thedrifter
02-07-08, 07:50 AM
From the Jaws of Victory
By NADIA SCHADLOW
February 7, 2008
The U.S. just dodged a bullet in Iraq.
Recently it was reported that Pentagon leaders were considering Gen. David Petraeus, commander of the Multi-National Force Iraq since February 2007, for a prestigious redeployment to Europe. It is good news for Americans and Iraqis alike that Gen. Petraeus decided to stay in Baghdad through the fall.
What's depressing is that top political and military leaders in Washington asked him to consider the move in the first place. The proposal to shift Gen. Petraeus out of Iraq reflects the unwillingness of the military as a whole to make the larger cultural changes required to succeed in tough counterinsurgency missions.
Gen. Petraeus has repeatedly pointed out that a key reason behind the improvements in Iraq revolved around the fact that Americans were walking the streets, living alongside Iraqis, forging close relationships with Iraqi soldiers and police, and demonstrating to the population a commitment to achieving enduring security. Indeed, a key requirement for success in war is consistency of effort over time. Only experience on the ground permits the acquisition of enough knowledge of the political landscape and personalities necessary to shape events and achieve political stability.
In short, removing such a successful leader from a mission in progress is senseless. It is also inconsistent with much of the America's wartime history.
George Washington served as commander of the American revolutionary forces for eight years, from 1775-1783. Without his resolute leadership and political instincts, it is likely that the Continental Army would have disintegrated.
In the Mexican War, Gen. Winfield Scott led the largest amphibious landing in the history of the U.S., near Vera Cruz. He was then able to achieve operational victory and strategic success by staying on as the military governor in Mexico City.
During World War II, Gens. Dwight D. Eisenhower and George C. Marshall served extended tenures in their respective positions. It would be hard to imagine the military changing these crucial commanders during the war.
Gen. Lucius Clay, initially Gen. Eisenhower's deputy, served for four years in Germany and was instrumental in initiating its reconstruction. With patience and determination, Clay established the foundation for Germany's postwar recovery.
In Korea, Gen. John Hodge served as the commander of U.S. occupying forces in the south from September 1945 to August 1948. While his record was mixed, he spent these years immersed in political infighting, mediating between Korean political factions and sustaining support for the mission in Washington. He helped to create institutions of government strong enough to withstand the invasion from the North, and three years of war.
Gen. Douglas MacArthur oversaw the occupation of Japan for six years from 1945 to 1951. He is credited with transforming the nation into a functioning democracy.
In Vietnam, the pacification policy begun in 1968 by Gen. Creighton Abrams might have achieved success had it begun earlier in the war. Abrams served for four years, integrating civil-military efforts to pacify and reconstruct the country.
Each of these wars represented distinct challenges and the outcomes were varied. Yet the effectiveness of the efforts depended in large measure on the detailed knowledge accrued by commanders, and on their ability to achieve unity of effort within their own teams and between the U.S. command and indigenous leaders.
Consistent effort over time is particularly important in counterinsurgency situations in which the political dimension of war is paramount. Forging the kind of political accommodation between the disparate groups necessary to address the fundamental causes of violence requires the development of close personal relationships.
The military acknowledges the need for dedicated headquarters and support structures to conduct long-duration missions. Forces must have staying power, and be able to identify and retain lessons learned as well as to sustain personal relationships.
Indeed, the military's own counterinsurgency (COIN) manual emphasizes the need to cultivate effective leaders in the host country. Younger officers deploying to and from Iraq have reinforced these themes, writing consistently about the importance of maintaining a stable presence and getting to know the political, social and cultural terrain.
Yet the turnover of top commanders in Iraq directly contradicts much of the COIN manual's observation that crafting a political solution over time is the only proven means by which insurgencies are defeated. Senior commanders play a huge role in integrating military policy with political goals. This is hard to achieve when top officers below Gen. Petraeus' rotate out either every seven months (for the U.S. Marines) or 12 to 15 months (for the U.S. Army). Not only will U.S. Army corps commander Gen. Raymond Odierno leave later this month, but his entire staff will as well.
While units at the brigade level and below have an extraordinarily high operational tempo and endure constant combat stresses, the situation is different with large, well-staffed headquarter units. Despite this fact, all are on the same rotation schedule.
Gen. Petraeus is likely being considered for a Combatant Command job as a reward for his superb performance in Iraq, and because the president wanted to recognize the general prior to the end of his administration -- particularly if the next administration turns out to be a Democratic one. But political considerations should not outweigh strategic imperatives. The decision to rotate top commanders out of complex situations is similar to a research lab deciding to remove its top scientist just as his team is on the verge of discovering an important new drug, or changing the coaching staff of an NFL team on an annual basis.
Certainly, remaining in a war zone for long periods of time is difficult and involves great personal sacrifice. But the military could take measures, such as allowing certain officers to make more frequent visits home or bring family members along on deployment in some circumstances, to lessen the burden. It also might consider other rewards for long service under arduous conditions.
What seems clear is that personnel decisions in wartime -- decisions made by the White House as well as top military leaders -- should be driven by what is required to accomplish the mission, rather than mechanistic peacetime policies that call for the periodic rotation of top commanders and their staffs.
Ellie
By NADIA SCHADLOW
February 7, 2008
The U.S. just dodged a bullet in Iraq.
Recently it was reported that Pentagon leaders were considering Gen. David Petraeus, commander of the Multi-National Force Iraq since February 2007, for a prestigious redeployment to Europe. It is good news for Americans and Iraqis alike that Gen. Petraeus decided to stay in Baghdad through the fall.
What's depressing is that top political and military leaders in Washington asked him to consider the move in the first place. The proposal to shift Gen. Petraeus out of Iraq reflects the unwillingness of the military as a whole to make the larger cultural changes required to succeed in tough counterinsurgency missions.
Gen. Petraeus has repeatedly pointed out that a key reason behind the improvements in Iraq revolved around the fact that Americans were walking the streets, living alongside Iraqis, forging close relationships with Iraqi soldiers and police, and demonstrating to the population a commitment to achieving enduring security. Indeed, a key requirement for success in war is consistency of effort over time. Only experience on the ground permits the acquisition of enough knowledge of the political landscape and personalities necessary to shape events and achieve political stability.
In short, removing such a successful leader from a mission in progress is senseless. It is also inconsistent with much of the America's wartime history.
George Washington served as commander of the American revolutionary forces for eight years, from 1775-1783. Without his resolute leadership and political instincts, it is likely that the Continental Army would have disintegrated.
In the Mexican War, Gen. Winfield Scott led the largest amphibious landing in the history of the U.S., near Vera Cruz. He was then able to achieve operational victory and strategic success by staying on as the military governor in Mexico City.
During World War II, Gens. Dwight D. Eisenhower and George C. Marshall served extended tenures in their respective positions. It would be hard to imagine the military changing these crucial commanders during the war.
Gen. Lucius Clay, initially Gen. Eisenhower's deputy, served for four years in Germany and was instrumental in initiating its reconstruction. With patience and determination, Clay established the foundation for Germany's postwar recovery.
In Korea, Gen. John Hodge served as the commander of U.S. occupying forces in the south from September 1945 to August 1948. While his record was mixed, he spent these years immersed in political infighting, mediating between Korean political factions and sustaining support for the mission in Washington. He helped to create institutions of government strong enough to withstand the invasion from the North, and three years of war.
Gen. Douglas MacArthur oversaw the occupation of Japan for six years from 1945 to 1951. He is credited with transforming the nation into a functioning democracy.
In Vietnam, the pacification policy begun in 1968 by Gen. Creighton Abrams might have achieved success had it begun earlier in the war. Abrams served for four years, integrating civil-military efforts to pacify and reconstruct the country.
Each of these wars represented distinct challenges and the outcomes were varied. Yet the effectiveness of the efforts depended in large measure on the detailed knowledge accrued by commanders, and on their ability to achieve unity of effort within their own teams and between the U.S. command and indigenous leaders.
Consistent effort over time is particularly important in counterinsurgency situations in which the political dimension of war is paramount. Forging the kind of political accommodation between the disparate groups necessary to address the fundamental causes of violence requires the development of close personal relationships.
The military acknowledges the need for dedicated headquarters and support structures to conduct long-duration missions. Forces must have staying power, and be able to identify and retain lessons learned as well as to sustain personal relationships.
Indeed, the military's own counterinsurgency (COIN) manual emphasizes the need to cultivate effective leaders in the host country. Younger officers deploying to and from Iraq have reinforced these themes, writing consistently about the importance of maintaining a stable presence and getting to know the political, social and cultural terrain.
Yet the turnover of top commanders in Iraq directly contradicts much of the COIN manual's observation that crafting a political solution over time is the only proven means by which insurgencies are defeated. Senior commanders play a huge role in integrating military policy with political goals. This is hard to achieve when top officers below Gen. Petraeus' rotate out either every seven months (for the U.S. Marines) or 12 to 15 months (for the U.S. Army). Not only will U.S. Army corps commander Gen. Raymond Odierno leave later this month, but his entire staff will as well.
While units at the brigade level and below have an extraordinarily high operational tempo and endure constant combat stresses, the situation is different with large, well-staffed headquarter units. Despite this fact, all are on the same rotation schedule.
Gen. Petraeus is likely being considered for a Combatant Command job as a reward for his superb performance in Iraq, and because the president wanted to recognize the general prior to the end of his administration -- particularly if the next administration turns out to be a Democratic one. But political considerations should not outweigh strategic imperatives. The decision to rotate top commanders out of complex situations is similar to a research lab deciding to remove its top scientist just as his team is on the verge of discovering an important new drug, or changing the coaching staff of an NFL team on an annual basis.
Certainly, remaining in a war zone for long periods of time is difficult and involves great personal sacrifice. But the military could take measures, such as allowing certain officers to make more frequent visits home or bring family members along on deployment in some circumstances, to lessen the burden. It also might consider other rewards for long service under arduous conditions.
What seems clear is that personnel decisions in wartime -- decisions made by the White House as well as top military leaders -- should be driven by what is required to accomplish the mission, rather than mechanistic peacetime policies that call for the periodic rotation of top commanders and their staffs.
Ellie