thedrifter
07-29-03, 06:01 AM
07-28-2003
Admitting a Guerilla War after All
By J. David Galland
One afternoon last week I found myself stuck in a traffic jam on Interstate 10, about 30 miles east of El Paso, Tex. There was not much on my mind other than getting home, another 300 miles down the road.
To distract myself from the 109-degree boredom of the westbound lane, I turned to my car radio. By a stroke of luck I found a National Public Radio broadcast that consisted of an interview and discussion.
The subject of the dialogue centered on the declaration, earlier in the day, by Gen. John Abazaid, who as commander of Central Command leads all U.S. forces in Iraq, that the United States was now involved in a classic guerrilla war in that country. This has been an issue that has been gnawing on me for weeks as we have watched our soldiers in Iraq fall like bowling pins.
Only a dew weeks ago, Gen. Tommy Franks had handed over the Centcom flag to Abazaid, but I don’t recall that Franks had ever announced anything about a guerrilla war emerging in Iraq.
Quite to the opposite, Franks strutted around like a victorious commander who came, saw and conquered. I pondered the thought that maybe Franks did not know what our forces faced in what was briefly described as “post-war” Iraq. Why, only after days in command, has Gen. Abizad become such an astute observer of what Gen. Franks failed to recognize?
The NPR radio program that triggered these thoughts featured as guest analyst the recently retired commander of U.S. Army Europe, Gen. Montgomery C. Meigs. The general’s role that day was to serve as another naysayer to the presence of a pervasive level of widening guerrilla resistance to America’s effort in Iraq.
As I am a professional student of our country’s forays into the nether world of guerrilla wars, Meigs, a refined and intelligent military professional, held my attention. He asserted that he did not agree with Abizaid that America was involved in a classic guerrilla conflict.
Meigs did concede, however, that there appears to be some level of classic guerrilla resistance present. But he insisted that it was small, loosely organized, and not pervasive to the point of Abizaid’s characterization.
My response: I don’t buy it. In a military operational environment where one shot kills, the pattern of activity since the fall of Saddam Hussein has been that of a measured, if low-level guerillas campaign against our troops.
Every morning we are greeted by news headlines that sadly reveal more of our soldiers are being culled, like men on a chessboard, by something less than a classic guerrilla insurgency. President Bush’s May 1 declaration from the flight deck of the USS Abraham Lincoln that the mission in Iraq had been accomplished, is refuted on a daily basis by the gunfire in Iraq.
As a past participant of our strategic failure in Vietnam, I am well aware that guerrilla wars are not something that the United States does well. What’s worse, Meigs’ on-air interview assessment continues a sad tradition of U.S. military leaders who seem to believe that if they deny or minimize the presence and ferocity of any guerrilla force confronting our troops, the threat itself will magically disappear.
Waging a comprehensive campaign of unconventional warfare remains the best method of countering an indigenous guerrilla insurgency. First, we must win the confidence of the population, top to bottom. Protection of the sympathetic citizenry is crucial in order to illustrate just who is in control, thereby convincing people to come over without fear of retribution. Probably most important, the external force must always display strength, control of the operating environment, understanding of the target population, and truly offer a solution to a better tomorrow. These responsibilities largely fall to the civil affairs units for planning, execution, and constant fine-tuning. In Iraq, this is a tall order that strains Western military assets in every area.
But why is the U.S. military seemingly unable to carry this out? Military ineptness itself is not the issue. Instead, I believe the military seems to suffer from a lack of political and grassroots support from the U.S. government and the American people – despite all of the proclamations of support for the troops.
So the question continues to appear: “Why can’t the most eminent military superpower in the world, with all its might and assets, stop a low intensity conflict waged by ragged and disgruntled defeated Iraqi soldiers armed with single-shot bolt-action rifles?” The answer does not follow.
Meigs himself on NPR made no attempt to answer directly. Instead, he continued to downplay the existence of the painfully obvious guerrilla activity, dismissing it as small and isolated.
Nor was Meigs alone. Defense Secretary Donald H. Rumsfeld himself downplayed the issue for weeks. On July 17, when asked about a guerrilla war, Rumsfeld stuck to his guns, telling reporters, “The reason I don’t use the phrase ‘guerrilla war’ is because there isn’t one.” Finally, Gen. Abizad in mid-July replied “yes” to the same question.
From my corner of the foxhole, the apparently serious disconnect between Rumsfeld and the Centcom commander suggests that at the highest levels of the U.S. military there is a lack of healthy comprehension of what constitutes guerrilla activity.
Tell that to the soldiers! Daily attacks on American soldiers have raised the present body count total in Iraq to 49 since the end of organized combat on May 1 – including five deaths in a 24-hour period this past weekend.
Our soldiers are operating in a shooting gallery, where those who are waging this non-existent guerrilla war have honed their killing skills to an appreciable art. A “how-to” killing guide that is reportedly circulating in Iraq, among the population advises gunmen to aim for the 2-centimeter gap between a soldier’s helmet and the collar of his Kevlar vest. Other recommended targets include the armpit area or the groin, respectively, in hopes of striking a major artery.
It is a mixed blessing that the Centcom commander finally acknowledged what his troops and the Iraqis have known all along – that an organized guerilla resistance in Iraq appeared shortly after major combat ended, and that it is getting worse every day. Now we must pray that Centcom can restructure its strategy and tactics to wage the unconventional warfare that alone can bring this conflict to a true victory.
J. David Galland is Deputy Editor of DefenseWatch. He can be reached at defensewatch02@yahoo.com.
http://www.sftt.org/cgi-bin/csNews/csNews.cgi?database=DefenseWatch.db&command=viewone&op=t&id=148&rnd=683.5271870618434
Sempers,
Roger
:marine:
Admitting a Guerilla War after All
By J. David Galland
One afternoon last week I found myself stuck in a traffic jam on Interstate 10, about 30 miles east of El Paso, Tex. There was not much on my mind other than getting home, another 300 miles down the road.
To distract myself from the 109-degree boredom of the westbound lane, I turned to my car radio. By a stroke of luck I found a National Public Radio broadcast that consisted of an interview and discussion.
The subject of the dialogue centered on the declaration, earlier in the day, by Gen. John Abazaid, who as commander of Central Command leads all U.S. forces in Iraq, that the United States was now involved in a classic guerrilla war in that country. This has been an issue that has been gnawing on me for weeks as we have watched our soldiers in Iraq fall like bowling pins.
Only a dew weeks ago, Gen. Tommy Franks had handed over the Centcom flag to Abazaid, but I don’t recall that Franks had ever announced anything about a guerrilla war emerging in Iraq.
Quite to the opposite, Franks strutted around like a victorious commander who came, saw and conquered. I pondered the thought that maybe Franks did not know what our forces faced in what was briefly described as “post-war” Iraq. Why, only after days in command, has Gen. Abizad become such an astute observer of what Gen. Franks failed to recognize?
The NPR radio program that triggered these thoughts featured as guest analyst the recently retired commander of U.S. Army Europe, Gen. Montgomery C. Meigs. The general’s role that day was to serve as another naysayer to the presence of a pervasive level of widening guerrilla resistance to America’s effort in Iraq.
As I am a professional student of our country’s forays into the nether world of guerrilla wars, Meigs, a refined and intelligent military professional, held my attention. He asserted that he did not agree with Abizaid that America was involved in a classic guerrilla conflict.
Meigs did concede, however, that there appears to be some level of classic guerrilla resistance present. But he insisted that it was small, loosely organized, and not pervasive to the point of Abizaid’s characterization.
My response: I don’t buy it. In a military operational environment where one shot kills, the pattern of activity since the fall of Saddam Hussein has been that of a measured, if low-level guerillas campaign against our troops.
Every morning we are greeted by news headlines that sadly reveal more of our soldiers are being culled, like men on a chessboard, by something less than a classic guerrilla insurgency. President Bush’s May 1 declaration from the flight deck of the USS Abraham Lincoln that the mission in Iraq had been accomplished, is refuted on a daily basis by the gunfire in Iraq.
As a past participant of our strategic failure in Vietnam, I am well aware that guerrilla wars are not something that the United States does well. What’s worse, Meigs’ on-air interview assessment continues a sad tradition of U.S. military leaders who seem to believe that if they deny or minimize the presence and ferocity of any guerrilla force confronting our troops, the threat itself will magically disappear.
Waging a comprehensive campaign of unconventional warfare remains the best method of countering an indigenous guerrilla insurgency. First, we must win the confidence of the population, top to bottom. Protection of the sympathetic citizenry is crucial in order to illustrate just who is in control, thereby convincing people to come over without fear of retribution. Probably most important, the external force must always display strength, control of the operating environment, understanding of the target population, and truly offer a solution to a better tomorrow. These responsibilities largely fall to the civil affairs units for planning, execution, and constant fine-tuning. In Iraq, this is a tall order that strains Western military assets in every area.
But why is the U.S. military seemingly unable to carry this out? Military ineptness itself is not the issue. Instead, I believe the military seems to suffer from a lack of political and grassroots support from the U.S. government and the American people – despite all of the proclamations of support for the troops.
So the question continues to appear: “Why can’t the most eminent military superpower in the world, with all its might and assets, stop a low intensity conflict waged by ragged and disgruntled defeated Iraqi soldiers armed with single-shot bolt-action rifles?” The answer does not follow.
Meigs himself on NPR made no attempt to answer directly. Instead, he continued to downplay the existence of the painfully obvious guerrilla activity, dismissing it as small and isolated.
Nor was Meigs alone. Defense Secretary Donald H. Rumsfeld himself downplayed the issue for weeks. On July 17, when asked about a guerrilla war, Rumsfeld stuck to his guns, telling reporters, “The reason I don’t use the phrase ‘guerrilla war’ is because there isn’t one.” Finally, Gen. Abizad in mid-July replied “yes” to the same question.
From my corner of the foxhole, the apparently serious disconnect between Rumsfeld and the Centcom commander suggests that at the highest levels of the U.S. military there is a lack of healthy comprehension of what constitutes guerrilla activity.
Tell that to the soldiers! Daily attacks on American soldiers have raised the present body count total in Iraq to 49 since the end of organized combat on May 1 – including five deaths in a 24-hour period this past weekend.
Our soldiers are operating in a shooting gallery, where those who are waging this non-existent guerrilla war have honed their killing skills to an appreciable art. A “how-to” killing guide that is reportedly circulating in Iraq, among the population advises gunmen to aim for the 2-centimeter gap between a soldier’s helmet and the collar of his Kevlar vest. Other recommended targets include the armpit area or the groin, respectively, in hopes of striking a major artery.
It is a mixed blessing that the Centcom commander finally acknowledged what his troops and the Iraqis have known all along – that an organized guerilla resistance in Iraq appeared shortly after major combat ended, and that it is getting worse every day. Now we must pray that Centcom can restructure its strategy and tactics to wage the unconventional warfare that alone can bring this conflict to a true victory.
J. David Galland is Deputy Editor of DefenseWatch. He can be reached at defensewatch02@yahoo.com.
http://www.sftt.org/cgi-bin/csNews/csNews.cgi?database=DefenseWatch.db&command=viewone&op=t&id=148&rnd=683.5271870618434
Sempers,
Roger
:marine: