thedrifter
11-15-08, 07:49 AM
Familiar Refrain on Afghan Surge
[Steve Schippert]
Eric Edelman, the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, warns against presuming success in an Afghan "surge" parallel to the one in Iraq. He is not naysaying or merely couching, as the headline may suggest to some. Read carefully and you will identify the same basic challenges that were described before the Iraq surge.
One of the Pentagon’s top policymakers warned Thursday that a “surge” of U.S. troops to Afghanistan like the one executed in Iraq 18 months ago doesn’t recognize the complexities of the Taliban and al Qaeda-sponsored violence there and could backfire.
Eric Edelman, the Pentagon’s top civilian policy advisor to Defense Secretary Robert Gates, said the situation in Afghanistan is far different than the one faced by U.S. troops in Iraq during the darkest days of sectarian violence in 2006,
“We shouldn’t just focus on the numbers of forces,” Edelman told defense reporters at a Nov. 13 breakfast meeting in Washington. “The success of the surge in Iraq, in my view, was less a function of the increased numbers … it was what they were doing that mattered.”
“The single-minded focus on what’s the level of force is wrong headed because there are a lot of elements that go into it and there’s no magic number,” he added.
Recall those of us who pleaded ahead of the Iraq surge that supporters and detractors "shouldn’t just focus on the numbers of forces"? What made the Iraq surge successful was the strategy employed, the shift in operational focus, and a refined mission that made the security of the Iraqi people central to the defeat of the insurgency and al-Qaeda. The number of troops in the surge was determined by identifying needs to achieve this shifted mission, not the other way around. And it put the Iraqi people first.
Likewise, those who support a "surge" in Afghanistan must look beyond the numbers and ask what strategic and tactical shifts are being suggested, for what mission shift, and whether it is one that also puts the security and safety of the Afghan (and Pakistani) indigenous people first.
What will make an Afghan "surge" look different is not the basic broader equation, but what specific differences must be accounted for and accommodated regarding these people — differences in culture, society, religion, and governance (or lack thereof).
The peoples of Iraq and Afghanistan/Pakistan are very, very different, and they require very, very different approaches. But the basic human calculus remains: Security before liberty; liberty before prosperity; and the achievement of relative prosperity and opportunity will net parallel measures of relative peace. But the people need to be secure and confident enough to reject the murderous forces in their midst — and believe in the alternative.
This is fundamentally more difficult in Afghanistan and the tribal regions of Pakistan, because in Iraq, there were at least the tiered mechanisms of governance in place, though they were dominated by a dictator. In other words, there was an infrastructure. This is markedly less so in the areas at hand in Afghanistan and Pakistan.
Edelman is quite right to warn against those who may be inclined to now assume a surge will mean success by its mere implementation. (It should be noted that such a warning is in part necessary because Petraeus has set quite a high bar for expectations.) And he is doubly right to direct attention away from simple numbers. Know that capable men and women are working feverishly to construct a plan that intends to duplicate the Iraq surge's success, but consciously and necessarily with fundamental ground-level differences.
No small task. And they're on it.
Ellie
[Steve Schippert]
Eric Edelman, the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, warns against presuming success in an Afghan "surge" parallel to the one in Iraq. He is not naysaying or merely couching, as the headline may suggest to some. Read carefully and you will identify the same basic challenges that were described before the Iraq surge.
One of the Pentagon’s top policymakers warned Thursday that a “surge” of U.S. troops to Afghanistan like the one executed in Iraq 18 months ago doesn’t recognize the complexities of the Taliban and al Qaeda-sponsored violence there and could backfire.
Eric Edelman, the Pentagon’s top civilian policy advisor to Defense Secretary Robert Gates, said the situation in Afghanistan is far different than the one faced by U.S. troops in Iraq during the darkest days of sectarian violence in 2006,
“We shouldn’t just focus on the numbers of forces,” Edelman told defense reporters at a Nov. 13 breakfast meeting in Washington. “The success of the surge in Iraq, in my view, was less a function of the increased numbers … it was what they were doing that mattered.”
“The single-minded focus on what’s the level of force is wrong headed because there are a lot of elements that go into it and there’s no magic number,” he added.
Recall those of us who pleaded ahead of the Iraq surge that supporters and detractors "shouldn’t just focus on the numbers of forces"? What made the Iraq surge successful was the strategy employed, the shift in operational focus, and a refined mission that made the security of the Iraqi people central to the defeat of the insurgency and al-Qaeda. The number of troops in the surge was determined by identifying needs to achieve this shifted mission, not the other way around. And it put the Iraqi people first.
Likewise, those who support a "surge" in Afghanistan must look beyond the numbers and ask what strategic and tactical shifts are being suggested, for what mission shift, and whether it is one that also puts the security and safety of the Afghan (and Pakistani) indigenous people first.
What will make an Afghan "surge" look different is not the basic broader equation, but what specific differences must be accounted for and accommodated regarding these people — differences in culture, society, religion, and governance (or lack thereof).
The peoples of Iraq and Afghanistan/Pakistan are very, very different, and they require very, very different approaches. But the basic human calculus remains: Security before liberty; liberty before prosperity; and the achievement of relative prosperity and opportunity will net parallel measures of relative peace. But the people need to be secure and confident enough to reject the murderous forces in their midst — and believe in the alternative.
This is fundamentally more difficult in Afghanistan and the tribal regions of Pakistan, because in Iraq, there were at least the tiered mechanisms of governance in place, though they were dominated by a dictator. In other words, there was an infrastructure. This is markedly less so in the areas at hand in Afghanistan and Pakistan.
Edelman is quite right to warn against those who may be inclined to now assume a surge will mean success by its mere implementation. (It should be noted that such a warning is in part necessary because Petraeus has set quite a high bar for expectations.) And he is doubly right to direct attention away from simple numbers. Know that capable men and women are working feverishly to construct a plan that intends to duplicate the Iraq surge's success, but consciously and necessarily with fundamental ground-level differences.
No small task. And they're on it.
Ellie