Set to take the lead in Iraq

[thedrifter]

Set to take the lead in Iraq
October 25,2004
ERIC STEINKOPFF
DAILY NEWS STAFF

by eric steinkopff

daily news staff

Preparations are under way for the eventual deployment of thousands from Camp Lejune's II Marine Expeditionary Force.

Military officials won't say yet how many troops from the 43,000-strong II MEF will replace their West Coast counterparts in Iraq next year, but in November 2003, the Defense Department estimated it could be upwards of 20,000. Elements of 2nd Radio Battalion, a communications intelligence unit, left in August for a one-year deployment, according to Lt. Gen. James F. Amos, II MEF commander. Press reports suggest those troops are currently in Ramadi, west of Baghdad.

The big exodus is expected to start in January, when U.S. and Iraqi officials plan to hold elections, and continue through March. Between now and then, Marines and sailors with II MEF who are bound for the still-volatile country, will participate in extensive training. Everyone, even helicopter repairmen, is being prepped for any eventuality - especially ground combat.

At New River Air Station last week, a group from II MEF's 2nd Marine Aircraft Wing Forward - as Marine Aircraft Group 26 is known - was practicing convoy security, responding to ambushes and learning how to identify improvised explosive devices, or IEDs. Marine Corps officials want all troops to know how to handle themselves according to the law of war.

"These are not your normal convoy people," said Capt. Mike Wallace, 33, an AH-1W Super Cobra pilot from Fort Mitchell, Ky. "These are avionics (technicians) and mechanics. They normally don't get off the base, but they may get tasked and need to be a productive member of the team."

Along a wooded stretch of road, teams of Marines moved on command in a camouflage dance. One team covered the other, and then the second reciprocated. Each line peeled off in the right direction - usually - or was corrected and ribbed by their counterparts for getting them all killed.

It's a learning experience. Mistakes are part of the pro-cess.

"It's nothing as advanced as a Marine wing support squad-ron or a transportation support battalion at Camp Lejeune," said Wallace, the MAG-26 pre-deployment training officer. "In case they are in a convoy and something happens, they know basically where the fires are coming from and how to employ their weapons."

Conceivably, such things could happen.

If a helicopter needs to make an emergency or precautionary landing, these specialists could be called on to go repair the aircraft or help take it apart for transport back to the base.

Adding to the danger are the IEDs, deadly roadside surprises often detonated by terrorists as a diversion.

"They can explode an IED over here," said Wallace, pointing in one direction, "and then pop you with a bunch of RPGs over there and then run."

Cpl. Deena Weissberg, 21, is a component mechanic from Poughkeepsie, N.Y. In the Marine Corps about two years, she normally works on flight controls, transmissions, rotor heads and blades for Marine helicopters. Having recently returned from a seven-month deployment to Iraq, Weissberg is well aware of what dangers lurk there for someone who gets separated from his or her unit. She hopes what she learned last week could save her life in an emergency.

"What I retained most was what to do as a POW (and) how to get back to the unit if I'm out on my own," Weissberg said.

"I don't feel in any danger, but it's good to know the stuff they're teaching. It's very important."


Contact Eric Steinkopff at estein kopff@jdnews.com or 353-1171, Ext. 236.


http://www.jacksonvilledailynews.com...8&Section=News

Ellie

[thedrifter]

Sgt's Wife Blames Officers For Abuse
Associated Press
October 23, 2004

BALTIMORE - The wife of an Army Reservist sentenced to prison for abusing prisoners in Iraq said she knows her husband did wrong, but she also blames the abuse on higher-ranking officials who "sit behind the curtains."

Martha Frederick, wife of Staff Sgt. Ivan "Chip" Frederick, said the eight-year sentence he received Thursday in Baghdad for his role in the Abu Ghraib prison scandal will force her family to "endure hardships and many sacrifices."

"The pain sets deeper yet in knowing that he serves these years not only for his actions or actions of a few reservists, but those included in the chain of command," she wrote in an e-mail to The Associated Press.

Her 38-year-old husband, of Buckingham, Va., received the stiffest punishment given so far in the scandal. But she questioned why her husband's superiors were not punished for what she said was their complicity on the abuse.

"I feel outrage that he and a few others will bear the weight for the actions of many," she wrote.

Since finding out her husband faced charges, Frederick said her family has felt as if they were "facing a life-threatening situation when you relive your life's most memorable moments as well as contemplating all the things that you wish you could change or have done differently."

Frederick said she will always see her husband as a "good soldier."



Throughout the e-mail, she claims "misguided" leadership led to the abuse of Iraqi detainees. She wrote that the photographs and videos showing abuse "do not represent the people of this country, nor do they represent Chip as a person."

"I do not see Chip as a good soldier gone bad but as a good soldier thrust into a no-win situation," she wrote.

Frederick joined the Army National Guard at 17, after persuading his mother to sign the authorizing papers.

Seven members of the 372nd Military Police Company of Cresaptown, Md., have been charged in the scandal. Spc. Jeremy C. Sivits of Hyndman, Pa., is already serving a one-year sentence after pleading guilty in May.

Ellie

[thedrifter]

U.S. dead in Iraq honored


By Guy Taylor
THE WASHINGTON TIMES


From the steps of the Lincoln Memorial yesterday morning, Shannon Lampton looked at the 1,100 empty coffins placed along the Reflecting Pool to honor U.S. soldiers killed in Iraq and knew her nephew has not been forgotten.
"It's stunning to see all this," said Mrs. Lampton, sweeping her hand across the tableau of coffins, each draped in crisp red, white and blue flags.
Mrs. Lampton had come from Melbourne, Fla., to honor her nephew, Army 1st Lt. Kenneth Michael Ballard, 26, who was killed in Najaf, Iraq, on Memorial Day. Later yesterday, she would read his name aloud, as part of a ceremony honoring every U.S. soldier who died in Iraq.







The litany would take nearly two hours, and Mrs. Lampton said it was stunning to see the "thick book of single-spaced names," from which people read at a makeshift lectern.
"My nephew is on page 29 at the bottom," she said. He was buried yesterday at Arlington National Cemetery.
The tribute was organized by several activist groups known collectively as the Iraq War Memorial to Honor U.S. War Dead.
Unlike many recent events in the District concerning the war in Iraq, there were no protest banners or protesters shouting angry slogans among the thousands who came to mourn and pay their respects to the dead.
"It's not anti-war," said Pat Elder, 49, a Bethesda resident who helped organize the tribute. "It's just sad, that's all. ... We're not the radical ones. We're just sad."
The coffins were placed seven deep on each side of the pool and stretched about 200 yards toward the National World War II Memorial and the Washington Monument.
"It really brings home the loss," said Mrs. Lampton, 39. "We clump them together as casualties ... but they're all somebody's brother, nephew or husband."
As of yesterday, 1,103 U.S. service members have died in Iraq since March 2003, according to the independent Iraq Coalition Casualty Count Web site.
"It's as many people as I graduated from high school with," Michael Alemar, 45, said as he looked at the coffins. "People just don't realize what 1,100 people looks like. Here's 1,100 people."
Mr. Alemar, a former Air Force service member who described himself as a Quaker, said the event was "not political" or even a protest but a "demonstration of what war does."
"This is the result of war," he said.
Mr. Alemar also said he helped construct the cardboard coffins for the event and was there to honor the soldiers, though he does not support the war in Iraq.
Lauren McCutcheon, 23, of the District, was another volunteer who did not support the war.
Today is "not about partisan politics or any other ideology," she said. "It's about showing the magnitude of human loss. When it's a few a day, I think people ... don't really see how many 1,100 is or realize that these are young, bright, well-trained men and women who are dying."

http://www.washtimes.com/metro/20041...2816-3512r.htm


Ellie

[thedrifter]

Marines Destroy Insurgent Post in Fallujah
American Forces Press Service

WASHINGTON, Oct. 24, 2004 – U.S. Marine jets destroyed a known enemy command and control post in Fallujah today, U.S. military officials in Iraq reported.

Secondary explosions were observed following the precision air strike. Both air and ground observers had reported "consistent insurgent activity, including presence of armed personnel, weapons positioning and hardening of structures," indicating insurgents were rebuilding a post previously destroyed Oct. 20, according to officials.

In other news, the State Department confirmed the death of Assistant Regional Security Officer Ed Seitz today in Baghdad. Seitz, a State Department security agent, was killed in a mortar attack on Camp Victory, a base near Baghdad International Airport.

"Ed was a brave American, dedicated to his country and to a brighter future for the people of Iraq," said Secretary of State Colin Powell in a statement from Japan, his first stop on a trip to Asia.

"Ed Seitz died in the service of his country and for the cause of liberty and freedom for others. There is no more noble a sacrifice," Powell said. "We honor Ed's devotion to country and freedom.

"The enemies of peace shall not shake our will. America and a free Iraq will prevail. This is what Ed gave his life for, and this is what we will accomplish."

Also, civilian news outlets reported discovery of about 50 bodies in eastern Iraq Oct. 23. They quoted sources saying that the victims were Iraqi soldiers being bused home on leave after basic training. Neither Multinational Forces Iraq nor the Iraqi government had yet issued details of the incident.

http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Oct2...004102401.html

Ellie

[thedrifter]

Why America Has Waged a Losing Battle on Fallouja
Marines were on the verge of taking the city in April when politics intervened. U.S. misjudgment, disagreement and shifting strategy ended up fanning the flames of the Iraqi insurgency.


By Alissa J. Rubin and Doyle McManus, Times Staff Writers


FALLOUJA, Iraq — As soon as the women of Fallouja learned that four Americans had been killed, their bodies mutilated, burned and strung up from a bridge, they knew a terrible battle was coming.

They filled their bathtubs and buckets with water. They bought sacks of rice and lentils. They considered that they might soon die.

"When we heard the news," said Turkiya Abid, 62, a mother of 15, "we began to say the Shahada," the Muslim profession of faith.

There is no god but God, and Muhammad is the messenger of God.

In Washington, the reaction to the March 31 killings was exactly what the women of Fallouja had expected: anger. Those inside George W. Bush's White House believed that the atrocity demanded a forceful response, that the United States could not sit still when its citizens were murdered.

President Bush summoned his secretary of Defense, Donald H. Rumsfeld, and the commander of his forces in the Middle East, Army Gen. John P. Abizaid, to ask what they recommended.

Rumsfeld and Abizaid were ready with an answer, one official said: "a specific and overwhelming attack" to seize Fallouja. That was what Bush was hoping to hear, an aide said later.

What the president was not told was that the Marines on the ground sharply disagreed with a full-blown assault on the city.

"We felt … that we ought to let the situation settle before we appeared to be attacking out of revenge," the Marines' commander, Lt. Gen. James T. Conway, said later.

Conway passed this up the chain — all the way to Rumsfeld, an official said. But Rumsfeld and his top advisors didn't agree, and didn't present the idea to the president.

"If you're going to threaten the use of force, at some point you're going to have to demonstrate your willingness to actually use force," Pentagon spokesman Lawrence Di Rita said later.

Bush approved the attack immediately.

That was the first of several decisions that turned Fallouja from a troublesome, little-known city on the edge of Iraq's western desert to an embodiment of almost everything that has gone wrong for the United States in Iraq.

Just as they had previously, U.S. policymakers underestimated the hostility in Fallouja toward the American military occupation of their land.

The U.S. assault on the city had the unintended effect of fanning the Sunni Muslim insurgency, precisely the outcome the United States wanted to avoid.

U.S. officials ignored the risk that American military tactics and inevitable civilian casualties would undermine support for the occupation from allies in Iraq and around the world.

Although military and civilian authorities eventually agreed on the Fallouja assault, their consensus quickly broke down, leading to hasty and improvised decisions.

The insurgency in Fallouja was never going to be easy to quash, but disarray among American policymakers contributed to U.S. failure.

This account is based on interviews with more than 40 key figures, many of whom refused to be identified because they still hold military or government jobs.

The troubles began with Bush's authorization to attack Fallouja, based on the sole option Rumsfeld and Abizaid gave him.

After the president ordered the Marines to advance, they battled their way into the city against heavy resistance. Four days later, with Fallouja only half-taken, they were abruptly ordered to stop.

The problem was not military but political: Members of the Iraqi Governing Council were threatening to resign, and British Prime Minister Tony Blair and United Nations envoy Lakhdar Brahimi had appealed to Washington to halt the offensive.

Before pulling out of Fallouja, the Marines hurriedly assembled a local force called the Fallouja Brigade, which they said would keep the insurgents in check. It proved an utter failure. Many of the men who enlisted turned out to be insurgents.

But it took nearly five months for the Marines and the new Iraqi government to disband the brigade. In the meantime, under the brigade's watch, Fallouja became a haven for anti-American guerrillas, a base for suicide bombers, and a headquarters for the man U.S. officials consider the most dangerous terrorist in Iraq, Abu Musab Zarqawi.

"Fallouja exports violence," said Col. Jerry L. Durrant, one of the Marine officers who inherited the problem.

Today the United States finds itself back where it started in April. Securing Iraq requires solving the problem of Fallouja. The U.S. military is bombing targets in the city almost every day, but few military analysts believe that will get the job done. A major offensive, perhaps the most significant battle of the unfinished Iraq war, is likely after the U.S. presidential election.

As they were in April, the Marines are poised on the outskirts of the city, awaiting orders.

*

Part I

GOING IN

Fallouja lies in the province of Al Anbar, which stretches west from the outskirts of Baghdad to the Jordanian border, south almost to the ruins of ancient Babylon and north to Salahuddin, the province that includes former President Saddam Hussein's hometown of Tikrit. It also borders Saudi Arabia and Syria.

Dominated by Sunni Muslims, Al Anbar is a landscape of shifting sands and mercurial allegiances. Unemployment has always been a problem. Fallouja, one of its largest cities, is deeply tribal, conservative and suspicious of outsiders.

Hussein, himself a Sunni, dealt with the province by drawing on its men for his army, Republican Guard and intelligence service.

When the war came, however, they did not fight for him.

Realistic about Iraq's military inferiority, they followed the instructions of U.S. special operations forces, who had scattered leaflets telling them that if they stayed home, they would not be attacked — and they weren't.

But when troops of the U.S. Army's 82nd Airborne Division occupied a school in the center of the city shortly after Baghdad fell in April 2003, Falloujans did not take it well. A rumor circulated that the soldiers were using their night-vision goggles to see through the clothes of women in the city.

Five days after the soldiers moved in, a protest demanding that they leave turned violent. Seventeen Falloujans were killed and 70 injured in the clash with troops.

Soon after, L. Paul Bremer III, the newly appointed civilian administrator for the U.S.-led Coalition Provisional Authority, dissolved the Iraqi army, along with the intelligence service, the Republican Guard and half a dozen other security services that had worked for Hussein. Overnight, thousands of men in Al Anbar lost their jobs and their pensions. It was a humiliation to them.

Skirmishes continued in Fallouja throughout the next year, even after U.S. troops moved their camps outside the city limits.

By last March, the 1st Marine Expeditionary Force had replaced the Army there. The Marines brought with them a minimal-force strategy, restricting their reprisals to targeted strikes while offering help in the form of money and aid.

But the violence did not end. On March 27, at least four Falloujans died in a confrontation with Marines in an industrial neighborhood on the city's north side.

It was into that landscape that four Americans working as private security guards made a wrong turn into the city on the morning of March 31.

Only a few yards in, they were halted by a barrage of bullets. A home video showed one contractor lying face down as a crowd surged around his sport utility vehicle. He appeared to have gotten the vehicle's door open, and he stumbled out, dying of gunshot wounds.

The mob set the SUV on fire. Two of the contractors' burned bodies were taken to a nearby bridge and suspended, looking like blackened rag dolls. The mob cheered.

Most Americans, including many working in Iraq, were stunned by the fury — the willingness not just to kill but also to mutilate. Many Iraqis also were horrified. A young Baghdad native who went to Fallouja reported with disbelief that adolescent boys were carrying pieces of charred human flesh on sticks "as if they were lollipops."

Among U.S. military officials in Iraq, the first response was to take a deep breath. The comments from spokesman Brig. Gen. Mark Kimmitt were surprisingly measured given the barbarity that was being rebroadcast every 15 minutes.

"There often are small outbursts of violence. They will go in, they will restore order and they'll put those people back in their place," he said of the Marines.

A day later, Brig. Gen. John Kelly, assistant commander of the 1st Marine Division, told a reporter that he would not be pushed into a counterproductive siege. The Marines would confront the insurgents, make friends with moderates in the city and gather intelligence.

The Marines would also search for Iraqis who could be leaders in Al Anbar. At Camp Pendleton in California, they had studied the problems other military units had encountered in the province and had concluded that the only authority the fiercely anti-Western residents would accept was that of local leaders. The difficulty was finding some who were also acceptable to the Americans.

Kimmitt reiterated the Marines' position. "We are not going to rush pell-mell into the city," he said.

*

U.S. RESPONSE

At Bremer's headquarters in Hussein's mammoth Republican Palace in Baghdad, and in Bush's Oval Office in Washington, the conversation started from a different premise. The slayings of the U.S. contractors were a challenge to America's resolve.

Bush issued a statement reaffirming his determination to defeat the insurgents. "We will not be intimidated," Press Secretary Scott McClellan quoted the president as saying. "We will finish the job."

Bremer's response was more emotional. At a graduation ceremony at Iraq's new police academy, he called the killers in Fallouja "human jackals" and the battle for the town part of a "struggle between human dignity and barbarism." The deaths of the security guards, he promised, would "not go unpunished."

Conway, the commander of the Marines in western Iraq, told the overall commander of U.S. forces in Iraq, Army Lt. Gen. Ricardo S. Sanchez, what the Marines had in mind.

According to one well-placed defense official, Conway also told Rumsfeld directly that the Marines favored a deliberate approach. But Rumsfeld rejected his advice. The Defense secretary and Air Force Gen. Richard B. Myers, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, believed that "it was unsatisfactory to have parts of the country that were not under control," Pentagon spokesman Di Rita said.

A civilian official who declined to be identified said that "the military leadership told us this was something they could do with a low risk of civilian casualties, using their precision weapons."

continued........

[thedrifter]

It was on April 1 that Rumsfeld and Abizaid briefed Bush on plans for attacking Fallouja. Rumsfeld's decision not to inform the president about the Marines' dissenting recommendation was proper, Di Rita said. That argument had been settled at a lower level.

"Military commanders owe their military advice to each other. The secretary and the chairman owe their military advice to the president," the spokesman said. "It is true that there was not a united view."

In a matter of hours, the president's decision made its way to the Marines at their desert outpost eight time zones away. At Camp Fallouja, the command post outside the city, Sanchez told Conway and his aides: "The president knows this is going to be bloody. He accepts that," an officer recalled.

Conway was perturbed. He expressed his reservations in front of the other staff officers — a way of making sure his objections were on the record.

But Col. John Coleman, Conway's right-hand man, who was present at most of the meetings, said that in the end, the Marines' job is to follow orders. "When the president says we go, we go."

On April 2, the Marines began preparing their attack, named Operation Valiant Resolve. Initially, the Marines estimated that they would need two battalions, a total of 2,500 troops, and that the mission would take 10 days. The fighting was plotted down to the street level. One battalion would take the northern half of the city, another the southern, and they would meet in the middle.


The Marines knew the stakes were high. "This battle is going to have far-reaching effects on not only the war here in Iraq, but in the overall war on terrorism," one young officer wrote home.

But beyond the declaration that the goal was to kill or capture those responsible for the contractors' deaths, there was no clear definition of the endgame. No one explained what, at the end of the day, the U.S. would have won.

"First prize, a week in Fallouja. Second prize, two weeks in Fallouja," a U.S. diplomat working with the occupation authority in Baghdad said dryly.

On April 4, Maj. Gen. James N. Mattis, commander of the 1st Marine Division, whose units would carry the battle, summoned his commanders to a final briefing.

The general, known as "Mad Dog Mattis" to his men, made it clear that the Marines were now in warrior mode.

"You know my rules for a gunfight?" he asked a reporter outside the meeting. "Bring a gun, bring two guns, bring all your friends with guns."

Sgt. Maj. Randall Carter, the top enlisted man in the 2nd Battalion of the 1st Marine Regiment, known in military shorthand as the 2/1, began to prepare his men.

"Marines are only really motivated two times," he bellowed. "One is when we're going on liberty. One is when we're going to kill somebody. We're not going on liberty…. We're here for one thing: to tame Fallouja. That's what we're going to do."

The young Marines responded with a thunderous shout of "Ooh-rah!" the all-purpose Marine cheer.

Near midnight, the temperature was 41 degrees, one of the coldest April nights Al Anbar province had had in years. The Marines moved out, establishing their forward command post in the cemetery on the northern edge of town.

*
PREPARATIONS

Inside Fallouja, "we knew we would be wiped off the Earth," recalled Kadhimia Abid Dulaimi, 59, a Fallouja woman who nevertheless helped insurgents, feeding them and letting them station themselves on her roof.

The insurgents' movements paralleled those of the Marines: They readied their weapons, scoped out buildings to use as sniper positions and stockpiled ammunition, said several Falloujans who fled a few days later.

A year after the U.S.-led invasion, the insurgency based in Fallouja had grown into an increasingly sophisticated movement made up largely of Iraqis — former Baath Party members, unemployed members of Hussein's military and intelligence services, and Sunni fundamentalists who wanted Iraq to be governed by Islamic law, Marine intelligence officers said. Foreign fighters were in the minority but were believed to be responsible for many of the suicide bombings.

On April 5, the Marine operation was underway. Carter and the 2/1 advanced into the northern part of the city and almost immediately ran into resistance. Insurgents on rooftops and others in cars peppered the incoming troops with gunfire and rocket-propelled grenades.

"If they want to come out and fight, that's fine with us," Maj. Brandon McGowan, executive officer of the 2/1, said at the time. "That way we don't have to go house to house."

Five Marines died in that first day of combat. Insurgents died too, as did some civilians.

"There was a girl of 20 years who went out to our nearby mosque to give blood, and she was hit in the head by a piece of shrapnel," said Umm Marwan, who fled with six of her children four days later. "The men carried her to the clinic, but I think she died before she got there."

On April 6, the Marines pushed farther into the city and ran into stiffer resistance. The insurgents came up with a strategy to slow the American advance. They blocked streets with buses and trucks to try to force the Marines onto routes where insurgents lay in wait. They ferried fighters from place to place in cars and even in city buses. They used an antiaircraft gun to fire on U.S. helicopters that roared over the rooftops, until the Marines destroyed the weapon.

On April 7, the Arabic-language satellite TV channel Al Jazeera carried a report from the city's hospital director, Tahr Issawi, that 60 people were dead. There was no way to verify the number or how many were civilians.

*

EYE ON NEWS

Watching the news unfold from his ranch near Crawford, Texas, on April 7, Bush twice requested video briefings directly from Abizaid and Bremer.

The Marines were making progress and taking few casualties. But Arab media reports of civilian deaths sparked protests among Iraqis outside Fallouja. Al Jazeera had a correspondent inside the town, Ahmed Mansur, and his broadcasts were vivid and emotional. He interrupted one report from the roof of a building to hit the deck as a U.S. warplane passed overhead.

After U.S. artillery hit a mosque that the Americans said had been sheltering insurgents, Mansur reported that a family had been killed in a car parked behind the mosque. He also said 25 members of a family were killed when their house was hit.

In his wood-paneled office at the Republican Palace in Baghdad, Bremer was besieged by Sunni members of the Iraqi Governing Council who pleaded to be given safe passage to Fallouja to try to negotiate a peace, top aides said.

Sunni tribal leaders, clerics and physicians appealed to Hachim Hassani for help. Hassani was the No. 2 man in the Iraqi Islamic Party, the most powerful Sunni political organization in the country, and he often represented the party on the Governing Council. He was also an English-speaking economist who had lived nearly 15 years in Detroit and, more recently, Woodland Hills. Bremer saw him as trustworthy and moderate.

Hassani was getting regular updates on civilian casualties in Fallouja and complaining to U.S. officials.

"Hachim was telling us that of the people killed, maybe 20% were civilians," said a senior Bremer aide who asked not to be named, adding that Hassani said that "even if it was 5%, that was 5% too many."

U.N. envoy Brahimi had just landed in Baghdad to help assemble an interim government. He told Bremer, "I can't operate this way," complaining that the offensive made political negotiations impossible, a U.S. official in Baghdad at the time said.

A few days later, Brahimi publicly called the military's response in Fallouja "collective punishments" and "not acceptable."

Criticism also came from Britain's Blair, the key U.S. ally in Iraq. The prime minister had been under pressure for more than a year from an antiwar majority in his ruling Labor Party, and the civilian casualties in Fallouja were causing the opposition to flare.

"The U.S. forces have to stop acting like warriors and start acting like peacekeepers," said Blair's former foreign secretary, Robin Cook. Blair telephoned Bush on April 7 to warn that the offensive in Fallouja was causing a backlash in the rest of Iraq, diplomats said.

The military felt the battle was also becoming a recruiting tool for the insurgency inside and outside Iraq. As portrayed on Al Jazeera, Fallouja was "a rallying call, an Alamo if you will, for the jihad," Col. Coleman recalled.

U.S. military and civilian officials would later blame each other for allowing the Arab media to paint the offensive as an attack on civilians, mosques and hospitals. Under the strain, relationships between American civilian and military officials — including Bremer and Sanchez — were becoming "dysfunctional," one official in Washington said.

Meanwhile, the Iraqis who were to fight alongside the U.S. troops drifted into the desert. The 2nd Battalion of the Iraqi army refused to take up arms against fellow countrymen. An Iraqi national guard unit walked as well. There was no way to put an Iraqi face on the battle.

The assault on the Sunni stronghold had the unexpected effect of buoying radical Shiite Muslims, especially those who followed the anti-American cleric Muqtada Sadr, who sent supplies to Fallouja during the Marine assault. Sadr used the events in Fallouja to help spark one of several uprisings against the occupation, in the Shiite holy city of Najaf.

The upsurge in fighting alarmed Americans as well. Even before the battle, a poll released April 5 found Bush's overall job approval at a new low of 43%.

"We are on the verge of losing control of Iraq," said Sen. Joseph R. Biden Jr. of Delaware, the ranking Democrat on the Foreign Relations Committee. Added Sen. Robert C. Byrd (D-W.Va.): "Surely I am not the only one who hears echoes of Vietnam."

Rumsfeld sought to put out the fires.

"The number of people involved in those battles is relatively small…. A small number of terrorists," he told reporters at the Pentagon on April 7. "Some things are going well, and some things obviously are not going well. And you're going to have good days and bad days, as we've said from the outset."

The Marines pressed on. By April 9, Mattis believed he was within 48 hours of taking the city.

*

BAGHDAD TALKS

In Baghdad, a group known as the Iraqi Security Committee was meeting every day and sometimes twice a day. The committee consisted of a handful of Iraqi Governing Council members, the Iraqi national security advisor and the heads of the Iraqi Defense Ministry, Interior Ministry and the intelligence service. Bremer also attended.

"The situation was very tense," recalled Hassani, the Sunni leader. "The violence by then had spread around Fallouja. I thought the situation was getting very dangerous and we needed to interfere."

On April 8, Hassani and Ghazi Ajil Yawer, another influential Sunni and member of the Governing Council, met with Adnan Pachachi, the usually pro-American elder statesman of the council's Sunni members. The three emerged from Pachachi's headquarters and said they were prepared to resign in protest, a move that could cripple the council and undermine Bush's promise to turn over sovereignty to Iraqis on June 30.

continued..........

[thedrifter]

A call came almost immediately from Bremer's office asking for a meeting that night.

The Sunni politicians arrived to find the two top U.S. generals in the Middle East, Abizaid and Sanchez, in Bremer's office. According to one participant, Abizaid told Hassani, "If you give me two days, I'll finish Fallouja."

Hassani, who appeared stunned, replied, "Yeah, you may finish Fallouja but I guarantee you, you'll have all Iraq as one big Fallouja."

Privately, American officials were divided over what course to take. One later said he thought the Sunnis were only "grandstanding." But Bremer was convinced that continuing the military offensive would create a political disaster, and supported the idea of a cease-fire to allow the council members to try to negotiate a deal.

Abizaid and Sanchez were reluctant, participants said, but finally came around. "I know major military action could implode the political situation," Abizaid said, according to one official.

Another person at the meeting recalled that the generals also said, "We can't pull out our troops until we've got some kind of local force on the ground."

The White House also acceded to the mounting pressure. The new view was: OK, give negotiations a try, officials said. But the time element was important. U.S. officials at the National Security Council didn't want the negotiations to go on forever. Give them a deadline, a couple of weeks, they said.

In the early hours of April 9, the orders reached the Marines at Fallouja: A cease-fire begins at noon. By that point, the Marines would later estimate, they had taken a third of the city with relatively modest U.S. losses — 11 dead.

That afternoon, Bremer's spokesman, Dan Senor, and Sanchez's spokesman, Gen. Kimmitt, announced a "unilateral suspension of offensive operations."

Senor said the purpose was "to hold a meeting between members of the Iraqi Governing Council, the Fallouja leadership and leaders of the anti-coalition forces, to allow delivery of additional supplies provided by the Iraqi government, and to allow residents of Fallouja to tend to the wounded and dead."

Kimmitt warned that should discussions fail, "the coalition military are prepared to go back on the offensive."

*

Part II

CEASE-FIRE

The Marines were unhappy. They had not wanted to attack Fallouja initially, but once their advice was ignored, their only goal was to crush the enemy. Now, they felt, they were being called off just when victory was within their grasp.

Conway seethed in private. Months later he went public with his discontent, an unusual step for a Marine general.

"I would simply say that when you order elements of a Marine division to attack a city, that you really need to understand what the consequences are, and not, perhaps, vacillate in the middle of something like that," he told reporters. "Once you commit, you've got to stay committed."

By midmorning on April 9, the Marines began to relax their cordon around the city to allow women, children and the elderly to leave. Nearly a quarter of the city's population of 285,000 fled through military checkpoints.

Col. John Toolan, commander of the 1st Marine Regiment and a veteran of the taking of Baghdad a year earlier, went to one of the checkpoints. Gun on his hip, he stopped cars in a search for insurgents. He found none, but came across Iraqi policemen and Civil Defense Corps troops fleeing the city.

"When are these people going to discover their manhood and stand and fight with us to save their city?" he demanded at the time.

Meanwhile, insurgents in the city regrouped. They still had considerable assets, including artillery and antiaircraft capability. They were controlling mosques and intimidating religious and civic leaders. They had popular support, and help from some Iraqi police, who were driving cars given by the U.S.

The guerrillas were not under the same restrictions as the Americans and continued to attack Marine positions and patrols. The Marines responded in force. The director of Fallouja Hospital appeared several times a day on Arab satellite TV channels with ever higher estimates of the death toll. On April 9, it was 450. A few days later it was 600.

From the Marines' viewpoint, there seemed to be no reliable way to separate civilians from insurgents.

Elderly men were picking up AK-47s and fighting. Two Fallouja women later described preparing food for the insurgents and giving them shelter. "I cooked rice and lentils for them…. I got them ammunition and held their guns for them as they were climbing onto my roof," said Dulaimi, the homemaker.

During the periods of relative calm, those who did not flee emerged from their houses to bury the dead. They carried the bodies wrapped in white sheets to the soccer stadium, which had been turned into a graveyard because Marines were camped in the cemetery.

Meanwhile, various groups, all claiming to represent Falloujans, clamored to be the ones to negotiate a peace deal. The jockeying made talks difficult.

"There are lots of groups offering to negotiate," said Senor, Bremer's spokesman. "We will talk to anybody, but at the moment we are not sure that anyone is actually able to negotiate on behalf of the people of Fallouja."

In Washington, the picture wasn't much clearer. "Most of this was opaque to us in Washington, certainly the details," one official said later.

With negotiations yielding little, Mattis called in reinforcements. He had begun the fight with only two battalions; by late April, he had seven.

At the same time, the Marines began to assert control over negotiations, trying to employ the tactic they had wanted to use in the first place: turning to moderate Falloujans to help manage the city.

Marine commanders were inclined to believe that former members of Hussein's armed forces were adherents of military order and could offer the city effective leadership. The Marines also had some empathy for the fighters who were former military men — a type they knew well. The ex-fighters had been ignored by officials in Baghdad since the war, much as the Marines felt that their advice often fell on deaf ears.

The Marines recognized that many of the fighters "weren't former regime loyalists, they certainly weren't foreign fighters, and they weren't religious extremists," said Coleman, the colonel.

"They were soldiers who have families," Coleman said later. He noted their frustration over being unemployed for a year after the army was disbanded. "They couldn't do the things a man and a father is expected to do … and then a force is all of a sudden arrayed and directed against your town. What do you do? Many of those men chose to pick up that AK-47 and join the fight."

The Marines turned to the head of the Iraqi intelligence service, Gen. Mohammed Shahwani, a onetime Hussein operative and a strong supporter of turning to former Hussein-era military men, several of the parties involved said.

Shahwani had fled Iraq in the early 1990s and was a key player in an abortive coup in 1996, backed by the CIA, according to secret police files kept by Hussein and obtained after the war by Ahmad Chalabi, a formerly exiled political leader.

"Gen. Shahwani and I were in direct contact," Conway said later. "He felt like he knew who some of the quality soldiers were from this region, and he did bring these people forward."

Conway explained that he wanted a "charismatic Iraqi general." Shahwani brought him Gen. Mohammed Latif and Maj. Gen. Jassim Saleh. Latif was a former head of military intelligence and Saleh had been a general in the armed forces. At a meeting at Camp Fallouja, Shahwani presented the two men along with two others as the right people to lead an armed force in Fallouja.

Coleman was impressed by Latif, whom he described as a natural leader, but Saleh was necessary for the deal to work. "Saleh was a son of the city, so he could walk right in there and command immediate respect," Coleman said. He was also a professional military man.

Saleh walked into the Fallouja post wearing the traditional Arab robe known as a dishdasha. "We called our troops to attention and gave him the kind of Marine military salute we would to someone of that rank," recalled Maj. Ed Sullivan.

Some Marine officers, including Sullivan, found Saleh almost a caricature of a Hussein-era general. "He played the part wonderfully. He was excessively polite. He met with Col. Toolan. He said, 'Your men fight like tigers,' " Sullivan recalled, shaking his head as he remembered Saleh's confidence.

It didn't take long for the Marines to recognize that Saleh, son of the city or no, might also be a problem. He turned out to be one of the leaders of the insurgency near Taji, a town just north of Baghdad, one Marine officer said. Saleh had been one of the insurgents planning the attacks on a large U.S. military base known as Camp Anaconda, military officials said.

At the same time, in an attempt to reach out to the larger Sunni community, Bremer announced a softening of the coalition policy that had stripped many Sunnis of their Hussein-era government jobs. But no decision in Iraq seemed to come easy; Bremer's move angered Shiite leaders, who accused him of reneging on his commitment to dismantle Hussein's Baath Party power structure.

When the idea of turning over security to a force headed by Latif and Saleh was brought up to Iraq's interim ministers, they expressed dismay.

"It was the equivalent of the poachers becoming the gamekeepers," said Ali Allawi, then interim minister of defense.

On April 29, Mattis held a long negotiating session with Latif, Saleh and two other former Iraqi generals. He struck a deal to allow them to raise a force of local men — the Fallouja Brigade — to take control of the city.

Mattis apparently intended to report the agreement up his chain of command before any public announcement was made, but a Los Angeles Times reporter was outside the meeting between Mattis and the Iraqi generals, and Mattis reluctantly confirmed what was already apparent.

continued.........

[thedrifter]

The deal took other U.S. officials by surprise — Bremer and Sanchez in Baghdad, and Rumsfeld and Bush in Washington.



A U.S. official in Baghdad said Abizaid telephoned Bremer and asked, "What's going on down there?"

"I have no idea," Bremer replied.

"It was a complete surprise to us," the official said. "Both Bremer and Abizaid were shocked. Bremer was furious…. Bremer learned about it from the press. The Marines sort of said, 'Presto, here it is.' "

In Washington, once it was clear that a deal had been struck, Rumsfeld announced a fait accompli. "The Marines on the ground are the ones that are making those judgments," he told a television interviewer.

At the White House, the move also was presented as a done deal, officials said. "We were told there was a deal," one official said. "We all kind of shook our heads and said, 'OK.' " Next to Bremer's warnings that renewed fighting would torpedo the formation of a new Iraqi interim government, the deal looked "acceptable," he said.

But Bremer and his aides complained privately about what they saw as the military's tendency to sideline the civilian authority. "You need a clear definition of what's a military decision and what's a political decision," one civilian official in Washington said. "In this case, the Marines stepped across that line."

Pentagon spokesman Di Rita defended the Marines against that charge. "They had an enormous amount of authority to go work the problem," he said. Mattis, who made the deal, was promoted to lieutenant general in September.

Iraqi national security advisor Mowaffak Rubaie, who is also a Shiite and deeply distrustful of the minority Sunnis who were part of the Hussein regime, learned of the Fallouja Brigade on May 1 when he read an account in a Western newspaper. The same day, he attended an early-morning meeting in Bremer's office.

"We went full blast. We said: 'This is wrong, you are repeating the same mistake you made in Afghanistan with the warlords…. This is going to backfire.' It was appeasement," Rubaie said.

Allawi, the interim defense minister, feared that U.S. officials would be tempted to clone it elsewhere — in Najaf, Mosul and Basra — leading to multiple militias and a security disaster, and that the strategy would eventually fail.

"I said, 'You'll get a period of relative quiet and the city will breathe a sigh of relief, but it will only be camouflage and subterfuge,' " recalled Allawi, who now lives in London.

But there was no turning back.

*

Part III

NEW BRIGADE

With 16 men lost to hostile fire since the offensive began April 5, the first three days of May grated on many of the Marines who had fought to take the city. Hour by hour they ceded positions to newly minted members of the Fallouja Brigade, whom they had been fighting only days before.

"We gave them a battalion's worth of rifles, about 800 rifles, I think," Gen. Conway said later. "Probably 25 to 27 trucks, probably 40 or 50 radios, and about 2,000 uniforms."

Lance Cpl. Jacob Atkinson, 21, of Richmond, Va., said at the time, "I just hope whoever is making the decision for this has a good plan."

His 150-member unit, Echo Company of the 2/1, had suffered significant casualties — three Marines dead and more than 50 wounded — during a month of combat and negotiations.

Echo Company's commander, Capt. Douglas Zembiec, tried to cool his men down. "I told every one of them, 'Your brothers did not die in vain,' " said Zembiec, 31, of Albuquerque. " 'We'll give this a chance. If it doesn't work, we're prepared to go back in.' "

Among Falloujans, the mood was one of heady excitement, pride and relief. One of their own was back in charge. Jassim Saleh was welcomed with cheers and applause as he strutted through downtown wearing his Hussein-era uniform.

There was joy, too, that the Americans, all the more hated after a month of bombing, were leaving. But there was also dismay as many Falloujan natives, who had left during the worst of the fighting, returned to find their homes, businesses and mosques reduced to rubble.

Hot weather had arrived, and flies swirled in clouds. At the edge of the Jolan neighborhood, an insurgent stronghold, Fallouja Brigade recruiters took applications from what seemed like an endless line of men.

Yassir Abaat, 28, who said he used to work for Hussein's presidential guard, joined the insurgency after his father was killed on the fourth day of the Fallouja siege.

"I have not stopped fighting. The war is not over," he said in a calm voice. "If the Americans attack again, we will defend ourselves."

Conway listed several missions that he expected Saleh's brigade to accomplish. They would kill or capture the foreign fighters battling U.S. forces, they would find and arrest the killers of the U.S. contractors, they would make the city safe for Westerners to enter and begin reconstruction, and they would ensure that the insurgents' heavy weapons were handed over.

Saleh would not be around long enough to make any of that happen, however. The Marines removed him amid Shiite accusations that he had been a commander for Hussein when atrocities were committed in southern Iraq. By early May he was out, replaced by Latif, whom the Marines had preferred from the start but who lacked Falloujan roots.

Under Latif, the experiment seemed to work at first. The city was peaceful. Civilians no longer were dying, and the destruction of homes and shops had stopped. Not a shot was fired at the Marines there, and most of the province was quiet as well.

Under the agreement, the Marines did not venture into Fallouja without an escort. But they worked relatively freely in surrounding villages and towns and were able to pay salaries, give compensation to those who had lost children or other civilian relatives in the fighting, and rebuild mosques and hand out bags of seed to farmers.

Coleman considered Latif a military professional and credited him with much of what was going right.

"You can look the man in the eye and you feel a power and presence there that, at least in our profession, you associate with a natural leader," he said.

On May 10, the Marines made their first and only patrol in the city center with the brigade. When it was over, Iraqi national guard and Fallouja Brigade members waved their guns in the air chanting, "From Fallouja to Kufa," a suggestion that the Iraqis should free their cities from American domination from central to southern Iraq.

From that point on, the brigade wanted the Marines to stay out of Fallouja, period. An Iraqi police captain said as much to Mattis.

In Washington, Bush and his aides insisted that progress was being made. "In and around Fallouja, U.S. Marines are maintaining pressure on Saddam loyalists and foreign fighters and other militants," the president said at a Pentagon ceremony May 10. "We're keeping that pressure on to ensure that Fallouja ceases to be an enemy sanctuary."

But as the month wore on, U.S. forces were no closer to vanquishing the insurgency or ridding the area of foreign fighters, and no closer to finding the killers of the contractors. Fallouja had become a no-go zone for the Marines.

*

Part IV

MORE ATTACKS

In June, insurgents began to push outside the city limits. They staked out the nearby Marine bases and targeted people entering and leaving.

On June 5, six Shiite truck drivers, outsiders in Sunni-dominated Fallouja, became frightened at an insurgent checkpoint and rushed to the police station for help. The police took them to a mosque, where they were handed over to insurgents. They were executed and their bodies mutilated, according to Shiite tribal sheiks and news reports.

Most Westerners steered clear of the highway near Fallouja. If they had to travel to western Iraq, they waited for a military flight.

By mid-June, the U.S. military believed that many of the bombings of civilian targets and other terrorist acts throughout Iraq were being directed by Zarqawi from Fallouja.

On June 19, the U.S. launched airstrikes there on what were believed to be safe houses used by Zarqawi. At least two homes were destroyed and 18 to 24 people killed. It was the beginning of an effort to use precision bombing to go after Zarqawi's network and other insurgents.

But the scenes Iraqis saw on Arab television told a different story. Emergency room doctors again said that many of the dead were women and children. Mothers cried over their lost sons — it was impossible to tell whether they were insurgents or civilians. People picked their way through ruined homes, looking in disbelief at the wreckage. Fallouja was off-limits to Western reporters.

The call to jihad found an audience in Fallouja, where an increasingly militant climate pervaded the city.

Young Iraqi men gathered at outdoor stands where hawkers sold videos shot by insurgents that showed suicide bombings in Iraq. The tapes featured testimonials from bombers before their deaths and then the explosive completion of their missions. Beheading tapes were also for sale.

Dulaimi, the Fallouja woman who had helped the insurgents in April, said that "most of the mujahedin are very brave people, and as long as they are doing something right, God will bring victory."

VIPERS' NEST

On June 28, Bremer transferred sovereignty to the new interim Iraqi government and then flew home. Fallouja was completely in the grip of insurgent forces, and the insurgency was spreading.

"It is a nest of vipers, and the vipers leave Fallouja to go to Baghdad," one U.S. officer said. He called the city and its untamed surroundings "the Cambodia of this war."

Rubaie, the national security advisor, estimated that about 350 foreign fighters had gone north to the city of Samarra from Fallouja and that about 150 had gone west to Ramadi.

Leaders of the Fallouja Brigade cheerfully confirmed much of the account. "Now there is [Islamic] law in Fallouja," said Mohammed Abid Makhlaf, a former brigadier in Hussein's army who had become a leader of the Fallouja Brigade.

"There is a kind of social collaboration between the Iraqi police, the Iraqi national guard, the mujahedin and the Fallouja Brigade," he said. "If there are robbers, the police and the mujahedin, with the imams of a mosque, will determine the punishment from a religious standpoint. For instance, if he is a robber, they will cut off his hand."

He said the view of most Falloujans was: "The U.S. is our first enemy. All the people in Fallouja hate Americans because they hit them, they killed them, they destroyed the whole city. Now the situation is better because there are no Americans. Their touch is not there."


continued....

[thedrifter]

*

NAJAF UNREST

In August, signs emerged that insurgents from Fallouja were aiding the Shiite insurgency 100 miles away in Najaf, where rebel cleric Sadr and his Al Mahdi militia had occupied the revered Imam Ali Mosque.

Col. Durrant, who runs the 1st Marine Expeditionary Force's coordination with the Iraqi security forces, recalled watching a television clip in which Falloujans were headed to Najaf "driving police cars we gave them, filled with arms and ammo we gave them."

At the same time, attacks on foreigners, including beheadings, became almost commonplace. By the end of August, more than 100 people had been kidnapped — most of them by groups thought to be based in the Fallouja area, intelligence officers said. At least 20 were killed.

The insurgents also were trying to eliminate anyone in Fallouja or Ramadi — the two cities account for 70% of Al Anbar province's population — who represented the interim government. The targets included members of the police, the national guard, ministerial appointees in the provincial offices, governors and their deputies.

One such target was Col. Suleiman Marawi, the head of one of two Iraqi national guard battalions based in Fallouja and a key ally of the Americans.

Marawi was attacked as he returned to the guardsmen's base outside the city. He managed to get into the base, but when a local imam offered to accompany him back into the city and mediate between him and his mujahedin attackers, Marawi agreed. He was soon turned over to the rebels, tortured and killed, Durrant said.

"They dumped his body by the side of the road," Durrant said, adding that it "had marks from boiling water. It was not a fast death."

Without Marawi, the national guard troops deserted. "The insurgents came in and took everything — beds, AK-47s, thousands of rounds of ammunition, machine guns, RPGs," Durrant said.

In the last days of August, the U.S. stepped up its precision bombing in neighborhoods known to have been taken over by insurgents.

"There are no families there now. Around evening we hear bombing and we see smoke and fire. To stay there is to risk your life," one woman said.

The Marines informed the Iraqi Defense Ministry that it would no longer pay the Fallouja Brigade's salary. The ministry and the Marines dissolved the force.

In Washington, Rumsfeld told reporters, "The Fallouja Brigade didn't work."

On Sept. 9, Gen. Abdullah Hamid Wael, the brigade's operational leader, announced the decision to the 2,000 members.

Supplied with U.S. weapons, ammunition, radios and vehicles, they turned their energies wholeheartedly to the insurgency.

Zarqawi and the killers of the American contractors, if they were in Fallouja, remained beyond U.S. reach.

Afterword

All through September and October, American warplanes bombed Fallouja in hope of killing Zarqawi and his followers, and in hope of forcing Fallouja's remaining residents to plead for peace.

It didn't work. Zarqawi remained at large, and the terrorist operations attributed to him continued. Fallouja's ruling council negotiated with the Baghdad government, agreeing to expel foreign fighters and welcome the Iraqi national guard, but the deal fell through.

Nearly two weeks ago, interim Prime Minister Iyad Allawi ordered Falloujans to hand over Zarqawi or face a new assault. The leader of Iraq's hard-line Sunni clergy, Sheik Harith Dhari, retorted that an attack would prompt a Sunni boycott of elections scheduled for January — a virtual death blow to the U.S.-authored timetable for Iraq's political progress.

"The Iraqi people view Fallouja as the symbol of their steadfastness, resistance and pride," Dhari said.

So the prime minister now faces the same dilemma Bush and Bremer faced in April: He can attempt to solve the problem of Fallouja with military force, but only at the risk of alienating Sunnis whose support the new government needs. If he leaves the insurgent stronghold to fester, the guerrillas will continue to gather strength.

Just as before, there is no easy choice, no clear course that will guarantee success. In April, the Americans found their options limited by earlier missteps: the decision to disband Iraq's armed forces, the failure to reach out to Sunnis, the lack of political and diplomatic groundwork for military actions. The question is whether those factors will again stand in the way of success, or whether Iraq has changed enough that the new interim government can root out the insurgents.

This time, an Iraqi, not an American, would be at least nominally in charge of an attack. The troops who would storm the city would include Iraqis with more training and experience than in April. The people of Fallouja appear divided over whether to fight to the death or cut a deal.

But the ranks of hardened insurgents and foreign fighters in Fallouja have increased. The decisions the United States made in the spring — in particular, the creation of the Fallouja Brigade and the Marines' promise to stay outside the city — gave the insurgents almost six months to dig in. That means Prime Minister Allawi has an even tougher battle ahead.

The Sunni insurgency whose seedbed was Fallouja has now spread far beyond the city's borders. An Iraq with its Sunnis in perpetual rebellion will not be stable. Allawi and his American supporters face the difficult task of winning back not only Fallouja, but also the rest of Iraq's Sunni belt — not only the control of its cities, but its hearts and minds as well.

*

(BEGIN TEXT OF INFOBOX)

Key Iraqi players

Several Iraqis had influential roles during the Fallouja conflict, especially Sunni Muslim leaders who threatened to quit the Iraqi Governing Council if the U.S. didn't end its assault on the city.

HACHIM HASSANI

April 2004: No. 2 in Iraq's leading Sunni Muslim party; Iraqi Governing Council member. Threatened to resign from council unless assault was halted.

Now: Interim minister of industry and minerals.

--

GHAZI AJIL YAWER

April 2004: Sunni member of Iraqi Governing Council. Threatened to resign unless assault was halted.

Now: Interim president.

--

ADNAN PACHACHI

April 2004: Sunni member of Iraqi Governing Council. Threatened to resign unless assault was halted.

Now: Head of Iraqi Independent Democrats.

--

GEN. MOHAMMED SHAHWANI

April 2004: Interim director of Iraqi intelligence. Put Marines in contact with Iraqi ex-generals after Fallouja cease-fire was declared.

Now: Interim director of Iraqi intelligence.

--

GEN. MOHAMMED LATIF

May 2004: Commander of Fallouja Brigade (replaced Jassim Saleh).

Now: Unknown.

--

ALI ALLAWI

April 2004: Interim defense minister. Objected to creation of Fallouja Brigade, saying it would not end insurgency.

Now: Living in London.

*

(BEGIN TEXT OF INFOBOX)

Events in Fallouja

Last spring, the killing of four U.S. civilians in Fallouja provoked a U.S. military response. After Iraqis and others protested, Marines were abruptly ordered to halt the attack.

March 31

Contractors slain

Mob attacks four U.S. contractors from a North Carolina-based security firm. Their bodies are burned, and two are hung from a bridge.

April 1

Bush OKs attack

The U.S. promises a tough response. President Bush meets with Secretary of Defense Donald H. Rumsfeld and Gen. John P. Abizaid. Bush approves an attack.

April 5

Marines act

Two battalions of Marines seal off the city and roll in at

1 a.m. They establish a 7-p.m.-to-7- a.m. curfew.

April 6

Urban combat

Two Marine companies (about 300 men) begin house-to-house fighting in the Jolan neighborhood.

April 7

Mosque attack

U.S. forces bomb a mosque complex in the city that reportedly had been used as a launching point for attacks on Americans.

April 8

Battle update

The commander of U.S. forces in Iraq vows to control insurgents in Fallouja. Three Sunni Muslims on the Iraqi Governing Council say they will resign if the offensive continues.

April 9

Offensive halted

Cease-fire is declared, with the proviso that Marines may shoot back if fired upon.

April 14

Perimeter control

Marines begin constructing an earthen berm to help control the flow of people and vehicles in and out of the city.

April 22

Peace talks

Marines and Iraqis Mohammed Latif and Jassim Saleh begin talks on forming a local peace force, the Fallouja Brigade. Saleh will head it for a few days, Latif for a couple of months.

April 30

Brigade in charge

Marines begin to withdraw from the city, turning over checkpoints to Fallouja Brigade members.

May 10

Joint patrols

Marines perform their first patrol with brigade members.

Early June

New fighting

Insurgents begin attacks outside the city limits.

June 28

U.S. hand-over

L. Paul Bremer III,

the U.S. civilian administrator, returns sovereignty to Iraqis and leaves the country.

August

Collaboration

Connections between Sunni insurgents in Fallouja and Shiite Muslims in Najaf become apparent.

Sept. 9

Brigade disbanded

Iraqi defense officials announce the Fallouja Brigade has been disbanded.

*

(BEGIN TEXT OF INFOBOX)

Chain of events

A Marine recommendation for targeted action after the slaying and mutilation of four American contractors in Fallouja in March was never brought to President Bush's attention.

Field recommendation

Lt. Gen. James T. Conway, the Marine field leader in Fallouja, wanted to use economic aid to win townspeople's support. He favored surgical strikes to confront insurgents.

Conway's proposal went to Lt. Gen. Ricardo S. Sanchez, commander of U.S. and allied forces in Iraq. Sanchez favored an assault instead.

The Cabinet

Both options were passed along to Defense Secretary Donald H. Rumsfeld, who recommended the assault and did not mention the Marines' preference.

Commander in chief

President Bush ordered a full assault on the city.

The assault

The military action was carried out by Marines under the direction of Maj. Gen. James N. Mattis. It was halted after four days under political pressure from Iraqi allies and others.

Chain of command

Bush

Defense Secretary Donald H. Rumsfeld

Gen. John P. Abizaid

Lt. Gen. Ricardo S. Sanchez

Lt. Gen. James T. Conway

*


--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Rubin reported from Fallouja and Baghdad and McManus from Washington. Times staff writers Mark Mazzetti in Washington, Patrick J. McDonnell in Fallouja and Baghdad, and Tony Perry in Fallouja and San Diego contributed to this report.


http://www.latimes.com/news/printedi...,3377151.story


Ellie

[thedrifter]

16 Killed in Bombing at Police Checkpoint
Forty people are hurt in the suicide attack. Four Iraqi guardsmen die in a separate explosion and gunmen kill two drivers in a supply convoy.

By Monte Morin, Times Staff Writer


BAGHDAD — A suicide car bomb detonated Saturday outside the gates of a Marine base in western Iraq, killing at least 16 Iraqi police officers and wounding 40 people at a police checkpoint.

In northern Iraq, there were several bloody attacks, including one in Mosul that killed two truck drivers.

Meanwhile, U.S. Marines said they had captured a top lieutenant of Jordanian militant Abu Musab Zarqawi in an early morning raid in Fallouja, and authorities reported successes in a weapons buyback program in a volatile Baghdad neighborhood.

The deadly car bomb near Baghdadi, about 140 miles west of Baghdad, the capital, exploded about 7 a.m. outside the Al Asad air base, U.S. and Iraqi officials said. No Marines were injured in the blast, officials said.

In Mosul, two truck drivers — at least one of whom was Turkish — were killed and two others were wounded in the attack on a convoy. A survivor said the convoy had just delivered a shipment of biscuits to a U.S. military base and was heading back to Baghdad about noon when gunmen in a speeding BMW opened fire.

In a second suicide car bombing, four Iraqi national guardsmen were killed and six others injured near a checkpoint south of Samarra, Associated Press reported.

The flurry of attacks against Iraqi and U.S. military targets came as U.S. Marines continued a months-long series of strikes against suspected militant hide-outs, meeting places and weapons storage sites in the rebel stronghold of Fallouja.

In a raid about 1:30 a.m. Saturday, Marines reported capturing a member of Zarqawi's "inner circle." Until recently, the individual was considered to be a minor player in the insurgent network but rose to a senior position with the death or capture of a number of suspects in U.S. attacks, a military statement said.

Fallouja residents said Marines raided the home of Abdel-Hamid Fiyadh, 50, who was arrested with his two sons, Walid, 18, and Majid, 25, and three other relatives, Associated Press reported. Relatives denied that the men had anything to do with Zarqawi. A U.S. military statement Saturday said Zarqawi was responsible for the "most heinous suicide bombings, mortar attacks, kidnappings and shootings that have claimed hundreds of Iraqi lives.

"This past week, a group led by Zarqawi pledged allegiance to Osama bin Laden and said it was in contact with Al Qaeda over operations in Iraq," the statement said.

The U.S. has offered a $25-million reward for Zarqawi's killing or capture and has stepped up efforts to destroy his network and wrest control of Fallouja before national elections, planned for January. Britain has approved a U.S. request to move 850 troops from Iraq's south to an area near Baghdad, which will free American forces for a planned offensive in Fallouja.

In Baghdad, several explosions were heard Saturday, including one from a rocket that hit the offices of the Iraqi Bar Assn., blowing a hole in the ceiling and spreading glass and rubble in all directions. The strike occurred at 10:30 a.m. in the upscale Mansour district, an Iraqi national guard officer said. Officials suspected the missile was intended for a nearby national guard headquarters.

Also Saturday, officials announced that more than 9,000 weapons had been gathered in a nearly two-week buyback program in Baghdad's Sadr City neighborhood, a hub of anti-U.S. violence since the invasion of Iraq last year. Deputy Prime Minister Barham Salih said that $5 million had been spent on the buyback program. The haul included 2,000 AK-47 rifles, 2,000 rocket-propelled grenades and 1,000 grenade launchers. A U.S.-sponsored weapons buyback in May led to a payout of $1.35 million.

Both U.S. and Iraqi officials said they were cautiously optimistic about the success of the arms buyback, which is part of a plan to restore peace and order to the volatile Shiite Muslim neighborhood, a stronghold of cleric Muqtada Sadr.

"We are hoping to expand this successful initiative to other cities around Iraq," Salih said. "This gives a chance to all Iraqis who have unlicensed arms to trade them off for money."

Authorities said it was impossible to determine whether the bulk of the weapons came from Sadr City or were turned in by weapons dealers and others from elsewhere in the capital and throughout Iraq.

U.S. commanders cautioned that the next step — a planned search of houses in Sadr City for weapons — would be a better gauge of whether large caches of arms and weapons remained. Officials are also anxious to see the removal of about 1,000 roadside bombs believed to have been placed in the streets of Sadr City to thwart U.S. patrols.

Once the threat is reduced, U.S. officials plan to move ahead with multimillion-dollar water, sewer and other projects in Sadr City — all held up by the violence.

*


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Times staff writer Patrick J. McDonnell and special correspondent Roaa Ahmed contributed to this report; Associated Press was used in compiling it.

http://www.latimes.com/news/nationwo...,3520869.story


Ellie

[thedrifter]

Marine Cpl. William I. Salazar, 26, Canoga Park; Killed in Bomb Blast

By Gregory W. Griggs, Times Staff Writer


William Isac Salazar rarely remembered birthdays, but this year he got it right.

The Marine corporal sent his father an e-mail from Iraq Oct. 14 to wish him well on his 56th, which was the next day. "I always forget your birthday so if I'm late or early, at least I tried to remember," he wrote. "So Happy Birthday, Dad. Send pictures of family and friends when you can."

Gus Salazar, who often checked the computer at his Canoga Park home for a message from his youngest son, promptly sent a reply that was never answered.

As Salazar, 26, was traveling Oct. 15 in a convoy in Karabilah in Al Anbar province near the Syrian border, a suicide car bomber drove into the formation of Humvees and trucks, killing him, two U.S. soldiers and a civilian Iraqi interpreter.

The Department of Defense identified the other American casualties as Army Sgt. Michael Glenn Owen, 31, of Phoenix, and Spc. Jonathan Jose Santos, 22, of Whatcom County, Wash.

When two Marines and a Navy chaplain showed up at the Salazar home that Saturday morning during breakfast, Gus Salazar thought they were collecting for charity.

His wife, Jennifer Nejman-Salazar, knew better.

"I've seen enough movies to know that scene. When I saw them, my heart just sunk, because I knew William had died. I screamed, 'Oh, my God. No!'

"I see other casualties on TV and feel for those families, but you never know what it's like until it happens to you. My life will never be the same again."

Salazar was a video cameraman and photographer who documented daily war activities and created training videos. He is the only cameraman to die during Operation Iraqi Freedom so far, and is believed to be the first military combat photographer to die in action since the Vietnam War.

Carrying rifles along with their digital equipment, combat camera teams work in pairs and accompany at least two patrols a day. Salazar would usually try to go on three patrols, said Lance Cpl. Michael McMaugh, who worked with him for two months this summer before returning to Camp Pendleton in September.

"He always wanted to go out. If something big was happening he wanted to be there to catch the action," McMaugh said. "He was always a hard worker, a take-charge kind of guy."

Staff Sgt. Paul Anstine, who oversaw Salazar's work in Iraq, said "Salazario," as he called him, learned photography so well during four months of special training at Ft. Meade in Maryland that he was given additional instruction in video production.

"I'll always remember he wanted to be better at what he did. He was always asking questions," Anstine said. "He had a true desire for knowledge to be a better combat cameraman and better leader…. That's what will always define him for me."

Salazar grew up in Lynwood and graduated from South Gate High School in 1996. An artistic teenager, he played accordion and trombone, liked to sketch and create CD cover designs, and was a party DJ who favored hip hop and rap, said Nejman-Salazar, his stepmother.

He took computer graphic design classes at Santa Monica College. Salazar also attended East Los Angeles College, where he played trombone in the marching band and for two of the school's jazz bands.

Band director Jesus Martinez said Salazar was serious about rehearsals and won awards for most spirited player and for most-improved Latin jazz musician.

A classmate, who is a professional guitarist, liked Salazar's sound so much he invited him to join his off-campus ensemble.

"He played with heart. It wasn't just about technique," said Scott Rodarte, who played with Salazar for about a year. "That's why instructors and everybody liked him. He really felt the music."

Salazar, who even then wore a crew cut, wanted to join the military but was rejected twice because of his weight, said Nejman-Salazar.

About four years ago, he moved to Las Vegas and briefly lived with his uncle, Lou Salazar, who was a Marine during the Vietnam War.

After Sept. 11, Nejman-Salazar said, William got serious about getting in shape, dropped more than 50 pounds and began his service at Camp Pendleton on Dec. 10, 2001.

His first overseas assignment was to create military training videos in Okinawa, Japan, for a year. He earned the National Defense Service Medal and the Sea Service Deployment Ribbon. Salazar was deployed to Iraq in May.

Salazar was laid to rest Saturday with full military honors at St. Hilary Catholic Church in Pico Rivera. Burial was at Resurrection Cemetery in Montebello.

http://www.latimes.com/news/nationwo...,1950347.story

Ellie

[thedrifter]

Army Denies Most Claims From Iraqis
Associated Press
October 25, 2004

DAYTON, Ohio - The Army has denied most of the thousands of compensation claims Iraqis have made against the U.S. military, determining that combat accounted for most of the deaths, injuries and property damage, a newspaper reported Sunday.

The Dayton Daily News' analysis of 4,611 civil claims in Iraq - hundreds alleging abuse and misconduct by American military personnel - showed just one in four resulted in some type of payment.

The Daily News gained access to the claims in an Army database through a Freedom of Information request.

Because coalition forces are immune from civil lawsuits and criminal charges in Iraq, the only option left to Iraqis is filing for compensation under the Foreign Claims Act.

However, Iraqis' recourse is limited. The military does not pay claims for incidents deemed to be caused by "combat operations," which could include checkpoint shootings and other incidents involving civilians.

In response to a man who claimed that his two brothers were killed and his parents injured on March 29, 2003, when coalition forces bombed his neighborhood, the military concluded: "Coalition forces dropped ordnance during Operation Iraqi Freedom on legitimate targets. Your family was in an area that was being legitimately targeted and therefore regrettably harmed."

Another case involved a man driving to get his infant daughter who became ill while staying with his wife's parents. The man was killed when soldiers opened fire on his car at a checkpoint. His family's claim for compensation was denied.

"Our point of view toward the Americans has changed. You can feel the fury inside you," said Amir Shleman, whose brother was killed by American soldiers. "If they treated people like human beings, no one would take up weapons against them."

The day after his brother was killed, soldiers left $2,000 near the pillow of his widow, money the family was told was for funeral expenses.

When the family filed a claim for compensation for the man's two children, they encountered months of delays before finally receiving a letter denying the claim, the Daily News said.


At least 437 claims seek compensation for Iraqi deaths and 468 for injuries, but those numbers likely are just a portion of the actual totals, the newspaper said.

More than 1,000 claims involved vehicle accidents, by far the largest category in the database. More than 400 claims involved destruction of crops, trees, livestock or water sources.

According to the newspaper's analysis, the average payment for a death in Iraq was $3,421. In addition to the formal claims system, Iraqis were sometimes given up to $2,500 in sympathy payments without any paperwork, said attorney Jack Bournazian, who held seminars to show Iraqi attorneys how to file the claims.

About 78 percent of the claims were for incidents that occurred after President Bush declared major combat operations over on May 2, 2003.

Lt. Col. Charlotte Herring, the chief of the U.S. Army's Foreign Torts Branch, said the Army database inspected by the newspaper is incomplete. In fiscal year 2004, the Army paid 11,000 claims and denied 3,000, she said. Prior to this past June, however, the Army did not track how many claims were denied.

Herring said the Army, which handles civil claims for all three service branches in Iraq, has given out $8.2 million since June 2003 and budgeted $10 million in fiscal year 2005 to help Iraqis deal with losses suffered because of war.

The claims process is made difficult, officials said, because of the time it takes to sort through invalid claims.

"There were blatantly fraudulent claims," said Marine Reserve Capt. Sean Dunn, who worked as a platoon commander and supervised claims payments in Iraq. "As soon as they realized there was money being paid, they were beating down the door wanting money for all kinds of crazy things with no evidence whatsoever."

Ellie

[thedrifter]

2nd Brigade Combat Team soldiers round up suspected insurgents in Iraq


By Joseph Giordono, Stars and Stripes
Pacific edition, Sunday, October 24, 2004



YONGSAN GARRISON, South Korea — Soldiers from the 2nd Brigade Combat Team have rounded up more than 300 suspected enemy fighters during raids in and around Ramadi, Iraq, over the past two weeks, officials said Friday.

According to a release issued by the brigade in Iraq, soldiers also seized dozens of rocket propelled grenades, mortar systems, rockets, anti-tank mines and several tons of rockets and small arms ammunition.

“We are relentless in our pursuit of terrorists,” Col. Gary S. Patton, 2nd BCT commander, was quoted as saying in the release. “We will take this battle to them at every opportunity, with overwhelming combat power, and without warning.”

The raids have come during brigade- and battalion-level operations, designed to cut off insurgents’ organizational and supply routes, officials said. The brigade is operating in Al Anbar province, which contains the insurgent-controlled cities of Ramadi and Fallujah.

The successes claimed by the brigade have not come without cost. Since arriving in Iraq at the end of August, the brigade has suffered at least 14 deaths, 12 of those listed by the Pentagon as combat casualties.

Seven of the deaths have come since Oct. 6, according to the Department of Defense.

“Units have also battled insurgents in fierce urban fighting,” 2nd BCT leaders acknowledged. In recent weeks, the brigade has been among several U.S. units tightening their hold around Ramadi and Fallujah; military officials have said they want to stop the flow of insurgents between the two cities, which have become planning centers for the attacks carried out against Iraqi citizens and U.S. soldiers.

“We have sustained some losses in close combat, but our fighting spirit remains very high,” Patton said, according to the release. “Our soldiers and Marines recognize they are making the area safer and more secure for the Iraqi people.”

According to brigade officials, the 2nd BCT is augmented with a Marine infantry battalion in addition to its own six Army battalions. The 2nd BCT was part of the 2nd Infantry Division until August, when it deployed from South Korea. The brigade will move on to Fort Carson, Colo., once its yearlong deployment is up, the Army has said.

In addition to offensive operations, the units are conducting missions to rebuild infrastructure and provide humanitarian aid in the local area, officials said. Second Brigade units have established relationships with a local university and several local schools, providing both security and supplies for the students.

“Members of the brigade also recently conducted a census of a refugee camp near Habbiniyah in preparation for much-needed humanitarian assistance. The unit is scheduled to deliver medical supplies to the camp this week,” the release read.

http://www.estripes.com/article.asp?...&article=25089


Ellie

[thedrifter]

1/23 snipers reclaim city from insurgents
Submitted by: 1st Marine Division
Story Identification #: 2004102463516
Story by Cpl. Randy Bernard



HIT, Iraq (Oct.10, 2004) -- Marines from Scout Sniper Platoon, Headquarters and Support Company, 1st Battalion, 23rd Marine Regiment, Regimental Combat Team 7, won a decisive battle against a heavy insurgent threat recently.

The snipers were called to action after they received reports that hundreds of heavily armed insurgents, dressed in black garb, were occupying the city.

"We are the eyes, ears and trigger finger for the battalion commander," said Sgt. Herbert B. Hancock, the chief scout sniper for the platoon. "Anything that he sees as a threat, we are sent out to check up on."

The snipers were the first Marines to enter the city and observe the threat. Once the snipers had located the insurgents and established positions to assess the situation, the snipers realized just how right the reports had been.

"They were all out in the open doing whatever they wanted to," said Hancock, 35, a native of Bryan, Texas. "They were in control of that side of the city, rerouting traffic, threatening to kill people and terrorizing people.

"Any convoy that looked like it had anything to do with the coalition was attacked and hit by (improvised explosive devices). There were civilians and civilian cars in the area, but they didn't care. They were being blatant about the fact that they were in control."

After witnessing the insurgents pull people from their cars, shoot at civilians and detonate IEDs in the traffic circle, the snipers began to fire at them.

Sergeant Milo S. Afong, a sniper with the platoon, took the first shot.

"I had a perfect silhouette of his body and his weapon," said Afong, 23, a native of Vista, Calif. "It had been the first time I saw people out here with weapons."

After the first shots were fired and a few insurgents were hit, the masked men in the traffic circle realized they were under attack.

"Even more of them showed up carrying (rocket propelled grenades) and AK-47s," said Cpl. Stephen R. Johnson, an assistant team leader with the platoon. "That is when they started shooting back. At first they were fighting us out in the open and behind cars. That wasn't working for them so they got up in the buildings and tried to set up concealed positions and shoot at us."

According to Gunnery Sgt. Timothy J. Dowd, the platoon commander, this battle marks the first time in history that snipers from 1/23 engaged enemy troops and was also one of the largest scale sniper missions in Operation Iraqi Freedom.

That was the heaviest firefight in the city, according to Johnson. That particular firefight lasted approximately 45 minutes. However, the sniper battle against the insurgents in the area lasted several more days, until their extract.

"The whole time it was like we were in a shooting gallery with people shooting at us," said Afong.

The Marines proved themselves as valuable assets to the battalion.

"We showed how (a handful of) guys basically eliminated a whole platoon," said Johnson, 24, a native of Woodlands, Texas. "We have proven that snipers are cost effective with lives and rounds. There are no substitutes for snipers on the battlefield."

The snipers made it out of the fighting with only minor injuries.



Sgt. Joseph D. LaBorde, a scout sniper with the Scout Sniper Platoon, Headquarters and Support Company, 1st Battalion, 23rd Marine Regiment sights in with an M82A3 Special Applications Scope Rifle. The .50 caliber rifle has stopping power capable of disabling a vehicle by taking out its engine block from great distances. Photo by: Cpl. Randy Bernard

http://www.usmc.mil/marinelink/mcn20...5?opendocument

Ellie

[thedrifter]

Insurgents in Latifiyah eager to battle British



THE WASHINGTON TIMES
LATIFIYAH, Iraq — Anti-government forces in this city just south of Baghdad say they are preparing a grim welcome for Britain's Black Watch regiment when it moves north from Basra as early as this week.
"It'll be easy to beat the British because the British are weaker than the Americans," boasted Abdullah Al-Ashiq, the reputed head of resistance fighters in this city, the U.S. Marine defenders of which are being shifted for an anticipated offensive in Fallujah, an insurgent stronghold.







The British "are used to fighting against pathetic forces like the Mahdi's Army of Muqtada al-Sadr," he scoffed. "That means they haven't got good experience in real fighting. Just wait. The British will discover the difference between us and them — the hard way."
Preparations to fight the British are at fever pitch, with the positioning of booby traps, roadside bombs and mortars.
Some of the British forces are expected to hunker down in the city's main police station, which is fortified with huge concrete slabs. But the extremists said they have infiltrated the Iraqi national guard, and that their spies within the police will provide them with precise information about British troop movements.
Mines also are hidden in tunnels and underpasses, while the area's orange groves and palm trees provide ideal cover for guerrilla fighting. The insurgents repeatedly have blown up the rail line that brings supplies from Baghdad. No trains are running now.
Any substantial casualties among the 850 Black Watch soldiers would bring more political trouble for British Prime Minister Tony Blair, whose Cabinet approved the deployment last week despite harsh criticism at home.
Four senior members of previous Conservative Party governments renewed the attacks yesterday, with former Defense Secretary Michael Heseltine saying the transfer of the Black Watch was far too big to be a purely operational matter.
The move was "militarily extraordinarily ill-judged" and appeared linked to the Nov. 2 U.S. presidential election, Mr. Heseltine said.
In Latifiyah, thought to be the place where terrorists held and decapitated Briton Kenneth Bigley and two Americans, some residents said the British troops might be given a short period to "prove themselves."
"I think the situation will be sorted out peacefully, because the British have a good policy to negotiate," said Abu Rashid, a 55-year-old farmer. "The Americans don't."
The extremists' main bases are an oil storage and processing depot on the outskirts of Latifiyah, and a mosque called Al-Masraa.
A reporter who entered the mosque found many fighters who spoke in a Syrian or Jordanian dialect. Some of them were reading from the Koran, while others intoned the afternoon prayer. The foreigners refused to be interviewed.
There are 22 mosques in the city, all dominated by Sunni hard-liners who follow the same Salafist philosophy as terror mastermind Osama bin Laden and Iraq's most feared terror leader, Abu Musab Zarqawi.
Zarqawi and his followers, who claimed responsibility for the Bigley slaying, have been able to operate with impunity in the city, but there is widespread public resentment against them.
Once a mainly Shi'ite farming area, much of the land and its homes were given to Sunnis by dictator Saddam Hussein in the 1980s, and Shi'ites now represent about 20 percent of the population.
Recently, hard-line Sunnis have used Latifiyah to shoot and rob Shi'ite pilgrims who trek southward to the holy cities of Najaf and Karbala — on the same road that the British soldiers must use now.
The hard-liners have ruined many Shi'ite-owned shops and, just south of the city, destroyed the Sa'eed Faraj, a shrine revered by the sect. The contractor who started to rebuild it has been killed.
"These people are not normal Sunnis who we can get along OK with," said a former Shi'ite shop owner. "They're from the Salafist sect, and they hate us."
Some Shi'ites are so angry that they were happy to provide information that could help expose the terrorists.
"The Tawhid and Jihad group [led by Zarqawi] is hidden in Al-Ba'ath district in northern Latifiyah, and they generally begin their shooting sprees around 11 in the evening," said Hassen Jassem, a 26-year-old farmer.
"Day by day, they harm us more and more. They stop us praying the Friday prayer in our traditional way. They demand we pray in the Sunni way. If we refuse, we're kicked out of the mosque."
Residents blame the attacks on their shops and property on a group of armed men known as "the Opel group" — a reference to the cars they use — and say the police are unwilling to leave their heavily defended station to protect the citizenry.
"I was afraid, so I got out," said minibus driver Ramadan al-Yassini, 47, who made his decision when a Shi'ite school principal was killed.
Iraqi police and national guard units backed by U.S. troops raided the town Sept. 4 and said they had arrested nearly 500 people and seized large caches of weapons.
But 12 police officers were killed in the raid, and an insurgent calling himself Abu Tahrir said later that his men had targeted the government forces with a suicide car bomb before attacking with mortars and rocket-propelled grenades.
"The mujahideen holy warriors only lost eight martyrs," he said. "They arrested just 80 men, and most of them were just civilians."
•Distributed by World News and Features. Paul Martin in London contributed to this report.

http://www.washtimes.com/world/20041...1436-5153r.htm


Ellie