February - March 1943

    During the final German efforts in the winter of 1942/3,

    Hitler wanted to recapture Kharkov but his Army Group South CinC, Von

    Manstein, pressed his case for destroying the attacking Russian

    spearheads. Once the Soviet South West Front forces had been defeated,

    Von Manstein turned toward Kharkov and completed a masterly

    leapfrogging of his forces from south of the Don to the Donets. At

    each stage he held the line with as few troops as possible to provide

    local reserves. To concentrate sufficient forces to mount the Donets

    and Kharkov counter-strokes, he denuded his eastern flank of its

    mobile divisions. The early thaw was exploited to economise in troops

    on the less important sector. As an example of economy of force to

    achieve a decisive concentration, Von Manstein's winter campaign is a



    Place the enemy in a position of disadvantage through the flexible

    application of combat power.11

    Manoeuvre is an essential element of combat power and contributes

    materially to exploiting successes, retaining freedom of action and

    reducing vulnerability. A commander must keep his forces well-balanced

    so that he can switch quickly from one course to another with the

    minimum of regrouping. The ability to react rapidly depends on good

    training, efficient staff work, a sound organization, reliable

    communications and a high degree of mobility.

    Success - Patton's Pursuit, Normandy to Metz, 1944

    Patton's advance from Avranches to Metz was a remarkable

    achievement. More than any other general on the Allied side he had

    realised Liddell Hart's theory of the indirect approach. His

    operational technique prevented the Germans from organizing resistance

    on the river lines and disrupted their command organization. Behind

    this technique lay his system of command, a combination of ambitious,

    but attainable, objectives and allowing the Corps commanders to use

    the maximum of initiative in how they were to be achieved.

  7. #7

    Seize, retain, and exploit the initiative.12

    Offensive action is the principal means open to a commander to

    influence the outcome of a battle or campaign. The Principle of

    offensive action embodies a state of mind which breeds the

    determination to gain and hold the initiative and to create

    opportunities to harass and destroy the enemy. Offensive action is

    essential to create confidence and to establish an ascendancy over the


    Success - Falkland Islands, 1982

    The final push by the British troops towards Port Stanley had

    a seriously demoralising affect on the Argentinian defenders. The

    whole campaign had been one of taking the war to the enemy. Despite

    lack of air superiority and severe logistical restraints, the British

    actions ably demonstrated that offensive action can wrest the

    initiative from the enemy.


    Never permit the enemy to acquire an unexpected advantage.13

    Every military operation requires that degree of security which

    will enable our forces to achieve their aim despite the enemy's

    interference. The denial to the enemy of information of our own forces

    and intentions entails unceasing vigilance to safeguard secrets,

    prevent infiltration and sabotage and to conceal combat units and

    logistic installations.

    Success - Virginia, 1862. The Valley and the Peninsula

    Through the spring of 1862 both Union and Confederate forces

    continued to manoeuvre while seeking the enemy's centre of gravity. A

    series of cleverly executed attacks by Lee and Jackson successfully

    tied down a numerically superior Union force attempting to reach

    Richmond. At the strategic level, the South were able to launch

    repeated diversionary raids in the Valley to prevent McDowell from

    reinforcing McClellan either in the Peninsula or more directly in

    front of Richmond. At the operational level, Jackson's use of his

    cavalry to screen his movements and reconnoitre his enemy's positions,

    and his habitual secrecy in the execution of his plans, provided the

    security on which the success of his actions depended.


    ...we may look upon the complete or partial destruction of the enemy

    as the sole object of all engagements.14

    This Principle perhaps more than any other is all-important.

    Simplicity can never be over-emphasised. A good, simple plan, with

    concise, clear orders minimizes the chance of confusion.


    The fundamental Principles of War might well be termed the

    Principles of Success and the application of these Principles should

    be studied by every officer as a practical aid to professional

    efficiency. In the absence of battlefield conditions, therefore, every

    effort should be made to study their application, in theoretical

    situations. With respect to the emergence of Manoeuvre Warfare

    doctrine in the USMC, all of these Principles and their application as

    described in this paper are of relevance. All the tenets of Manoeuvre

    Warfare as currently taught are encompassed within the fundamental

    Principles of War. Whatever new concepts are applied in modern

    teaching they must necessarily be based on military history, and

    applied with imagination and commonsense. Indeed, it behoves us all to

    `look back to the future'.


    1 Carl von Clausewitz, "On War", tr. O.J.Matthijs Jolles, (Random House Inc., 1943),


    2 MCCDC, USMC, "Ground Combat Operations", OH 6-1 (Quantico, 1988). Chapter 2,

    Section I.

    3 B.H.Liddell Hart, "Thoughts on War" (Faber and Faber Ltd., 1944), p.122.

    4 Douglas MacArthur, Annual Report, Chief of Staff, US Army, 1933.

    5 MCCDC, USMC, "MAGTF Master Plan"(draft), (Quantico, 1988).

    6 Headquarters, Department of the Army, "Operations", FM 1OO-5(Washington, DC, 1986),


    7 Ibid, p.173.

    8 Ibid, p.175.

    9 Ibid, p.176.

    10Ibid, p.174

    11Ibid, p.175.

    12Ibid, p.173.

    13Ibid, p.176.

    14Carl von Clausewitz, "On War", tr. O. J Matthijs Jolles, (Random House Inc., 1943),



    British Army Field Manual, Volume 1, Part 1, "The Application of Force",

    Army Code No. 71344. London, 1985.

    Carl von Clausewitz, "On War". Tr. O.J.Matthijs Jolles. Random House Inc.,


    Headquarters, Department of the Army. "Operations". FM 100-5. Washington,

    DC., 1986.

    Marine Air Ground Training and Education Centre. Marine Corps Combat

    Development Command. "Campaign Planning", C(C)3526. Quantico, 1989.

    Marine Air Ground Training and Education Centre. Marine Corps Combat

    Development Command. "MAGTF Master Plan" (draft). Quantico, 1988.

    Marine Air Ground Training and Education Centre. Marine Corps Combat

    Development Command. "The Value of Military History", C(C)385O.

    Quantico, 1988.

    Paret, Peter, ed. "Makers of Modern Strategy". New Jersey: Princeton

    University Press, Princeton, 1986.

    Thibault, George Edward, ed. "The Art and Practice of Military Strategy".

    Washington DC., National Defense University, 1984.

    U.S. Marine Corps. Marine Corps Combat Development Command. "Ground

    Combat Operations", OH 6-1. Quantico, 1988.

  8. #8

    Here's another link for ya !


    This has a lot of potential info, at least, references!

  9. #9

    Statement by General Pace USMC

    Before 107th Congress. 9 April 2002


  10. #10

    Here's another link for ya

    Warfighting Concepts division.

  11. #11
    DSR & DSR/PW
    Disposable Spotting Rifle and Disposable Spotting Rifle / Personal Defense Weapon

    6900 N. Hwy US 1
    Unit 6108
    Port St. John, FL 32927

    Future USMC shoulder-launched missiles will be equipped with spotting rifles to provide the gunner with a better chance of hitting the target with the first missile. These rifles fire tracer bullets that have the same trajectory as the missiles and aid the gunner to "zero in" on the target before firing the missile. The rifles also integrate the missile fire control into the rifle, giving the gunner a familiar grip, trigger pull, and safety. With the enhanced effectiveness of the weapon, it is possible to reduce the inventory and the number of missiles that must be hand-carried into the field.

    Previous spotting rifles were not able to produce bullet trajectories that could match the missile trajectories at all ranges and operating temperature conditions. They were also complex, difficult to operate and boresight, maintenance intensive, and expensive.

    Consolidated Industrial Associates, Inc. (CIA) was tasked to develop a spotting rifle that could match the missile trajectory at all ranges and operating temperatures, simple to operate, maintenance free, conformal to several different shoulder-launched weapons and, at the same time, be so inexpensive that it could be disposable along with the expended missile encasement. This project encompassed the experimental acquisition of tracer operating performance data, gunpowder burn rate characterization data, bullet aerodynamic data (with and without tracer operation,) and bullet stability data that could be used in CIA’s launch and flight software.

    The result was a comprehensive compilation of data, software, and design optimization methodology that could be used to optimize the spotting rifle and bullet design that would significantly enhance the effectiveness of future shoulder-launched ballistic missiles.

    The program, in its final part of the SBIR Phase II activity, will result in a prototype spotting rifle that integrates the missile fire control.

    The benefits of the spotting rifle to increase the first round hit probability on missiles have been recognized by the British and US military forces for many years. The USMC used the concept on the Shoulder-Launched, Multi-purpose, Assault Weapon in the 1980’s. It proved to be effective in improving the first-round hit probability and reducing the number of weapons required to be carried into the field. This concept had a reusable launcher which contained the spotting rifle, sight, and missile fire control. Future shoulder-launched weapons, envisioned by the US Army and the USMC, are being designed to be more disposable, with little or no reusable elements.

    There are, however, many shoulder-launched weapons in the US inventories that could be retrofitted with a DSR. The DSR would enhance their effectiveness and, consequently, their longevity in the inventory.

    Our allied forces in Britain, Israel, Sweden, Germany, and Switzerland have shoulder-launched weapons that could utilize the improvements of the Disposable Spotting Rifle.

    The baseline technology for spotting rifles that could fit the future shoulder-launched, disposable, ballistic missiles is the British LAW 80 spotting rifle. This unit has many plastic components, a complex breach unlocking mechanism, a complex bullet-within-a-bullet design, and an aluminum barrel. Integration of the rifle and missile fire-control systems would require a complex mechanical design and close proximity of the rifle to the fire control system. It has moderate weight and expense. The design of the gun and the bullets prevents the bullets from matching the rocket trajectories at low temperatures.

    The technology developed in this SBIR lies in the tracer, gunpowder, and aerodynamic data. This data, combined with CIA’s internal and external ballistic codes and optimization methodology, provides the basis for the design optimization of a spotting rifle for future shoulder-launched ballistic missiles.

    In addition, it was necessary to make the gun simple and inexpensive. This was achieved by utilizing the data, software, and methodology to optimize the trajectory fit with bullet and barrel designs that operated at pressures nearly an order of magnitude lower than commonly found in modern guns. The low-pressure operation made it possible to fabricate the guns primarily from composite materials. This lowers the gun cost substantially and allows the use of injection molding mass production technology. Likewise, the bullet design was simplified to eliminate components and allow the use of semi-solid metal forming (like soda cans.)

    Further, it was important that the gun be conformal to the missile encasement and be located at a different position from the fire control system. The bullets were constructed to use electric initiation instead of percussion primer initiation. Thus, the design allows great flexibility in the form, fit, and function of the fire-control system and eliminates the many mechanical components associated with conventional guns. Since the bullets are fired electrically, it is simple to integrate the missiles’ electrical fire control system and to eliminate the many associated mechanical and electrical components.

    The following is a table outlining the significant features of the software and hardware being developed for the Disposable Spotting Rifle, along with a brief description of the advantages and benefits of over the current technology.

    Gun & Bullet Design/Optimization

    Large Experimental Data Base & 10 years of development & Usage to achieve present version. Software & Methodology is ready now to provide system & component optimization, system performance prediction & system evaluation.

    Smart-Gun safe& fire system software & hardware
    1) Single button operation, automatic disarming.

    2) User determined code complexity.

    3) Prototype functional & achieves all operational objectives.
    1) Simple, fast, & reliable to Operate. Safe when operator forgets to apply safety.

    2) User decides speed of operation vs. need for safety complexity.

    3) Ready for adaptation to guns.

    Electrically-Fired Bullets 1) No gun movement prior to firing.

    2) Unlimited rate-of -fire.
    1) Improved accuracy.

    2) Possible to generate a literal metal wall to protect against incoming missiles and projectiles.

    While gun design software exists in other forms, it is not sufficiently flexible to consider the large variety of gun designs that CIA’s software was developed to include. The software can be used to determine critical coefficients from experimental data, and it can then be used to optimize the gun and bullet design to meet the geometric, pressure distribution, bullet acceleration, powder geometry, and other constraints of a particular application. The hardware and analytical techniques necessary to acquire critical data for coefficient determination has also been developed by CIA. Likewise, the flight software can be used to deduce critical coefficients from experimental data and then define the critical geometric, mass properties, and aerodynamics of the bullet to optimize the trajectory of the bullet to match the trajectory of the missile at all temperatures, altitude, and attitude conditions.

    The introduction of electrically fired bullets presents a unique opportunity to utilize an electronic fire control for the gun (Smart Gun.) This technology was developed to the point that a working model was developed. The smart gun features include unique and infinitely variable access coding to suit the user’s desired level of accessibility. Extraordinarily easy to remember, change, and transfer access identification. One point of entry access is used which cannot be obscured by gloves, fluids, debris, etc. No radio frequency, magnetic, optical, or other external devices are necessary. This device is at the stage of micro miniaturization which is an easy, routine, process.

    Electrically -fired bullets present substantial advantages over the present percussion-fired bullets. This concept allows for a very compact design, without the mechanical hammers, springs, moving mass parts, etc. that are necessary with conventional guns. It is now possible to locate the fire control system (trigger) anywhere on the weapon, wherever it is best for the application. The only connection is a series of electrical wires. It is also important to the accuracy of the weapon that there be no movement of mechanical parts between the time the trigger is pulled and the time the bullet is fired. Such movement of mass pulls the gun off the aim point. Many gunners account for such mechanical movement through experience, but there is no need for this training with electrically fired bullets. There is no movement.

    The technology development required by this SBIR has been completed. The remaining activity is to develop a prototype rifle for demonstration and delivery. This includes a final design optimization of the bullet and rifle and the design and fabrication of the fire-control system.

    Government officials may review the technical reports and critical point briefings produced under this SBIR by contacting NSWC.

    The design technology is ready now. The integrated system will be completed to the point of producing a working prototype at the end of the Phase II activities in June 2001.

    Consolidated Industrial Associates, Inc. is a small, privately held Florida-based company that has three major divisions of activity: 1) Medical Systems, 2) Military Systems, and 3) Commercial systems. The company was established in 1993.

  12. #12



    The Medical division has developed the techniques and manuals for Vestibular (balance, dizziness, and sea sickness problems) Rehabilitation. The work was utilized in a Vestibular Rehabilitation Facility joint venture. Proposals have been issued to develop a seasickness program for the US Military services. This division also provides management training and consulting. A training program has been developed for medical doctors to assist them in managing hospital facilities. The result of a four-year program with the largest hospital system in a Florida county is that the hospital is achieving financial success while 90% of the hospitals in Florida are currently in the red.

    The military division has provided consulting services to the military (US Navy and USMC) and to industry in the areas of rocket propulsion, gun design, and bullet design. The current SBIR is at the midway point in the Phase II activity. Its goal is to develop a disposable spotting rifle concept for USMC. The concept selected in the Phase I activity used electrically fired bullets in a low pressure, multi-barrel, composite material, conformal gun. Presently the contract is being increased in scope to develop, in parallel, an alternate disposable spotting rifle that can be used as a personal defense weapon, firing both spotting bullets and standard military ammunition.

    The military division is also involved in a joint venture to develop ceramic gun barrel technology. This technology has the potential to provide gun barrels that do not get hot and do not wear out. CIA’s gun design software, test hardware, and methodology will be used to define and characterize combustion the phenomenon. Proposals to the US Government are being prepared at this time to develop and demonstrate this revolutionary technology. The first SBIR contract is being negotiated at this time.

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  13. #13

    White paper requests

    As published in the Commerce Business Daily on: 02/22/01

    Solicitation Number: BAA 01-011

    Due Date: 23 March 2001

    Classification: A

    Type: Procurement


    Office Of Naval Research,
    Ballston Center Tower One
    800 N. Quincy Street
    Arlington, VA 22217-5660

    Title: Lightweight Materials and Survivability Technologies for MAGTF Expeditionary Family of Fighting Vehicles (MEFFV)

    Technical Points of Contact:

    Steve Ouimette, Naval Surface Warfare Center (NSWC),
    Carderock Division, (301) 227-4219, email: OuimetteSH@nswccd.navy.mil

    Tracy Gustke Frost (NSWC),
    Carderock Division, (301) 227-4579, email: FrostTG@nswccd.navy.mil

    Contract Negotiator:

    Vera M. Duberry, ONR Code 253,
    (703) 696-2610,email: duberrv@onr.navy.mil

    The Expeditionary Warfare Operations Technology Division of the Office of Naval Research (ONR 353) is soliciting white papers and proposals for materials technologies applicable to future USMC vehicles and equipment in the 2015-2020 timeframe. This effort will involve the exploration and development of advanced lightweight materials and related survivability technologies for a future Marine Corps Marine Air Ground Task Force (MAGTF) Expeditionary Family of Fighting Vehicles (MEFFV). These technologies must support the future Naval warfare capability of power projection and the United States Marine Corps (USMC) capstone operational concept of Expeditionary Maneuver Warfare (EMW), as well as the entire family of supporting concepts such as Operational Maneuver From the Sea (OMFTS) and Ship-To-Objective Maneuver (STOM). This program aims to assess the technical feasibility of these materials and related technologies by developing, optimizing and demonstrating components, subsystems and systems to increase the overall survivability characteristics of Marine Corps ground combat forces and their systems.

    Emphasis is placed on exploration, design, development, demonstration and optimization (e.g., cost reduction, weight reduction, performance enhancement) of lightweight structural technologies, lightweight armor technologies, lightweight structural-armor technologies, and multifunctional concepts and technologies that address one or more of the multiple survivability needs of armored vehicles. The definition of survivability is the classical detection avoidance, acquisition avoidance, hit avoidance, penetration avoidance and kill avoidance.

    There is interest in advanced material technologies that enable the development of innovative lightweight structural, lightweight armor, and lightweight structural-armor concepts, as well as multifunctional survivability systems. The goal of the program is to reduce the proportion of weight devoted to structure and armor protection and increase the overall survivability of the total vehicle and its crew. Examples of structural and survivability technologies and approaches include, but are not limited to, advanced materials such as fiber reinforced composites, structural foam metals (beyond aluminum and nickel), metal alloys, metal matrix composites, ceramics and ceramic-metallic composites, nano-ceramics, nano-structured alloys, nano-fiber materials, nano-crystalline materials, functionally gradient materials, coatings, treatments, and polymers. Lightweight structural-armor concepts may include combinations of various materials and/or technologies working in concert with each other to produce the desired weight reductions and enhanced survivability goals. Proposals in this area need to address vehicle structure loads, ballistic protection, dynamic deflection, vibrations, wear and fatigue, structural response and integrity to ballistic shock, affordability, manufacturability, repairability, and ease of inspection and maintenance. Multifunctional concepts and/or technologies simultaneously address multiple survivability and/or operational needs. They may or may not provide one or more of the functions discussed above. To set them apart from the capabilities above, they would include additional functions such as material coatings that increase survivability and operational capabilities by providing corrosion resistance, signature management, abrasive resistance, wear resistance, thermal protection, or other multi-functional characteristics. Multifunctional also means that the concept or technology could provide additional non-survivability related functions such as structural, sensing, frequency selective characteristics, power generation, self-healing, or other operational benefit.

    All white papers should discuss, within the phases of the program, the feasibility of integrating the proposed material and/or related technology into a family of vehicle platforms between 10 to 30 ton gross vehicle weight (GVW) or other applications to service the Army and/or future Naval system.. White papers involving multifunctional materials should address issues such as the limitations imposed and the opportunities created, by the integrated system on the potential design and survivability of the overall vehicle. Issues to be considered include, but are not limited to, integration of a light armor system into a platform structure, inclusion of structural characteristics into a light armor system, and design of an armor system that efficiently and effectively builds on itself both in physical terms and performance terms for the light and/or medium MEFFV system. White papers should address the means of reducing the cost of expensive lightweight materials as part of their multi-phase program.


    This notice constitutes a Broad Agency Announcement (BAA) as contemplated in FAR 6:102(d)(2)(I) and is directed toward material solutions and system integration solutions. White papers are sought from all available sources to include Industry, Institutions of Higher Education (IHE), and Government Laboratories. Teaming/partnering is welcomed.

    Offerors must obtain the BAA Proposal Information Package (PIP), which provides further information on the MEFFV system; technical area of interest; submission, evaluation, funding, white paper and proposal formats; and other general information. This document may be obtained from the ONR web page http://www.onr.navy.mil/02/baa/.

    Instructions for Preparation of White Papers:

    White papers are sought to preclude unwarranted effort on the part of an offeror in preparing full technical and cost proposals without an initial assessment of the operational, technical and logistical feasibility of the concept. White papers are due on or before 1600 (4:00PM) Eastern Standard Time, on Friday, 23 March 2001. Offerors submitting the most promising white papers will be encouraged to submit full technical and cost proposals on all or part of their white paper submission. However, any such encouragement does not assure a subsequent award. Any offeror may submit a full proposal even if its white paper was not identified as promising. Offerors may expect written feedback on their white papers on or about 6 April 2001. Technical and cost proposals are due no later than 1600 EST or 4:00PM, Friday, 27 April 2001. Early submittal of white papers and full proposals are encouraged to help facilitate the evaluation and response process.

    Offerors must submit an original and (9) hard copies, along with an electronic copy on CD or floppy disk, of the unclassified white papers and full technical and cost proposals to the Office of Naval Research, 800 North Quincy Street, Arlington, VA 22217-5660, Attention: Ms. Vera M. Duberry, Code 253\Room 720. The proposal label should also contain the BAA number and title. Classified white papers and proposals are welcome and shall be prepared and submitted in accordance with the guidance set forth below. Classified, including CONFIDENTIAL, SECRET, and TOP SECRET white papers and proposals will be double wrapped and the classification level identified accordingly on the "inner" envelope.

    The "inner" envelope should be addressed exactly as follows:

    WEST BETHESDA, MD 20817-5700
    RE: BAA Proposal "Lightweight Materials and Survivability Technologies for
    MAGTF Expeditionary Family of Fighting Vehicles (MEFFV)"
    It is very important that the "inner" envelope also be stamped, prominently and multiple times with the classification level and identification of the materials as "working papers", for example - "SECRET – WORKING PAPERS".

    The "outer" envelope for Classified, including CONFIDENTIAL, SECRET, AND TOP SECRET white papers and proposals should be addressed and sent to:

  14. #14


    WEST BETHESDA, MD 20817-5700
    This notice, in conjunction with the Proposal Information Package located on the Web, constitutes the total BAA. No additional information is available, nor will a formal RFP or other solicitation regarding this announcement be issued. Requests for the same will be disregarded.

    This effort will be conducted in three (3) phases, each consisting of a two-year period of performance. Phase I (FY 01, FY 02, and FY 03) and Phase II (FY 03, FY 04, and FY 05) are expected to be funded at approximately $1.5M annually and Phase III (FY 05 and FY 06) is expected to be funded at approximately $2M annually (subject to the future availability of funds) for a total of $10M. It is anticipated in Phase I to have approximately 4-6 awards, each funded in the range of $500K - $750K, subject to funding availability. Phase I is 6.1/6.2 category funding of basic research/applied technology and shall include a preliminary design and feasibility study. Phase II is 6.2-category funding of applied technology. All Phase I efforts should be conducted with the Phase II applications in mind. Phase III is 6.3-category funding of technology demonstration. It is anticipated that there will be multiple performers in each of the phases, but the government reserves the right to down-select to a single performer or to re-compete to seek out new performers during the later phases.

    It is anticipated that there will be multiple awards. Awards may be in the form of contracts, grants, cooperative agreements, or other transactions as appropriate. This acquisition does not meet the requirement for use of a Section 845 other transaction. For proposals submitted by consortia or teams, Articles of Collaboration, which define the interaction and commitment of the proposal partners, must be developed prior to award but are not required to be delivered with the technical and cost proposals. The Government reserves the right to select for award all, some, or none of the submissions. Offerors must state in their white papers and technical and cost proposals that they are submitted in response to this BAA.

    Evaluation Criteria:

    White papers and technical and cost proposals will be evaluated on a best value basis using the following criteria. The primary evaluation criteria (of equal importance) are: (1) Overall scientific and technical merit and (2) Potential contribution to fulfilling MEFFV operational goals (See PIP for further details). Other evaluation criteria (of less importance than that of (1) and (2), but of equal importance to each other) are: (3) Offeror's capabilities and related experience/personnel (principle investigator and other key R & D personnel), (4) Cost realism, and (5) Commitment to small business. This evaluation factor applies only to proposed contract awards over $500K. The criteria for evaluation of the offeror’s commitment to small business will include (i) the extent to which such firms (i.e., Small Businesses, Veteran-Owned Small Businesses, HUBZone Small Business Concerns, Small Disadvantaged and Women-Owned Small Businesses and Historically Black Colleges and Universities or Minority Institutions (HBCUs/MIs)) are specifically identified in the proposal; (ii) the extent of commitment to use such firms for meaningful work; (iii) the complexity and variety of the work small firms are to perform; (iv) the realism of the plan; (v) the extent of participation of such firms in terms of both percentage and dollar value of the total acquisition; and (vi) the offeror’s past performance on utilization of small business concerns in contract performance. Those offerors required to submit Subcontracting Plans, who do not submit subcontracting plans which meet statutory goals, should justify the goals they include.

    Small Business Subcontracting Plans should be prepared in accordance with FAR Clause 52.219-9 entitled "Small Business Subcontracting Plan". Each plan will be evaluated to determine whether it meets or exceeds the Congressionally mandated goals of twenty-three percent (23%) for small business concerns (including HUBZone small business concerns), five percent (5%) for small disadvantaged business concerns, five percent (5%) for women-owned small business concerns, and three percent (3%) for veteran-owned small business. If these goals are not expected to be met, a detailed explanation should be included. The North American Industry Classification System (NAICS) code for this solicitation is 541511 (which corresponds with the standard industrial classification code of 7371) with the small business size standard of 500 employees. No portion of this BAA has been set aside for small businesses, veteran-owned small businesses, HUBZone small businesses, small disadvantaged businesses, woman-owned small business concerns, and historically black colleges and universities or minority institutions; however, their participation is encouraged.

    The Government reserves the right to select for award all, some, or none of the proposals received and intends to incrementally fund any resultant award(s).

    Restrictive notices notwithstanding, proposals may be handled by a support contractor. The support contractor will not be involved in the technical evaluation or selection of proposals for award. Each support contractor’s employee having access to the white papers and technical and cost proposals will be required to sign a non-disclosure statement prior to the closing date of this BAA.

    This BAA provides no funding for direct reimbursement of proposal development costs. All proposals will be acknowledged. Proposals will not be returned after evaluation.

    All administrative correspondence and questions regarding this BAA, including requests for information on how to submit a white paper or technical and cost proposals, should be directed to the Contract Specialist, Ms. Vera M. Duberry, at duberrv@onr.navy.mil no later than 12:00 Noon on 23 April 2001. ONR intends to use electronic mail and fax for correspondence regarding this BAA. White papers and technical and cost proposals may not be submitted by fax or e-mail. Any white papers and technical and cost proposals sent by fax or e-mail will be disregarded. ONR encourages use of the World Wide Web (WWW) for retrieving the Proposal Information Package and any other related information that may subsequently be provided.


    This notice constitutes a BAA as contemplated in FAR 6.102 (d)(2)(i). A formal RFP or other solicitation regarding this announcement will not be issued. Request for the same will be disregarded. ONR will not issue paper copies of this announcement. The Government reserves the right to select or award all, some or none of the proposals received in response to this announcement. All responsible sources may submit a proposal, which shall be considered under these guidelines by the Office of Naval Research.

  15. #15

    Ya wanta see more?

    Input "Future USMC" in yer google search engine. Thousands of thing to look at.

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