U.S. Army Official 507th Maintenance Company Report

[thedrifter]

An Nasiriyah, Iraq...pdf.......
This report describes, in narrative form, the attack on an element of the U.S. Army 507th Maintenance Company by Iraqi military forces and irregulars in the city of An Nasiriyah on 23 March 2003 during OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM.


http://www.sftt.org/PDF/article07102003a.pdf


Sempers,

Roger
:marine:

[MillRatUSMC]

ROE - Rules of Engagement rears it's ugly head again.
Also placing the blame on the soldiers for not maintain their weapons, when it's the lubrication issued to them that's to blame.
Many are buying other lubrications out of pocket.
Radio batteries going dead and no replacements, someone to blame for this.
Human error on assume that one route was his main route when it was another.
Than making the wrong turn several times.
It also sites that the pace of attack in Iraqi Freedom might also have something to do with all these errors.
Sleep deprivation and hardly any rest, these have to be taken as the fog of war.
All the above speaks of covering your six by the higher ups in the chain of command.
It was diaster waiting to happen.
It's our hope that some lessons are learn from all this.
Question;
Could a kinder Army have something to do with all this?

Semper Fidelis
Ricardo

[richgitz]

I got a question, is the conveys that go out each day have air
cover? It seems that every day, the conveys are the one having
the main problems with taking the worst hits. I also think that
the closer they are to where saddam is the more heated up it
will get. I don't know but this picture sucks to me.

[thedrifter]

Editor’s Note: Presented here are some interim assessments of the Army’s investigation into the ambush of the 507 Maintenance Company in Iraq on March 23, 2003, that left the unit devastated, with 11 soldiers killed and another seven taken prisoner. As additional contributors analyze the document, their conclusions will be added here.

Details of Report Point to Leadership Failures


By Roger Moore



The Iraqi attack on the 507th Maintenance Co. was not only a tragedy, it was a massive failure to employ one of the basic tenets of the Art of War: Principles of Leadership. Here is my interim assessment after reading the draft “Attack on the 507th Maintenance Co.: An Nasiriyah, Iraq,”



Technical and Tactical Proficiency: While members of the 507th may have been technically proficient in their assigned MOS’s, the events of March 23, 2003, clearly show that the unit had no tactical proficiency.



According to the report, the 507th was only in-country 33 days before the An Nasiriyah failure. Deploying from Ft. Bliss, Tex, we can give benefit of the doubt that the 507th was acclimated to the desert environment. Upon its arrival the 507th began to “spin-up” and regain familiarity with neglected (in all likelihood) soldiering/warrior skills.



While there is nothing in the report to indicate the quality of leadership in the 507th, some of the actions described show a disturbing lack of trust and confidence within the unit.



* While the basic combat load was distributed for individual and crew-served weapons, the pyro and anti-armor weapons were consolidated and secured. My conclusion is that “fragging” – or more charitably, a lack of confidence in the unit’s ability to handle the ordnance safely – was a major concern.



Moreover, there is no mention in the report that during the 90-minute period from 0530-0700 on March 23 March, Capt. Troy Kent King should have had more than a “good idea” that his unit was lost that he, his officers or NCOs made a recommendation or decision to issue pyro and anti-armor before the situation degraded further.



* Additionally, there is no indication in the 15-page executive summary that any Frag Orders were issued given the fact that enemy contact was imminent.



* Instead of rallying his troops at an alternate point and trying to marshal a coherent defense while sending a messenger towards a friendly unit, Capt. King left his unit 10 kilometers behind while trying to evade/escape with a section of the company.



* The operations officer (S-3) of the 3rd Forward Support Battalion failed to ensure that King understood his mission and orders when he gave him a CD-ROM containing orders, route information and annotated large scale maps, according to the document.



Other questions and issues that emerge from the report include:



While the commercially available Garmin/Etrex Vista GPS receiver by all accounts outperformed the military PLGR, did anyone take into account that of the shelf GPS units can be MIJI’ed (Moning, Intrusion, Jamming, Intercepted)? After all, it operates from a radio/satellite signal.



Distribution of the GPS units according to Serial 2 (page 7) was adverse and should have been broken into elements to allow backup or redundancy, same with the crew-served weapons.



Over-reliance on technology: There was no mention of the presence of a lensatic compass and Defense Mapping Agency map(s) being used to double-check or update routes during movement and to keep all vehicles updated on route or situation.



While battery problems plagued the entire force, where were the mobile communication power assets to enable vehicle power and conserve batteries? With three Humvees present, one should have acted as a “convoy messenger” to coordinate movement when the radios died.



Failure by NCOs to ensure basic soldiering skills beyond MOS proficiency.



Failure by Capt. King to ensure that his troops knew and understood the orders and mission and actions to take if friendly contact was lost and take responsibility for his men.



Failure by the 3rd FSB Battalion Commander to know his troops and their capabilities and take actions to offset weaknesses.



Failure by the stateside battalion commander of the 507th to ensure his troops were trained and had the equipment necessary to accomplish the mission.



Failure of the Army and its officer corps to provide realistic training prior to entering the battlefield and discarding the lives of the men and women under their command for the sake of political expediency.



Failure, finally, of the United States Congress and the former Clinton administration to provide the tools necessary for the constitutionally mandated common defense.



Roger Moore is a Contributing Editor of DefenseWatch. He can be reached at rmoore_dw@yahoo.com.





507th Soldiers Were Not Combat-Ready



By Paul Connors



An initial review of the 15-page executive summary of the report, “Attack on the 507th Maintenance Co.: An Nasiriyah, Iraq,” reveals the following:



1) The 507th was part of a larger 600-vehicle convoy. The unit was separated from the main body and subsequently made navigation errors that compounded the problems.



2) The batteries on their FM radios went dead and they had no extras or spares.



3) As an Ordnance Maintenance Company, all they had were small arms (and one .50 cal. machine gun that quickly jammed). The troops were specifically armed with M-16 rifles and the worthless M9 Beretta 9-mm. sidearms.



4) Weapons failures in the fine sand of Iraq were not uncommon. The sand there is approximately as fine as talcum and gets into everything (and stays there).



5) Night and inclement weather compounded by communications failures and bad navigation made CAS impossible.



6) The captain commanding the company was an ordnance officer, not a combat arms officer from an infantry or armored unit. My assessment is that his warfighting skills were lacking.



Unlike the Marine Corps, not all army officers are trained to be rifle platoon leaders first. After commissioning, they go to their basic branch school which may or may not have anything to do with waging war.



Can you imagine if this had been a medical convoy led by a doctor, nurse or medical service officer? They would have run around like a bunch of ninnies and given up.



Army Ordnance Companies primarily concern themselves with first-tier maintenance support for vehicles (which they do not use). For example: their mechanics might fix the turret ring on an Abrams tank or a Bradley Fighting Vehicle, but they would not necessarily know how to deploy that tank or IFV in combat. These guys and gals also included IT specialists and other techy types, as well as supply clerks. That's the MOS Pfc. Jessica Lynch held.



These guys were notT ass-in-the-grass soldiers. Many of them probably weren't even current on M-16s. They might as well have sent Air Force technicians out there for all the infantry skill these guys and gals did not have.



Having been a grunt before I traded in my M21 for a laptop, I would hate to have to fight any kind of ground action with poorly-trained soldiers like these.



Paul Connors is a Senior Editor of DefenseWatch. He can be reached at paulconnors@hotmail.com. © 2003 Paul Connors.



continued......

[thedrifter]

Army Report on 507th Is Just a Beginning <br />
<br />
<br />
By Ray Perry <br />
<br />
<br />
<br />
The Army’s report, “Attack on the 507th Maintenance Co.: An Nasiriyah, Iraq,” raises several important questions that need further...