thedrifter
04-07-08, 09:34 AM
The Press Botches Basra [Daveed Gartenstein-Ross]
Bill Roggio and I had an article in The Daily Standard on Friday examining the press coverage of the recent fighting in Basra. We argue that the media's coverage was shamefully slanted from the very outset, with the New York Times declaring the Iraqi security forces' operations "stalled" just two days in, and other outlets following suit. An excerpt:
Virtually every media outlet declared the Basra operations a military failure before a week had passed. A New York Times headline blared that the "Iraqi Army's Assault on Militias in Basra Stalls" on March 27, two days after the launch of operations. Two days later—just four days after operations began—Britain's Independent noted that "the Iraqi army and police have failed to oust the Mahdi Army from any of its strongholds in the capital and in southern Iraq." And six days after the onset of operations, the Guardian was reporting that "the Iraqi army had made little headway in Basra and large swaths of the city remain under the Mahdi Army's control."
To be sure, the Iraqi security forces' performance in Basra is best described as mixed. However, they did not run into a wall. The Iraqi military was able to clear one Mahdi Army-controlled neighborhood in Basra and was in the process of clearing another when Sadr issued his ceasefire. The ceasefire came on March 30, after six days of fighting, and was seemingly unilateral in the sense that the Iraqi government made no apparent concessions in return. By that time, 571 Mahdi Army fighters had been killed, 881 wounded, 490 captured, and 30 had surrendered countrywide, according to numbers tabulated by The Long War Journal. Thus, an estimated 95 Mahdi Army fighters were killed per day during the six days of fighting. In contrast, al Qaeda in Iraq did not incur such intense casualties even during the height of the surge.
The Iraqi security forces were at their best in the smaller cities in Iraq's south. The Mahdi Army suffered major setbacks in Hillah, Najaf, Karbala, Diwaniyah, Amarah, Kut, and Nasiriyah. The security forces drove the Mahdi Army off the streets in those cities within days. The casualties taken by the Mahdi Army in Baghdad, Basra, and the wider south surely played a role in Sadr's tactical decision to call a ceasefire. An American military officer serving in southern Iraq told us, "Whatever gains [the Mahdi Army] has made in the field [in Basrah], they were running short of ammunition, food, and water. In short, [the Mahdi Army] had no ability to sustain the effort."
You can read our full article here. There is still much for us to dissect about the fighting in Basra — particularly what it says about the Iraqi security forces' readiness, and what needs to be done to make the area more secure in the future. But while the results in Basra clearly were not ground for celebration, they were far less negative than early press coverage would lead you to believe.
http://www.weeklystandard.com/Content/Public/Articles/000/000/014/936meniz.asp
Ellie
Bill Roggio and I had an article in The Daily Standard on Friday examining the press coverage of the recent fighting in Basra. We argue that the media's coverage was shamefully slanted from the very outset, with the New York Times declaring the Iraqi security forces' operations "stalled" just two days in, and other outlets following suit. An excerpt:
Virtually every media outlet declared the Basra operations a military failure before a week had passed. A New York Times headline blared that the "Iraqi Army's Assault on Militias in Basra Stalls" on March 27, two days after the launch of operations. Two days later—just four days after operations began—Britain's Independent noted that "the Iraqi army and police have failed to oust the Mahdi Army from any of its strongholds in the capital and in southern Iraq." And six days after the onset of operations, the Guardian was reporting that "the Iraqi army had made little headway in Basra and large swaths of the city remain under the Mahdi Army's control."
To be sure, the Iraqi security forces' performance in Basra is best described as mixed. However, they did not run into a wall. The Iraqi military was able to clear one Mahdi Army-controlled neighborhood in Basra and was in the process of clearing another when Sadr issued his ceasefire. The ceasefire came on March 30, after six days of fighting, and was seemingly unilateral in the sense that the Iraqi government made no apparent concessions in return. By that time, 571 Mahdi Army fighters had been killed, 881 wounded, 490 captured, and 30 had surrendered countrywide, according to numbers tabulated by The Long War Journal. Thus, an estimated 95 Mahdi Army fighters were killed per day during the six days of fighting. In contrast, al Qaeda in Iraq did not incur such intense casualties even during the height of the surge.
The Iraqi security forces were at their best in the smaller cities in Iraq's south. The Mahdi Army suffered major setbacks in Hillah, Najaf, Karbala, Diwaniyah, Amarah, Kut, and Nasiriyah. The security forces drove the Mahdi Army off the streets in those cities within days. The casualties taken by the Mahdi Army in Baghdad, Basra, and the wider south surely played a role in Sadr's tactical decision to call a ceasefire. An American military officer serving in southern Iraq told us, "Whatever gains [the Mahdi Army] has made in the field [in Basrah], they were running short of ammunition, food, and water. In short, [the Mahdi Army] had no ability to sustain the effort."
You can read our full article here. There is still much for us to dissect about the fighting in Basra — particularly what it says about the Iraqi security forces' readiness, and what needs to be done to make the area more secure in the future. But while the results in Basra clearly were not ground for celebration, they were far less negative than early press coverage would lead you to believe.
http://www.weeklystandard.com/Content/Public/Articles/000/000/014/936meniz.asp
Ellie