Issue Date: December 29, 2003

UAVs’ combat role uncertain — for now
Forces compete to use them for intelligence gathering, targeting

By Gail Kaufman
Special to the Times

FALLON NAVAL AIR STATION, Nev. — Unmanned aerial vehicles, which were used as missile-slinging attackers in the Afghanistan campaign, retreated somewhat to their traditional reconnaissance roles during the invasion of Iraq.
Among the reasons: Strike planners were wary of depending on the fragile craft in Iraqi winds and sandstorms, and many of the would-be hunter UAVs were put to work in the search for Iraqi leaders and missile launchers.

“In Afghanistan, we could afford to take risks using them as shooters because the target set was so small,” said Navy Capt. Dave “Roy” Rogers, who oversaw air tasking orders and flight schedules in the Combined Air Operations Center during the Iraq operation. But in Iraq, he said, “Field commanders were screaming for UAVs to be dedicated to [intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance], which is a big reason why, as shooters, UAVs were marginalized.”

In the Afghanistan operation, barely a dozen UAVs launched 115 Hellfire missiles and laser-designated 525 targets for manned aircraft to destroy. But in Iraq, where the United States deployed a whopping 56 larger UAVs and more than 60 portable ones, they launched 62 Hellfires and designated 146 targets.

UAVs could have had more things to shoot at in Iraq, where the 25,000-item list of targets far surpassed the one in Afghanistan. But after the first furious week of airstrikes wiped out most fixed targets, a desperate hunt began for difficult-to-find mobile targets such as tanks and surface-to-air missiles.

“That created a big problem for the intelligence folks,” said Rogers, now director of the Defense Department’s Joint UAV test and evaluation office here. His office is creating a list of UAV tactics, techniques and procedures.

UAV flight hours were snapped up for intelligence missions, despite howls from operations officers in the operations center who begged Rogers’ wartime boss, Air Force Gen. T. Michael “Buzz” Moseley, to provide some for tactical missions.

Other obstacles

There were too few radio frequencies available for ground-to-air links to operate more than one UAV at a time, said Sgt. 1st Class Gregory Galloway, who worked with hunter UAVs in Kuwait during the Iraq operation.

The weather, which featured winds up to 70 knots, did not help. Even slight winds sidelined most UAVs, Rogers said. The Predator, for example, can only handle about 8-knot crosswinds.

Only the sole Global Hawk in the region flew in poor weather, Rogers said.

“The turbulence knocks the crap out of them,” Rogers said. “If you were a junior officer planning a strike package and UAVs could only answer the mail about 40 percent of the time, what would you do?”

The answer: Use manned aircraft until tougher UAVs become available.

“If we’re going to get really serious about using UAVs in combat, we need to get the air vehicles to be more capable,” he said.

The Air Force already is attempting to do that by buying a handful of larger, longer-range Predator Bs from General Atomics of San Diego. The B variant also is intended for use by the operations branch to find and destroy targets on its own, which will reduce the need for separate intelligence missions, according to Air Force officials involved with the program.

Members of Rogers’ staff said that once the military gets more UAVs, the debate over their use — intelligence gathering or tactical targeting? — will start to go away.

Gail Kaufman is a staff writer for Defense News.

http://www.marinecorpstimes.com/stor...ER-2468618.php


Sempers,

Roger