TRhistorian
01-22-10, 08:10 PM
Turkish-American Relations: Historical Context and Current Issues
by
RACHEL PRAGER
GEORGETOWN UNIVERSITY
2003
Summary
Nearly two years after the birth of a new post September 11th strategic era of revitalized
cooperation, Turkish-American relations have taken an unanticipated turn. Disagreements over
Iraq, the downsizing of the U.S. Air Base in Incirlik, and the more recent detention of Turkish
soldiers in Northern Iraq by American troops, have placed the much-vaulted strategic partnership
in jeopardy. Recent diplomatic exchanges aside, the strategic partnership continues to stand on
precarious ground.
The strategic partnership, formally in place since 1999, has failed to adjust to more aggressive
U.S. policies in the Middle East, changes in the Turkish economic and political spheres, and
transformations in the geostrategic landscape. Washington’s confrontational stance toward
Middle East rogue nations has been met with resistance from Ankara. Turkey desires stable
economic and security relations with neighbors Syria, Iraq and Iran, and has resented U.S.
policies that undermine these aims. Second, the strategic partnership has failed to accommodate
Turkey’s changing political and economic spheres. In the last few years, Turkey has faced two
financial meltdown, the election of the Islamist-rooted AKP, growing discomfort with American
unilateralism, sweeping domestic political reforms, rising costs of the Cypriot stalemate on
Turkey’s European aspirations, and the widening transatlantic gulf between the U.S and EU
gatekeepers France and Germany. Third, transformations in the geostrategic landscape have
diminished Turkey’s utility as a launching pad for the U.S. military. American alliances with
countries in Central Asia and the new American foothold in Iraq have presented the U.S. with a
greater number of allies and basing options. Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan and Tajikistan, for example,
provide support for U.S. troops engaged in war on terrorism operations in Afghanistan.
Moreover, technological advances enabling U.S. troops to deploy further and faster have
diminished the geostrategic utility of any one country, including Turkey.
It is against this backdrop that Ankara and Washington should take a fresh look at the issues on
the American-Turkish agenda. Six issues form the core of the current American-Turkish strategic
partnership: (i) the stabilization of Iraq and the future status of the Iraqi Kurds, (ii) the war on
terrorism, (iii) the future of the NATO alliance, (iv) Turkish accession to the EU and acceleration
of democratic reforms, (v) energy initiatives in the Caspian region, and (vi) sustainable Turkish
economic growth. Although bilateral cooperation is near maximized on some of these issues,
such as Caspian energy initiatives and Turkish aspirations for EU membership, Ankara and
Washington have yet to map out a comprehensive plan that enhances bilateral cooperation and
mutual gains on these other fronts. As can be expected, these issues are a source of both bilateral
tension as well as untapped opportunity.
Iraq and the Kurds
The rift over Iraq and the future of the Iraqi Kurd population currently are the most important
issues on the American-Turkish agenda. Prior to the outbreak of war, Ankara repeatedly stated
that the Kurdish situation is a matter of Turkish national security, citing the potential for massive
Kurdish refugee flows and a resurgence of PKK terrorism. Less often-stated in public discourse
is Ankara’s fear that a prosperous, protected Kurdish area in Northern Iraq will destabilize the
2
Turkish Kurd population as well as pave the way for the creation of an independent Kurdish
state. Moreover, Turkey fears that the Turkmen, which constitute about 2% of the Iraqi
population and possess cultural and linguistic ties to Anatolia, will be excluded from systems of
representation in post-Saddam Iraq. Like the Kurds, the Turkmen claim Kirkuk as their capital.
With the end of major combat operations in Iraq, Kurdish refugee flows have yet to materialize.
Ankara nonetheless remains fixated over the future of the Kurdish population in Northern Iraq
and continues to doubt Washington’s intentions. From Ankara’s perspective, an empowered
Kurdish north may incite succession movements in southeast Turkey, as well as harbor PKK
terrorists. Turkish fears over the Kurds are not entirely farfetched. The Kurdish population
numbers 24 - 27 million people, half of which reside in Turkey and constitute 20% of the
Turkish populace. Six million of these Turkish Kurds live in East and Southeast Turkey, near
neighboring Kurdish populations in Northern Iraq, northeastern Iran and northern Syria. While
these Kurdish populations have been divided with most having more in common with their host
countries than each other, the post-Iraq landscape may empower Kurdish secessionists. Already,
the PKK, now known as KADEK, has announced the end of its five-year ceasefire agreement
with the Turkish government, and Kurdish rebels are thought to be hiding in Northern Iraq.
War on Terror
Turkish contributions to the war on terror have continued irrespective of American-Turkish
disagreements over Iraq. Turkey led the Afghan ISAF for over 7 months until the German-Dutch
term began on February 10, 2003. Turkey has continued to allow the use of Incirlik to perform
counter-terrorism operations. Turkey also has five Turkish ships participating in NATO
counterterrorism operations in the Mediterranean. Moreover, Turkey has blocked the funding
available to terrorist groups. Although Turkish cooperation in Iraq did not meet American
expectations, Turkey did grant overflight rights and the transport of non-weaponry supplies to
coalition troops.
However, there are key differences between Turkish and American priorities in the war on terror.
Turkish priorities lie in preventing the rise of Kurdish secessionism and PKK terrorism. While
the U.S. recently signed a “joint action plan” with Turkey targeting Turkish Kurdish rebels in
northern Iraq, the U.S. possesses a broader counterterrorism agenda. There are also muted
disagreements between Ankara and Washington regarding the scope and goals of the war on
terror. Ongoing American-Turkish cooperation against terrorism will depend on future goals and
operations pursued within the war on terror framework. Given the convergence of American and
Turkish counterterrorism interests, it is likely that cooperation will continue in monitoring
terrorist networks, sharing information, and Afghan stabilization. But Turkish military and
political support in future missions will not be forthcoming if Turkey perceives the mission in
question to be anti-Muslim rather than anti-terrorist, or believes that it will undermine its internal
stability. Turkish leadership has expressed its concerns that the war on terror must go beyond
military operations to address education and economic deprivation in those areas that are prone
to Islamic extremism. U.S. attention for now, though, has remained on the military component.
NATO
The Iraq war has weakened the NATO alliance, jeopardizing Turkey’s traditional strategic link
to the U.S. If NATO remains divided and ineffective, Turkish participation in future operations
3
with the United States will be difficult for Ankara. NATO and the UN have provided Turkish
leadership with political cover when they have promoted policies that are opposed by the Turkish
populace. Institutionalized international mandates facilitated Turkish involvement in the 1990-91
Gulf War, Somalia, Bosnia, Kosovo and, more recently, Afghanistan. A U.N. mandate may
enable the entry of Turkish peacekeeping forces into Iraq by the end of 2003 as well.
The weakening of NATO possesses additional strategic implications for Turkey, given its
exclusion for the EU’s budding security structure, the European Defense and Security Policy
(ESDP). Turkey’s longstanding differences with Greece have exacerbated Turkish fears that the
ESDP will be used as a vehicle to work against Turkish interests in the Aegean, Cyprus and
Europe. Turkey does have some leverage though. In order for the Europeans to use NATO assets
in EU missions, they must first obtain NATO approval, thus giving Turkey control over EU
force deployments.
Sustainable Economic Growth and Cooperation
A decade of poor economic management culminating in the 2001 financial crisis, the recent
global economic contraction, Turkish political instability in 2002 and the 2003 Iraq war have
kept Turkey’s economy in flux. Current economic indicators and the implementation of IMF
reforms suggest that the Turkish economy may finally be stabilizing. Turkey, however, is still far
behind its European counterparts with a GDP per capita of $2,200 and the absence of key
structural reforms. But although the Turkey’s future economic state may be uncertain, it is also
imbued with possibility. With Turkey’s unsaturated markets; a population of 70 million, 70% of
which are under the age of 35; its strategic location between Europe and the Middle East; and
relatively cheap but skilled workforce, Turkey can be a powerhouse for trade and U.S.
investment.
These opportunities aside, Turkey’s current economic woes impact the American-Turkish
relationship by making Turkey a less willing and able strategic partner. Turkey, for example,
initially was reluctant to take over ISAF in Afghanistan in part because of the associated costs. In
the same vein, Turkey’s willingness to spend on other U.S.-supported initiatives, such as the
NATO Reaction Force, may be dampened by its weak economic state. Simply put, when
Turkey’s economy is doing well, Turkey can pump resources and high-level attention into
bilateral or multilateral initiatives rather than worrying about its mounting debt and high inflation
rates. The establishment of Qualified Industrial Zones (QIZ), one of the many proposals under
review by the U.S., does not provide considerable gains for Turkish goods. More favorable, in
Turkey’s assessment, would be the inclusion of Turkey in the proposed Middle East trade
initiative, which aims to establish a U.S.-Middle East free trade zone within a decade. Trade
initiatives aside, though, Turkey’s path to sustainable economic growth lies in its ability
implement much needed economic reforms.
***
The rationale for remaining engaged in this difficult period and working for the revitalization of
relations is clear. Turkey remains a secular, democratic majority-Muslim nation that ascribes to
Western values and stands in defense of Washington’s belief that the Islamic and Western world
can not only coexist but also cooperate and even integrate with one another. These last six
4
months have provided a wake-up call for those in both capitols who wish to safeguard the future
of American and Turkish strategic cooperation.
by
RACHEL PRAGER
GEORGETOWN UNIVERSITY
2003
Summary
Nearly two years after the birth of a new post September 11th strategic era of revitalized
cooperation, Turkish-American relations have taken an unanticipated turn. Disagreements over
Iraq, the downsizing of the U.S. Air Base in Incirlik, and the more recent detention of Turkish
soldiers in Northern Iraq by American troops, have placed the much-vaulted strategic partnership
in jeopardy. Recent diplomatic exchanges aside, the strategic partnership continues to stand on
precarious ground.
The strategic partnership, formally in place since 1999, has failed to adjust to more aggressive
U.S. policies in the Middle East, changes in the Turkish economic and political spheres, and
transformations in the geostrategic landscape. Washington’s confrontational stance toward
Middle East rogue nations has been met with resistance from Ankara. Turkey desires stable
economic and security relations with neighbors Syria, Iraq and Iran, and has resented U.S.
policies that undermine these aims. Second, the strategic partnership has failed to accommodate
Turkey’s changing political and economic spheres. In the last few years, Turkey has faced two
financial meltdown, the election of the Islamist-rooted AKP, growing discomfort with American
unilateralism, sweeping domestic political reforms, rising costs of the Cypriot stalemate on
Turkey’s European aspirations, and the widening transatlantic gulf between the U.S and EU
gatekeepers France and Germany. Third, transformations in the geostrategic landscape have
diminished Turkey’s utility as a launching pad for the U.S. military. American alliances with
countries in Central Asia and the new American foothold in Iraq have presented the U.S. with a
greater number of allies and basing options. Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan and Tajikistan, for example,
provide support for U.S. troops engaged in war on terrorism operations in Afghanistan.
Moreover, technological advances enabling U.S. troops to deploy further and faster have
diminished the geostrategic utility of any one country, including Turkey.
It is against this backdrop that Ankara and Washington should take a fresh look at the issues on
the American-Turkish agenda. Six issues form the core of the current American-Turkish strategic
partnership: (i) the stabilization of Iraq and the future status of the Iraqi Kurds, (ii) the war on
terrorism, (iii) the future of the NATO alliance, (iv) Turkish accession to the EU and acceleration
of democratic reforms, (v) energy initiatives in the Caspian region, and (vi) sustainable Turkish
economic growth. Although bilateral cooperation is near maximized on some of these issues,
such as Caspian energy initiatives and Turkish aspirations for EU membership, Ankara and
Washington have yet to map out a comprehensive plan that enhances bilateral cooperation and
mutual gains on these other fronts. As can be expected, these issues are a source of both bilateral
tension as well as untapped opportunity.
Iraq and the Kurds
The rift over Iraq and the future of the Iraqi Kurd population currently are the most important
issues on the American-Turkish agenda. Prior to the outbreak of war, Ankara repeatedly stated
that the Kurdish situation is a matter of Turkish national security, citing the potential for massive
Kurdish refugee flows and a resurgence of PKK terrorism. Less often-stated in public discourse
is Ankara’s fear that a prosperous, protected Kurdish area in Northern Iraq will destabilize the
2
Turkish Kurd population as well as pave the way for the creation of an independent Kurdish
state. Moreover, Turkey fears that the Turkmen, which constitute about 2% of the Iraqi
population and possess cultural and linguistic ties to Anatolia, will be excluded from systems of
representation in post-Saddam Iraq. Like the Kurds, the Turkmen claim Kirkuk as their capital.
With the end of major combat operations in Iraq, Kurdish refugee flows have yet to materialize.
Ankara nonetheless remains fixated over the future of the Kurdish population in Northern Iraq
and continues to doubt Washington’s intentions. From Ankara’s perspective, an empowered
Kurdish north may incite succession movements in southeast Turkey, as well as harbor PKK
terrorists. Turkish fears over the Kurds are not entirely farfetched. The Kurdish population
numbers 24 - 27 million people, half of which reside in Turkey and constitute 20% of the
Turkish populace. Six million of these Turkish Kurds live in East and Southeast Turkey, near
neighboring Kurdish populations in Northern Iraq, northeastern Iran and northern Syria. While
these Kurdish populations have been divided with most having more in common with their host
countries than each other, the post-Iraq landscape may empower Kurdish secessionists. Already,
the PKK, now known as KADEK, has announced the end of its five-year ceasefire agreement
with the Turkish government, and Kurdish rebels are thought to be hiding in Northern Iraq.
War on Terror
Turkish contributions to the war on terror have continued irrespective of American-Turkish
disagreements over Iraq. Turkey led the Afghan ISAF for over 7 months until the German-Dutch
term began on February 10, 2003. Turkey has continued to allow the use of Incirlik to perform
counter-terrorism operations. Turkey also has five Turkish ships participating in NATO
counterterrorism operations in the Mediterranean. Moreover, Turkey has blocked the funding
available to terrorist groups. Although Turkish cooperation in Iraq did not meet American
expectations, Turkey did grant overflight rights and the transport of non-weaponry supplies to
coalition troops.
However, there are key differences between Turkish and American priorities in the war on terror.
Turkish priorities lie in preventing the rise of Kurdish secessionism and PKK terrorism. While
the U.S. recently signed a “joint action plan” with Turkey targeting Turkish Kurdish rebels in
northern Iraq, the U.S. possesses a broader counterterrorism agenda. There are also muted
disagreements between Ankara and Washington regarding the scope and goals of the war on
terror. Ongoing American-Turkish cooperation against terrorism will depend on future goals and
operations pursued within the war on terror framework. Given the convergence of American and
Turkish counterterrorism interests, it is likely that cooperation will continue in monitoring
terrorist networks, sharing information, and Afghan stabilization. But Turkish military and
political support in future missions will not be forthcoming if Turkey perceives the mission in
question to be anti-Muslim rather than anti-terrorist, or believes that it will undermine its internal
stability. Turkish leadership has expressed its concerns that the war on terror must go beyond
military operations to address education and economic deprivation in those areas that are prone
to Islamic extremism. U.S. attention for now, though, has remained on the military component.
NATO
The Iraq war has weakened the NATO alliance, jeopardizing Turkey’s traditional strategic link
to the U.S. If NATO remains divided and ineffective, Turkish participation in future operations
3
with the United States will be difficult for Ankara. NATO and the UN have provided Turkish
leadership with political cover when they have promoted policies that are opposed by the Turkish
populace. Institutionalized international mandates facilitated Turkish involvement in the 1990-91
Gulf War, Somalia, Bosnia, Kosovo and, more recently, Afghanistan. A U.N. mandate may
enable the entry of Turkish peacekeeping forces into Iraq by the end of 2003 as well.
The weakening of NATO possesses additional strategic implications for Turkey, given its
exclusion for the EU’s budding security structure, the European Defense and Security Policy
(ESDP). Turkey’s longstanding differences with Greece have exacerbated Turkish fears that the
ESDP will be used as a vehicle to work against Turkish interests in the Aegean, Cyprus and
Europe. Turkey does have some leverage though. In order for the Europeans to use NATO assets
in EU missions, they must first obtain NATO approval, thus giving Turkey control over EU
force deployments.
Sustainable Economic Growth and Cooperation
A decade of poor economic management culminating in the 2001 financial crisis, the recent
global economic contraction, Turkish political instability in 2002 and the 2003 Iraq war have
kept Turkey’s economy in flux. Current economic indicators and the implementation of IMF
reforms suggest that the Turkish economy may finally be stabilizing. Turkey, however, is still far
behind its European counterparts with a GDP per capita of $2,200 and the absence of key
structural reforms. But although the Turkey’s future economic state may be uncertain, it is also
imbued with possibility. With Turkey’s unsaturated markets; a population of 70 million, 70% of
which are under the age of 35; its strategic location between Europe and the Middle East; and
relatively cheap but skilled workforce, Turkey can be a powerhouse for trade and U.S.
investment.
These opportunities aside, Turkey’s current economic woes impact the American-Turkish
relationship by making Turkey a less willing and able strategic partner. Turkey, for example,
initially was reluctant to take over ISAF in Afghanistan in part because of the associated costs. In
the same vein, Turkey’s willingness to spend on other U.S.-supported initiatives, such as the
NATO Reaction Force, may be dampened by its weak economic state. Simply put, when
Turkey’s economy is doing well, Turkey can pump resources and high-level attention into
bilateral or multilateral initiatives rather than worrying about its mounting debt and high inflation
rates. The establishment of Qualified Industrial Zones (QIZ), one of the many proposals under
review by the U.S., does not provide considerable gains for Turkish goods. More favorable, in
Turkey’s assessment, would be the inclusion of Turkey in the proposed Middle East trade
initiative, which aims to establish a U.S.-Middle East free trade zone within a decade. Trade
initiatives aside, though, Turkey’s path to sustainable economic growth lies in its ability
implement much needed economic reforms.
***
The rationale for remaining engaged in this difficult period and working for the revitalization of
relations is clear. Turkey remains a secular, democratic majority-Muslim nation that ascribes to
Western values and stands in defense of Washington’s belief that the Islamic and Western world
can not only coexist but also cooperate and even integrate with one another. These last six
4
months have provided a wake-up call for those in both capitols who wish to safeguard the future
of American and Turkish strategic cooperation.