Politics May Derail Redeployment Plan
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    Cool Politics May Derail Redeployment Plan

    08-26-2004

    Politics May Derail Redeployment Plan



    By William F. Sauerwein



    Last week President George W. Bush announced plans for the most massive troop redeployment since the end of the Cold War. This has been in the works for some time, and is intended for “transforming” our military for meeting new threats.



    Unfortunately, in our hot political climate the debate over the pros and cons has degenerated into partisan bickering. Hopefully cooler heads will prevail, and our military leaders will develop an effective policy.



    Following World War II, the United States faced a major “transformation” in military policy because of its superpower status. The challenges of the Cold War forced us, for the first time in our history, to permanently maintain forward-deployed forces. During this time of threat a favorite phrase was, “Politics stops at the water’s edge.”



    That changed during the latter stage of the Vietnam War, waged as part of the greater Cold War strategy. Americans divided along lines of “left” and “right,” each with its own facts, and charges against the other. Following Vietnam, the left disdained American military power, while the right believed in its necessity.



    A very confused policy resulted, perceived as weakness by our enemies and allies alike. The Soviets became emboldened, sponsoring operations in Africa, Latin America and overtly invading Afghanistan. Some of our allies, Germany in particular, doubted our resolve, and sought separate accommodations with the Soviets.



    Initially during the early years of the Reagan Administration the old “water’s edge” philosophy seemed reborn. Within a few years “politics as usual” reemerged with the left opposing the rebuilding of our military power and prestige. Its adherents stated that Europe depended too much on us and must pull its weight regarding their defenses. Furthermore, they believed that American troops in Korea only prevented the South Koreans from invading the North (and not the other way around).



    When the Soviet Union collapsed in 1991, the left demanded that we massively reduce our troop strength and military spending. However, with the election of then-President Bill Clinton they developed a new attitude regarding military power. They particularly supported “humanitarian” missions and “peacekeeping” missions for supporting failing European commitments in the Balkans.



    However, the right disapproved of these missions because they used dwindling military funds for non-military missions. Their complaints contained some truth as military funding steadily declined while the missions increased. Military readiness became such a low priority that it was virtually ignored, even when new threats emerged. Our strategy throughout the 1990s remained reactive instead of proactive, and no major changes occurred.



    Since the threat shifted from Central Europe it seems logical that forces shift to meet the new realities. When the American frontier moved across the Great Plains the Army reduced its installations in the Old Northwest. Today, Bulgaria and Romania seem preferable locations for bases over Germany, given their closer proximity to the Middle East.



    Central Asian republics such as Uzbekistan also receive mention because they are in “Indian country.” Unfortunately, this close proximity entails the same security concerns as our outposts on the frontier and firebases in Vietnam. If an enemy guerrilla force sabotages an airfield or port facility, it just reduced our mobility.



    Closing the old installations and building new ones is a time-consuming, and costly, process. Since our military is strapped for cash, any unnecessary expenses must be avoided. It seems more cost-effective if we increased our air- and sealift capabilities. That includes building more air transports and roll-on/roll-off (RO/RO) ships, and improved embarkation and debarkation facilities.



    Another concern is reducing the number of family members and civilian employees living overseas. This makes sense because it would reduce the money spent on transporting household goods, automobiles, etc. overseas. It reduces the amount of money needed for quality-of life-programs, such as family housing and schools.



    However, these savings could cause adverse effects such as lowered morale among our mostly married personnel. Our reduced personnel strength means troops moving overseas more frequently, which worsens during wartime or other emergencies. During the 1990s the increased operations tempo (optempo) caused many to leave the service, including National Guard and Reserve personnel.



    Austere conditions, and family separation, should make all overseas duty a hardship tour, meaning one year under peacetime conditions. My tours of duty in Korea were very “austere,” similar to the frontier outposts. Whereas my three-year tour of duty in Germany closely resembled stateside conditions, including the presence of my family.



    Moving troops every year between duty stations entails an increase in transportation costs, which uses air travel. That could be offset since every three years the soldier, the spouse, children, pets, furniture, automobile, etc. all move.



    One underlying idea appears to be stationing troops and their families in CONUS, and deploying the units overseas for training. Overseas facilities would seemingly resemble the National Training Center (NTC) at Fort Irwin, Cal., our two training bases in Germany (Grafenwoehr and Hohenfels) and Camp Doha in Kuwait. The length of troop rotations seems unclear, but speculation fluctuates between three and six months. From my experience spending one month under these conditions seems long enough, and sufficiently “austere.”



    This “transformation” emphasizes its economical advantage; however that depends on the frequency of deployments. Overseas military operations are expensive and entail much more than a maneuver force engaged in either training or combat. Transportation costs begin with moving the unit from its home station to its debarkation point. Troops normally use chartered commercial airliners of the Civil Reserve Air Fleet (CRAF), with civilian flight crews.



    continued..........


  2. #2
    These planes must land for refueling and crew rest, which involves support personnel at these facilities. Troops debark the aircraft for “comfort stops,” food and exercise, requiring facilities and personnel manning them. The amount of security personnel needed at these facilities depends on the threat level, even in peacetime.



    Commercial airliners are not combat aircraft and do not land in close proximity to the battlefront. Debarking troops require facilities, manned by support personnel, for assembling and gathering their personal gear. They now require transportation to their final destination, meeting other support personnel when they arrive.



    Military vehicles are not fuel-efficient, and maintenance of these high-tech platforms is very expensive. Our high-tech ordnance and equipment is also expensive, but necessary for enabling the survival and victory of our troops. That includes the equipment needed for protection against nuclear, biological and chemical (NBC) weapons, and necessary decontamination gear.



    “Experts” often ignore the military’s massive logistical tail, which begins with the maneuver unit and reaches back to the home station. This “tail” moves all manner of supplies needed for sustaining the maneuver unit, and all supporting units along the way. These lines of communication require security provided by air, ground and naval assets, depending on the threat level.



    Another problem concerns rapid deployment versus firepower for our troops arriving in theater. If units deploy with their home station equipment it renders them combat ineffective until that equipment arrives. The length of time depends on the resources available for rail-loading at home station, transferring this equipment from rail to ship and the length of sea travel. Off-loading requires port facilities, and personnel, and moving the equipment from the port.



    During the Cold War we addressed this problem by pre-positioning equipment at POMCUS sites. These sites contained the full complement of combat vehicles enhancing the rapid deployment of CONUS-based units. Other sites contained ammunition, fuel, supplies, etc., for rapidly uploading these units, and moving them into combat.



    The major disadvantage, all these sites required on-site maintenance personnel and guard detachments from forward-deployed units. They were highly visible, and certainly known by the enemy, and therefore subject to attack. During my tour in Germany, I read in the Stars & Stripes about sabotage at a POMCUS site.



    Any break in this chain can cause failure throughout the entire system until we fix the break. When Japan bombed Pearl Harbor, it debunked our whole Pacific strategy, and doomed our troops in the Philippines. Had the Soviets bombed our air bases, or disrupted our sea lanes, it could have debunked our Cold War strategy. With al Qaeda cells in 60 countries, including the United States, we can ill-afford half-hearted security measures.



    These choices are not easy or cheap. However, as the world’s sole superpower we must make them. Our leadership and strength extend no further than we can project and sustain our military power. Events move quickly, requiring timely decisions on troop commitments, and rapidly moving sufficient forces into crisis situations.



    My greatest fear is that our political divisions may prevent any rational debate over implementing any military strategy. Even in the midst of a war, political partisanship dominates the nation, affecting the war effort. If we cannot sustain a coherent military strategy during war, we certainly cannot sustain one during peace.



    Our internal bickering displays a lack of focus, which encourages our enemies and discourages potential allies. The unstable nature of the post-Cold War world requires that the United States demonstrate strong leadership. Only then can we deter our enemies and build alliances for winning today, and meeting future challenges.



    William F. Sauerwein is a Contributing Editor of DefenseWatch. He can be reached at mono@gtec.com. Please send Feedback responses to dwfeedback@yahoo.com.

    http://www.sftt.org/cgi-bin/csNews/c....0214137518195


    Ellie


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