thedrifter
07-24-03, 06:08 AM
07-22-2003
Waging War During Peacetime
By William F. Sauerwein
The United States once again finds itself engaged in combat – and suffering casualties – while believing itself at peace. This phenomenon is not new to the nation, or its armed forces, but it seems that we have never learned from our experiences.
While the public demands a military that is capable of immediately winning military campaigns, taxpayers also want it done at a minimal cost. Subsequently, U.S. forces are stretched even thinner fighting these wars and deterring wars in other theaters.
Today’s security environment seems reminiscent of the Indian campaigns following the Civil War. The nation, reeling from both the human and economic costs of that war, did not relish fighting another conflict. Nevertheless, external forces beyond our control forced the nation and its Army to do just that.
Congress after Appomattox had reduced the U.S. Army’s authorized strength to 25,000 men, but in fact, it never reached even those numbers. Its fighting strength was in 25 regiments of infantry, ten regiments of cavalry and four regiments of artillery. Since Congress approved no manpower provisions for a general staff, recruiting command, training command, etc., all personnel assigned in those duties came from the regiments. Support troops did not exist, and those duties were performed either by civilian contractors or by more detached soldiers.
Fighting the various Indian tribes was not the Army’s only function during this time. Until 1877, the Army was responsible for policing the former Confederate states under Reconstruction. We also maintained garrisons at various strategic locations in the East, because we did not have cordial relations with the European Powers. American soldiers also guarded our potentially hostile borders with Mexico and British Canada.
The remainder of the Army was spread thin across the ever-shifting Western frontier, and confronted seemingly endless hostilities. If war broke out in one area, the Army was forced to shift troops from regions considered at peace. However, weakening these areas often provided the stimulus for sparking hostilities with the absence of adequate troops.
Frontier life was hard, military pay was low, enlistments were low and desertions were high. Subsequently, most combat units engaged in hostilities were at between 40 and 50 percent strength, with casualties and disease taking an additional toll. With the apathy of the public and the Congress, it took the under-strength Army almost 30 years to pacify the West.
When the Spanish-American War broke out in 1898, the U.S. armed forces were unprepared to fight a modern foreign power. While Spanish infantry used modern smokeless cartridge Mauser rifles, American Volunteer units received Civil War vintage black-powder Springfield rifles. Congress refused to purchase sufficient quantities of modern rifles until existing stocks were depleted. This put our soldiers at a disadvantage, and the black-powder signature made them easy targets.
The Army, scattered across the Great Plains, was totally unprepared for the war with Spain. Transportation from frontier posts to eastern assembly areas was slow and chaotic, and military transport ships did not exist. The situation was far more chaotic for Volunteer units mustered at the state level. Because of a shortage of space, the cavalry units had to leave their horses behind – so much for training as you fight.
Fortunately, Spain was a declining power, and the main combat theater, Cuba, was only 90 miles from Florida. The U.S. Navy, kept more modern because of foreign trade priorities, quickly bottled up the Spanish fleet in Santiago de Cuba. It also defeated the Spanish garrison in Manila in the Philippines, but both naval forces lacked ground forces to exploit their maritime successes.
What does this history lesson have to do with today’s situation in Iraq, Afghanistan, Korea and elsewhere?
The answer comes from poet George Santayana, who wrote: “Those who do not learn the lessons of history are doomed to repeat them.”
From 1865 until 1891, the United States attempted to pacify the American West with an under-strength, under-funded military force. Today the United States is attempting to meet its global responsibilities with an under-strength, and under-funded military force.
Furthermore, in both cases, the nation adopted no coherent strategy for defeating the existing threats. In Robert M. Utley’s history, Frontier Regulars, he mentions a “parsimonious Congress” which ignored both the threat and military readiness. Surplus equipment from the Civil War had to be used up first, even if it was outdated or unserviceable. The Army was forced to use single-shot, breech-loading rifles until the 1890s, while many Indians obtained modern repeating rifles.
While today’s military forces boast the latest in technology, little effort has been devoted to improving the firepower, or other equipment of the combat soldier himself. Instead, it seems our modernization is primarily dedicated to air power, cruise missiles and “smart bombs.” No matter how good this stuff is, you cannot claim victory until your ground troops occupy the enemy’s home ground.
Today’s forces are spread from Iraq moving westward all the way to the Korean DMZ. In other words, all around the world, engaged in a variety of missions including combat, host nation assistance, peacekeeping, humanitarian and firefighting in the American West. Like the soldiers of the American frontier, these troops are deployed in ever-smaller units, which increases their vulnerability.
I do not know where the next war will occur, but I do know we are grossly unprepared for it. How would we respond in the event of a new conflict with another “axis of evil” country, like Iran or North Korea? Or if China decided the opportunity is ripe for establishing its control over Taiwan, a nation we have pledged to defend. Even if we had forces ready, our transportation assets are severely strained supporting ongoing operations in Afghanistan and Iraq.
A chapter in Time-Life’s history, The Soldiers, is entitled, “Where Mistake Meant Disaster, and Disaster Meant Annihilation.” Army forces were sent on the various Indian campaigns in insufficient numbers for the magnitude of the tasks required of them. This problem was exposed during the Sioux-Cheyenne Campaign of 1876, and at the Battle of Little Big Horn.
Like the Indians, our current enemies have learned to negate our advantages by using guerrilla tactics and terrorism. They hit us where we are weakest, especially on our vulnerable logistical forces. Additional troops are tied down guarding bases, manning checkpoints and guarding convoys that could be out chasing the “bad guys.”
The public did not get serious about the Indian wars until the Little Big Horn defeat humbled the nation during the July 4, 1876 Centennial. Congress “solved” the problem by voting a 2,500-man increase in authorized army end-strength, but nothing else. This increase went to cavalry units, and infantry units’ strength was further decreased, reducing their effectiveness. Today, even the Bush administration still resists contemplating an increase to the active-duty military end-strength, but I do not see how we can avoid it.
During the war in Afghanistan, it was said that we needed more Special Operations troops. But without an increase in overall end-strength this would require that the personnel be taken from other forces. During the war in Iraq, we needed more heavy forces, again with no corresponding personnel increase. Following the 507th Maintenance Company’s ambush it became clear that we needed more support troops. Now we need more military police units for meeting the problems of policing the Iraqi population. With no increase in active-duty end-strength, which components must we rob to get these forces?
The bottom line is that it is imperative that the U.S. military obtain congressional approval for an active-duty end-strength that is sufficient for meeting all of our superpower responsibilities. We need to put overwhelming numbers of forces into Iraq and Afghanistan, and get those troops out on operations. We need a much larger force in Afghanistan, for example, to close down the borders to eliminate the enemy’s outside support, and give the enemy no rest inside the country. We must have enough forces so that when relieving one unit from an operation, a fresh unit is available to immediately take up the chase.
If we do not demonstrate more substantial success in both Iraq and Afghanistan, the public will sooner or later demand that we withdraw. If we withdraw, we will disastrously reinforce the “Somalia Syndrome,” emboldening terrorists and hostile regimes to resist our military moves.
Our leaders – from President Bush to Congress to the Pentagon – must understand that there is no alternative to expanding the size and strength of the U.S. military to meet its critical tasks ahead.
William F. Sauerwein is a Contributing Editor of DefenseWatch. He can be reached at mono@gtec.com.
http://www.sftt.org/cgi-bin/csNews/csNews.cgi?database=DefenseWatch.db&command=viewone&op=t&id=142&rnd=699.9236657870414
Sempers,
Roger
:marine:
Waging War During Peacetime
By William F. Sauerwein
The United States once again finds itself engaged in combat – and suffering casualties – while believing itself at peace. This phenomenon is not new to the nation, or its armed forces, but it seems that we have never learned from our experiences.
While the public demands a military that is capable of immediately winning military campaigns, taxpayers also want it done at a minimal cost. Subsequently, U.S. forces are stretched even thinner fighting these wars and deterring wars in other theaters.
Today’s security environment seems reminiscent of the Indian campaigns following the Civil War. The nation, reeling from both the human and economic costs of that war, did not relish fighting another conflict. Nevertheless, external forces beyond our control forced the nation and its Army to do just that.
Congress after Appomattox had reduced the U.S. Army’s authorized strength to 25,000 men, but in fact, it never reached even those numbers. Its fighting strength was in 25 regiments of infantry, ten regiments of cavalry and four regiments of artillery. Since Congress approved no manpower provisions for a general staff, recruiting command, training command, etc., all personnel assigned in those duties came from the regiments. Support troops did not exist, and those duties were performed either by civilian contractors or by more detached soldiers.
Fighting the various Indian tribes was not the Army’s only function during this time. Until 1877, the Army was responsible for policing the former Confederate states under Reconstruction. We also maintained garrisons at various strategic locations in the East, because we did not have cordial relations with the European Powers. American soldiers also guarded our potentially hostile borders with Mexico and British Canada.
The remainder of the Army was spread thin across the ever-shifting Western frontier, and confronted seemingly endless hostilities. If war broke out in one area, the Army was forced to shift troops from regions considered at peace. However, weakening these areas often provided the stimulus for sparking hostilities with the absence of adequate troops.
Frontier life was hard, military pay was low, enlistments were low and desertions were high. Subsequently, most combat units engaged in hostilities were at between 40 and 50 percent strength, with casualties and disease taking an additional toll. With the apathy of the public and the Congress, it took the under-strength Army almost 30 years to pacify the West.
When the Spanish-American War broke out in 1898, the U.S. armed forces were unprepared to fight a modern foreign power. While Spanish infantry used modern smokeless cartridge Mauser rifles, American Volunteer units received Civil War vintage black-powder Springfield rifles. Congress refused to purchase sufficient quantities of modern rifles until existing stocks were depleted. This put our soldiers at a disadvantage, and the black-powder signature made them easy targets.
The Army, scattered across the Great Plains, was totally unprepared for the war with Spain. Transportation from frontier posts to eastern assembly areas was slow and chaotic, and military transport ships did not exist. The situation was far more chaotic for Volunteer units mustered at the state level. Because of a shortage of space, the cavalry units had to leave their horses behind – so much for training as you fight.
Fortunately, Spain was a declining power, and the main combat theater, Cuba, was only 90 miles from Florida. The U.S. Navy, kept more modern because of foreign trade priorities, quickly bottled up the Spanish fleet in Santiago de Cuba. It also defeated the Spanish garrison in Manila in the Philippines, but both naval forces lacked ground forces to exploit their maritime successes.
What does this history lesson have to do with today’s situation in Iraq, Afghanistan, Korea and elsewhere?
The answer comes from poet George Santayana, who wrote: “Those who do not learn the lessons of history are doomed to repeat them.”
From 1865 until 1891, the United States attempted to pacify the American West with an under-strength, under-funded military force. Today the United States is attempting to meet its global responsibilities with an under-strength, and under-funded military force.
Furthermore, in both cases, the nation adopted no coherent strategy for defeating the existing threats. In Robert M. Utley’s history, Frontier Regulars, he mentions a “parsimonious Congress” which ignored both the threat and military readiness. Surplus equipment from the Civil War had to be used up first, even if it was outdated or unserviceable. The Army was forced to use single-shot, breech-loading rifles until the 1890s, while many Indians obtained modern repeating rifles.
While today’s military forces boast the latest in technology, little effort has been devoted to improving the firepower, or other equipment of the combat soldier himself. Instead, it seems our modernization is primarily dedicated to air power, cruise missiles and “smart bombs.” No matter how good this stuff is, you cannot claim victory until your ground troops occupy the enemy’s home ground.
Today’s forces are spread from Iraq moving westward all the way to the Korean DMZ. In other words, all around the world, engaged in a variety of missions including combat, host nation assistance, peacekeeping, humanitarian and firefighting in the American West. Like the soldiers of the American frontier, these troops are deployed in ever-smaller units, which increases their vulnerability.
I do not know where the next war will occur, but I do know we are grossly unprepared for it. How would we respond in the event of a new conflict with another “axis of evil” country, like Iran or North Korea? Or if China decided the opportunity is ripe for establishing its control over Taiwan, a nation we have pledged to defend. Even if we had forces ready, our transportation assets are severely strained supporting ongoing operations in Afghanistan and Iraq.
A chapter in Time-Life’s history, The Soldiers, is entitled, “Where Mistake Meant Disaster, and Disaster Meant Annihilation.” Army forces were sent on the various Indian campaigns in insufficient numbers for the magnitude of the tasks required of them. This problem was exposed during the Sioux-Cheyenne Campaign of 1876, and at the Battle of Little Big Horn.
Like the Indians, our current enemies have learned to negate our advantages by using guerrilla tactics and terrorism. They hit us where we are weakest, especially on our vulnerable logistical forces. Additional troops are tied down guarding bases, manning checkpoints and guarding convoys that could be out chasing the “bad guys.”
The public did not get serious about the Indian wars until the Little Big Horn defeat humbled the nation during the July 4, 1876 Centennial. Congress “solved” the problem by voting a 2,500-man increase in authorized army end-strength, but nothing else. This increase went to cavalry units, and infantry units’ strength was further decreased, reducing their effectiveness. Today, even the Bush administration still resists contemplating an increase to the active-duty military end-strength, but I do not see how we can avoid it.
During the war in Afghanistan, it was said that we needed more Special Operations troops. But without an increase in overall end-strength this would require that the personnel be taken from other forces. During the war in Iraq, we needed more heavy forces, again with no corresponding personnel increase. Following the 507th Maintenance Company’s ambush it became clear that we needed more support troops. Now we need more military police units for meeting the problems of policing the Iraqi population. With no increase in active-duty end-strength, which components must we rob to get these forces?
The bottom line is that it is imperative that the U.S. military obtain congressional approval for an active-duty end-strength that is sufficient for meeting all of our superpower responsibilities. We need to put overwhelming numbers of forces into Iraq and Afghanistan, and get those troops out on operations. We need a much larger force in Afghanistan, for example, to close down the borders to eliminate the enemy’s outside support, and give the enemy no rest inside the country. We must have enough forces so that when relieving one unit from an operation, a fresh unit is available to immediately take up the chase.
If we do not demonstrate more substantial success in both Iraq and Afghanistan, the public will sooner or later demand that we withdraw. If we withdraw, we will disastrously reinforce the “Somalia Syndrome,” emboldening terrorists and hostile regimes to resist our military moves.
Our leaders – from President Bush to Congress to the Pentagon – must understand that there is no alternative to expanding the size and strength of the U.S. military to meet its critical tasks ahead.
William F. Sauerwein is a Contributing Editor of DefenseWatch. He can be reached at mono@gtec.com.
http://www.sftt.org/cgi-bin/csNews/csNews.cgi?database=DefenseWatch.db&command=viewone&op=t&id=142&rnd=699.9236657870414
Sempers,
Roger
:marine: