View Full Version : Equipment Intel
Saw this on another board. It's a long read but good intel.
Enjoy
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ABRIDGED
AN/PVS- 14 Night Vision Equipment ~ “Great piece of gear, need more.”
M16A4 with associated combat optic (ACOG 4x), the West Coast’s SAM Rifle ~ All interviewed were extremely pleased with the performance and felt it “answered the mail” for the role of the Squad Advanced Marksman (SAM).
M4 Carbine ~ Many Marines commented on desire for the shorter weapon vice the longer M16’s.
M249 Squad Automatic Weapon (SAW) ~ The SAW’s are worn out and apparently beyond repair. They have far exceeded their service life. Many Marines are duct taping and zip tying the weapons together. Reconnaissance units were requesting parasaw, infantry units requesting collapsible buttstock.
5.56mm vs. 7.62 Lethality ~ 5.56mm “definitely answered the mail” and “as long as the shots were in the head or chest they went down”
M9 Pistol Magazines ~ The magazines are not working properly.
Weapon Backup ~ Many infantrymen are requesting that all operators have an issued backup weapon,
Rifle Propelled Grenade ~ Many Marines are requesting Rifle Propelled grenades to augment or replace the M203. The M203 doesn’t have an adequate range capability. (note: this desire stems from the fact that the most effective weapon employed against coalition forces was the RPG).
M240G Medium Machine Gun ~ Marines who did not really know what to expect were extremely impressed with effects on target.
SMAW Thermobaric (New) Round ~ Only received reports of two shots. One unit disintegrated a large one-story masonry type building with one round from 100 meters. They were extremely impressed. However, another unit tried to breach a wall of a similar masonry building after being unsuccessful at trying to mechanically breach a door. “The round just bounced off the wall.” They were not so impressed.
Drop Holsters and “phone dummy chords”
Three-Point Slings ~ Marine unit funds and individual funds were used to purchase three-point slings for M16A2 service rifles.
MOLLE Gear ~ Marines uniformly and strongly DISLIKED this item
Kevlar Helmets ~ Very positive feedback received. During urban fighting in Iraq, a Marine Corporal was struck in the front of his helmet by a 7.62 x 39mm round. The Kevlar PASGT helmet absorbed the impact of the round with no injury to the Marine.
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Flexcell Extended Range External Mount Fuel Bladders (“Flexcells”) ~ “The system is good.” Recommended a mounting system for LAV-25. System was used in the Log variant LAV (by
being placed in rear) and in the beds of rolling stock. Provide additional “in stride” refueling capability that assisted in the long and rapid USMC advance into Iraq. The flexcell allowed 2D Battalion to conduct an in stride refueling of the battalion in less than 90 minutes, 80 kilometers inside Iraqi territory the first night of the ground war. One company reported having a single tank refueled and operational in under 3 minutes. The flexcells aided the battalion in its six hundred mile trek into Iraq. Increased weight of flexcells was a problem, however. The combined weight of the full flexcell bladders mounted to the M1A1 turret and bustle rack extension tended to burn up motor brakes on the tank turrets. One tank company commander said his Marines were going through three to four turret motor brakes per vehicle per week. Also two tanks were lost as result of damage to flexcells. One tank hit a tree causing a flexcell pod to rupture. Fuel leaked into the engine compartment causing the engine to FOD out and the turbine to burn up. The tank had to be evacuated. There were no casualties. Second instance, an M1A1 received small arms fire. Again, fuel leaked into the engine compartment with same result. The tank caught fire and had to be abandoned during combat. The stationary tank remained under small arms and repeated RPG fire at close range. Under cover of darkness, an Iraqi irregular tossed a Molotov cocktail into the empty tank. This coupled with the burning engine and the multiple RPG hits resulted in a total loss of the tank. It is recommended that the bladders be configured for hull mounting along the skirts. However, this configuration could cause track maintenance problems since access would be impeded. Another criticism was the quick release straps. Flexcells were not quick release capable according to Marines.
This was probably that pic we have been talking about.
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Tank-Infantry Phone ~ The TI phone allowed for close communication between armor and infantry units. During the Battle of City Palace in Baghdad, Company A, 2D Tank Battalion attached to 1st Bn 5th Marines. Tanks worked in direct support of infantry. Infantrymen used the TI phone to direct tank fires in the urban fight. In one instance, infantry talked a tank crew on an enemy sniper position and eliminated the threat with 120mm main gunfire.
QuikClot by Z-Medica ~ Quik-Clot was ineffective (specifically, it was ineffective on arterial bleeding).
M1A1 MBT Loader’s Weapons Station ~ need an articulating mount and gunners shield similar to ACAV variants on U.S. Army M113 armored personnel carries only.
Kevlar lined HMMWV ~ Helped absorb the blast of an RPG and prevented catastrophic damage to the vehicle and crew.
Kevlar “ kidney pads” ~ Were suggested for some soft skinned vehicle crewmen.
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UNABRIDGED
Background ~ In support of Operation Iraqi Freedom, Marine Corps Systems Command (MCSC) fielded equipment in response to Urgent Universal Need Statements which provided additional capability to I MEF. At the request of the Combat Assessment Team, MCSC provided three officers to assess UNS / legacy system items. This was the second trip supported by MCSC personnel in theatre. The following locations were visited:
An Nasiriyah
Ad Diwaniyah
Observations ~ The following notes are based on discussions with Marines in the field. Accordingly, much of the information provided is subjective and opinion based. I would recommend appropriate and further review before taking action. Intent of this discussion is to highlight those areas where the Marine Corps, as an institution, should consider applying resources in order to improve the identified functional areas. This report is a result of the efforts of Capt Patricia Dienhart (PM, GTES), Capt Shannon Roos (PM, Tanks) and Capt Mike Howard (PM, IWS) who traveled current USMC battlespace to interview the Marines who are currently using the gear. Additionally, I conducted a number of camp interviews; those systems are included in this report:
Dust abatement – remains a high priority for the MEF and affects units throughout the battlespace. My personnel experience suggests that this type of materiel needs to come into theatre ASAP. Dust in certain areas is greater than 6” deep and very much like a fine talcum powder. Foot and vehicle traffic, along with ever-present winds, can reduce visibility to less than 50’ feet in a matter of moments. Convoy operations become exceedingly difficult, air operations come to a halt and living conditions for Marines become intolerable. A bigger concern is that commanders in the field are faced with a Catch-22 situation of spraying oil on the ground (hazmat, environmental issues in a “win the hearts and minds environment”) vs. functioning.
C4I Issues - Interoperability of various Communications equipment was an issue in all C3 vehicles and COCs (Tanks, LAR, AAVs). Marines were overwhelmed with the high number of varied communications equipment they were expected to use. Routinely, communicators, operations officers, and commanders found themselves in information overload as they received information over too many different networks (e.g. an LAV Marine was connected to the intercom via his CVC headset, receiving information on a personal intra squad radio (requiring him to remove his helmet to talk), while also (depending on the particular LAVs configuration) “working” 2-3 man portable radios to communicate with other units (PVC 5 for SEALs, PRC 148 for fellow Marines, etc) and “monitoring” two laptops). This situation was exacerbated in C3 vehicles where I personally saw that every “shelf” was taken up by a radio and seat spaces and floor spaces were taken up with open computers for communications devices such as Blue Force Tracker, MDACT, or Iridium phones. Marines recounted numerous instances where units would call via radio to verify that a message was received over MDACT, while the receiving unit had just put the MDACT aside to monitor BFT since a previous unit had called asking about the receipt of a digital photo over BFT. Consolidation of communications assets / capabilities is an issue that requires review at the institutional level. Commanders want one box that provides multiple capabilities and that is simple and easy to use.
Overwhelmingly, units were in agreement that communications architecture required an overhaul. There were too many different devices that provided redundant capabilities. Additionally, units never seemed to receive enough of ONE communications asset, forcing them to rely on a “hodge-podge” of assets that were not consistent throughout the force. (e.g. some units had only MDACT for digital communication while another unit had only Blue Force Tracker. These units could not talk to each other unless they went through a third party or used a courier system). A specific case occurred between LAR S-2 and the Div G-2, while attempting to send pictures from the Dragon Eye to Division HQ G-2. The S-2 had BFT readily available while the G-2 did not. The G-2 needed to “borrow” the commander’s BFT to receive these messages or simply wait for a courier with a MEMOREX disk to arrive with the pictures. Time lost often rendered the pictures irrelevant in this fast paced fight. As the Operations Officer from 1st LAR stated, “the communications architecture is broken and the interoperability of various communications assets is virtually non-existent.”
Satellite Communications - The only consistently reliable means of communication was “SATCOM.” In this fast paced war, if a communications system was not functioning quickly, alternative methods were employed. This was a specific problem of the EPLRS radio (which relies on Line of Site (LOS)). With units constantly moving, over various terrain, LOS was not possible. Accordingly, any system connected to the EPLRS radio proved unreliable (e.g. MDACT, AFATDS, etc). The only systems consistently praised by the Marines were the Blue Force Tracker (SATCOM- though unsecure) and Iridium Phones (SATCOM). These systems provided reliable communications at all times. In many instances these systems were the sole means of communication.
Many Marines noted MDACT, which has a larger bandwidth and greater capability for sending electronic information was marginalized by its dependence on the EPLRS (LOS) radio. As one commander stated, “Satellite Communications is simply the way of the future and the Marine Corps needs to start focusing on that.” Rumor suggested the Army “gave” the Marine Corps satellite time (note: I believe the USMC contracted bandwidth prior to crossing the LD) in order to use the BFT; had this not been the case, the Marine Corps would have found itself fighting, in several instances, without tactical communication.
There were numerous comments regarding the fielding (plans) of gear. Consistently units felt “forgotten” in the fielding plans of various pieces of equipment. For example, Combat Engineer Battalion was not included in the original SAPI plate distribution; ultimately, they received inadequate numbers of SAPI plates the day prior to crossing the LD. CEB leadership was faced with hard questions from their Marines (e.g. literally, questions such as, “Why is {his} life more important than mine?”). EOD and LAR units consistently felt “left out” of the distribution of the latest combat gear (note: these fielding issues should be reviewed by the appropriate Advocate and Requirements reps). Additionally, if LAR was included in a fielding plan, they were treated similarly to “leg” infantry units; though structured differently (LAR battalions have four companies vice the traditional three of an infantry unit). This caused problems when items were fielded as “one per company” as invariably in a 4-company base one company would go without the newly fielded equipment. This problem became acute when one company was forced to use secondary communications, burdening the COC with monitoring two different radios for all their companies.
Logistics Trains - CSSG resupply trains were fired upon. However, their technology and armor was inferior to that of the divisions’. Marines without SAPI plates in soft skinned vehicles were the norm. “Rear area” units have elements that routinely operate on the “front lines”. Though CSSGs did not face the same intensity and threats of Division units, they received fire and worked in a very hostile environment. As the tempo of the modern fight will cause differences between the front lines and rear areas to blur, Advocate level consideration needs to be given to more equitable fieldings of equipment. FSSG units need to be outfitted with more Blue Force Trackers, more high tech radios, and better-armored protection (SAPI plates, armored HMMWVs, etc).
Preliminary UNS Review ~ The following is a list of UNS / legacy items for which was gathered from the Marines that used them:
Fuel hoses and reels – One of success stories of the conflict and follow on HA mission. Approximately 70 miles of hoses and reel were laid that supported the MEF’s movement without flaw. Despite supporting what were, arguably, the longest LOC’s in recent USMC history, fuel was never a potential limiting feature of the war. The hose reel system outpaced the Army’s installation of IPDS system. However, within the bulk fuel community, there is a concern that the wrong lessons will be learned. The fuel effort required the dedicated use of a bulk fuel company for the duration of the war. Once the lines were laid, they required high maintenance and the constant supervision / over watch of the skill sets resident in the dedicated engineer unit which supported the fuel lines.
TCDL suites - Systems were sent out to various MSCs to include the 1st UK Div and provided real time surveillance of the battlespace. The systems easy to use and proved to be reliable under a very harsh environment. The units requested additional systems as a result of this new capability that it gave the units. However, the limited availability of spares and FSR support for these systems were a concern.
Black Cell Suites – This equipment transmitted UAV video down to the Bn level increasing visibility of the battlespace. The systems were easy to use and set-up. However, the limited availability of spares was a concern. Additionally, due to limited availability, there were not enough Black Cell suites to support every unit that requested one.
Low Cost Receiver – This system proved very easy to use, was lightweight and “Marine Proof”. The system never failed to work and was used to push information around the battlefield and every unit wanted one of these systems.
IOS Suites - Units want a small system during the next upgrade. Additionally, the units request a Windows platform, if available.
AFATDS – The following insights were drawn from MGySgt Albrecht, an artilleryman with 28 of experience. Until all parties return from the battlespace, I have only one view. Accordingly, issues below...
M4 Carbine ~ Many Marines commented on desire for the shorter weapon vice the longer M16’s. They say that it would have definitely been better in the urban environment because of the confined spaces. Since most of the operators were operating from a vehicle platform, the smaller weapon would have helped tremendously for mounting and dismounting.
There were numerous comments that the M16 is too long and cumbersome in the urban fight. Several Marines even opted to use the AK- 47s that had been captured from Iraqi weapons caches. Others were trading the rifle for pistols to go into buildings to allow mobility in confined spaces.
There has been a push to get M-4’s to crewmen of the mechanized vehicles, LAR in particular. The distribution needs to include LAR, AAV’s, Tanks, Motor Transportation, and any other units that may have a requirement. IWS has fielded some assets to LAR, but not all others. LAR still has mostly M16’s. The M-16’s are too cumbersome/long for crewmen to employ (get out of the cupola or out of a door/window) in a timely manner while under stress such as when receiving fire.
M249 Squad Automatic Weapon (SAW) ~ The SAW’s are worn out and apparently beyond repair. They have far exceeded their service life. Many Marines are duct taping and zip tying the weapons together. Reconnaissance units were requesting parasaw, infantry units requesting collapsible buttstock.
5.56mm vs. 7.62 Lethality ~ 5.56mm “definitely answered the mail” and “as long as the shots were in the head or chest they went down” were typical quotes from several Marines; many who were previously very skeptical of 5.56mm ammunition. Most of the interviewed Marines who reported targets not going down and/or could still fight were referencing non-lethal shots to the extremities. There were reports of targets receiving shots in the vitals and not going down. These stories need not be described, but are of the rare superhuman occurrences that defy logic and caliber of round. Some Marines did ask about getting the heaver-grained 5.56mm rounds, up to 77 grain if possible.
M9 Pistol Magazines ~ The magazines are not working properly. The springs are extremely weak and the follower does not move forward when rounds are removed. If the magazine is in the weapon, malfunctions result. If out of the weapon, remaining rounds fall out of the magazine. Dirt and sand does cause some of the problem with follower movement, but multiple cleanings of the magazine each day does not alleviate the problem. The main problem is the weak/worn springs. (note: I personally encountered this problem as well. Say what you will, but I had to break down all magazines daily to clean them. Despite this effort, rounds routinely “fell” out of the magazine. Forces in contact did not have the time or the luxury to break down each 9mm magazine daily. M16 magazines worked well. Like many officers, I also traded up to a rifle).
Weapon Backup ~ Many infantrymen are requesting that all operators have an issued backup weapon, (i.e. M9 pistol) to augment their T/O weapon. If they can’t get pistols for secondary weapon purposes, they need more pistols available for MOUT operations to operate in very confined spaces, stairwells, etc. They request at least one per squad; minimum, one per fire team; better.
Rifle Propelled Grenade ~ Many Marines are requesting Rifle Propelled grenades to augment or replace the M203. The M203 doesn’t have an adequate range capability. (note: this desire stems from the fact that the most effective weapon employed against coalition forces was the RPG).
M240G Medium Machine Gun ~ Marines who did not really know what to expect were extremely impressed with effects on target.
M203 Load Bearing ~ Grenade bearing vests don’t hold enough ammunition. Rounds don’t fit into many of the pockets, so grenadiers aren’t able to carry as many rounds as the vest is designed to carry. They aren’t able to fit rounds into all of the pouches. Grenadiers are coming up with several different “band-aid” solutions to carry enough ammunition, most of which are not working. The Marines interviewed would like a vest that will hold at least 20 HE rounds plus 4 illumination rounds; 24 total rounds.
Grenade Pouches ~ Marines (at least infantry) need more than the two that are on the load bearing vest and/or issued with MOLLE. The MOLLE pouches aren’t holding the grenades properly, “pins are falling out”.
Viper ~ Operators saying “great gear, need more”. Operators are getting good azimuth and distance to target. However, they are unable to get the target grid location as advertised. “Zero maintenance Problems.” Used with Fire Support Teams. None came in for optics maintenance complaint. Desire for system to be linked to Thermal Imaging System (TIS) Designators. FACs for 2D Tank Battalion highlighted the need for a laser designator specific for moving vehicles with extended range compatible with FEP. GLTD II was useful but not on the move. MULE is obsolete and not practically mountable on tanks without loss of loader’s M240 machine at that station.
TOW 2 ~ Operators are extremely happy with the performance. Several operators reported tank (T-72) catastrophic (K) kills. TOW 2B caused some concern when shooting over any metal (such as around the oil fields) and around “friendlies” because of the one sensor. The operators already knew these factors. The TOW 2A had no such concerns. The one downside comment (a constant theme by all interviewed), had to do with training. For gunners trained on the newer sight, they are great. For the untrained on the new system, gunners are unable to identify and range targets, etc. Many operators are also having a tendency to follow the rocket with the sight when the rocket rises above the gun-target line, instead of leaving the site on target. This causes the rocket to go higher and higher as the operator follows the rocket. Sometimes they recover and hit the target, most of the time they don’t.
Additionally, the TOW sites are being successfully used for surveillance purposes. Operators are impressed with the capabilities the site offers in this area.
PRC-148 and Inter Squad Radios (IRR) ~ “Great gear, need more for everyone”. One problem is that the power switch is prone to breaking off. Great to have capability to talk UHF (line of sight) for...
ROWPUs ~ Reverse Osmosis Water Purification Units received nothing but praise from various members of the 15th MEU(SOC). The only concern raised was that the units were getting old, would run rough...
Comm Suite in AAV ~ Not highly received; comments were made that the Comm Suite needed an overhaul. One major downfall of the suite is its lack of capability of HF transmission when on the move. <br />
...
Comm Suite in AAV ~ Not highly received; comments were made that the Comm Suite needed an overhaul. One major downfall of the suite is its lack of capability of HF transmission when on the move. <br />
...
Dragon Eye ~ Division HQ G-2’s Dragon eye was used for a week, prior to crossing the LD. However, prior to crossing the LD the computer went down and there was no maintenance plan in place. (note:...
Combat Vehicle Crewman (CVC) “Nomex” Coveralls ~ Several Vehicle crewmen complained that Nomex Combat Vehicle Crewman coveralls need improving. Crews observed that coveralls and gloves easily tore....
Armored Vehicle Launched Bridge (AVLB) AVLB ~ Not employed to any great extent during operations. However, many in the 2D tank battalion cited the need for an improved AVLB variant. Throughout operations, the AVLB was slow, achieving speeds of only 20mph. It was recommended that HETs be used to transport AVLBs. AVLB is at the end of its life cycle. Spares were difficult to get. AVLB track was in short supply. AVLB track was repaired with SL-3 on vehicle. Once that ran out, track from non-operational AVLBs was used. Only two of the battalion’s AVLBs made it to the site at Ad-Diwaniyah at the time of this interview. It is recommended that MCSC should coordinate with Requirements and the Advocate IOT POM for a variant that can keep pace with the M1A1. LAR Marines offered some unique perspectives based on their mission experiences. One Marine suggested that AVLB assets were needed forward with LAR. They proposed a lightweight “LAR” MCL Bridge variant or a faster tracked MCL 70 ton variant.
Drivers Vision Enhancer (DVE) ~ Crews stated that the DVE had an excellent picture. Some users requested a wider field of view. In addition, crewmen had zero depth perception. It was a plus to be able to see through dust and smoke. One maintenance complaint was that the connection cable (about the first four inches) continued to break. Bravo Company had five cable breaks and had to splice and duct tape. Crewmen also complained of not having a battery back up. Crewman felt that the DVE was far superior to the older Night Optical Device (NOD) that used passive IR. After four to five hours of continuous use, some drivers experienced dizziness and blurred vision. However, in most cases this was not considered too severe. Scouts and TOWs requested HMMWV mounts for DVEs similar to U.S. Army platforms.
Tank-Infantry Phone ~ The TI phone allowed for close communication between armor and infantry units. During the Battle of City Palace in Baghdad, Company A, 2D Tank Battalion attached to 1st Bn 5th Marines. Tanks worked in direct support of infantry. Infantrymen used the TI phone to direct tank fires in the urban fight. In one instance, infantry talked a tank crew on an enemy sniper position and eliminated the threat with 120mm main gunfire. The tanks with armor protection, thermal sights, and precision weapons became valuable “armored OPs” according to Capt. Sudmyer, Alpha Company Commander. He went on to relate the TI phone was a very useful tool in the coordinating the armor and infantry. With the extended cable, there were no exposure problems for the infantry. The TI phone was considered to have a very simple and rugged design. No significant corrosion occurred in the Iraqi climate. Initial kits delivered to theater were missing some mounting bolts. Interconnectivity cable was a little short on some kits but posed no serious problems. Capt Garcia recommended a use sheet for the infantry on the inner door panel. A simple instruction sheet on the phone and Vic-3 intercom might prove helpful in the future.
QuikClot by Z-Medica ~ 2D Tank Battalion Surgeon LT Bruce Webb (USN) stated that Quik-Clot was ineffective (specifically, it was ineffective on arterial bleeding). Battalion Corpsman attempted to use Quik-Clot in three separate occasions:
- Wounded Iraqi civilian. Shot near brachial artery. Quik Clot was applied per the instructions. The substance dried but was flaking off. Standard direct pressure applied by corpsman proved more effective on the patient.
- Iraqi civilian shot in back with punctured spine. Quik-Clot applied to severe bleeding. Pressure from bleeding sprayed Quik-Clot away. According to LT Webb, “Quik-Clot was everywhere but the wound”.
- Iraqi civilian, female, shot in femoral artery. She suffered severe arterial bleeding. Patient bled out. Quik-clot unable to be applied effectively due to pressure of blood flow from wound. Patient died.
- An LAR Marine was shot in the femoral artery. Quick Clot was applied to the heavily bleeding wound. The pressure from the blood soon caused the quick clot to be pushed out of the wound and rendered ineffective. A tourniquet was applied instead. The patient died.
Quik Clot may work if applied in a “buddy system” manner. One individual applies the Quik Clot substance while another individual quickly applies the sterile gauze to the wound. However, applying the Quik-Clot as directed proved ineffective. Direct pressure and tourniquets were used instead. (note: different opinion from the MEU MO I interviewed. Recommend further study on this item).
Tourniquet ~ Non-pneumatic tourniquet (NSN 6515-00-383-0565) ½ by 42 inches in the corpsman medical kits proved ineffective. The tourniquet tended to slip around thigh or arm while attempting to tighten buckle. In the end medical personnel resorted to green sling and stick to tighten around pressure points to stem the flow of arterial bleeding in the extremities.
Need to keep effective battle dressings in Individual First Aid Kits.
Bustle Rack Extension (M1A1 MBT) ~ Bustle Rack Extension was rated as an excellent piece of equipment and demonstrated definite utility. However, the added weight with flexcell was estimated to be a cause of motor brakes burning out, though not conclusively proven.
Gypsy Racks ~ Gypsy Racks were rated as excellent, durable, and rugged. “Gypsy Racks were a great piece of equipment”. Distribution was a problem. Not enough got to the units prior to LD. 1st LAR modified some to fit their Light Armored vehicles. Suggest manufacturers modification in future for LAVs. Similar requirement fulfilled by Bustle Rack Extension on M1A1 Main Battle Tank. Weight of gear in gypsy rack occasionally pulled down the HMMWVs tailgate. The field expedient work around used was a bolt where the tailgate mates with the vehicle in the up position.
MPAT 120mm round ~ The MPAT 120mm tank round was used extensively during campaign. However, 2D Tank Battalion had problems with rounds sticking in gun tube after 1 hour of battle carry. Rounds had to be fired off or manually extracted. In on instance, a gun tube was inoperable due to a stuck round. The warhead of that round is still in the gun tube as the report this written. The lot number is being investigated. One theory is that the plastic wrapping around the fins to convert the round from 105mm to 120mm may be the culprit. The heat of gun tube may cause expansion of this material resulting in the rounds becoming stuck. It is important to note that in all but one case, the rounds were fired out or manually extracted by the crews. No significant degrading was reported during engagements.
Snap Road Block Kit ~ LAR Marines identified a requirement for a Snap Road Block Kit. Items included public address system, cones, placards, beacons, etc. Kit is in use by United States Army and is in their supply system.
ROC-V Vehicle ID proved useful to the battalions. Need for better thermal identification training at extreme ranges. Thermal sights at range in excess of 3000 meters appeared as “blobbed” and distorted. Presented problems in shoot-no-shoot situations.
External Auxiliary Power Unit (EAPU) ~ A quieter system was recommended. Solar Trickle Panels were also recommended for recharging batteries. Units need them to reduce wear and tear on vehicle power and generators. Army has embedded solar panels in electronic heavy vehicles to power systems. Some solar panels are capable of generating 90 watts of power. With more systems being added to vehicles. Power training on batteries is an issue that should be address. Tactical situations do not always allow for operating under vehicle or External power (EAPU).
M1A1 MBT Loader’s Weapons Station ~ Need for butt stock kit for the loader’s 240 7.62mm machine gun. Useful in MOUT. Also need an articulating mount and gunners shield similar to ACAV variants on U.S. Army M113 armored personnel carries only. Additional Armor Protection would prove useful in close fight. Even a kit that could be applied for urban mission and removed for other contingencies could be useful.
M1A1 MBT Tank Commander’s Weapons Station ~ More ammunition is needed for the caliber .50 M48 machine at the commander’s weapons station. It is hazardous for the tank commander to reload the weapon during combat conditions. The battalion received heavy amounts of small arms fire during operations in Iraq. When the 100 rounds of .50 cal were exhausted, tank commanders would have to wait for the conclusion of engagements to reload. Recommendation: the need for a greater ammunition capability. Perhaps a larger ammunition compartment on the mount
Kevlar lined HMMWV ~ Helped absorb the blast of an RPG and prevented catastrophic damage to the vehicle and crew.
Kevlar “ kidney pads” ~ Were suggested for some soft skinned vehicle crewmen.
Battle Damage Repair (BDR) for bore evacuators ~ Bore evacuators on the 120mm that we damaged by small arms were patch welded by battalion maintenance.
Logistics Comments ~Need HEMMET refuelers. Need more reliable fuel pumps. Water pumps had to be cannibalized to keep re-fuelers operational. Faster pumps also needed. The tank battalions have legitimate requirement for extended bed MTVRs. Two pods and a pump to fit on one bed of extended MTVR. LVS has exceeded its life cycle and proved mechanically unreliable. Recommend Four Heavy Equipment Transports (HETs) per battalion