thedrifter
01-01-09, 06:58 AM
HELL'S HIGHWAY
By GORDON CUCULLU
January 1, 2009 --
PRESIDENT-elect Barack Obama's plan to surge forces in Afghanistan - almost doubling US boots on the ground - faces one big problem: Hell's Highway.
Not the bloody cult film or the video game, but the main supply line that provides our troops in Afghanistan with vital material to live, work and fight.
This treacherous, rocky road winds up-country from Pakistan's coastal ports, through the legendary Khyber Pass, into bases in Afghanistan. Along it, trucks laden with fuel, ammunition, food and other necessary accoutrements of war make their way north, keeping American soldiers and Marines in the fight.
The road has become a focal point for our enemies, providing lucrative targets for al Qaeda and Taliban fighters (plus those of local bandit warlords) who rightly see this as the easiest, most efficient way to degrade US war-making capabilities. As the number of convoys traversing the road has grown routine and predictable, casualties have mounted, with losses in life and resources growing daily.
Gen. Dwight Eisenhower, following Napoleon's dictum of an army traveling on its stomach, famously established the Red Ball Express in World War II's European Theater. The Red Ball - a unit of 2½ ton supply trucks and highly motivated, primarily African-American drivers - was tasked with the mission of delivering cargo as close to the front lines as possible. They performed heroically and were a major contribution to the unique logistical system that historians like the late Stephen Ambrose credit with Allied capability to halt Hitler's December 1944 Ardennes Offensive at the Battle of the Bulge.
But there are major differences between that logistical triumph and the tenuous route over which supplies flow into Afghanistan today.
While subject to occasional Luftwaffe and German infiltrator attacks, the Red Ball flowed through liberated areas, reasonably safe from attack. Today's convoys enjoy no such advantage.
It may well be the single most strategically vulnerable point of the Obama surge.
Cargo aircraft simply can't deliver sufficient amounts of needed supplies, given the enormous tonnage required to maintain ground and air forces at combat strength levels. US military and contract air transport is already overtaxed - on its best day, capable of providing only basic support for engaged units. Add in high-volume, enormously heavy components like fuel and ammunition, and any air-supply route would collapse under the load.
Military authorities have recognized this vulnerability, and recently announced plans to open a new supply net that would use bases in Central Asia and a new road to be constructed into Afghanistan.
But such a monumental project is months away and calls for hundreds of millions in new spending to establish bases in countries with fragile governments. Further, the planned supply line would be contingent on road and rail usage from Europe and Russia, which could cut the route or demand a quid pro quo for allowing transit of supplies, rendering US interests vulnerable.
What's more, the arrangement prohibits transit of weapons and munitions, forcing reliance on stressed air transport. That leaves us with the method of supply used in expeditionary warfare dating back to the Trojan war and beyond: an ocean-crossing fleet discharging cargo to overland carriers that deliver goods to the soldiers.
Pakistan is the only country in the region that can provide the ports and road net we need. Iran is a de facto enemy, while the nations to Afghanistan's north are themselves land-locked.
Hence route security along Hell's Highway is rapidly becoming the singular most vital cog in expanding military operations in Afghanistan. If the supply route is cut, US forces will run short of what they need to conduct operations.
Yet that security is now provided by a poorly organized, often competitive and barely competent mix of Pakistani forces, Afghani military and locally hired contract security groups. Commanders in the theater of operations are already diverting combat units for route-protection missions.
In short order, significant numbers of combat units may have to be diverted from the fight against Taliban and al Qaeda forces in remote, contested areas to a mission of protecting the vital supply lifeline. And those units will also consume some of the northbound supplies.
Commanders may well face a tipping-point scenario, with route-protection units pulling so much from the supply flow that other combat units still face deficiencies. Securing the route with acceptable losses in men and resources will be a tough challenge.
Ultimately the military will, because of the mission it has been given, try to do everything: put more boots on the ground, protect the supply lines and increase combat operations. But that will mean paying a high price in blood and lost resources, much of it along Hell's Highway.
US casualties will mount along the route as usage almost doubles. Some fighting may take place on the Pakistani side of the border, exponentially exacerbating tensions with that country.
Obama's flip comment during the campaign about conducting military operations within Pakistan without that government's permission may come back to haunt him. He may soon face exactly that alternative in a place and for reasons he and his advisers likely never contemplated: trying to protect the supply line along Hell's Highway.
Gordon Cucullu is a former Army lieutenant colonel. His latest book, "Inside Gitmo: The True Story Behind the Myths of Guantanamo Bay," is scheduled for release Jan. 27.
Ellie
By GORDON CUCULLU
January 1, 2009 --
PRESIDENT-elect Barack Obama's plan to surge forces in Afghanistan - almost doubling US boots on the ground - faces one big problem: Hell's Highway.
Not the bloody cult film or the video game, but the main supply line that provides our troops in Afghanistan with vital material to live, work and fight.
This treacherous, rocky road winds up-country from Pakistan's coastal ports, through the legendary Khyber Pass, into bases in Afghanistan. Along it, trucks laden with fuel, ammunition, food and other necessary accoutrements of war make their way north, keeping American soldiers and Marines in the fight.
The road has become a focal point for our enemies, providing lucrative targets for al Qaeda and Taliban fighters (plus those of local bandit warlords) who rightly see this as the easiest, most efficient way to degrade US war-making capabilities. As the number of convoys traversing the road has grown routine and predictable, casualties have mounted, with losses in life and resources growing daily.
Gen. Dwight Eisenhower, following Napoleon's dictum of an army traveling on its stomach, famously established the Red Ball Express in World War II's European Theater. The Red Ball - a unit of 2½ ton supply trucks and highly motivated, primarily African-American drivers - was tasked with the mission of delivering cargo as close to the front lines as possible. They performed heroically and were a major contribution to the unique logistical system that historians like the late Stephen Ambrose credit with Allied capability to halt Hitler's December 1944 Ardennes Offensive at the Battle of the Bulge.
But there are major differences between that logistical triumph and the tenuous route over which supplies flow into Afghanistan today.
While subject to occasional Luftwaffe and German infiltrator attacks, the Red Ball flowed through liberated areas, reasonably safe from attack. Today's convoys enjoy no such advantage.
It may well be the single most strategically vulnerable point of the Obama surge.
Cargo aircraft simply can't deliver sufficient amounts of needed supplies, given the enormous tonnage required to maintain ground and air forces at combat strength levels. US military and contract air transport is already overtaxed - on its best day, capable of providing only basic support for engaged units. Add in high-volume, enormously heavy components like fuel and ammunition, and any air-supply route would collapse under the load.
Military authorities have recognized this vulnerability, and recently announced plans to open a new supply net that would use bases in Central Asia and a new road to be constructed into Afghanistan.
But such a monumental project is months away and calls for hundreds of millions in new spending to establish bases in countries with fragile governments. Further, the planned supply line would be contingent on road and rail usage from Europe and Russia, which could cut the route or demand a quid pro quo for allowing transit of supplies, rendering US interests vulnerable.
What's more, the arrangement prohibits transit of weapons and munitions, forcing reliance on stressed air transport. That leaves us with the method of supply used in expeditionary warfare dating back to the Trojan war and beyond: an ocean-crossing fleet discharging cargo to overland carriers that deliver goods to the soldiers.
Pakistan is the only country in the region that can provide the ports and road net we need. Iran is a de facto enemy, while the nations to Afghanistan's north are themselves land-locked.
Hence route security along Hell's Highway is rapidly becoming the singular most vital cog in expanding military operations in Afghanistan. If the supply route is cut, US forces will run short of what they need to conduct operations.
Yet that security is now provided by a poorly organized, often competitive and barely competent mix of Pakistani forces, Afghani military and locally hired contract security groups. Commanders in the theater of operations are already diverting combat units for route-protection missions.
In short order, significant numbers of combat units may have to be diverted from the fight against Taliban and al Qaeda forces in remote, contested areas to a mission of protecting the vital supply lifeline. And those units will also consume some of the northbound supplies.
Commanders may well face a tipping-point scenario, with route-protection units pulling so much from the supply flow that other combat units still face deficiencies. Securing the route with acceptable losses in men and resources will be a tough challenge.
Ultimately the military will, because of the mission it has been given, try to do everything: put more boots on the ground, protect the supply lines and increase combat operations. But that will mean paying a high price in blood and lost resources, much of it along Hell's Highway.
US casualties will mount along the route as usage almost doubles. Some fighting may take place on the Pakistani side of the border, exponentially exacerbating tensions with that country.
Obama's flip comment during the campaign about conducting military operations within Pakistan without that government's permission may come back to haunt him. He may soon face exactly that alternative in a place and for reasons he and his advisers likely never contemplated: trying to protect the supply line along Hell's Highway.
Gordon Cucullu is a former Army lieutenant colonel. His latest book, "Inside Gitmo: The True Story Behind the Myths of Guantanamo Bay," is scheduled for release Jan. 27.
Ellie