thedrifter
07-10-03, 06:00 AM
07-09-2003
A Key Iraqi ‘Lesson Learned’ – Keep the M-14
By Roger Moore
A key “lesson learned” from Operation Iraqi Freedom and chronicled in the DefenseWatch Special Report: “Small Arms and Individual Equipment Lessons Learned”, has been about firepower.
The decades-old argument over the ineffectiveness of the “Mighty Mattel,” as the M-16 was once known – because of its composite plastic and aluminum handgrip stamped with the “Mattel” logo when the rifles were first introduced – has dramatically resurfaced almost 30 years after its introduction.
The M-16 was designed as a result of Army studies from World Wars I and II, and Korea, where battlefield statistics showed that most kills occurred at 300 yards or less. Surprisingly perhaps, there have been conflicting reports from Army and Marine units in Iraq regarding the effectiveness of the M-16A2 and the 62 grain 5.56x45mm NATO round, but both services agree on the need for a more effective killing round.
Iraq, as we have all seen, has a tremendous amount of wide-open space. Until you can close with the enemy and engage them at 500 meters or less, the M-16 and its related weapons systems are ineffective. The M-14 offers an increased firepower capability to engage enemy troops well over 500 meters and give our warriors another tool to lessen casualties.
Despite the obvious value of the M-14, the Pentagon in its corporate wisdom is about to get rid of its remaining stock of 300,000 M-14s.
A WorldNetDaily article from June 15, 2003, revealed that the Pentagon is about to do away with the venerable old workhorse. The civilian marksmanship community is circulating a petition to have the weapons “civilianized” and sold under a program called the DCM (Director of Civilian Marksmanship) Program as a way to help pay for the Iraqi war.
Estimates from the online petition to civilianize the M-14 say that the government can recoup $300-600 million from sales of the rifles while “curbing government waste.”
Variants of the M-14 still exist in the U.S. arsenal. The M-21 and M-25 sniper rifles are refined versions of the M-14. The 26th MEU (SOC) used the M-14DMR (Designated Marksman Rifle) designed at the Marine Corps Combat Development Command, Quantico, Va., as a result of lessons learned from Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan.
The M-14DMR has a maximum effective range of 1,000 meters and will still operate with the 20-round box magazine. That range is generally reserved for indirect fire weapons and unless you happen to have an M1A2 Abrams main battle tank, Bradley Fighting Vehicle, mortar section or artillery battery close by or within radio range, you’re out of luck.
Marine Sgt. Dalton P. Baker quoted in an internal news article on Marine Link, said “A commercially equivalent [sniper rifle] would cost somewhere between twenty-eight and thirty-two thousand dollars apiece.” By converting an M-14, he noted, “We can build this rifle in two days, mostly because it takes 24 hours for the [fiberglass] epoxy to dry, and it only costs a little more than six hundred dollars in materials.”
Units from the 101st Airborne Division deployed at the squad level with M-14s in order to engage the enemy across large expanses of open terrain. It was a lesson the 82nd Airborne Division failed to pick up on prior to deployment.
What about the research and development costs to field a squad “stand-off” weapon? Ongoing efforts fall short of the M-14’s existing capabilities.
The M-16A2 SAMR (Squad Advanced Marksmanship Rifle) is an obvious acknowledgement of the need for a “stand-off” weapon with greater killing distance than a regular M-16A2 or M-4 carbine. But even with the upgrades of the SAMR, a stock or upgraded M-14 still gives a squad an extra 100-400 meters of killing area.
An unidentified Marine in a January 2003 Popular Mechanics cover story summed it up succinctly. “Carefully adjusting the variable scope on top of the new sniper rifle, a unit marksman squinted toward the far end of the training site where a fellow Marine was removing his chemical protection mask. ‘This is sweet,’ he chuckled. ‘I can look down his ear canal with this thing.’ The next person whose ear comes in the crosshairs of the enhanced Designated Marksman Rifle (DMR) will get more than an impromptu earwax inspection.”
Although not directly related to the M-14, the comments in the Iraqi “lessons learned” report from the Scout/Sniper teams employing the XM-107 Barrett .50 cal. sniper rifle can be applied to the need for providing an increased killing area. As the report found:
“XM-107: The Barrett .50 cal. Sniper Rifle may have been the most useful piece of equipment for the urban fight – especially for our light fighters. The XM-107 was used to engage both vehicular and personnel targets out to 1400 meters. Soldiers not only appreciated the range and accuracy but also the target effect. Leaders and scouts viewed the effect of the .50 cal. round as a combat multiplier due to the psychological impact on other combatants that viewed the destruction of the target.”
One sniper interviewed for the report said:
“My spotter positively identified a target at 1400 meters carrying an RPG on a water tower. I engaged the target. The top half of the torso fell forward out of the tower and the lower portion remained in the tower.”
The bottom line in modern combat remains: Rounds on target – especially at extended ranges.
So before DoD turns all of those M-14s out to pasture, officials need to seriously consider the present and foreseeable future areas of conflict and the consequences of giving up a known, proven combat asset with the ability to “reach out and touch someone” at a range of over 500 meters.
The Pentagon should keep the M-14 and allow units to employ at least one per squad and exponentially multiply the psychological and combat effectiveness of knowing that every squad in a U.S. combat division has the organic capability to “reach out and touch someone.”
Roger Moore is a Contributing Editor of DefenseWatch. He can be reached at rmoore_dw@yahoo.com.
http://www.sftt.org/cgi-bin/csNews/csNews.cgi?database=DefenseWatch.db&command=viewone&op=t&id=126&rnd=761.3389675711186
Small Arms and Individual Equipment Lessons Learned
http://www.sftt.org/article06102003a.html
Popular Mechanics Article.....
http://www.popularmechanics.com/science/military/2003/1/antiterrorism_forces/print.phtml#Popular%20Mechanics
Sempers,
Roger
:marine:
A Key Iraqi ‘Lesson Learned’ – Keep the M-14
By Roger Moore
A key “lesson learned” from Operation Iraqi Freedom and chronicled in the DefenseWatch Special Report: “Small Arms and Individual Equipment Lessons Learned”, has been about firepower.
The decades-old argument over the ineffectiveness of the “Mighty Mattel,” as the M-16 was once known – because of its composite plastic and aluminum handgrip stamped with the “Mattel” logo when the rifles were first introduced – has dramatically resurfaced almost 30 years after its introduction.
The M-16 was designed as a result of Army studies from World Wars I and II, and Korea, where battlefield statistics showed that most kills occurred at 300 yards or less. Surprisingly perhaps, there have been conflicting reports from Army and Marine units in Iraq regarding the effectiveness of the M-16A2 and the 62 grain 5.56x45mm NATO round, but both services agree on the need for a more effective killing round.
Iraq, as we have all seen, has a tremendous amount of wide-open space. Until you can close with the enemy and engage them at 500 meters or less, the M-16 and its related weapons systems are ineffective. The M-14 offers an increased firepower capability to engage enemy troops well over 500 meters and give our warriors another tool to lessen casualties.
Despite the obvious value of the M-14, the Pentagon in its corporate wisdom is about to get rid of its remaining stock of 300,000 M-14s.
A WorldNetDaily article from June 15, 2003, revealed that the Pentagon is about to do away with the venerable old workhorse. The civilian marksmanship community is circulating a petition to have the weapons “civilianized” and sold under a program called the DCM (Director of Civilian Marksmanship) Program as a way to help pay for the Iraqi war.
Estimates from the online petition to civilianize the M-14 say that the government can recoup $300-600 million from sales of the rifles while “curbing government waste.”
Variants of the M-14 still exist in the U.S. arsenal. The M-21 and M-25 sniper rifles are refined versions of the M-14. The 26th MEU (SOC) used the M-14DMR (Designated Marksman Rifle) designed at the Marine Corps Combat Development Command, Quantico, Va., as a result of lessons learned from Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan.
The M-14DMR has a maximum effective range of 1,000 meters and will still operate with the 20-round box magazine. That range is generally reserved for indirect fire weapons and unless you happen to have an M1A2 Abrams main battle tank, Bradley Fighting Vehicle, mortar section or artillery battery close by or within radio range, you’re out of luck.
Marine Sgt. Dalton P. Baker quoted in an internal news article on Marine Link, said “A commercially equivalent [sniper rifle] would cost somewhere between twenty-eight and thirty-two thousand dollars apiece.” By converting an M-14, he noted, “We can build this rifle in two days, mostly because it takes 24 hours for the [fiberglass] epoxy to dry, and it only costs a little more than six hundred dollars in materials.”
Units from the 101st Airborne Division deployed at the squad level with M-14s in order to engage the enemy across large expanses of open terrain. It was a lesson the 82nd Airborne Division failed to pick up on prior to deployment.
What about the research and development costs to field a squad “stand-off” weapon? Ongoing efforts fall short of the M-14’s existing capabilities.
The M-16A2 SAMR (Squad Advanced Marksmanship Rifle) is an obvious acknowledgement of the need for a “stand-off” weapon with greater killing distance than a regular M-16A2 or M-4 carbine. But even with the upgrades of the SAMR, a stock or upgraded M-14 still gives a squad an extra 100-400 meters of killing area.
An unidentified Marine in a January 2003 Popular Mechanics cover story summed it up succinctly. “Carefully adjusting the variable scope on top of the new sniper rifle, a unit marksman squinted toward the far end of the training site where a fellow Marine was removing his chemical protection mask. ‘This is sweet,’ he chuckled. ‘I can look down his ear canal with this thing.’ The next person whose ear comes in the crosshairs of the enhanced Designated Marksman Rifle (DMR) will get more than an impromptu earwax inspection.”
Although not directly related to the M-14, the comments in the Iraqi “lessons learned” report from the Scout/Sniper teams employing the XM-107 Barrett .50 cal. sniper rifle can be applied to the need for providing an increased killing area. As the report found:
“XM-107: The Barrett .50 cal. Sniper Rifle may have been the most useful piece of equipment for the urban fight – especially for our light fighters. The XM-107 was used to engage both vehicular and personnel targets out to 1400 meters. Soldiers not only appreciated the range and accuracy but also the target effect. Leaders and scouts viewed the effect of the .50 cal. round as a combat multiplier due to the psychological impact on other combatants that viewed the destruction of the target.”
One sniper interviewed for the report said:
“My spotter positively identified a target at 1400 meters carrying an RPG on a water tower. I engaged the target. The top half of the torso fell forward out of the tower and the lower portion remained in the tower.”
The bottom line in modern combat remains: Rounds on target – especially at extended ranges.
So before DoD turns all of those M-14s out to pasture, officials need to seriously consider the present and foreseeable future areas of conflict and the consequences of giving up a known, proven combat asset with the ability to “reach out and touch someone” at a range of over 500 meters.
The Pentagon should keep the M-14 and allow units to employ at least one per squad and exponentially multiply the psychological and combat effectiveness of knowing that every squad in a U.S. combat division has the organic capability to “reach out and touch someone.”
Roger Moore is a Contributing Editor of DefenseWatch. He can be reached at rmoore_dw@yahoo.com.
http://www.sftt.org/cgi-bin/csNews/csNews.cgi?database=DefenseWatch.db&command=viewone&op=t&id=126&rnd=761.3389675711186
Small Arms and Individual Equipment Lessons Learned
http://www.sftt.org/article06102003a.html
Popular Mechanics Article.....
http://www.popularmechanics.com/science/military/2003/1/antiterrorism_forces/print.phtml#Popular%20Mechanics
Sempers,
Roger
:marine: