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thedrifter
04-30-03, 09:47 AM
The Mission of the Marines in Lebanon--1982-1983

WITHDRAWAL OF PLO--AUGUST 1982
As a result of the Israeli invasion of Lebanon in June 1982l, Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) and Syrian combatant forces were driven back into Beirut where they had become isolated in August 1982. The government of Lebanon, in an effort to obtain the withdrawal of those forces from Beirut and lift the siege of that city, requested an international presence. The government wanted an international force because of concern that the withdrawal of the PLO or Syrian combatants would result in a vacuum in Beirut that it could not fill. The PLO also sought an international presence to provide a degree of protection from harassment by hostile forces during its withdrawal.

Ambassador Philip Habib, the United States Special Envoy to the Middle East at that time, negotiated an agreement for a ceasefire and the withdrawal of the PLO and the Syrians from Beirut. Ambassador Habib testified that a United Nations force to supervise the withdrawal was not acceptable to Israel. Robert Dillon, the U.S. ambassador to Lebanon from June 1981 until 12 days before the bombing of the marine compound, testified that the Israelis would not trust any international force unless the United States participated. Because of the unacceptability of the United Nations and a request by Lebanon that the United States participate in a Multinational Force, Ambassador Habib said he recommended this course of action to the President who approved the recommendation. France and Italy also contributed military units. Between August 25 and September 9, 1982, the withdrawal of the PLO was successfully carried out. Upon its completion, the Multinational Force withdrew from Beirut on September 10, 1982.

The assassination of Lebanese President-elect Bashir Gemayel on September 14 and the Phalangist slaughter of Palestinian refugees in their camps at Sabra and Shatila on September 17 again plunged Beirut into turmoil. The Lebanese government requested the return of the Multinational Force to Beirut to facilitate the restoration of Lebanese government sovereignty and authority, thereby bolstering its efforts to ensure the safety of persons in the area and bring an end to the violence.


NEW MULTINATIONAL FORCE--SEPTEMBER 1982
On September 20, 1982, President Reagan announced that, in consultation with the French and Italian governments, agreement had been reached to form a new Multinational Force to reenter Beirut with the mission of enabling the Lebanese government to resume full authority over its capital. In accordance with the President's instruction, the marines reentered Beirut on September 29.

Ambassador Habib explained the basic objectives of the United States in Lebanon. They were threefold: the withdrawal of all external forces from Lebanon; the reestablishment of full Lebanese sovereignty over its territory in the wake of the withdrawal of those foreign forces; and the assurance, to the best of our ability, that Lebanese territory would not be a source of hostile action against Israel. He said, "One of the things we were doing also was to support, help train and arm a Lebanese National Army." According to the ambassador, those objectives have not changed at the present time. Ambassador Habib also said he believes they are still valid objectives in the national interest of the United States and in the interest of our allies, because they are important to the achievement of peace and tranquility throughout the area.
It is evident from the foregoing objectives that the mission of the marines was essentially political and diplomatic rather than military. The various iterations also reflect the unusual nature of the mission.

In the eyes of the world, the mission of the Multinational Force was peacekeeping. The mandate agreed upon by the nations comprising the force stated:


The Multinational Force are to assure the safety of persons in the area and to bring to an end the violence which has tragically recurred.
In his September 29, 1982, letter to the Speaker of the House, announcing the reintroduction of the marines into Lebanon, President Reagan stated:


. . . Their mission is to provide an interposition force at agreed locations and thereby provide the multinational presence requested by the Lebanese government to assist it and the Lebanese Armed Forces. In carrying out this mission, the American force will not engage in combat. [Emphasis added--HyperWar] It may, however, exercise the right of self-defense and will be equipped accordingly. . . . All armed elements in the area have given assurances that they will refrain from hostilities and will not interfere with the activities of the Multinational Force. . . .
The U.S. European Command, in translating this "interposition force" responsibility into military orders, described the marine mission as "to establish an environment which will permit Lebanese Armed Forces to carry out that responsibility in the Beirut area; . . . be prepared to protect U.S. forces. . . . "

The marines in Lebanon interpreted the mission as requiring a visible presence. General James Mead, who as a colonel commanded the 32nd Marine Amphibious Unit (MAU) that entered Beirut on September 29, 1982, testified the mission "was to show a presence, and always balance that with the safety of the marines." The marines sought to demonstrate their presence in many ways: U.S. flags were flown on all their vehicles and over their bunkers; flags were sewn on the sleeves of their uniforms; they carried out extensive patrols in their areas of responsibility; they participated in civil improvement programs; and they assisted in the rescue of Lebanese isolated by a snowstorm.

LOCATION OF THE MARINES AT THE AIRPORT
General Mead said the presence mission required him to strike some balances. The first of these was in the location of the marines. He said that in his initial planning he intended to occupy the high ground four to eight kilometers to the east of the airport. He found, however, that the selection of his position was not a simple military decision; rather, it involved several diplomatic and political considerations. General Mead said that the Israelis wanted to maintain control of the airport as well as the Sidon road immediately east of the airport up to its junction with the Damascus road. The diplomatic negotiations denied the airport location to the Israelis but granted them control of the Sidon road. General Mead noted that, if the marines had located in the high ground as he had planned, the Israelis on the Sidon road would have been passing through marine positions, "which to the Moslems shows the perception of cooperation between the Multinational Force and the Israelis which was unacceptable from a political standpoint."

Ambassador Dillon testified the marines were located at the airport "because, let's just call it the U.S. Government, but I think military staff officers, among others, felt it was the safest place for them to be." According to Ambassador Habib, one of the considerations in locating the marines at the airport was that it would be better to have them at the southern end of the Multinational Force "where we were up with the Israelis, rather than to have somebody else who they might have had less confidence in." He also noted that the marines were determined to preserve the integrity of their force, and that the airport location provided such an integral perimeter. He stated that the airport also offered the marines an area of direct access for supply purposes.

General mead acknowledged that the U.S. military had been involved in the deliberations that placed the marines at the airport. He said, "We did not want to accept the position but, because of the low order of threat and the diplomatic requirements, it was acceptable and we felt that we could ensure the safety of the marines and, therefore, were forced down onto the low ground as defined by the railroad to the east of the airport."

While they were located at the airport, the marines were not responsible for defending it. Ambassador Dillon stated, "it was never the duty of the marines to defend the airport. They had a duty to defend themselves." He noted, however, "People believed that the presence of the marines at the airport served the purpose of keeping it open." General Mead testified that he never believed it was the marines' responsibility to keep the airport open and had never received any orders to that effect.

The importance of Beirut International Airport is that it is perceived in the country as a symbol of the authority of the central government. When it is functioning, the government is perceived as effective. Conversely, dissidents express their dissatisfaction with the government by closing the airport. General Mead testified, "It seems to us that when they are displeased there is a mortar round that comes in and closes down the airport. Everybody sees that. That is the way votes are cast."

continued..........

thedrifter
04-30-03, 09:48 AM
CHANGING CIRCUMSTANCE--EFFECT ON THE MISSION
The testimony of all the witnesses was that the mission has remained basically unchanged since the reintroduction of the marines in September 1982. But while the mission in unchanged, the circumstances in Beirut have changed drastically. IN the early months these changes were almost imperceptible; but, by summer 1983, they were very noticeable and significantly affected the manner in which the mission could be carried out.

Initially the marines did not encounter difficulty in demonstrating their presence. Ambassador Habib said there was not a circumstance in which they were threatened. When they came ashore they found what General Mead called a "permissive attitude" with a minimal threat. He said they found a tremendous outpouring of relief and good will from the Shiite Moslems, and they were accepted as "local heroes" in that area and remained so until July 1983. He attributed the friendly attitude of the population to the perception that the marines were impartial. They were regarded as a calming force between the rival religious factions, each of which possessed its own militia. As such, they were welcomed as peacekeepers.

As time went on, the perception of the United States as an impartial peacekeeper changed and, with it, the attitude of the Moslem population toward the marines. General Mead cited the U.S. training of the Lebanese Armed Forces, and essential element in the rebuilding of national authority, as one of the first developments perceived as U.S. bias in favor of the Christians. He also noted that about April the Moslems became markedly dissatisfied with the failure to redress the continuing imbalance in the government, the number of Moslems in important government positions. He believed that the artillery shelling at that time was an expression of their displeasure.

It appears that the atmosphere began to change substantially after the May 17 agreement with Israel. People had hoped that, after the long negotiation, there would be a withdrawal of all foreign forces. When it became apparent this was not the case, there was a Moslem backlash against the Lebanese government for its participation in the negotiations. The subsequent Israeli withdrawal from the Shuf and the outbreak of fighting in that area changed the atmosphere even more dramatically.

Lebanese President Amin Gemayel and Foreign Minister Elie Salem told subcommittee members who visited them that U.S. officials had assured them the United States would pressure Syria to leave once Israeli reached a withdrawal agreement with Lebanon. However, all witnesses questioned on this issue denied knowledge of any such assurance, including Ambassadors Habib and Dillon.

The latest, and perhaps the most significant, change was the use of naval gunfire in support of the Lebanese Armed Forces during the September fighting at Suq el-Gharb. That gunfire broke up the attack, but it reinforced the Moslems' belief that the United States had moved even further from impartial peacekeeper to Christian supporter. Colonel Timothy J. Geraghty, command of the marines in Beirut from May to November 1983, testified, "The support that was provided at Suq el-Gharb was, in my opinion, a departure

from our neutral peacekeeping role to direct support of the Lebanese Armed Forces." [HyperWar again: it requires testimony to establish this point? How could any supposedly intelligent being not understand that all parties to the civil war would regard training, arming, and supplying the LAF--let alone, directly supporting combat operations--as something other than impartial neutrality? Such a belief system would be diagnostic of psychosis in an individual...] The subcommittee also learned that Colonel Geraghty had strongly opposed the administration's proposal to change the Rules of Engagement to allow the shelling at Suq el-Gharb. Captain Morgan France, commander of the task force of ships off Beirut, regarded this authority to support the Lebanese Armed Forces as a change of mission. He said:

We felt the naval gunfire in defense of the mission ashore was a sound, tactical move, but naval gunfire in support of the Lebanese Armed Forces was a definite change of mission and, of course, one of the things we had emphasized all the way through there was maintaining our neutral presence, and this met especially regarding the civil war in Lebanon because the marines were surrounded by the Shia.



Sempers,

Roger