The Easter Offensive and the bridge at Dong Ha
The Easter Offensive and the bridge at Dong Ha
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Posted: August 12, 2003
1:00 a.m. Eastern
Editor's note: The following commentary is the conclusion to yesterday's column, King Kong lives!
By Richard Botkin
© 2003 WorldNetDaily.com
At midday on March 30, 1972, almost by complete surprise, the North Vietnamese Army launched its single biggest assault of the Vietnam War. Larger in size and scale than the very costly but politically effective 1968 Tet Offensive, the NVA this time were fighting an almost conventional battle.
Generously supplied with seemingly unlimited artillery, Soviet armor and the latest air-defense weapons, reports of the NVA strength and battlefield successes were, for the first few days, not believed by the South Vietnamese general staff and their senior American advisers way down yonder in Saigon.
The first three and a half days of what came to be known as the Easter Offensive of 1972 were a near rout. The shock value of the new conventional NVA juggernaut was wreaking havoc with friendly forces. Indiscriminate artillery barrages, as intense as any experienced by the old hands, were especially deleterious for the uncounted masses of peasants turned refugees in Quang Tri Province. The poor weather and low visibility temporarily neutered the South's advantage in air power. It was hard to believe things could turn so negative in such a short time.
It was clear early on that the town of Dong Ha was a strategic target for the NVA. Offering the only bridge over the Cam Lo-Cua Viet River capable of supporting the heavy T-54 tanks now being used with such tremendous effect, the enemy needed to take it intact. Control of that one bridge would open the South for further exploitation. At a minimum, the turnover of Dong Ha would assure the loss of the northern provinces.
The allied unit closest to the gathering storm at Dong Ha was the Vietnamese Third Marine Battalion. As fate would have it, Capt. John Ripley was the covan (the Vietnamese name "co-van" for U.S. Marine Corps advisers means "trusted friend") that day about to enter the arena.
By 1971, John Ripley had done almost everything a Marine captain could accomplish commensurate with his rank. Having already successfully served in Vietnam as an infantry company commander in 1967, during which time Ripley was decorated and wounded, he had had subsequent tours with Marine Force Recon and as an exchange officer with the British Royal Marines. (Postings with the Royal Marines are extremely competitive and go only to the most promising officers.) Happily married and the father of three very young children, Ripley did not really need to be back in Vietnam. But he was.
The ferocity of the NVA offensive caused all manner of problems with allied command and control. Due to the extreme emergency, Lt. Col. Gerry Turley, who had recently arrived to serve as the senior covan in the northern region, was ordered to also assume control of the Third ARVN Division Forward. Recognizing the need to destroy the bridge, even though higher headquarters (who were unaware of the deteriorating tactical situation) ordered him not to, Turley gave the order. He was certain he was sending Capt. Ripley to his death.
With some cover fire provided by the men of the Third Marine Battalion and aided by U.S. Army Maj. John Smock, Capt. John Ripley accomplished what was not possible: He went out and blew up the bridge.
There is no sports analogy for what Ripley did. It was not like running a three minute mile, bench pressing 700 pounds, or pulling out a come-from-behind Super Bowl upset victory. There were no adoring crowds. What Ripley did was simply impossible. Had he failed while attempting to do it, his peers would have only thought him noble and brave for trying.
The significance of the timely destruction of the bridge at Dong Ha cannot be overstated – both in terms of Ripley's personal heroism and the impact it had on the entire communist offensive. Those who ponder alternative history could easily argue that had the NVA been able to secure the bridge and the town at that time, the unfortunate end of the Republic of Vietnam on April 30, 1975, might have been markedly speeded up.
Built by U.S. Navy Seabees in 1967, the bridge was a 200-meter concrete and steel leviathan. Its destruction required deliberate planning, intellect and guts. Mostly guts. Ripley would provide all three as he needed to distribute 500 pounds of dynamite on the structure's underside.
Making a dozen-odd trips between the southern bank of the river and the belly of the bridge, each time he shuttled roughly 40 pounds of explosives as he swung, hand-over-hand, out to the various spans and stringers, all the while exposed to enemy fire from the northern side. Placement of the dynamite and requisite wiring took more than two hours.
With the rigging complete, and without fanfare, Smock and Ripley blew the bridge. (For a superbly chronicled read of the entire action, see "The Bridge at Dong Ha" by Ripley friend and fellow covan U.S. Marine Corps Col. John Miller. For the view from the senior adviser who effectively ran the entire show during this period of the war, pick up Col. Gerry Turley's compellingly honest and painstakingly fair "The Easter Offensive." Both available at the U.S. Naval Institute or the Marine Corps Association.)
Ripley's performance that day continues to fascinate. These were not the deeds of a regular man. His bravery was not some gut reaction or counterpunch to a blow struck by an enemy. His actions in that three-hour window – with the world collapsing around him – were deliberate, willful, premeditated. Every ounce of his spiritual and physical fiber was focused on mission accomplishment. Anything less and he surely would have failed. Exhausted prior to the start, when he was finished he was way past empty.
With the bridge's destruction, the communist offensive was blunted but the fighting continued. Always seeming to draw tough assignments, the Third Marine Battalion – known as the Soi Bien or "Wolves of the Sea" – was a storied unit within the Vietnamese Marine Corps. While John Ripley's actions on Easter Sunday of 1972 would make him a legend among his brother covans and professional contemporaries, he was at least evenly matched with the man who led the Soi Bien.
Major Le Ba Binh was a Marine's Marine. He was to the Vietnamese Marine Corps, in its by-then 18-year history, what Chesty Puller, Dan Daly and Pappy Boyington combined were to the by then 196-year history of the U.S. Marine Corps. About the same age as his trusted friend John Ripley, Binh had even served as a student at The Basic School in Quantico where all American Marine lieutenants are schooled in the warrior arts. Wounded at least a dozen times, he had already been decorated for valor on seven separate occasions when the Easter Offensive began.
Binh was the consummate combat leader. Always out front where the action was heaviest, he was revered by his men and would endure any burden to defeat the hated communists. With the world crumbling around his Marines and the generally poor showing being put forth by most ARVN units in Military Region 1, he intended to follow the orders he received – to hold at all costs.
The battles in and around Dong Ha were only part of the much larger communist offensive. While many other ARVN units initially collapsed under NVA pressure, the various battalions of the Vietnamese Marine Corps, along with their covans, fought with tenacity and gave ground grudgingly.
Facing an entire 20,000 man division with an estimated 200 tanks, the 700-plus men of the Third Marine Battalion held Dong Ha for four days, until they too were completely surrounded and were forced to make a fighting withdrawal from the area. Less than a month later, as those who remained stood in formation to be addressed by their commandant at the regional headquarters in Hue, Maj. Binh would muster only 52 survivors. The two companies which had provided Ripley with cover fire while he and Major Smock destroyed the bridge, and then remained in place to battle the NVA armor and infantry, had been wiped out to the last man.
The Easter Offensive ended in failure for the NVA, in no small part thanks to the efforts of the Vietnamese Marine Corps and their faithful advisers. The unfortunate demise of freedom in Southeast Asia would come nearly three years later. In the meantime, covans Gerry Turley, John Ripley, George Philip and all the others headed home to be reabsorbed back into the regular Marine Corps and American society in general.
There was no going home – no rotation date – for Major Binh or his Marines. They fought the communists right up until and past April 30, 1975. Le Ba Binh was not among the fortunate few able to secure spots on the extraction helicopters that last day of April. Captured, he was sentenced to the "re-education camps."
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