thedrifter
07-13-03, 01:52 PM
Mobile Sea Base Hercules in the Northern Persian
Mobile Sea Base Hercules In The Northern
Persian Gulf: Beirut Barracks II?
CSC 1995
SUBJECT AREA Warfighting
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Title: Mobile Sea Base Hercules in the Northern Persian
Gulf: Beirut Barracks II?
Author: Commander Peter I. Wikul, United States Navy
Thesis: Because U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) did not
apply the lessons learned from the Beirut Barracks bombing
on 23 October l983 to the planning and deployment of Mobile
Sea Base (MSB) Hercules to the northern Persian Gulf, U.S.
forces almost suffered another Beirut tragedy.
Background: The United States military takes great pains to
write, catalog, and disseminate lessons learned to improve
doctrine. An analysis of the planning and manner in which
MSB Hercules was deployed to the northern Persian Gulf is
cause for concern. It makes one wonder if anyone seriously
reads, studies and applies lessons learned. The Long
Commission identified problems and recommended solutions to
preclude another Beirut tragedy, but CENTCOM appears not to
have provided sufficient command oversight to Commander,
Middle East Force prior to their deploying MSB Hercules near
Farsi Island without adequate protection. A little over
two weeks later, the Iranians launched an attack. The
Iranians lost. Because America won a decisive victory on
the night of 8 October l987, serious problems went
unnoticed.
Recommendation: All military planners should thoroughly
review lessons learned to avoid repeating tragic mistakes.
This is especially true for those planners at the
operational level who are tasked to provide command and
oversight to the tactical forces.
MOBILE SEA BASE HERCULES IN THE NORTHERN PERSIAN GULF:
BEIRUT BARRACKS II?
Early Sunday morning 23 October l983 a fanatic
Lebanese militiaman from Hezbollah drove a truck laden with
the equivalent of l2,OOO pounds of explosives into the U.S.
Marine Corps Battalion Landing Team (BLT) Headquarters
Barracks at Beirut Airport. The fanatic perished the
instant he detonated the bomb, killing 24l American
servicemen and wounding 7O.1 The Hezbollah succeeded in
their mission.
Five years later on the night of 8 October l987,
fanatics from the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC)
mounted an attack against a secret U.S. mobile sea base
(MSB) approximately 25 miles west of Farsi Island.2 This
time the Americans exacted a harsh toll on the Iranians.
U.S. forces sank three boats, probably killed fourteen IRGC
personnel, and captured four survivors.3 By contrast, there
were no U.S. casualties. The IRGC mission failed.
My thesis contends that U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM)
failed to apply the Beirut bombing lessons learned, as
documented in the Long Commission Report,4 the planning
and deployment of Mobile Sea Base Hercules to the northern
Persian Gulf. In support of my thesis I contrast specific
Report recommendations with CENTCOM’s employment of MSBs
during the initial phase of Operation ERNEST WILL, where
there was potential for another Beirut Barracks disaster. A
discussion of the strategic imperatives, operational
considerations and tactical employment of MSB Hercules will
precede my analysis. Because the facts concerning the
incident of 8 October l987 often have been reported
erroneously for lack of accurate information both in the
press and by historians, I provide a correct historical
account of this incident. Finally, I deliberate the impact
of applying lessons learned to future operations.
On the surface, both incidents are seemingly disparate
events. The Beirut bombing is the worst disaster for U.S.
military forces in recent history. By contrast, history has
recorded the combat action on 8 October l983 as a decisive
victory for the U.S. military.5 However, two common
threads tie both incidents together. First, the U.S.
military underestimated the Muslim fundamentalist militants’
capability to assess a critical vulnerability within the
U.S. operational theater; and they further underestimated
their ability to follow through with their assessment by
planning and executing an operation designed specifically to
thwart U.S. strategy. Second, we underestimated their moral
will to attack superior U.S. forces.
THE STRATEGIC LEVEL
Operation ERNEST WILL has its roots in the Iran-Iraq
war. The war escalated into an economic war of targeting
oil tankers. By spring of l987 the Tanker War claimed 325
ships.6 “Kuwait--seeing its oil exports seriously
imperiled by Iranian attacks on its tankers transiting the
Gulf--sought protection for them.”7
A small nation without military credibility to deter
attacks against its oil tanker fleet, Kuwait made appeals
for help to both the Soviet Union and the U.S. It was only
after the Soviets responded that the U.S. followed suit.8
The Soviets leased to Kuwait three oil tankers which would
sail under the Soviet flag and be protected by its navy.9
The U.S. approach was different. While in the Arabian Sea
and Persian Gulf, Kuwaiti oil tankers would sail under the
American flag (called reflagging) in convoy with U.S.
warships.
Two other events would further hasten U.S. involvement
in the Persian Gulf. On l7 May l987, two Iraqi missiles
fired in error by one of its jet fighters accidentally hit
the frigate USS Stark. Then, on the very first ERNEST WILL
escort mission, the reflagged tanker Bridgeton hit a mine
near Farsi Island while U.S. warships escorted it. It was
probably sheer luck which kept one of the warships escorting
the Bridgeton from the same fate.10 Although the U.S.
could not prove it, the mine that the Bridgeton hit was most
likely Iranian. Seeding mines and attacking commercial
shipping with impunity, Iran seemed to have free rein in the
northern Persian Gulf and was threatening U.S. policy
objectives.
http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/report/1995/WPI.htm
Sempers,
Roger
:marine:
Mobile Sea Base Hercules In The Northern
Persian Gulf: Beirut Barracks II?
CSC 1995
SUBJECT AREA Warfighting
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Title: Mobile Sea Base Hercules in the Northern Persian
Gulf: Beirut Barracks II?
Author: Commander Peter I. Wikul, United States Navy
Thesis: Because U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) did not
apply the lessons learned from the Beirut Barracks bombing
on 23 October l983 to the planning and deployment of Mobile
Sea Base (MSB) Hercules to the northern Persian Gulf, U.S.
forces almost suffered another Beirut tragedy.
Background: The United States military takes great pains to
write, catalog, and disseminate lessons learned to improve
doctrine. An analysis of the planning and manner in which
MSB Hercules was deployed to the northern Persian Gulf is
cause for concern. It makes one wonder if anyone seriously
reads, studies and applies lessons learned. The Long
Commission identified problems and recommended solutions to
preclude another Beirut tragedy, but CENTCOM appears not to
have provided sufficient command oversight to Commander,
Middle East Force prior to their deploying MSB Hercules near
Farsi Island without adequate protection. A little over
two weeks later, the Iranians launched an attack. The
Iranians lost. Because America won a decisive victory on
the night of 8 October l987, serious problems went
unnoticed.
Recommendation: All military planners should thoroughly
review lessons learned to avoid repeating tragic mistakes.
This is especially true for those planners at the
operational level who are tasked to provide command and
oversight to the tactical forces.
MOBILE SEA BASE HERCULES IN THE NORTHERN PERSIAN GULF:
BEIRUT BARRACKS II?
Early Sunday morning 23 October l983 a fanatic
Lebanese militiaman from Hezbollah drove a truck laden with
the equivalent of l2,OOO pounds of explosives into the U.S.
Marine Corps Battalion Landing Team (BLT) Headquarters
Barracks at Beirut Airport. The fanatic perished the
instant he detonated the bomb, killing 24l American
servicemen and wounding 7O.1 The Hezbollah succeeded in
their mission.
Five years later on the night of 8 October l987,
fanatics from the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC)
mounted an attack against a secret U.S. mobile sea base
(MSB) approximately 25 miles west of Farsi Island.2 This
time the Americans exacted a harsh toll on the Iranians.
U.S. forces sank three boats, probably killed fourteen IRGC
personnel, and captured four survivors.3 By contrast, there
were no U.S. casualties. The IRGC mission failed.
My thesis contends that U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM)
failed to apply the Beirut bombing lessons learned, as
documented in the Long Commission Report,4 the planning
and deployment of Mobile Sea Base Hercules to the northern
Persian Gulf. In support of my thesis I contrast specific
Report recommendations with CENTCOM’s employment of MSBs
during the initial phase of Operation ERNEST WILL, where
there was potential for another Beirut Barracks disaster. A
discussion of the strategic imperatives, operational
considerations and tactical employment of MSB Hercules will
precede my analysis. Because the facts concerning the
incident of 8 October l987 often have been reported
erroneously for lack of accurate information both in the
press and by historians, I provide a correct historical
account of this incident. Finally, I deliberate the impact
of applying lessons learned to future operations.
On the surface, both incidents are seemingly disparate
events. The Beirut bombing is the worst disaster for U.S.
military forces in recent history. By contrast, history has
recorded the combat action on 8 October l983 as a decisive
victory for the U.S. military.5 However, two common
threads tie both incidents together. First, the U.S.
military underestimated the Muslim fundamentalist militants’
capability to assess a critical vulnerability within the
U.S. operational theater; and they further underestimated
their ability to follow through with their assessment by
planning and executing an operation designed specifically to
thwart U.S. strategy. Second, we underestimated their moral
will to attack superior U.S. forces.
THE STRATEGIC LEVEL
Operation ERNEST WILL has its roots in the Iran-Iraq
war. The war escalated into an economic war of targeting
oil tankers. By spring of l987 the Tanker War claimed 325
ships.6 “Kuwait--seeing its oil exports seriously
imperiled by Iranian attacks on its tankers transiting the
Gulf--sought protection for them.”7
A small nation without military credibility to deter
attacks against its oil tanker fleet, Kuwait made appeals
for help to both the Soviet Union and the U.S. It was only
after the Soviets responded that the U.S. followed suit.8
The Soviets leased to Kuwait three oil tankers which would
sail under the Soviet flag and be protected by its navy.9
The U.S. approach was different. While in the Arabian Sea
and Persian Gulf, Kuwaiti oil tankers would sail under the
American flag (called reflagging) in convoy with U.S.
warships.
Two other events would further hasten U.S. involvement
in the Persian Gulf. On l7 May l987, two Iraqi missiles
fired in error by one of its jet fighters accidentally hit
the frigate USS Stark. Then, on the very first ERNEST WILL
escort mission, the reflagged tanker Bridgeton hit a mine
near Farsi Island while U.S. warships escorted it. It was
probably sheer luck which kept one of the warships escorting
the Bridgeton from the same fate.10 Although the U.S.
could not prove it, the mine that the Bridgeton hit was most
likely Iranian. Seeding mines and attacking commercial
shipping with impunity, Iran seemed to have free rein in the
northern Persian Gulf and was threatening U.S. policy
objectives.
http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/report/1995/WPI.htm
Sempers,
Roger
:marine: