thedrifter
12-28-08, 07:23 AM
'New warfare' focuses on listening
Experts say U.S. must find roots of local problems in Afganistan
By David Wood
The Baltimore Sun
Posted: 12/28/2008 12:01:00 AM CST
FORT BRAGG, N.C. — In a sandy clearing in the pine woods, Special Forces soldiers and civilians are struggling with the riddle of Afghanistan: Why is the United States, seven years after it invaded and threw out the Taliban, still falling short in the war?
From their varied backgrounds — infantryman, farming expert, foreign aid officer — they work under U.S. Army doctrine: You can't beat insurgents with military force.
For years, everyone from politicians to generals have advocated "more troops," and the Pentagon will deploy about 4,000 additional soldiers and Marines in the next two months. Roughly 20,000 more are likely to be deployed in spring and summer.
But military officers acknowledge that pure force can be counterproductive, especially in regions hostile to outsiders, where civilian casualties and destruction accompany combat operations.
As U.S. Secretary of Defense Robert Gates observed recently about Afghanistan, "We cannot kill or capture our way to victory."
Instead, counterinsurgency experts here say they believe the U.S. must focus on building stability into the lives of ordinary Afghans. That sounds simple and obvious, but it's a 180-degree turn from the current strategy. And it requires sending Americans skilled not just in war-zone work but in fitting development to local needs.
The United States can't "fix" Afghanistan's poverty, illiteracy and other causes of instability. But Special Forces counterinsurgency experts
say they believe they can stem the rising Taliban insurgency by refocusing the U.S. effort. Instead of just chasing insurgents and heaping development projects — such as roads, schools and clinics — into a district, first determine the causes of local conflict. Then work to fix those problems.
"This is new warfare," said John Mott, a Montana-bred cowboy who works on livestock management with a local Afghanistan government. "This is not the Peace Corps, it's a counterinsurgency. If it were as simple as shooting bad guys, I'd be all for it. That's easy to do.
"This other," he sighed, "is slow and frustrating — everything Americans hate to do."
Listening carefully to local people, counterinsurgency experts say, can help determine why a particular village is dominated by the Taliban, who are often disliked for their harsh methods. Probing further can determine what can be done.
Afghanistan "is a complex environment, and you got to ask a lot of questions and peel back the layers," said Jim Derleth, senior adviser on conflict and stabilization at the U.S. Agency for International Development. "We are not doing that."
Americans were proud of a school recently opened in Paktika province in eastern Pakistan. But conflict flared immediately. Fighting broke out, and the Taliban arrived to threaten the teacher with death.
It turned out that unpopular and corrupt police assigned to protect the school were extorting bribes from villagers, and the Taliban became heroes for chasing the cops away.
In Paktika province, American dollars would have been better invested in helping the local government select a new police chief and remove the corrupt police.
Ellie
Experts say U.S. must find roots of local problems in Afganistan
By David Wood
The Baltimore Sun
Posted: 12/28/2008 12:01:00 AM CST
FORT BRAGG, N.C. — In a sandy clearing in the pine woods, Special Forces soldiers and civilians are struggling with the riddle of Afghanistan: Why is the United States, seven years after it invaded and threw out the Taliban, still falling short in the war?
From their varied backgrounds — infantryman, farming expert, foreign aid officer — they work under U.S. Army doctrine: You can't beat insurgents with military force.
For years, everyone from politicians to generals have advocated "more troops," and the Pentagon will deploy about 4,000 additional soldiers and Marines in the next two months. Roughly 20,000 more are likely to be deployed in spring and summer.
But military officers acknowledge that pure force can be counterproductive, especially in regions hostile to outsiders, where civilian casualties and destruction accompany combat operations.
As U.S. Secretary of Defense Robert Gates observed recently about Afghanistan, "We cannot kill or capture our way to victory."
Instead, counterinsurgency experts here say they believe the U.S. must focus on building stability into the lives of ordinary Afghans. That sounds simple and obvious, but it's a 180-degree turn from the current strategy. And it requires sending Americans skilled not just in war-zone work but in fitting development to local needs.
The United States can't "fix" Afghanistan's poverty, illiteracy and other causes of instability. But Special Forces counterinsurgency experts
say they believe they can stem the rising Taliban insurgency by refocusing the U.S. effort. Instead of just chasing insurgents and heaping development projects — such as roads, schools and clinics — into a district, first determine the causes of local conflict. Then work to fix those problems.
"This is new warfare," said John Mott, a Montana-bred cowboy who works on livestock management with a local Afghanistan government. "This is not the Peace Corps, it's a counterinsurgency. If it were as simple as shooting bad guys, I'd be all for it. That's easy to do.
"This other," he sighed, "is slow and frustrating — everything Americans hate to do."
Listening carefully to local people, counterinsurgency experts say, can help determine why a particular village is dominated by the Taliban, who are often disliked for their harsh methods. Probing further can determine what can be done.
Afghanistan "is a complex environment, and you got to ask a lot of questions and peel back the layers," said Jim Derleth, senior adviser on conflict and stabilization at the U.S. Agency for International Development. "We are not doing that."
Americans were proud of a school recently opened in Paktika province in eastern Pakistan. But conflict flared immediately. Fighting broke out, and the Taliban arrived to threaten the teacher with death.
It turned out that unpopular and corrupt police assigned to protect the school were extorting bribes from villagers, and the Taliban became heroes for chasing the cops away.
In Paktika province, American dollars would have been better invested in helping the local government select a new police chief and remove the corrupt police.
Ellie