thedrifter
07-12-03, 02:00 PM
Truth on the USS Liberty, attacked by Israel in 1967
Friendless Fire?
http://www.usni.org/proceedings/Articles03/PROwalsh06.htm
also see: http://www.ussliberty.org/nsafiles.htm
By David C. Walsh
Proceedings, June 2003, US Naval Institute
Did Israel know the ship it was firing on 36 years ago-here, after the
attack, listing from a deadly torpedo hit-was the USS Liberty? Today, top
former U.S. intelligence officials are saying "Yes."
On 8 June 1967 the electronic intelligence ship USS Liberty (AGTR-5) was on
station in international waters 13 miles off the Sinai Peninsula in the
eastern Mediterranean. The Arab-Israeli War had wound down, the air was
clear, and the seas were light. What happened early that Thursday afternoon
is well known. Without warning, a furious attack on the ship commenced from
Israeli Mirage and Mystere jets, followed by Ayah-class motor torpedo boats
(MTBs). Employed were rockets, napalm, quick-firing 30-mm and 40-mm cannon,
.50-caliber machine guns, and torpedoes. Four unshielded .50-caliber machine
guns were the Liberty's only defense. The one Israeli torpedo hit of five
launched left a yawning 40-foot hole in the hull, devastating the
cryptological spaces below decks and killing 25 U.S. National Security
Agency (NSA) technicians instantly.
Later, 821 shell holes were counted in the ship's superstructure and hull. A
total of 34 men died, with another 172 wounded, many disfigured for life,
among the highest peacetime tolls for any noncombatant U.S. Navy vessel and
by far the worst single loss to the U.S. intelligence community. It seems a
miracle the ship did not go down.1
Revisiting the Incident
In December 2002, the Naval Historical Center hosted a presentation on the
still deeply controversial attack by Federal Judge and retired U.S. Naval
Reserve Captain A. Jay Cristol, on a promotional tour for his recent book,
The Liberty Incident: The 1967 Attack on the U.S. Navy Spy Ship. Based on
Judge Cristol's doctoral thesis, the book relies heavily on newly
declassified (or newly interpreted) documents and more than 500 interviews
with U.S. and Israeli political and military leaders involved in the
incident, including former Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara, Admiral
Isaac Kidd, and Yitzhak Rabin, who was the Israeli Defense Force Chief of
Staff at the time. Only seven of the interviewees, however, were on board
the Liberty during the attack.2
At the Washington Navy Yard's Education Center, Judge Cristol addressed a
full house that included active-duty U.S. Navy personnel and surviving
Liberty crew members. He argued that the evidence "in totality" validated
Israel's long-standing position: namely, the catastrophe was the bitter
fruit of mistaken identity and communications gaffes by both sides.3 The
U.S. government quickly accepted Israel's apology 36 years ago, if not its
explanation.4 Israel also settled death and injury claims, albeit
reluctantly. And in 1980, the United States received $6 million in
compensation for the $40-million intelligence ship.
The Liberty Incident contains considerable, largely Israeli-sourced detail.
It also includes a chapter called "Television's Perspective," in which the
author surmises that most survivors-some of whom openly criticize Israel's
domestic policies and its formidable Washington lobby-have a political ax to
grind.
Judge Cristol, with 38 years' naval service, mourns the mens' deaths and
injuries, and his book honors their courage. But like the Israeli
government, the judge is dubious of the nay sayers. They rely on
"conjecture, hearsay and plain wishful thinking," flawed or traumatized
memories, and "various conspiracy theories," he says.5
No Bigots
Such characterizations, along with the linking of Liberty veterans with Arab
extremists and racist groups, sit poorly with the ship's crew. Indeed, the
Internet Web site of the Liberty Veterans' Association (LVA) makes clear
that all bigots' support is unwelcome.6 The suggestion of prejudice
especially upsets Jewish survivors, such as the senior engineering officer,
George Golden, who received the Silver Star for directing heroic efforts to
keep the ship afloat. And James Ennes Jr., the LVA historian and spokesman
accused in Judge Cristol's book of taking "an irrationally harsh line
against Israel," refers to such assertions as "just silly."7
Ennes, a retired Navy lieutenant commander, was officer of the deck before
being badly wounded early in the attack. He devoted 13 years' research
toward his own book, Assault on the Liberty. Some half-dozen major-and many
minor-disagreements mark the dispute's two main schools: Judge Cristol's
"mistaken identity" and Ennes's, the crew's, and several U.S. intelligence
professionals' "deliberate attack."
More Inquiries
Since 1967, survivors have pleaded for a more far-reaching government
inquiry into the incident. But Judge Cristol argues that another would be a
waste of time. Some 13 already have been conducted (five by Congress, one by
the U.S. Navy, and several by Israel). And according to Cristol, while
typically citing recklessness or inefficiency, all exonerate the Israeli
attackers of deliberate intent.
"False!" retorts Ennes. Of the 13 investigations cited by Judge Cristol,
Ennes observes, "Most were not investigations. . . . They were merely
reports to the boss from advisors . . . (and) mostly summaries and excerpts
of the Naval Court of Inquiry report."8
Clark Clifford, Chairman of President Lyndon B. Johnson's Foreign
Intelligence Advisory Board, drafted one such inquiry. Judge Cristol
characterizes Clifford as angry, but finding Israel innocent of murder.
Ennes infers darker meanings from the same document.
"Something had gone terribly wrong," Clifford wrote the President, "and then
it had been covered up. I never felt the Israelis had made adequate
restitution or explanation for their . . . unprovoked actions." Clifford
also termed "unbelievable" the explanation that the attack was accidental.
The Liberty's spotters, for example, had picked out the MTBs' small hull
marks, yet the Israeli attackers claimed never to have seen the U.S. ship's
much larger ones. Clifford, an intimate of Johnson's and champion of Israel,
urged the attackers be "punished," as did U.S. Secretary of State Dean Rusk,
noting there was "every reason to believe that the USS Liberty was
identified, or at least her nationality determined . . . one hour before the
attack."9
But instead of punishing the attackers, Israel honors them in a museum. Told
of the display, retired Air Force Major General John Morrison, NSA deputy
director for operations at the time, commented, "I am offended by that." And
retired Army Lieutenant General William Odom, NSA director from 1985 to
1988, and also unaware of the display, remarked, "I am astonished that
Israel should put glory on the people who killed my SigInt-ers [signals
intelligence personnel]."10 The Liberty's blood-stained flag is exhibited at
the National Cryptologic Museum in Fort Meade, Maryland.
Disputed Timelines and Communications
Although Liberty crew members insist the attack lasted about an hour and a
quarter, Judge Cristol's book asserts that the Israeli jets and MTBs
finished their grisly business in only 22 to 25 minutes.11
Ennes recalls being unsettled by the numerous flights over the Liberty by
Israeli reconnaissance planes, starting the previous night and continuing
for a six-hour period preceding the assault. Trained U.S. Navy observers
counted a dozen overflights. Some were made by a lumbering,
Star-of-David-marked Nord Noratlas "flying boxcar," which pulled several
times to within mast-clipping range-low enough for any Israeli pilot to see
a vessel incapable of harming his country.
Melvin Smith, senior enlisted intercept chief, reassured Ennes when he
overheard the pilots several times identify the flag as U.S. and the ship
for what she was.12 At that time, of course, Israel was a friend. Later,
despite jamming of the ship's distress frequencies, and before all her
transmitters were shot away, the Liberty's radio operators managed again to
hear the attackers make a positive identification in the clear.13 Judge
Cristol, conceding his newly released Israeli transcripts reveal one correct
identification, states that they are confusing and mutually
contradictory-typical of the "fog of war."14 Further, citing Ennes, he
states that no Hebrew linguists were on board the spy ship, and that Israeli
pilots would not have made unencrypted transmissions.15
Ennes acknowledges that no "official" Hebrew linguists were on board, but he
points out that at least one of the doomed NSA men, Russian/Arabic linguist
Allen Blue, understood Hebrew.16 As for the jamming, Ennes, quoting Chief
Radioman Wayne Smith and an article in Proceedings, also notes that the ship
could not have been misidentified, because the frequencies jammed were
peculiar to the U.S. Navy. Liberty Radioman Richard "Rocky" Sturman also
recalls that he and other technicians heard the radio jamming.17 Judge
Cristol rejects such accounts as "myth."18
continued.........
Friendless Fire?
http://www.usni.org/proceedings/Articles03/PROwalsh06.htm
also see: http://www.ussliberty.org/nsafiles.htm
By David C. Walsh
Proceedings, June 2003, US Naval Institute
Did Israel know the ship it was firing on 36 years ago-here, after the
attack, listing from a deadly torpedo hit-was the USS Liberty? Today, top
former U.S. intelligence officials are saying "Yes."
On 8 June 1967 the electronic intelligence ship USS Liberty (AGTR-5) was on
station in international waters 13 miles off the Sinai Peninsula in the
eastern Mediterranean. The Arab-Israeli War had wound down, the air was
clear, and the seas were light. What happened early that Thursday afternoon
is well known. Without warning, a furious attack on the ship commenced from
Israeli Mirage and Mystere jets, followed by Ayah-class motor torpedo boats
(MTBs). Employed were rockets, napalm, quick-firing 30-mm and 40-mm cannon,
.50-caliber machine guns, and torpedoes. Four unshielded .50-caliber machine
guns were the Liberty's only defense. The one Israeli torpedo hit of five
launched left a yawning 40-foot hole in the hull, devastating the
cryptological spaces below decks and killing 25 U.S. National Security
Agency (NSA) technicians instantly.
Later, 821 shell holes were counted in the ship's superstructure and hull. A
total of 34 men died, with another 172 wounded, many disfigured for life,
among the highest peacetime tolls for any noncombatant U.S. Navy vessel and
by far the worst single loss to the U.S. intelligence community. It seems a
miracle the ship did not go down.1
Revisiting the Incident
In December 2002, the Naval Historical Center hosted a presentation on the
still deeply controversial attack by Federal Judge and retired U.S. Naval
Reserve Captain A. Jay Cristol, on a promotional tour for his recent book,
The Liberty Incident: The 1967 Attack on the U.S. Navy Spy Ship. Based on
Judge Cristol's doctoral thesis, the book relies heavily on newly
declassified (or newly interpreted) documents and more than 500 interviews
with U.S. and Israeli political and military leaders involved in the
incident, including former Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara, Admiral
Isaac Kidd, and Yitzhak Rabin, who was the Israeli Defense Force Chief of
Staff at the time. Only seven of the interviewees, however, were on board
the Liberty during the attack.2
At the Washington Navy Yard's Education Center, Judge Cristol addressed a
full house that included active-duty U.S. Navy personnel and surviving
Liberty crew members. He argued that the evidence "in totality" validated
Israel's long-standing position: namely, the catastrophe was the bitter
fruit of mistaken identity and communications gaffes by both sides.3 The
U.S. government quickly accepted Israel's apology 36 years ago, if not its
explanation.4 Israel also settled death and injury claims, albeit
reluctantly. And in 1980, the United States received $6 million in
compensation for the $40-million intelligence ship.
The Liberty Incident contains considerable, largely Israeli-sourced detail.
It also includes a chapter called "Television's Perspective," in which the
author surmises that most survivors-some of whom openly criticize Israel's
domestic policies and its formidable Washington lobby-have a political ax to
grind.
Judge Cristol, with 38 years' naval service, mourns the mens' deaths and
injuries, and his book honors their courage. But like the Israeli
government, the judge is dubious of the nay sayers. They rely on
"conjecture, hearsay and plain wishful thinking," flawed or traumatized
memories, and "various conspiracy theories," he says.5
No Bigots
Such characterizations, along with the linking of Liberty veterans with Arab
extremists and racist groups, sit poorly with the ship's crew. Indeed, the
Internet Web site of the Liberty Veterans' Association (LVA) makes clear
that all bigots' support is unwelcome.6 The suggestion of prejudice
especially upsets Jewish survivors, such as the senior engineering officer,
George Golden, who received the Silver Star for directing heroic efforts to
keep the ship afloat. And James Ennes Jr., the LVA historian and spokesman
accused in Judge Cristol's book of taking "an irrationally harsh line
against Israel," refers to such assertions as "just silly."7
Ennes, a retired Navy lieutenant commander, was officer of the deck before
being badly wounded early in the attack. He devoted 13 years' research
toward his own book, Assault on the Liberty. Some half-dozen major-and many
minor-disagreements mark the dispute's two main schools: Judge Cristol's
"mistaken identity" and Ennes's, the crew's, and several U.S. intelligence
professionals' "deliberate attack."
More Inquiries
Since 1967, survivors have pleaded for a more far-reaching government
inquiry into the incident. But Judge Cristol argues that another would be a
waste of time. Some 13 already have been conducted (five by Congress, one by
the U.S. Navy, and several by Israel). And according to Cristol, while
typically citing recklessness or inefficiency, all exonerate the Israeli
attackers of deliberate intent.
"False!" retorts Ennes. Of the 13 investigations cited by Judge Cristol,
Ennes observes, "Most were not investigations. . . . They were merely
reports to the boss from advisors . . . (and) mostly summaries and excerpts
of the Naval Court of Inquiry report."8
Clark Clifford, Chairman of President Lyndon B. Johnson's Foreign
Intelligence Advisory Board, drafted one such inquiry. Judge Cristol
characterizes Clifford as angry, but finding Israel innocent of murder.
Ennes infers darker meanings from the same document.
"Something had gone terribly wrong," Clifford wrote the President, "and then
it had been covered up. I never felt the Israelis had made adequate
restitution or explanation for their . . . unprovoked actions." Clifford
also termed "unbelievable" the explanation that the attack was accidental.
The Liberty's spotters, for example, had picked out the MTBs' small hull
marks, yet the Israeli attackers claimed never to have seen the U.S. ship's
much larger ones. Clifford, an intimate of Johnson's and champion of Israel,
urged the attackers be "punished," as did U.S. Secretary of State Dean Rusk,
noting there was "every reason to believe that the USS Liberty was
identified, or at least her nationality determined . . . one hour before the
attack."9
But instead of punishing the attackers, Israel honors them in a museum. Told
of the display, retired Air Force Major General John Morrison, NSA deputy
director for operations at the time, commented, "I am offended by that." And
retired Army Lieutenant General William Odom, NSA director from 1985 to
1988, and also unaware of the display, remarked, "I am astonished that
Israel should put glory on the people who killed my SigInt-ers [signals
intelligence personnel]."10 The Liberty's blood-stained flag is exhibited at
the National Cryptologic Museum in Fort Meade, Maryland.
Disputed Timelines and Communications
Although Liberty crew members insist the attack lasted about an hour and a
quarter, Judge Cristol's book asserts that the Israeli jets and MTBs
finished their grisly business in only 22 to 25 minutes.11
Ennes recalls being unsettled by the numerous flights over the Liberty by
Israeli reconnaissance planes, starting the previous night and continuing
for a six-hour period preceding the assault. Trained U.S. Navy observers
counted a dozen overflights. Some were made by a lumbering,
Star-of-David-marked Nord Noratlas "flying boxcar," which pulled several
times to within mast-clipping range-low enough for any Israeli pilot to see
a vessel incapable of harming his country.
Melvin Smith, senior enlisted intercept chief, reassured Ennes when he
overheard the pilots several times identify the flag as U.S. and the ship
for what she was.12 At that time, of course, Israel was a friend. Later,
despite jamming of the ship's distress frequencies, and before all her
transmitters were shot away, the Liberty's radio operators managed again to
hear the attackers make a positive identification in the clear.13 Judge
Cristol, conceding his newly released Israeli transcripts reveal one correct
identification, states that they are confusing and mutually
contradictory-typical of the "fog of war."14 Further, citing Ennes, he
states that no Hebrew linguists were on board the spy ship, and that Israeli
pilots would not have made unencrypted transmissions.15
Ennes acknowledges that no "official" Hebrew linguists were on board, but he
points out that at least one of the doomed NSA men, Russian/Arabic linguist
Allen Blue, understood Hebrew.16 As for the jamming, Ennes, quoting Chief
Radioman Wayne Smith and an article in Proceedings, also notes that the ship
could not have been misidentified, because the frequencies jammed were
peculiar to the U.S. Navy. Liberty Radioman Richard "Rocky" Sturman also
recalls that he and other technicians heard the radio jamming.17 Judge
Cristol rejects such accounts as "myth."18
continued.........