Automatic Rifle Concept: Part II—Reorganizing the Infantry Squad
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    Cool Automatic Rifle Concept: Part II—Reorganizing the Infantry Squad

    Automatic Rifle Concept: Part II—Reorganizing the Infantry Squad

    by CWO3 Jeffrey L. Eby

    This is the second article outlining the automatic rifle
    assessment conducted by 2d Battalion, 7th Marines (2/7).


    The previous article summarized the relationship between weapons lethality and dispersion on the battlefield and the need for a highly mobile automatic rifle (AR)—reliable and capable of semiautomatic fire—at the fire team (FT) level. The first article also indicated that, rather than eliminate the M249 squad automatic weapon (SAW) from the Marine Corps inventory, the weapon should be employed in its designed role as a light machinegun (LMG). The M249 as an LMG, coupled with a true AR at the FT level, would markedly increase the lethality of the infantry squad. It would further the historical paradigm, already outlined in the first article, of increased lethality resulting in the need for increased dispersion.



    Because of the results achieved in Phase I, experimental squad and platoon organizations were constructed in order to examine how the inclusion of a true AR and the consolidation of the SAWs at various levels of command would affect tactics, techniques, and procedures at the platoon, squad, and FT level. This article will summarize the results of the constrained squad reorganization.



    2/7 reorganized its rifle companies in order to better utilize the SAW and to integrate the AR into the squads. The battalion hoped that different configurations in squad and platoon organization might prove better at taking advantage of the mass, flexibility, and command and control available when removing LMGs from the assault role. Each rifle company maintained one platoon, using the current table of organization (T/O) and with current tables of equipment, to act as the evaluation’s control group. The companies then reorganized one of their platoons, integrating the ARs and consolidating the SAWs at different levels of command. The first platoon in each company reorganized a squad by replacing the SAWs in the first and second FTs with one of the AR test variants and consolidating the SAWs in the third FT.

    The battalion reintroduced the billet of grenadier, since most unit leaders felt that the team leader became too preoccupied with controlling his team and paying attention to his surroundings to effectively employ the weapon. Because an AR does not require an assistant, the new organization eliminated the billet of the assistant automatic rifleman (AAR). Whereas Marines quickly fall behind with an M249 in the assault role, they can easily operate any of the AR test variants singlehandedly. The M249 SAW received the new moniker LMG, due to the increased accuracy of the description and to aid Marines in mentally separating the LMGs from ARs during discussion and employment.


    Using a gunner and assistant gunner for each LMG became a variant on the LMG FT. This variant allowed the LMG to be manned and enjoy the same benefits as a medium or heavy machinegun. Rather than merely carry extra ammunition and a spare barrel, the assistant would load, direct impacts, help move the gun, and observe for maneuver encroachment on the gun target line.

    The third platoon in each company consolidated their LMGs at the platoon level; i.e., the platoon organized itself into two rifle squads armed with test variant ARs, and the nine LMGs were placed into an LMG section. This configuration truly tested the principles of mass and the ease of command and control. (See Table 3.) The benefit gained from this configuration was that the squad leader turned section leader could quickly identify targets, talk the LMGs onto them and, therefore, mass overwhelming firepower. By entirely removing the LMGs from the squads and replacing them with ARs, they would not slow the movement of the rifle squads. In addition, as in the use of the LMG FT with assistant gunners, the battalion hoped to use the section leader to relieve the LMG gunner from having to remove his eyes from the sights to search and assess targets.

    Conclusions
    After reorganizing the companies, 2/7 exercised the modified T/Os in several venues and exercises to include battalion-level training and Combined Arms Exercise 6–02 (CAX 6–02) at Twentynine Palms, military operations on urbanized terrain (MOUT) training at Camp Pendleton, and helicopter operations during Weapons and Tactics Instructor Class 10–02 (WTI Class 10–02).


    In October 2001 Company G conducted a 3-week urban warfare training block at the MOUT facility at Camp Pendleton. The company evaluated the separate T/Os in a variety of scenarios and discovered pros and cons for each.


    The platoon with the SAWs organized at the squad level (LMG FT) proved the most effective. The LMG FT within the squad was able to effectively develop and maintain fire superiority—independent of the notional platoon fires (M240G machineguns) to cover the squad’s movement and entry into the objective. The two AR equipped FTs of the squad proved more mobile, versatile, and agile in the assault than conventionally configured squads with the M249s still in the FT. The modified squad’s ARs provided good suppressive fires at the team level while remaining light and wieldy enough to be effective during room clearing. Movement to and into the house proved rapid, decisive, and overwhelming.


    The key difficulty encountered with this organization manifested itself as traditional urban casualty rates occurred. LMG gunners had to transition from security roles inside the building to actual room clearing duties. The LMG’s bulk, weight, and general clumsiness proved deadly to the Marines attempting to employ them in room clearing operations. Marines solved this dilemma by reversing the traditionally accepted maxim of always keeping an automatic weapon in the fight. When tasked with room clearing duties, LMG gunners dropped their LMGs and picked up ARs or M16A2 rifles and ammunition from casualties to accomplish their assigned mission.


    The company’s third platoon used the LMG section (LMS). In order to evaluate squad and squad leader urban training conducted earlier, the LMS fought as an independent element. It did quite well due to a very capable section leader. The firepower generated by the massing of LMGs proved to be overwhelming to the FT-sized element of defenders in the house. They could do nothing to oppose entry into the building. Once inside, while suffering from many of the individual problems involved with the M249 and room clearing, the LMS did utilize the ability to answer the enemy’s individual rifle rounds with the concentrated, if imprecise, bursts of fire from three and four massed LMGs. The ARs within the third platoon’s maneuver squads performed as expected, providing local firepower to the teams but remaining light enough to use effectively in the assault.


    The Camp Pendleton training provided an excellent training and evaluation opportunity. The urban environment favored ARs once inside buildings. They remained lightweight and easy to maneuver with while providing good firepower at short ranges. The LMGs proved most effective when providing longer range suppressive fire to cover movement into buildings, while experiencing expected problems when used in the assault. The combination of ARs and LMGs within the squads provided the best of both worlds—LMGs used to provide overwhelming firepower to cover the squad’s movement and ARs used to provide overwhelming firepower within the building.


    Company F evaluated the new T/O while deployed in support of a number of evolutions: WTI Class 10–01 in Yuma, Exercise STEEL KNIGHT at Twentynine Palms, various squad- to company-level live fire exercises, and CAX 6–02. Company F found that the LMS provided the ability to mass firepower quickly, increased flexibility at the squad and platoon levels, and eased the command and control responsibilities of the FT, squad, and section leaders.


    The company organized into assault, support, and security elements during company live fire attacks. The M240G machinegun section and the 60mm mortar section were placed in general support of the company. Company F routinely tasked the platoon with the LMS configuration as the support element. The ability of this platoon—and the mass of fire its LMS could produce—provided the suppression needed to allow the company’s M240G machinegun and 60mm mortar sections to get into action without risking a survivability fight.


    Company F used the platoon with its LMGs consolidated into LMG FTs as the company’s assault element. As with Company G the LMG FTs proved adept at generating local support by fire positions, allowing the maneuver rifle teams to safely close the critical last 100 yards to the objective. As expected the ARs with the FTs provided them with the versatile automatic weapon needed in the assault role.


    Upon consolidation or withdrawal—in the case of a raid—the support element’s LMS aided the displacement of the company’s general support M240G machinegun and 60mm mortar sections. Especially during raids, the support element’s LMS gave the company a high-volume firepower asset to cover the company’s withdrawal with greater survivability and maneuverability than the company’s medium machineguns.


    The battalion also conducted squad and platoon combined arms live fire exercises. During the squad evaluation the squads conducted day and night security patrols, a live fire night ambush, and a day live fire attack. The squads tasked their LMG FTs as the support element for these tasks. Again, the battalion found that M249 LMGs consolidated into FTs proved more conducive to squad-level tactical operations. In all four graded tasks the LMG FTs provided the squad leader with a manageable element that could rapidly generate a lethal amount of suppression in the small unit fight.


    continued....


  2. #2
    During the platoon evaluation, platoon commanders were augmented with a section of tanks, a squad of assault amphibious vehicles (AAVs), and an 81mm mortar team (two tubes). The platoons conducted defensive operations and attack rehearsals, a day live fire attack (including consolidation, casualty evacuation, reorganization, and resupply), a night live fire ambush (fragged over the radio late in the afternoon following the daylight attack), and a night retrograde in Mission Oriented Protective Posture 4 (MOPP 4) in order to decontaminate and conduct a MOPP gear exchange. The different platoons experimented with both the LMG FT and the LMS. Although both SAW organizations were used successfully, the learning point was that the SAWs were much more effective when they were removed from the FT in the assault. All of the platoons used their 81mm mortars and M240G machineguns to advance toward the enemy during the daylight attack. The more successful platoons utilized their LMG teams and sections to provide suppression over the last 200 meters of advance as battlefield geometry and constricted terrain forced the mortars and the machineguns (both ground mounted and tank/AAV mounted) to cease or shift firing to maintain safety parameters and surface danger zones (SDZs).


    In most cases the speed and rapidity of the mounted attack prevented the platoons from maintaining effective suppression from initial mortar and machinegun positions. The LMG teams and sections provided intermediate bases of fire (300 meters and in) in order to maintain the momentum of the attack. The final piece of the suppression puzzle provided by the SAW LMG squads and sections allowed the assault squads to maneuver freely without being held up due to a lack of effective suppression.


    The final evaluation of the reorganized units came during CAX 6–02. The LMG FTs and the LMS proved very effective throughout CAX, but especially so during block one—the Range 400 complex—and block two—the mobile assault course (MAC) and the helicopter assault course (HAC). A recurring problem during Range 410A and Range 400 is the inability of heavy machineguns and M240G machineguns to provide effective suppression during the entire course of the attack. There are several reasons for this phenomenon, but they are for another article.


    Battlefield geometry, SDZ restrictions, and excessive ammunition usage forced initial support positions to cease or shift fires causing gaps in suppression. The LMGs were able to cover these gaps and provided an indispensable tool for the small unit commander to directly influence his fight. He was able to quickly and easily direct precise, effective suppressive fire onto the objective while husbanding his assault element’s ammunition. The same effects were observed during the MACs and the HAC. The LMGs provided the small unit commander enough firepower and flexibility to directly influence the outcome of his close fight, leading to the success of the company as a whole.


    The Marine Corps should never stop looking at ways to increase the lethality of Marines and their weapons. The increase of night vision capability and squad-level communications assets represents the latest steps in that search. Indeed, the fact that these force multipliers are already in place presents the infantry with even more questions as weapons lethality increases.


    For example, if the historical paradigm of increased lethality resulting in increased dispersion holds true, then current communications and doctrinal capabilities allow the traditional infantry FT to be separated into autonomous two-man buddy teams. Canada, which is equipped with almost the exact same infantry weapons systems as the United States, already utilizes such organizations. Their infantry sections (squads) are broken down into four-man fire groups (FTs) consisting of two-man FTs (buddy teams).


    2/7 believes that the next step in increasing the lethality of the rifle squad does not consist of replacing the M249 SAW. Rather, squad lethality, both quantitatively and qualitatively, can be greatly increased in two very cost-effective ways. First, the M249 SAW should be used in the LMG role for which it was designed, not the ad hoc AR role for which it was purchased. Second, to ensure that each rifle FT possesses the automatic weapon necessary for the close combat fight, a true AR should be acquired.


    As threat forces match the firepower of the current rifle squad, the Marine Corps must maintain the innovative edge for which it is famous. While experimentation is still required, the evaluations undertaken by 2/7 definitively indicate that the Marine Corps should place the M249 into an LMG role and add a true AR to the squad’s inventory.


    >Editor's Note: The author would like to thank LtCol James A. Cameron and Majs Scott Kenner and Thomas Clinton for their assistance and support during the weapons testing and preparation of this article.




    >>CWO3 Eby is the Marine gunner, 7th Marine Regiment.

    [
    http://www.mca-marines.org/Gazette/2004/04eby2.html


    Ellie


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