thedrifter
01-15-08, 07:19 AM
Hormuz, Quds Force and Language Skills: A Recent History [Steve Schippert]
The US Navy gave ABC News a tour of the U.S. ships involved in the recent IRGC incident on the Strait of Hormuz, and the ships commanders are convinced that the threatening transmission ("I am coming to you. You will explode in a few minutes.") is too coincidental to have had an origin by chance and blindly independent of the IRGC's aggressive speedboat actions.
"When I heard it, it just raised my awareness level. That the threat level seemed to perhaps increase when you combine it with the maneuvering of the vessels and the fact they would not respond to our warnings and interrogations," James told ABC News.
After first implying that the transmission came from the Iranian vessels, the Navy later said the communication could have come from the shore. Officials now say it is not clear where the transmission came from. There has even been speculation that it was a hoax and had nothing to do with the Iranians.
But Adler and James, who heard the transmission in the heat of the confrontation, said they disagreed.
"I think it's too coincidental that it wasn't from one of the ships, or the boats near by us," Adler said.
Spook86, a 20-year military intelligence veteran, agrees.
The timing of that call suggests someone who was doing more than simply monitoring radio traffic on Channel 16. Under existing rules of engagement (ROE), American warships initiate radio contact well before approaching ships enter their inner defensive perimeter. Based solely on bridge-to-bridge communications, the intruder would have only a general idea of the vessels' location. His threatening call, at the height of the incident, seems hardly coincidental, and appears to have been based on more than VHF radio traffic.
By comparison, an IRGC command element, located on a nearby, Iranian-controlled island (or another naval vessel) would have detailed knowledge of the operational plan, and—with access to other communications channels, ELINT data and radar plots—an excellent idea of how the encounter was unfolding. With that information, it would be easy to make the radio call, at exactly the right moment.
It would also be relatively simple for Iranian linguists to mimic the well-known "monkey," creating plausible denial for their involvement. Tehran has used deceptive radio broadcasts in the past, to great effect. During the Iran-Iraq War, Iranian SIGINT units operated dummy radio networks, which passed bogus information that was intercepted by the Iraqis, causing them to deploy troops in the wrong areas. Given Iran's past proficiency in electronic deception, finding someone to imitate the heckler would be a piece of cake.
In agreement with that possibility, the Iranian IRGC has in the past used convincing (accent free) foreign language skills for operational deception. I offer up 'Exhibit B,' the Iranian Quds Force operation in Karbala precisely one year ago in which five U.S. soldiers were killed, four of them executed point-blank on the side of the road after the attackers' egress. Take close note of the language skills employed — to say nothing of the blonde-haired, fair-skinned operators.
The black GMC Suburban vehicles, the same style as seen in US convoys for diplomatic and security personnel, stopped at the checkpoint. While this is never overtly stated, it can be derived from the checkpoint guards’ statements that the occupants spoke English and had American military identification cards. The guards were convinced the men in the American uniforms were American, as they reportedly called ahead to the Provincial Joint Coordination Center, where a meeting was taking place between the US Army civil affairs unit and local Iraqi security.
Several important factors can be gleaned from this face-to-face encounter:
The American uniforms and equipment were authentic.
The attackers spoke English without accent discernible to the native Iraqi guards.
Appearance played a role in the 12-man team, as one of the ‘Americans’ was described by an Iraqi guard as even having blonde hair.
The identification cards were authentic enough to convince checkpoint personnel upon inspection.
Iranian deception in IRGC and Quds Force operations against us has included — very intently — the employment of convincing foreign-language skills in deception. It should be kept in mind that it is entirely possible — if not likely — in the Hormuz incident as well.
The US Navy ships' captains sure believe so.
Ellie
The US Navy gave ABC News a tour of the U.S. ships involved in the recent IRGC incident on the Strait of Hormuz, and the ships commanders are convinced that the threatening transmission ("I am coming to you. You will explode in a few minutes.") is too coincidental to have had an origin by chance and blindly independent of the IRGC's aggressive speedboat actions.
"When I heard it, it just raised my awareness level. That the threat level seemed to perhaps increase when you combine it with the maneuvering of the vessels and the fact they would not respond to our warnings and interrogations," James told ABC News.
After first implying that the transmission came from the Iranian vessels, the Navy later said the communication could have come from the shore. Officials now say it is not clear where the transmission came from. There has even been speculation that it was a hoax and had nothing to do with the Iranians.
But Adler and James, who heard the transmission in the heat of the confrontation, said they disagreed.
"I think it's too coincidental that it wasn't from one of the ships, or the boats near by us," Adler said.
Spook86, a 20-year military intelligence veteran, agrees.
The timing of that call suggests someone who was doing more than simply monitoring radio traffic on Channel 16. Under existing rules of engagement (ROE), American warships initiate radio contact well before approaching ships enter their inner defensive perimeter. Based solely on bridge-to-bridge communications, the intruder would have only a general idea of the vessels' location. His threatening call, at the height of the incident, seems hardly coincidental, and appears to have been based on more than VHF radio traffic.
By comparison, an IRGC command element, located on a nearby, Iranian-controlled island (or another naval vessel) would have detailed knowledge of the operational plan, and—with access to other communications channels, ELINT data and radar plots—an excellent idea of how the encounter was unfolding. With that information, it would be easy to make the radio call, at exactly the right moment.
It would also be relatively simple for Iranian linguists to mimic the well-known "monkey," creating plausible denial for their involvement. Tehran has used deceptive radio broadcasts in the past, to great effect. During the Iran-Iraq War, Iranian SIGINT units operated dummy radio networks, which passed bogus information that was intercepted by the Iraqis, causing them to deploy troops in the wrong areas. Given Iran's past proficiency in electronic deception, finding someone to imitate the heckler would be a piece of cake.
In agreement with that possibility, the Iranian IRGC has in the past used convincing (accent free) foreign language skills for operational deception. I offer up 'Exhibit B,' the Iranian Quds Force operation in Karbala precisely one year ago in which five U.S. soldiers were killed, four of them executed point-blank on the side of the road after the attackers' egress. Take close note of the language skills employed — to say nothing of the blonde-haired, fair-skinned operators.
The black GMC Suburban vehicles, the same style as seen in US convoys for diplomatic and security personnel, stopped at the checkpoint. While this is never overtly stated, it can be derived from the checkpoint guards’ statements that the occupants spoke English and had American military identification cards. The guards were convinced the men in the American uniforms were American, as they reportedly called ahead to the Provincial Joint Coordination Center, where a meeting was taking place between the US Army civil affairs unit and local Iraqi security.
Several important factors can be gleaned from this face-to-face encounter:
The American uniforms and equipment were authentic.
The attackers spoke English without accent discernible to the native Iraqi guards.
Appearance played a role in the 12-man team, as one of the ‘Americans’ was described by an Iraqi guard as even having blonde hair.
The identification cards were authentic enough to convince checkpoint personnel upon inspection.
Iranian deception in IRGC and Quds Force operations against us has included — very intently — the employment of convincing foreign-language skills in deception. It should be kept in mind that it is entirely possible — if not likely — in the Hormuz incident as well.
The US Navy ships' captains sure believe so.
Ellie