Is Violence the Ultimate Authority?

[Sgt Leprechaun]

Try reading, for your edification, Victor Davis Hanson's books on the Greeks. VERY edifying, and well done. Nonfiction, I might add. You can begin with almost any of them, but I liked "The Western Way of War". He's also done several others.

Also, when it comes to the 'trenches', Marc "Animal" MacYoung as an excellent series, one of my favorites of which is "Violence, Blunders and Fractured jaws". Naturally, one cannot approach this topic without also touching on Major Dave Grossman's outstanding works, "On Killing" and "On Combat".

While I'm a fan of Pressfield, the only book of his I can sink my teeth into is the first one, the remainder, much as I've wanted to like them, I just can't get into.

Gotta run.. More later.

[Jonathan Goss]

I have some Victor Davis Hanson, actually! Can't recall which books but I know they're sitting on my research shelves at the apartment. I LOVED "Western Way of War"; that one I very much remember and it is a constant resource for anyone interested in the subject of hoplite warfare. I actually just saw an interview on Youtube of him and Christopher Hitchens which was pretty interesting about war crimes in WWII. He is engaging to both read and watch (partly because he looks like Robocop). Pressfield is also that way. I wish they had him as a talking head on more shows because he brings a much needed charisma and humility to often Ogaden-dry topics.

When you mention Pressfield's first book, do you mean "Gates of Fire"? He wrote one before that, "The Legend of Baggar Vance", but it didn't gain as much traction as "GoF", though it seems worth reading. Anyway, to book-nerd out for a second (as if anyone didn't see that coming), "GoF" changed my life. That's probably the best novel I've ever read. "Tides of War" was not as popular--probably because it was a story of antiheroes fighting an unheroic war--but I find it the most fun to reread. The character of Telamon was profoundly badass. And who can forget "The War of Art"? A must read for any aspiring professional (in any field).

"Violence, Blunders and Fractured Jaws" looks promising by the title alone. And "On Combat" and "On Killing" ring familiar, but I haven't read them. Thank you for the suggestions. Did you ever take a look at Pressfield's later novels like "The Virtues of War" and "The Afghan Campaign"? I'd imagine, given your occupation, you've probably heard of them. Not as Romantic (in the literary sense) as "GoF" but compelling in their own ways.

And thank you for replying at such late/early hours. Unless you're half way around the world, I assume this has been a "small hours" exchange for you.

[Sgt Leprechaun]

Yep. Gates of Fire it is. Great read.

I reply at such late hours because I work a midwatch LOL

[hussaf]

Gates of Fire is on the Marine Corps Reading List...I think for Corporals. Many guys in the Fleet have read that one now.

FYSA: I think Dave Grossman is a Lt. Col, though I'm pretty sure he's retired.

In my MOS I deal with authority/power in both kinetic and non-kinetic environments. I've found authority can only be given, not taken...though whatever level one grants others authority over them varries greatly. In the U.S. most grant authority based on laws. In other countries, its much different. Afghans will often do what you want when they are convinced it will benefit them....even if its just in the short term. Truly its the WIIFM strategy, "whats in it for me?" That could be the application or the cessation of the application of violence, or it could be the proverbial 'carrot.' In the military, being Western and subject to the UCMJ, we also acquiesce to rules such as the Law of Land Warfare, ROEs, Geneva Convection, et al. Per the above, we utilize violence in self-defense, only after establishing positive identification of the attacking parties, and with enoough violence to subdue the threat. Of course there are grey areas, mistakes, or just crappy situations that make that not always the case, but that is the intent. Specifically using violence to gain authority over the populace in Afghanistan does two things; it doesn't work, and its not allowed. Afghans, the Taliban specifically, are used to being treated violently and expect it. This means relatively little to them. One of their biggest concerns IS actually security. Most tribal elders are sick of the fighting...maybe not so much the younger guys, but many of them as too. However, when surrounded by violence their entire life...more application of it does little. If the Taliban offer security and safety so the locals can go about their day unimpeded, or if the US can, it doesn't matter. If they have to pay fees and taxes to the TB for this safety, they will do it...if we can keep them safe without being under the thumb of the TB, they would prefer that...but either would do.

Anyway, the military is not applying violence to gain authority...that is not the goal of COIN, which is the strategy we are applying. Perhaps violence is used when, say, attempting to create freedom of movement and stabilization in a certain AO or district center, but that is a means to an end....the end being that freedom of movement on that specific road in that specific district or village.....which, in turn, could be argued as a derivitive of authority. Basically, what I am saying is people allow temselves to be subjected to an authority as they deem most beneficial to them at the time. We are trying, or at least say we are trying (varries per occasion) to give Afghans what they want. The Taliban are utilizing Murder and Initmidation campaigns. The Taliban are winning because they have more numbers and better access to the population than we do....its their country and they know it better than we ever will, and better than our military leaders are even trying to (military commanders are an obtuse lot that believe they can reuse, or slightly rewrite, a generic strategy they attempt to allply to an entire country or province. This is anathema to what actually works, particularly in a "country" as variable as Afghanistan.

Ok, well I'm going to be in the field until May in the ****tiest part of Helmand, might be coming back to a computer after that. Maybe I'll have a different opinion after experiencing this year's Spring Offensive...I hope its more subdued than the last one
SF
A.

[hussaf]

yeah, no spell checker on this computer....plus some of the buttons are missing and sticking, so sorry for the hard read.

[Jonathan Goss]

yeah, no spell checker on this computer....plus some of the buttons are missing and sticking, so sorry for the hard read.

Not a hard read at all, Hussaf; you fared much better sans a spellchecker than I do at times!

So the application of violence in Afghanistan is so commonplace that it is practically a given by its people, do you think building a more efficient (I hesitate to use the oft-derogatory term "Westernized") infrastructure there will provide a peaceful stability that will remain when we depart? Or do you think the Afghan people would allow it to collapse out of mistrust and/or lack of appreciation as soon as we leave? I don't mean "lack of appreciation" in an insulting way, but tribalism seems to be resistant to change. The status quo is powerful.

Also, is there any justification for US military commanders rigidly holding to methods of operation/overall strategy that have been tried so often before but are just being tweaked? Or is there something to "staying the course", as it were? Is there any merit to consistency or is it just perpetuating ineffectual trends?

It seems that violence has been a profound source of authority there, used under the guise of "WIIFM" (in this case, "do what the Taliban says and our tribe will have an easier time"). So what could displace that? Can a new unified power structure arise in such a varied region of the world based on something other than violence-enforced law? I guess that also hints at another tangential question: Is the American Dream of "Life, Liberty and the Pursuit of Happiness" a universal one, or is the mindset of the Afghan people focused on something else?

That seems like a dumb question but mindsets differ across the globe. Take the Eastern and Western approaches to religion; both are fundamentally different from one another in damn near inexplicable ways. The Eastern way of spirituality is so alien to the Western way that it almost requires a rewiring of the brain to plug in and understand it. I wonder if that same sort of thing applies to Middle Eastern and Western ways of thinking in regards to how ultimate authority should be granted and applied.

PS: It's a real tragedy that "Gates of Fire" wasn't made into a movie. It would have stomped "300" in nearly every regard. That **** was caaaaash.

[hussaf]

They don't want, care, or need to be Westernized. If it happens, it happens....as long as it doens't negatively effect their life...most don't care. What happens in Kabul is vastly different than what happens in other parts of the country. Bamiyan and Nare e-Saraj might as well be different countries....for example. Hell, Helmand province is vastly different than most other provinces in AFG. Its not a unified country, people have no real concept of patriotism to the state. If we can bring in Foreign Direct Investment, and promote some semblance of transparency and reduce corruption...then perhaps the governmental infrastructural will be valid enough to actually let their authority be known to, and effect, the Afghan people in a positive way. Realistically, most Afghans just want to do what they do and not have outsiders (whether Taliban or ISAF) effect them unless its to their benefit (and not even then for some of them).

As far as authority and violence, I was more focusing my answer from the point of view of the U.S. Marine Corps.

As far as mindsets of different cultures...that's a difficult one to disect. Yes they are different, and one can attempt to understand the machinations of a culture (like westerners studying taoism, or Budhism), which gives one a window into a certain aspect of a culture...but i don't think one could possibly completely understand a culture they didn't grow up in.

[Jonathan Goss]

I remember reading in Sebastian Junger's "War" that one of the problems with creating any form of "national" governing authority was the distances between population centers and the inability to provide a form of federal (like we have) control over them because they were so spread out and with so many variations, I guess a result of tribalism. It seems like dealing with dozens of different city-states, each with their own nuances and separated by terrain that doesn't lend itself to cross country government monitoring or control. Having never been myself and never studied a current map, I can't say, but it seems to make sense and I think that's what you're sort of echoing (though I could be wrong).

Some of your terminology is both fascinating and foreign to me, particularly "kinetic and non-kinetic environments", "the Law of Land Warfare", and "COIN".

Also, you spoke of the defensive role of violence in the military's role in Afghanistan, though it's way off topic, how do Marines approach the offensive role of violence? Do you seek out enemies and set up situations to receive fire from targets so you can return fire or actively pursue/stalk known combatants and destroy them? I admit being vastly naive on this subject and am just curious as to how Marines go about the more proactive side of violence in an AO, if at all. (I also understand that this is probably too multifaceted a topic to really do justice but any input is, as always, greatly appreciated) As always, thank you for taking the time to read and/or answer. The point of view of the USMC is exactly what interests me in these matters, hence why I ask here.

[Jonathan Goss]

*clarification: "off topic" referring my question on offensive role of violence, not your answer. Your answer was very much on topic.

[Covey_Rider]

I remember reading in Sebastian Junger's "War" that one of the problems with creating any form of "national" governing authority was the distances between population centers and the inability to provide a form of federal (like we have) control over them because they were so spread out and with so many variations, I guess a result of tribalism. It seems like dealing with dozens of different city-states, each with their own nuances and separated by terrain that doesn't lend itself to cross country government monitoring or control. Having never been myself and never studied a current map, I can't say, but it seems to make sense and I think that's what you're sort of echoing (though I could be wrong).

Some of your terminology is both fascinating and foreign to me, particularly "kinetic and non-kinetic environments", "the Law of Land Warfare", and "COIN".

Also, you spoke of the defensive role of violence in the military's role in Afghanistan, though it's way off topic, how do Marines approach the offensive role of violence? Do you seek out enemies and set up situations to receive fire from targets so you can return fire or actively pursue/stalk known combatants and destroy them? I admit being vastly naive on this subject and am just curious as to how Marines go about the more proactive side of violence in an AO, if at all. (I also understand that this is probably too multifaceted a topic to really do justice but any input is, as always, greatly appreciated) As always, thank you for taking the time to read and/or answer. The point of view of the USMC is exactly what interests me in these matters, hence why I ask here.

Be weary of getting into politics here. I understand you are having an informative discussion and your posts are well put together. Just know that this thread has appeared to be making a shift towards the political aspects of the war. Politics isn't a debate to be had in this section, as it most always ends badly.

You're also getting into trying to learn about tactics used in an ongoing war. Just know that you're not going to get all of the answers that you're looking for. Some information, whether it's open source or not, just shouldn't be passed around on an open forum.

[Jonathan Goss]

Be weary of getting into politics here. I understand you are having an informative discussion and your posts are well put together. Just know that this thread has appeared to be making a shift towards the political aspects of the war. Politics isn't a debate to be had in this section, as it most always ends badly.

You're also getting into trying to learn about tactics used in an ongoing war. Just know that you're not going to get all of the answers that you're looking for. Some information, whether it's open source or not, just shouldn't be passed around on an open forum.

Gotcha, thank you, Covey_Rider. I hadn't considered either of those points as being contentious or sensitive. I totally understand. I'd love to see anything that anyone is willing to share on the topic of tactics that isn't considered sensitive but absolutely respect the nature of the subject and how it can affect active service members. As for the politics, again I understand, I just didn't consider them to be wayward. But if they are then they are and I'll refrain.

I try to let the conversation evolve naturally and just go wherever the inquiry leads me, but I will always respect the necessity for discretion.

*I also realize that I can't get all the anwers I'm looking for, but anything is better than nothing. I'll take what I can get, as always.

[marine1011]

Few things more annoying than being pretentious just for the sake of displaying a way with words, with little real content.
Move to Political Forum, where kierkegaard, who is the same way, can enjoy this. TheReservist, too, will be involved.
Pseudo-intellectuals all.

[advanced]

Few things more annoying than being pretentious just for the sake of displaying a way with words, with little real content.
Move to Political Forum, where kierkegaard, who is the same way, can enjoy this. TheReservist, too, will be involved.
Pseudo-intellectuals all.

It's not that they're pseudo-intellectuals, it's just that they're pseudo.

[hussaf]

Without getting into specifics, guys pretty much walk or drive around until something, or nothing, happens....on a big map this lets flag officers say we have freedom of movement or presence in a certain area or district center.

everyone is answerable to someone but, for the most part, commanders can determine how to enact the intent of their orders...meaning the specifics are largely up to them...until they are not. Its the military so anyone can be told to do stuff.

Offensive operations, or direct action and targetting, is mostly done by SOF guys or Task Force. Regular grunt units typically try to maintain control of an area or objective....maintaining freedom of movement and presence of ISAF folks.

COIN is a very common catch-phrase in the military and political realm...its counterinsurgency operations, spoken about quite often in the news. Kinetic and non-kinetic refer to combat. the Law of Land warfare is a document, you can goodle, pertaining to just what the title suggests. Again, Marine abide by the ROEs set forth by commanders obeying politicians' intent.

[Jonathan Goss]

Few things more annoying than being pretentious just for the sake of displaying a way with words, with little real content.
Move to Political Forum, where kierkegaard, who is the same way, can enjoy this. TheReservist, too, will be involved.
Pseudo-intellectuals all.

You know, I once asked Steven Pressfield in an email about how to handle negative criticism. His reply: "**** 'em." So if you have nothing positive or informative to add, then **** you, HarperJim.