Devildogg4ever
08-24-03, 06:37 AM
By Con Coughlin
(Filed: 24/08/2003)
Officials at the United Nations compound in Baghdad could not have made themselves any clearer. During numerous meetings with coalition commanders to discuss the security arrangements for the Canal Hotel, the UN's administrative headquarters, they were insistent that they did not want a large American presence to protect them.
Even when members of Iraq's interim government received warnings that the remnants of Saddam Hussein's regime were planning a suicide truck attack against a "soft" target in the Iraqi capital - such as the Canal Hotel - the UN officials reiterated the view that they could look after themselves.
Salim Lome, the UN spokesman in Baghdad, was still defending this position last Wednesday morning as American and Iraqi rescue workers continued to recover survivors from the remains of the hotel.
UN officials "did not want a large American presence outside", Mr Lome explained, because it would have compromised their position as independent intermediaries between the Iraqis and the "occupying powers". Unlike the Americans, who spent so much of their time in Saddam Hussein's well-fortified former palaces, UN staff were primarily in Iraq to undertake a humanitarian mission, and did not want "to live behind barbed wire".
It was as a direct consequence of this naivety that there was only a single American army Humvee guarding the main road to the hotel when the suicide bomber embarked upon his murderous mission.
Yet, perversely, it is the Americans, rather than the UN, who seem to be getting all the blame for last week's tragic attack on the UN. As Kofi Annan, the UN Secretary-General, declared soon after breaking his family holiday in Finland to return to New York immediately after the attack: "The occupying power is responsible for law and order and the security of the country. That has not happened."
Relations between the US and UN, of course, have not exactly been cordial since Saddam proved so adroit at sowing division and discord among the Security Council during the intense period of diplomatic manoeuvring that preceded the war.
What Mr Annan and those who share his world view fail to grasp, however, is that while the UN would prefer to keep its distance from the activities of the American and British soldiers who are trying to restore some semblance of civil society to Iraq after 35 years of Ba'athist tyranny, this is a distinction that is utterly lost on the small pockets of Saddam loyalists who remain determined to wreck the post-war settlement.
Indeed after the security council formally sanctioned the US-British coalition as the "occupying power" in Iraq under resolution 1483, it is little wonder that Saddam's loyalists regard the UN as actively colluding with the coalition. And in case Mr Annan hasn't noticed, Saddam's loyalists have been doing their best in recent weeks to disrupt the UN's much-vaunted humanitarian activities by attacking infrastructure targets, such as the water and electricty supplies.
The latest outburst of international sparring over how to manage Iraq's post-Saddam future, prompted by the bombing of the UN compound, will undoubtedly give comfort to Saddam and the determined band of loyalists who remain intent on making sure the coalition fails in its attempt to restore political stability to Baghdad. Saddam is no doubt thinking along the lines stated by Lenin in the days leading up the Russian revolution: the worse it gets, the better it is.
Certainly the UN's conduct since the bombing does not inspire much confidence that it could provide a viable alternative to the coalition in running Iraq. In order for tangible progress to be made in rebuilding Iraq, the priority must be the complete eradication of Saddam's regime and its sympathisers, whether they be Palestinian renegades or Al-Qa'eda militants.
The top priority, of course, must be to get Saddam himself, for so long as he remains at large he will continue to serve as a rallying point for the discontents. And on that front, while the headlines mainly concentrate on the activities of the saboteurs and bombers, the coalition continues to make remarkable progress.
Following last week's capture of Taha Yassin Ramadan, the former Iraqi vice-president, and (Chemical) Ali Hassan al-Majid, Saddam's cousin and long-term enforcer, the coalition has now accounted for more than 40 of those named in the pack of cards of most wanted regime members. Apart from Saddam himself, the only other significant former regime member still at large is Izzat Ibrahim, the deputy head of the Ba'ath party's ruling body, the Revolutionary Command Council.
Critics of the coalition also conveniently overlook the fact that not everything that has happened in Iraq since Saddam's overthrow has been a disaster. A recent survey of the Iraqis showed that more than 70 per cent supported the removal of Saddam's regime, which probably explains why the different factions and ethnic groups in Iraq have not allowed their age-old rivalries to degenerate into open civil war, as was so confidently predicted by pre-war doom-mongers.
If, then, Iraq is not about to become the new Lebanon, there is still the possibility that it could become the new Afghanistan, with scores of foreign, although mainly Arab, fighters flooding in to join a new jihad to repel the foreign invaders from Muslim soil.
Iraq is now the front line in the war on terror. Were the coalition to hesitate in its determination to confront the remnants of Saddam's regime, and the motley crew of Islamic troublemakers who are seeking to take advantage of the unstable security situation, it would indicate that the West lacks the will to confront those who seek to harm it.
For this reason it is essential that Mr Annan and his colleagues at the UN, rather than trying to undermine the effectiveness of the coalition by diluting its command structure, concentrate their energies on finding the means to strengthen the coalition. The serious task of nation-building in Iraq can only begin in earnest once the war is finally won.
• Con Coughlin is the author of Saddam: The Secret Life (Macmillan)
http://portal.telegraph.co.uk/opinion/main.jhtml?xml=/opinion/2003/08/24/do2401.xml&sSheet=/portal/2003/08/24/ixportal.html
(Filed: 24/08/2003)
Officials at the United Nations compound in Baghdad could not have made themselves any clearer. During numerous meetings with coalition commanders to discuss the security arrangements for the Canal Hotel, the UN's administrative headquarters, they were insistent that they did not want a large American presence to protect them.
Even when members of Iraq's interim government received warnings that the remnants of Saddam Hussein's regime were planning a suicide truck attack against a "soft" target in the Iraqi capital - such as the Canal Hotel - the UN officials reiterated the view that they could look after themselves.
Salim Lome, the UN spokesman in Baghdad, was still defending this position last Wednesday morning as American and Iraqi rescue workers continued to recover survivors from the remains of the hotel.
UN officials "did not want a large American presence outside", Mr Lome explained, because it would have compromised their position as independent intermediaries between the Iraqis and the "occupying powers". Unlike the Americans, who spent so much of their time in Saddam Hussein's well-fortified former palaces, UN staff were primarily in Iraq to undertake a humanitarian mission, and did not want "to live behind barbed wire".
It was as a direct consequence of this naivety that there was only a single American army Humvee guarding the main road to the hotel when the suicide bomber embarked upon his murderous mission.
Yet, perversely, it is the Americans, rather than the UN, who seem to be getting all the blame for last week's tragic attack on the UN. As Kofi Annan, the UN Secretary-General, declared soon after breaking his family holiday in Finland to return to New York immediately after the attack: "The occupying power is responsible for law and order and the security of the country. That has not happened."
Relations between the US and UN, of course, have not exactly been cordial since Saddam proved so adroit at sowing division and discord among the Security Council during the intense period of diplomatic manoeuvring that preceded the war.
What Mr Annan and those who share his world view fail to grasp, however, is that while the UN would prefer to keep its distance from the activities of the American and British soldiers who are trying to restore some semblance of civil society to Iraq after 35 years of Ba'athist tyranny, this is a distinction that is utterly lost on the small pockets of Saddam loyalists who remain determined to wreck the post-war settlement.
Indeed after the security council formally sanctioned the US-British coalition as the "occupying power" in Iraq under resolution 1483, it is little wonder that Saddam's loyalists regard the UN as actively colluding with the coalition. And in case Mr Annan hasn't noticed, Saddam's loyalists have been doing their best in recent weeks to disrupt the UN's much-vaunted humanitarian activities by attacking infrastructure targets, such as the water and electricty supplies.
The latest outburst of international sparring over how to manage Iraq's post-Saddam future, prompted by the bombing of the UN compound, will undoubtedly give comfort to Saddam and the determined band of loyalists who remain intent on making sure the coalition fails in its attempt to restore political stability to Baghdad. Saddam is no doubt thinking along the lines stated by Lenin in the days leading up the Russian revolution: the worse it gets, the better it is.
Certainly the UN's conduct since the bombing does not inspire much confidence that it could provide a viable alternative to the coalition in running Iraq. In order for tangible progress to be made in rebuilding Iraq, the priority must be the complete eradication of Saddam's regime and its sympathisers, whether they be Palestinian renegades or Al-Qa'eda militants.
The top priority, of course, must be to get Saddam himself, for so long as he remains at large he will continue to serve as a rallying point for the discontents. And on that front, while the headlines mainly concentrate on the activities of the saboteurs and bombers, the coalition continues to make remarkable progress.
Following last week's capture of Taha Yassin Ramadan, the former Iraqi vice-president, and (Chemical) Ali Hassan al-Majid, Saddam's cousin and long-term enforcer, the coalition has now accounted for more than 40 of those named in the pack of cards of most wanted regime members. Apart from Saddam himself, the only other significant former regime member still at large is Izzat Ibrahim, the deputy head of the Ba'ath party's ruling body, the Revolutionary Command Council.
Critics of the coalition also conveniently overlook the fact that not everything that has happened in Iraq since Saddam's overthrow has been a disaster. A recent survey of the Iraqis showed that more than 70 per cent supported the removal of Saddam's regime, which probably explains why the different factions and ethnic groups in Iraq have not allowed their age-old rivalries to degenerate into open civil war, as was so confidently predicted by pre-war doom-mongers.
If, then, Iraq is not about to become the new Lebanon, there is still the possibility that it could become the new Afghanistan, with scores of foreign, although mainly Arab, fighters flooding in to join a new jihad to repel the foreign invaders from Muslim soil.
Iraq is now the front line in the war on terror. Were the coalition to hesitate in its determination to confront the remnants of Saddam's regime, and the motley crew of Islamic troublemakers who are seeking to take advantage of the unstable security situation, it would indicate that the West lacks the will to confront those who seek to harm it.
For this reason it is essential that Mr Annan and his colleagues at the UN, rather than trying to undermine the effectiveness of the coalition by diluting its command structure, concentrate their energies on finding the means to strengthen the coalition. The serious task of nation-building in Iraq can only begin in earnest once the war is finally won.
• Con Coughlin is the author of Saddam: The Secret Life (Macmillan)
http://portal.telegraph.co.uk/opinion/main.jhtml?xml=/opinion/2003/08/24/do2401.xml&sSheet=/portal/2003/08/24/ixportal.html