A Hero’s Death by Friendly Fire

[thedrifter]

12-07-2004

A Hero’s Death by Friendly Fire



By Philip A. Quigley



Army Ranger Pat Tillman died as a hero. No one will dispute that. How Spc. Pat Tillman died, however, was an outrage. He perished because of a hasty command decision, poor communication and bravado. Pat Tillman died by direct friendly fire when, in the fog of war, members of his platoon misidentified Tillman and an Afghan guide as Taliban fighters.



Ordinarily, Tillman’s death would have barely made the news. But Pat Tillman was no ordinary soldier. Here’s how one recent newspaper account described him:



“A long-haired, fierce-hitting defensive back with the Arizona Cardinals of the National Football League, [Tillman] turned away a $3.6 million contract after the Sept. 11, 2001, attacks to volunteer for the war on terrorism, ultimately giving his life in combat in Taliban-infested southeastern Afghanistan,” The Washington Post recalled on Sunday. “Millions of stunned Americans mourned his death last April 22 and embraced his sacrifice as a rare example of courage and national service.”



Pat Tillman was a member of 2nd Platoon, “A” Co. of the 2nd Battalion, 75th Ranger Regiment. The Rangers are elite, highly revered members of the Army whose training is long, hard and extensive. Pat Tillman was proud to be a Ranger. He and his brother, Kevin, had enlisted in the Army together and served in Iraq together, fighting alongside Navy SEALs and other elite SOF forces. Their unit was subsequently transferred to Afghanistan to fight along the Pakistani border, conducting “seek and destroy” missions. It was on one of these missions that Tillman died last Apr. 22.



A detailed account of the friendly-fire incident and subsequent Army “spin” of Tillman’s death have emerged in large part due to a two-part investigation published by The Washington Post on Sunday and Monday, Dec. 5-6, 2004 (See “In The Kill Zone: The Unnecessary Death Of Pat Tillman,” Dec. 5, and “In The Kill Zone: Managing The Facts,” Dec. 6).



According to the Post account, Tillman’s platoon leader, a young, wet-behind-the-ears West Pointer, was eager to impress his superior officers, but nevertheless had some common sense. His commanders were under pressure to get “boots on the ground” before nightfall in their designated patrol area near Khost, in Afghanistan’s Taliban-infested Paktia province.



Despite the unit’s aggressive timetable, the lieutenant reportedly advised his command that because one of his Humvees had broken down, he thought he should keep his platoon together and proceed to the area as a whole, instead of splitting up with one group escorting the downed vehicle and one group to move ahead. However, higher-ups ordered the young officer to execute the planned mission over his objections.



This was a poor decision: The Rangers were going to be moving, divided, over hostile terrain as night was falling.



Leaders make command decisions. They weigh their options and decide. After a careful review of the Post investigation, it is clear that Tillman’s platoon leader did not make a correct command decision challenging the endangering order he had received. He was interested in returning will all of his assigned vehicles and to complete the assigned patrol. With hindsight, it is obvious that he should have left the broken vehicle behind and proceeded with his group intact to the objective to complete the task.



Moreover, the debate over the mission itself seems to have set the stage for what happened next: While the lieutenant was arguing this point with the command, he and his platoon remained in the same spot for five hours. That was plenty of time for local Taliban insurgents to gauge their strength and plot an ambush.



The Marine Corps employs a concept for flank protection called overwatch, a.k.a. “Guardian Angels”. This is a warning system to prevent ambushes by being vigilant to suspicious activity and terrain features on all sides of a unit’s location and path of advance. Had such a defense been in place, Pat Tillman would likely alive today.



Tillman’s platoon leader guided his platoon through a narrow canyon approximately 5-10 yards across at its narrowest point. Half of the group, towing the downed vehicle, had to go around the canyon while the second “serial” of the platoon proceeded into the canyon. In the first of several errors, the first group did not radio this to the platoon leader. Then due to road obstructions, they were unable to go around and had to drive through the same narrow pass the first group had earlier maneuvered through successfully.



Immediately as they entered the canyon, they drew fire from unseen gunmen high up the canyon walls. Rangers interviewed by the Post recalled that they could not visually identify their attackers and could only see shapes and muzzle flashes. With their radios not functioning properly, they were cut off and isolated from the rest of the platoon.



On hearing the shooting and explosions, the lieutenant ordered his half of the platoon toward the origination of the firing. They had no idea where their platoon mates were and their platoon mates didn’t know where the other half were coming from. With the lack of communication, between the two groups, this proved fatal.



The trapped part of the platoon did their best trying to flee the kill zone of the ambush but could not with the truck towing the downed vehicle blocking their way, so, with what firepower they had, they got into the one working Humvee and punched ahead to engage the enemy.



Darkness was falling, and with it the fog of war.



The platoon leader’s group set in positions in the high canyon wall and tried to engage their enemy. At this point, all that could be seen by either group were figures and muzzle flashes. Tillman and the rest of the group engaged their targets, but because of the increasing darkness, became the targets – not from the Taliban fighters – but from their own confused platoon mates.



Because of modern warfare rules of engagements, infantrymen are taught to fire when fired upon. Rangers are considered the elite of the group and are held to higher standards. In that canyon in Paktia province on Apr. 22, the Rangers failed to meet those standards. Giving in to adrenaline, Tillman’s platoon members began engaging them without fire discipline, shooting indiscriminately against what one Ranger described as “shapes and muzzle flashes” that they instinctively – and wrongfully – assumed were the enemy.



Tillman and his comrades did all they could to try to identify themselves as friendly. they popped smoke grenades, waved hand and arm signals, shouted, and even shot a warning flare. This was to no avail. They were continuously fired upon until they no longer called out. The real enemy was gone long before then.



For many of Tillman’s platoon mates, this was their first engagement. They rushed upon their “kills,” only to learn those they killed were their own men.



What happened next was an Army disgrace. The service awarded Tillman the Silver Star medal posthumously while spinning the emerging facts of his death out of all recognition.



Only eight days after his death, the Army issued a statement about Tillman’s heroism, which stated: “He ordered his team to dismount and then maneuvered the Rangers up a hill near the enemy’s location. As they crested the hill, Tillman directed his team into firing positions and personally provided suppressive fire …. Tillman’s voice was heard issuing commands to take the fight to the enemy forces.”



There was nothing in the Army release about Tillman’s equally heroic attempts to call off the friendly fire that was pinning down him and his mates. The *Post reported that at the time of the news release an investigation had already compiled more than a dozen statements describing the situation as it had actually occurred.



“Army records show Tillman fought bravely during his final battle,’ the Post continued. “He followed orders, never wavered and at one stage proposed discarding his heavy body armor, apparently because he wanted to charge a distant ridge occupied by the enemy, an idea his immediate superior rejected, witness statements show.”



Worse, the *Post noted that Tillman’s own brother, also a member of that ill-fated platoon, was never told the truth of what had happened to Pat Tillman.



The newspaper account indicates that after investigating what happened, the Army mildly disciplined several members of Tillman’s platoon and four officers in their chain of command. While details have been withheld because administrative punishment is not releasable, it seems clear that Tillman’s command wanted “boots on the ground” no matter what the complicating factors.



The Rangers’ proud motto from Omaha Beach on D-Day in 1944 is, “Rangers lead the way!”



In this instance, such false bravado cost an American hero his life.



Contributing Editor Philip A. Quigley Jr. served as an enlisted Marine combat scout during Operation Iraqi Freedom, and is pursuing a post-military goal of writing about contemporary defense issues. He can be reached at HawkmanPQ@aol.com. *Send Feedback responses to dwfeedback@yahoo.com.

Ellie

[TRLewis]

RIP Brother.

RTLW.

"Worse, the *Post noted that Tillman’s own brother, also a member of that ill-fated platoon, was never told the truth of what had happened to Pat Tillman."

Gonna have to call BS on that one. His brother moved on to being a sniper in the 2nd ranger batt. Trust me, he knows what went on, and has no ill feelings towards his fellow rangers.