thedrifter
03-24-08, 09:02 AM
Paying price for failing to secure peace
Iraq war exposes deep divisions, extreme tribalism
Matthew Fisher, National Post
Published: Monday, March 24, 2008
KANADAHAR, Afghanistan -As U.S. Marines swarmed into southern Afghanistan this month to help Canadian and British forces fight the Taliban and al-Qaeda, it was a reminder of the heady time five years ago when some of these same Marines swept into Baghdad and American power briefly reached an apex.
The anniversary of that war occurs at a time when I am with Canadian forces in Kandahar. During the spring of 2003 I was embedded with a crack Marine recon outfit that was the tip of the spear for what the Pentagon called Operation Iraqi Freedom. After a slow start on March 19 in the smoldering oil fields of southern Iraq, the 1,100 Marines of the 3rd Light Armored Reconnaissance Battalion, the Wolfpack, bolted north and west, rushing past scores of heavier units before crossing the Euphrates in a dash for Baghdad.
Only a couple of days after the ground offensive had begun, with many formations slowed down by fighting in Nasariya and Najaf, the 3rd LAR was camped within sight of the "shock and awe" that coalition aircraft were raining down every night on the Iraqi capital.
The only major hiccup in the battalion's pell mell rush to the heart of Saddam Hussein's empire came after dusk on the night of March 23 when, hundreds of kilometres ahead of other U.S. forces, the Wolfpack tried to seize a key bridge over the Tigris River. The mission failed when the Marines were ambushed by a larger force of Iraqi regulars later identified as the Fedayeen Saddam.
Helping to decide the biggest engagement of the Iraqi war when it seemed that the hour-long battle might be lost, dozens of U.S. and British warplanes dropped their bombs and missiles "danger close" in a ferocious pyrotechnic display that destroyed a string of Iraqi tanks that were about to attack.
After enduring the infamous Mother of All Sandstorms, which reduced visibility to less than a metre, and then waiting for food, water, fuel and ammo and the other 25,000 troops of the 1st Marine Division to finally catch up, the 3rd LAR were among the first Marines to enter Baghdad on April 8 as U.S. Army units penetrated the city from the southwest.
As engineers bolted together a Bailey bridge over the Diyala River, Lieutenant-Colonel Stacey Clardy, the 3rd LAR's laconic commander, surveyed a chaotic scene, with thousands of Iraqis by turns cheering their liberators and stealing everything they could get their hands on.
With the smouldering ruins of Baghdad and the thieves providing a dramatic backdrop, the colonel was asked about the armchair generals at home who had complained that the war had taken too long because there were not enough troops.
"We have more than enough soldiers to win this war," Lt.-Col. Clardy answered, spitting tobacco juice out one side of his mouth.
"What we don't have is enough soldiers to keep the peace."
Prophetic words, as it turned out. Despite the revisionist victory theories now being touted by neo-cons, the Second Gulf War has not only been a graveyard for nearly 4,000 Americans and hundreds of thousands of Iraqis. It has had devastating, perhaps irreparable consequences for Washington's reputation overseas.
I never thought that Saddam had weapons of mass destruction or that he was in any way connected to Osama bin Laden's abominable enterprise.
But I mistakenly believed that Iraq and the Middle East would be better off without the Butcher of Baghdad and that a clean victory was easily within the U.S.'s reach.
Ignoring centuries of evidence, I never reckoned enough on the extreme tribalism, the Kurdish-Arab rivalry or the lethal Shia-Sunni fissures that the war exposed.
Some aspects of Afghanistan's problems mirror those of Iraq in 2003. The most obvious is that there have not been enough fighting troops to win the peace here, too.
Coincidently, the Marines, including many who were part of the Iraqi invasion force five years ago and have served there several times since, are once again being asked to be the tip of the spear.
Afghanistan has seen even fewer decisive battles than Iraq has. But it shares with Iraq an equally vast, arid landscape, similarly complex and volatile tribal and ethnic divisions and an even more conservative religious culture that eludes Western understanding.
Furthermore, Afghanistan is regarded not only as another test of U.S. power but Western resolve. Unlike Iraq, Canadians have a big stake here. They can only hope this conflict turns out more happily.
Ellie
Iraq war exposes deep divisions, extreme tribalism
Matthew Fisher, National Post
Published: Monday, March 24, 2008
KANADAHAR, Afghanistan -As U.S. Marines swarmed into southern Afghanistan this month to help Canadian and British forces fight the Taliban and al-Qaeda, it was a reminder of the heady time five years ago when some of these same Marines swept into Baghdad and American power briefly reached an apex.
The anniversary of that war occurs at a time when I am with Canadian forces in Kandahar. During the spring of 2003 I was embedded with a crack Marine recon outfit that was the tip of the spear for what the Pentagon called Operation Iraqi Freedom. After a slow start on March 19 in the smoldering oil fields of southern Iraq, the 1,100 Marines of the 3rd Light Armored Reconnaissance Battalion, the Wolfpack, bolted north and west, rushing past scores of heavier units before crossing the Euphrates in a dash for Baghdad.
Only a couple of days after the ground offensive had begun, with many formations slowed down by fighting in Nasariya and Najaf, the 3rd LAR was camped within sight of the "shock and awe" that coalition aircraft were raining down every night on the Iraqi capital.
The only major hiccup in the battalion's pell mell rush to the heart of Saddam Hussein's empire came after dusk on the night of March 23 when, hundreds of kilometres ahead of other U.S. forces, the Wolfpack tried to seize a key bridge over the Tigris River. The mission failed when the Marines were ambushed by a larger force of Iraqi regulars later identified as the Fedayeen Saddam.
Helping to decide the biggest engagement of the Iraqi war when it seemed that the hour-long battle might be lost, dozens of U.S. and British warplanes dropped their bombs and missiles "danger close" in a ferocious pyrotechnic display that destroyed a string of Iraqi tanks that were about to attack.
After enduring the infamous Mother of All Sandstorms, which reduced visibility to less than a metre, and then waiting for food, water, fuel and ammo and the other 25,000 troops of the 1st Marine Division to finally catch up, the 3rd LAR were among the first Marines to enter Baghdad on April 8 as U.S. Army units penetrated the city from the southwest.
As engineers bolted together a Bailey bridge over the Diyala River, Lieutenant-Colonel Stacey Clardy, the 3rd LAR's laconic commander, surveyed a chaotic scene, with thousands of Iraqis by turns cheering their liberators and stealing everything they could get their hands on.
With the smouldering ruins of Baghdad and the thieves providing a dramatic backdrop, the colonel was asked about the armchair generals at home who had complained that the war had taken too long because there were not enough troops.
"We have more than enough soldiers to win this war," Lt.-Col. Clardy answered, spitting tobacco juice out one side of his mouth.
"What we don't have is enough soldiers to keep the peace."
Prophetic words, as it turned out. Despite the revisionist victory theories now being touted by neo-cons, the Second Gulf War has not only been a graveyard for nearly 4,000 Americans and hundreds of thousands of Iraqis. It has had devastating, perhaps irreparable consequences for Washington's reputation overseas.
I never thought that Saddam had weapons of mass destruction or that he was in any way connected to Osama bin Laden's abominable enterprise.
But I mistakenly believed that Iraq and the Middle East would be better off without the Butcher of Baghdad and that a clean victory was easily within the U.S.'s reach.
Ignoring centuries of evidence, I never reckoned enough on the extreme tribalism, the Kurdish-Arab rivalry or the lethal Shia-Sunni fissures that the war exposed.
Some aspects of Afghanistan's problems mirror those of Iraq in 2003. The most obvious is that there have not been enough fighting troops to win the peace here, too.
Coincidently, the Marines, including many who were part of the Iraqi invasion force five years ago and have served there several times since, are once again being asked to be the tip of the spear.
Afghanistan has seen even fewer decisive battles than Iraq has. But it shares with Iraq an equally vast, arid landscape, similarly complex and volatile tribal and ethnic divisions and an even more conservative religious culture that eludes Western understanding.
Furthermore, Afghanistan is regarded not only as another test of U.S. power but Western resolve. Unlike Iraq, Canadians have a big stake here. They can only hope this conflict turns out more happily.
Ellie