The Lost American.......

(This paper was prepared for the National Security Council at the joint request of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and the Center for Naval Analysis. The opinions expressed are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Carnegie Endowment or the CNA, neither of which take positions on such matters.)


1. Operational concept: A US-led international force would enter the heart of the famine zone, establish either a series of safe havens in which the relief agencies and UN could operate safely without escorts and a larger exclusion zone from which armed vehicles would be prohibited. The zone would be monitored by JSTARS and TARPS and patrolled by armed helicopters. Rapid response teams would be based in the forward areas to respond to any threats to personnel, military or civil relief workers, in the safe haven. The safe havens would be supplied by air and from the sea. While the actual operating area for ground forces would be relatively small, using a combination of the exclusion zone and demarches to the faction leaders not to interfere with allied or UN operations would permit us to influence events beyond the haven and exclusion zone. The allies would make it clear that operation would be strictly humanitarian and that as long as the factions did not interfere, they would not be harmed. The duration of the mission would be short term, no longer than the beginning of the next rainy season (mid-March) and an approximate withdrawal date would be announced in advance. Turnover would be to a UN force.


2. The objectives:

a) Provide security so that relief agencies can do their job.

b) Break the back of the famine and stop the deaths.

c) Create an environment conducive to drawing the people back to the land.

d) Create sufficient security that refugees in Kenya are drawn back to Somalia.


3. Force Structure:

Amphibious Force:

The operation would be spearheaded by a Marine Expeditionary Unit operating off the coast. The Marines would land from an LHA supported by AV-8Bs and AH-1Js. They would secure bases ashore including a primary port and one or more airports inland in the heart of the famine zone. The operation should be structured so that terminals at each end of two MSRs are secured.

Main security force:

Once the air and beachheads are secure, the main security force would be landed by ship and plane. A force of brigade to possibly division strength would be drawn from US Army light infantry or airborne forces: (101st AirMobile, 82nd Airborne, 325 Inf. or 7th Inf.) and if necessary supported offshore by a MEB. If the city of Mogadishu is included in the security zone, elements of an armored division will also be needed (2nd ACR) with tanks, IFVs, and APCs.

Supporting elements:

Army support elements should include:

-- 2 MP Battalions;

-- 2 CA companies

-- 1 engineering battalion (with tracks);

-- 1 transportation company;

-- Associated supply and logistics units.

Liaison Units:

-- 1 HQ support unit;

-- One ANGLICA

Air Support:

Rotary wing:

In addition to the 24 helicopters attached to the MEU:

-- 2 US Army helicopter companies of UH-60s,

-- 1 helicopter company of CH-47s,

-- 1 detachment of USAF CH-53D Pave Coins

-- 1 company of AH-6 Apaches

Fixed wing:

-- 5 C-5s or 12 C-141s

-- 15 C-130s

Naval task force:

A naval task force assembled around the PhibRons supporting the MEU and MEB would be reinforced from the Naval Transport Command and would supply the force ashore and deliver replinishments.

Depending on the security situation, it may be advisable to station a CV with supporting elements over the horizon.

Special missions:

The SOCCENT SF HRT should remain on station ex Mombasa. In addition, 1 Marine HRT/Recon Unit should remain off-shore ex Mogadishu throughout the operation.


4. Security zones: The intervention should establish a series of airtight safe zones in which the relief agencies can work freely and an interlocking exclusion zone where they can travel with minimal risk. Unescorted convoys should be able to transit the exclusion zone without risk. The zones should encompass sufficient area that relief agencies can deliver seeds and agricultural inputs without risk and Somali herdsmen should be able to move their livestock without fear of attack.

The heart of the famine area is the area around Baidoa. At a minimum, the zone should include: Baidoa, Houddur, Wajit, Belet Weyne and the areas surrounding them plus a seaport.

http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontl...p/somalia.html


Sempers,

Roger

I just finished read "We Wish to Inform You That Tomorrow We Will Be Killed with Our Families: Stories from Rwanda" by Philip Gourevitch. The refuge camps set up in Zaire for Rwanda refuges used these camps to regain their strength and harbored many of the perpatrators of the genocide. These "Hutu Power" members, threatened and even killed refuges that tried to return to Rwanda. I hope they keep this in mind with the paper above.

Kalbo

Bump...

Ellie