thedrifter
02-15-08, 01:01 PM
Published: February 15, 2008
Afghanistan Redux
Col. Jeff Bearor (USMC, ret.)
The recent report of the Afghanistan Study Group, co-chaired by retired U.S. Marine General James Jones and Ambassador Thomas Pickering, was startling clear: “The mission to stabilize Afghanistan is faltering.”
The administration’s plan to deploy 3,200 Marines to Afghanistan soon is a welcome development, but it is just the down payment for what’s required. While the initial indications were that the deployment is a “one time” action, it is likely to presage sending additional Marines and soldiers to the beleaguered country to retrieve the deteriorating situation.
Our focus on Iraq the past three years and the hand-off of command of the forces in Afghanistan to NATO in 2006 have meant fewer U.S. combat forces committed to that fight. Afghanistan is twice the size of Iraq with a larger population – yet we’ve committed less than 30,000 U.S. forces to the campaign. Southern and eastern Afghanistan, as well as the tribal border regions of Pakistan, remain bastions for the remnants of both al Qaeda and the Taliban and we lack the force levels to effectively track down the enemy and pacify the countryside.
We cannot afford to let Afghanistan slip back and once again become the main training ground for terrorists. Perhaps even more important at this point is the fact that an unstable Afghanistan contributes greatly to an unstable Pakistan. The very last thing we need is for this important ally and its nuclear weapons to slip into the grasp of Islamic extremists.
Last fall, and again last week, the Secretary of Defense went to his NATO counterparts and requested that our allies send additional combat troops to Afghanistan and to unleash the troops that were already in the country to allow more of them to engage in combat operations against the Taliban and al Qaeda terrorist masters. While a number of NATO countries and other allies have committed troops to the Afghan campaign, most countries have restricted their forces to training and support duties far from the main fighting in the south and east.
So far SecDef has not been successful in getting his NATO counterparts to agree to increase levels of combat troops.
The “ABCA” (America, British, Canada, Australia) countries’ forces (plus the Dutch and some French forces) have been carrying the majority of the fight for the NATO command even though as many as 26 NATO nations have contributed forces in the past. The French have said they will commit more troops in the Helmand province to support Canadian forces who have been fully engaged in combat operations. However, it is not enough.
In Afghanistan we are in the same situation we were in Iraq before the President committed to the “surge” of forces. We are in the fight but have not committed the one thing that can guarantee success on the ground – U.S. ground combat forces.
Until we muster the will to send more ground forces to Afghanistan like we did in Iraq, we won’t just falter – we’ll lose.
Ellie
Afghanistan Redux
Col. Jeff Bearor (USMC, ret.)
The recent report of the Afghanistan Study Group, co-chaired by retired U.S. Marine General James Jones and Ambassador Thomas Pickering, was startling clear: “The mission to stabilize Afghanistan is faltering.”
The administration’s plan to deploy 3,200 Marines to Afghanistan soon is a welcome development, but it is just the down payment for what’s required. While the initial indications were that the deployment is a “one time” action, it is likely to presage sending additional Marines and soldiers to the beleaguered country to retrieve the deteriorating situation.
Our focus on Iraq the past three years and the hand-off of command of the forces in Afghanistan to NATO in 2006 have meant fewer U.S. combat forces committed to that fight. Afghanistan is twice the size of Iraq with a larger population – yet we’ve committed less than 30,000 U.S. forces to the campaign. Southern and eastern Afghanistan, as well as the tribal border regions of Pakistan, remain bastions for the remnants of both al Qaeda and the Taliban and we lack the force levels to effectively track down the enemy and pacify the countryside.
We cannot afford to let Afghanistan slip back and once again become the main training ground for terrorists. Perhaps even more important at this point is the fact that an unstable Afghanistan contributes greatly to an unstable Pakistan. The very last thing we need is for this important ally and its nuclear weapons to slip into the grasp of Islamic extremists.
Last fall, and again last week, the Secretary of Defense went to his NATO counterparts and requested that our allies send additional combat troops to Afghanistan and to unleash the troops that were already in the country to allow more of them to engage in combat operations against the Taliban and al Qaeda terrorist masters. While a number of NATO countries and other allies have committed troops to the Afghan campaign, most countries have restricted their forces to training and support duties far from the main fighting in the south and east.
So far SecDef has not been successful in getting his NATO counterparts to agree to increase levels of combat troops.
The “ABCA” (America, British, Canada, Australia) countries’ forces (plus the Dutch and some French forces) have been carrying the majority of the fight for the NATO command even though as many as 26 NATO nations have contributed forces in the past. The French have said they will commit more troops in the Helmand province to support Canadian forces who have been fully engaged in combat operations. However, it is not enough.
In Afghanistan we are in the same situation we were in Iraq before the President committed to the “surge” of forces. We are in the fight but have not committed the one thing that can guarantee success on the ground – U.S. ground combat forces.
Until we muster the will to send more ground forces to Afghanistan like we did in Iraq, we won’t just falter – we’ll lose.
Ellie