thedrifter
01-09-08, 08:36 AM
01-05-2008
CAV Officer Responds to Criticism About Threat to NCO Corps
SFTT
Editor's Note: Let the "battle" be joined.... there is no more important issue facing the American military than Leadership, and this is a cogent analysis by Capt. Eric Olsen who has, as Hack would have said, "Stood tall." If you disagree, the door is open for your response. If you concur, why?
Some time ago I read the article entitled “As Iron Mike Says, ‘Follow... Somebody Else’” by Col. Mike Plank and felt compelled to respond. I will not include the entire text here in the interest of brevity but, at the risk of being presumptuous, I believe the basis of his argument is encapsulated in his final three short paragraphs.
“We have created an officer corps that is so concerned over ‘rank parity’ and political correctness that it holds illegal change of command ceremonies for E9s where the CSM assumes TOTAL RESPONSIBILITY for the unit and takes the unit colors AWAY from the legal commander. The same officer corps treats and regards its young commissioned officers as some type of garbage and then wonders why they leave in droves”
“Once again, this is a top driven decision in the Army that starts with our mainly inept, corporate-speak, PC, general officer corps.
“We must get back to the basics of officership and professionalism across the entire Army and not just in places with a few professional officer leaders.”
In my response I related some views from my foxhole as an additional warning to the NCO corps against following the Officer Corps down our road to destruction. I wrote:
“Well put. I have seen and continue to see exactly that.
“As a young captain in the OIF invasion, I was actually told by field grade officers that I had to designate a NCOIC for ‘my’ convoys.
“I could go along because I was the one that planned it and knew the mission and had a reputation for making convoys happen without incident, but I had to designate an NCO to run it. I was to designate a NCO attachment that didn’t know the mission or all the people going on the mission just because he was the senior NCO. I told them to put down ‘NCOIC: CPT Olsen’ and left.
“It just so happened that on that convoy the E8 they wanted to designate as NCOIC slept through Ramadi and Fallujah, putting my convoy in danger. He stayed awake after I stopped the convoy and told him I would shoot him myself if he fell asleep again.
“Range operations throughout the Army now have to have an NCOIC and safety NCO/officer. An officer can’t be the NCOIC. I argued that one and lost. I was the only officer of any rank that spent the whole day out there and made sure I could qualify expert. All the others showed up to barely qualify and left.
“My first sergeant has more information to brief at the quarterly training briefs than I do because ‘training is run by the 1SG and briefed to the CSM.’ I didn’t even bother to fight that one because my commander listened to the CSM over his commanders.
“And the list goes on. The NCO Corps has become as corrupted and political as the Officer Corps. Senior NCOs have to back stab for the next promotion just like senior officers. And the worst part of the whole thing, coming from the officer side, is that we are not only allowing it but in most cases promoting this type thinking.
“I don’t blame this lieutenant for his comments. His whole Army life he has been told by senior NCOs and mentor officers to defer to his NCOs. Let them run the operations, they are the experts.
“I was fed that same load of crap in all my pre-commissioning classes also; I just didn’t buy into the lie.
“I blame the senior officers and NCOs that are so focused on their own career and ‘toeing the line’ that they won’t step up and make people do their job no matter what that job is.
“Or maybe I am just a captain the times have left behind.”
Now, I have been around the block enough times to know that I would receive some strongly worded responses and was not disappointed. I was surprised, however, that the responses were a) personal attacks lacking much in the way of substance and b) completely and totally missing the point of the original article and my response.
I normally bow out when name-calling starts because nothing constructive is added to the argument at that point. But I will make an exception to my rule in this instance because each of these responses perfectly exemplifies a major problem with our army.
In “Some in Senior NCO Ranks Lean to ‘Self-Promoting Rubbish’, ” MSG V actually listened and contemplated before writing his response and offered some solutions.
“I have to agree with some of the comments about my own Senior NCO Corps. Couple of quick questions to the field;
“1) When or how did these so-called ‘Change of Responsibility’ ceremonies come about? I don’t recall any of those coming up thru the ranks these past 20 odd years. Seems like another example of self-promoting rubbish that the E9 corps likes lately.
“2) When doing some research into our Sister Services' Senior NCO Academies, I was surprised how short the courses were. Then it struck me, why on earth's name is the U.S. Army's SGM Academy course so long? What does a senior E8 or E9 need to know that it takes another nine months in class? Waste of time and money.
“3) If I see one more senior NCO, or Officer for that matter, shy away from the APFT I shall puke. What happened to leading from the front?
“Quick Idea: Let a team (hand picked) go around the National Guard and Army Reserve and give the APFT to standard on any random unit. I thought that's what inspections really were, not some ‘advanced notice. CIP that everyone finger drills.
By the way I am brigade AGR Training NCO in a Reserve unit.”
And being the only one to agree with me a little, I unfortunately have to disagree with the solution presented in “Senior NCO Ranks.” We don’t need another non-deployable group of crossed “t” and dotted “i” inspection organizations. We need to hold leaders accountable for “everything their unit does or fails to do.”
We need much less top-down regulatory minutiae inspections and much more bottom-up, mission performance evaluation to determine worth. I didn’t “go by the book” and flag an overweight soldier in my unit once. I caught grief for it because of an upcoming inspection but wouldn’t sign the paperwork. Why?
This soldier was the best in the unit in MOS proficiency, could drag me, unconscious, out of a burning truck, always shot 40/40, always looked good in uniform, never had disciplinary issues, busted his butt at PT and always scored above 220 on the APFT. But he busted tape because he was a 5’4” Samoan built like a fireplug.
Thankfully he never had to save my life but I am absolutely positive he could have saved mine or anyone else’s in any situation and that is worth more to me than Army wide inspections. Was I right? You can judge for yourself, but I sleep well at night because I know I put what is important first.
In “Degraders Should Look for Another Line of Work,” Maj. Nicholson responded as follows.
“As a professional Soldier and combat arms officer I am continually amazed by the attitudes displayed in some of the letters submitted to the ‘Your Feedback’ column addressing NCO/Officer Corps relations.
“Apparently writers of letters that denigrate or somehow try to downplay the importance of either ranks require a little more maturity. When I read these types of articles I am glad that throughout my career I have served among warriors of all ranks who exhibit the highest professional standards. My Non-Commissioned and Commissioned Officer role models both played a vital role in my education and development into a leader.
“Every Soldier, Sailor, Airman, and Marine at each rank in every MOS serves a vital function towards accomplishing the U.S. military's mission -- in war and peace.
“For those who think otherwise, this team sport we call Soldiering may be the wrong line of work.”
And to the major from “Degraders” I say “I am, sir.” But not for the reason you are all thinking of right now. You will find the reason later if you actually read and consider what I am saying. And your response aids my reasoning with these quotes: “Every Soldier, Sailor, Airman, and Marine at each rank in every MOS serves a vital function” and “My Non-Commissioned and Commissioned Officer role models…” and “As a professional Soldier and combat arms officer…” Thank you.
I bet the E7 from “A Load of Crap” (I will get to him next) thinks I am about to say the major is wrong because of something like “those enlisted guys aren’t as important as the officers” or that “this major shouldn’t have NCOs as a role models” or something ridiculous like that.
He will be disappointed when I don’t fit into his stereotype by saying those enlisted guys are much more critical to mission accomplishment than any officer above the company grade could ever be (in the current Army). And how about the fact that most of my role models are NCOs -- not because they are NCOs but because they are mission accomplishing, no BS kind of guys. But I will address the points from “A Load of Crap” later.
Back to “Degraders.” Do you really believe there is nothing wrong, we are as good as we can get, and everything is great when we all just get along -– like in his units? And who could disagree with his talking points (quoted above) that are heard from every “going places” four-star through O6 I have ever heard talk. I do and will. If we, as a military, can’t critically examine shortcomings within our own organization we will never find solutions and we can never move on. We can’t, we aren’t, and it is getting worse.
Look at recent history. Pointing out shortcomings is not good for a career. Gen. (ret) Shinseki (of whom I am not a huge admirer for numerous other reasons) perfectly proves my point. He critically examined and then voiced his reservations about the ability of the military to pacify a post war Iraq with current troop numbers in a clear, concise, well thought out way. He was rapidly and less than ceremoniously removed. And he was right.
Or you can go the other way. No one who has been to Iraq can say the picture is all roses. I think I can remember about five cycles of Fallujah being a hot spot, becoming a major operational target, being “pacified” and then becoming a hot spot again since the war began. That is not progress. That is repeating old mistakes hoping for a different result. But it is acceptable because every commander wants to be the one who rooted the insurgents out of Fallujah, not the one to report that all the terrorists he rooted out moved back in six months later and will have to be rooted out again by the next guy.
And now I will digress for a short time. If you want to get ahead, today’s officers and CSMs take every mission they are given, ask for more, say it is possible because their unit is great (because of them of course) and ride the soldiers into the ground because they don’t have enough assets for the mission they scraped and clawed to get. But the officer of NCO will get a great evaluation out of it and the damage won’t be felt until after they get their LOM and move on.
The dedication of your soldiers will carry you through and they won’t reach the breaking point until they have to perform the same missions again, with the next commander or CSM and lose more of their friends (because the first time they didn’t have the assets to do accomplish the long term mission versus just achieving short term success) while being micromanaged by their commanders from an air-conditioned tent miles away.
That is what a large portion of the Officer Corps and senior NCO Corps has become. It is unacceptable for them to critically examine a mission and say a bridge too far is too far. Instead they say the bridge too far is perfect and let me take the one past that.
Here is my example. The 82nd at Normandy was expected to capture and hold critical infrastructure. The mission could still be accomplished taking the 75% expected casualties. So, with 25% manpower they could hold the bridges for up to two days (if memory serves). The mission (very difficult), the risk (hopefully casualties would be less than 75%), and an outcome (the analysis proved very close to true and the bridge held).
Now imagine a mission of securing a Middle East city, patrolling to protect the citizens, searching to find weapons, providing for infrastructure projects, helping build a city government, training the police force and securing the routes in and out of the city. Let’s say this is a city of the size that the mission could be handled by an augmented infantry battalion maxing out its resources because casualties were expected to be less than 5%. So, 95% of the Battalion strength could accomplish the mission.
But, now imagine that infantry battalion commander being given the mission for this city and requesting the mission for the eight that surround it for 15 months without relief. Or looking at it another way, the 82nd commander accepting the Normandy mission, requesting the 101st mission and offering to help the Rangers’ mission and you will get the idea. The mission (not physically possible), the risk (the mission couldn’t be performed at 200% strength let alone with combat power degraded by a variety of factors) and the outcome (one city is controlled and the others are not followed by the cycle seen in Fallujah).
But I am off track. I get so mad because the soldiers are taking the brunt of these problems. The same soldiers we ask the most of. But back to the responses.
Lastly, in “Whining About NCO Corps ‘A Load of Crap’ ” SFC Burgess took the cake with this obviously impassioned reply.
“The reason I am compelled to write you at this time is that I just can't take what I am reading from some of the “Soldiers, Sailors and Airmen” who have been writing to you about the sorry state of the NCO Corps in the US Army.
“It's all pretty much a load of crap.
“I am just days away from hitting the 19-year mark and Lord knows I could write a book about the sorry ass-ed NCOs I have known. But, I could write volumes about the good, hard working, devoted, professional, disciplined, elite and patriotic NCOs I have had the honor of serving with.
“The US Army has, bar none, the finest NCO Corps of any force the world has ever known. No other NCO Corps has ever been as dedicated, educated or well trained in the history of warfare.
“To the young and obviously disgruntled Captain that wrote,
“No Difference in Corruption between Officer Corps and NCO Corps”
“I would have to say “BULL****, SIR.”
“He is clearly only telling one side of the story. He needs to understand that the reason NCOs are put in charge is because the average O-3 has about as much time in the Army as I have in the chow line. Most company commanders couldn't find their asses with both hands without an NCO to draw them a map.
“Really, just try to imagine a company commander that didn't take advice and guidance from his/her 1SG. They wouldn't be in command for very damn long. In combat, they wouldn't be alive for very long, and neither would the rest of the company.
“Let me also assure everyone that NCOs are not even in the same arena when it comes to being power hungry, ladder climbers.
“If you don't believe me, just look at a recent DOD pay scale. Let the young captain ask himself this: “If NCOs are the ones being consistently put in charge of everything, then why are the officers making all the money?"
“Who's really got a right to *****? His battalion commander had a very good reason for placing an NCO in charge. He wanted to be successful.
“As long as we're checking the DOD active duty pay scales, let's also check the historical data of officers vs senior NCO promotions. See if anyone can find out what percentage of captains were NOT picked up on the last major's board. I'll go ahead and tell you. 3%. That's right...3% were NOT picked up. 97% of the eligible captains were promoted. I guess that was because they are all so damn good. Riiiiight.
“It's really very simple. NCOs most definitely do run the Army. However, they do it within the regulations set forth by the officers appointed over them. NCOs don't make policy, they enforce it. Anyone who thinks otherwise is a bloody fool.
“So, anyway, I feel better now. Keep up the good work and thanks so much for looking out for us.”
WOW! You missed the point. The officer corps is, in my mind, virtually unsalvageable above the company level. There are some good ones but not enough to make a difference. My entire response was to voice a warning that many of the cancers that have stricken the officer corps are beginning to infect the NCO corps. And once again you prove my point.
I just about guarantee you were once burned or almost burned by an un-listening, self-serving officer. But that is beside the point. It is in the past, you haven’t gotten passed it, and it is causing you to be part of the problem. That being said, I have to say WOW again.
Please, don’t even bother with the pay thing or promotion thing. If you want to get paid more, go to OCS, or better yet, get out and be a doctor or something. If an O5 that is only along for the ride in MY convoy and is screwed up, I will tell him exactly what to do because I am responsible for the lives of my guys on my convoy and he is endangering them. Same way that if an E8 (or E2 for that matter), who is along for the ride in my convoy, is endangering my guys will be put in his place. THIS HAS NOTHING TO DO WITH PAY OR PROMOTION RATES. GET OVER IT! You can have every bit of my pay and bust me to E-nothing when the E2 or E8 or O5 or anyone else doesn’t get killed on my watch despite their own stupidity. And it is my proudest achievement that no one did.
And, did you have to resort to the old clichés. “You were in diapers when I was in the jungles of ‘Nam (or Iraqi sand, or Panama or wherever)…” “I have more time in the chow line (or PX or latrine or deployed or whatever)…” And I love the same old sorry “an NCO’s job is to keep everyone alive despite the bumbling officer” crap -- didn’t I see that in an Oliver Stone movie somewhere.
I didn’t think finer points of the story where I described how the convoy team I trained and always hand picked after they met my standard, was constantly requested by the Commander, CSM, and 1SG. Yes, my guys were that good (and yes, the NCOs wanted me to run their convoys). I didn’t think that was relevant. I figured it would be enough to describe how the E8 that was added by a clueless major was endangering the lives of the people in my convoy by sleeping through Fallujah and Ramadi. Obviously I should have clarified. Thank you, I learned, and am better for it.
But, I didn’t say what I did to him because I was an officer and he was enlisted. I said and did it because it was the right thing to do. And if I was an E2 I would have said the same thing to him because he was endangering my guys. I would expect any soldier (which is what I consider myself -- not an officer or NCO or anything else but a soldier) in charge to do the same thing.
If you have to work to keep anyone in your unit alive in addition to performing your mission, you have failed as a leader in the Army at any level. And a soldier at any level can be a leader, so don’t go there. If an NCO has to work to keep an officer alive, or the opposite, the person doing the work is as much or more a failure than the other. And if even one soldier has to work to keep their NCO and officer alive because the two can’t work together, shame on us (the Non-Commissioned and Commissioned Officer leadership) as a group.
My number one rule is that I am a success if I help the people around me to be successful regardless of rank, ability, time in service, APFT score, MOS, service or any other reason.
To make everyone successful is to cash in on everyone’s strengths, work on their weaknesses together and most of all DEVELOP AS A TEAM-each member of the team performing their critical role. I have striven for that with each and every one of my soldiers, NCOs and officers, sometimes with success and sometimes without but always with effort. But either way, they have improved my weaknesses and I have tried everything I could to improved theirs.
“Never bring up a problem without suggesting a solution” so here it is.
NCOs, you have a specific mission and it is no fail. At the platoon level and below you teach soldiers and advise your officers, while at the company level and above you advise your commander. When you are required to fill “check the block” staff billets, develop training plans for QTB, manage the actions of the NCOs within subordinate units (yes, 1SG and CSMs, you) like a separate chain of command, and attend schooling that emphasized minutiae and paperwork (instead of training soldiers), you are taken away from and not allowed to develop in your primary mission of training soldiers and/or advising commanders. But these unimportant things are the things that get you that next promotion so a growing number of you are focusing all your attention on them. And the cancer spreads.
Don’t let the cancer that has withered the officer corps I was so proud to join (based on stories from my enlisted, NCO and Officer Grandfather) continue to spread. If I seem hard on NCOs, it is like the terminally ill lung cancer patient telling the young smoker to quit. “Change now or you will end up like me.” NCOs, change now or you may very well end up like the Officer Corps.
Officers, we have a specific mission and it is also no fail. The officer corps used to lead by a) learning to perform the mission b) proving they knew it to the soldiers by performing it from the front and c) once that was accomplished, learning how to best accomplish the mission in the big picture by study and experience.
Now the officer corps a) spends half their life in schooling or staff jobs where they only learn PowerPoint, not skills b) focuses on looking good to the boss instead of working with the troops and c) refusing to ask the tough questions about how to best accomplish the big picture mission and standing up for what is right. And this is because obedience is valued over ability and being a “yes man” is esteemed way above “learning your job.” And with the good ones giving up or getting out and the other “going places” ones moving up, we are not going in the right direction
.
We, the Army, need to address these issues and moreover, figure out how to solve them and move along. But the responses I have referred to here are perfect examples of what, more often than not, comes out when addressing real problems. And that is why I am getting out. I do not think we, as an Army, have the ability to critically address the problems (the “Degraders”) and come to mission focused solutions (in the “Senior NCO Ranks”) without resorting to name calling and pointless arguments that just end up throwing (“A Load of Crap”) around with no value added.
Thank you all for helping make my points.
But I am just a disgruntled, know-nothing officer that has to be drawn a map by my NCOs, and cavalry trooper (not listed in the Major’s “vital function” list). Maybe it is more productive to keep arguing about pay, APFTs and maturity used when voicing problems (I don’t even know what that means) instead defining the problem, assessing possible solutions, implementing the best solution and getting better as an organization.
Eric Olsen, Cpt., CAV
Ellie
CAV Officer Responds to Criticism About Threat to NCO Corps
SFTT
Editor's Note: Let the "battle" be joined.... there is no more important issue facing the American military than Leadership, and this is a cogent analysis by Capt. Eric Olsen who has, as Hack would have said, "Stood tall." If you disagree, the door is open for your response. If you concur, why?
Some time ago I read the article entitled “As Iron Mike Says, ‘Follow... Somebody Else’” by Col. Mike Plank and felt compelled to respond. I will not include the entire text here in the interest of brevity but, at the risk of being presumptuous, I believe the basis of his argument is encapsulated in his final three short paragraphs.
“We have created an officer corps that is so concerned over ‘rank parity’ and political correctness that it holds illegal change of command ceremonies for E9s where the CSM assumes TOTAL RESPONSIBILITY for the unit and takes the unit colors AWAY from the legal commander. The same officer corps treats and regards its young commissioned officers as some type of garbage and then wonders why they leave in droves”
“Once again, this is a top driven decision in the Army that starts with our mainly inept, corporate-speak, PC, general officer corps.
“We must get back to the basics of officership and professionalism across the entire Army and not just in places with a few professional officer leaders.”
In my response I related some views from my foxhole as an additional warning to the NCO corps against following the Officer Corps down our road to destruction. I wrote:
“Well put. I have seen and continue to see exactly that.
“As a young captain in the OIF invasion, I was actually told by field grade officers that I had to designate a NCOIC for ‘my’ convoys.
“I could go along because I was the one that planned it and knew the mission and had a reputation for making convoys happen without incident, but I had to designate an NCO to run it. I was to designate a NCO attachment that didn’t know the mission or all the people going on the mission just because he was the senior NCO. I told them to put down ‘NCOIC: CPT Olsen’ and left.
“It just so happened that on that convoy the E8 they wanted to designate as NCOIC slept through Ramadi and Fallujah, putting my convoy in danger. He stayed awake after I stopped the convoy and told him I would shoot him myself if he fell asleep again.
“Range operations throughout the Army now have to have an NCOIC and safety NCO/officer. An officer can’t be the NCOIC. I argued that one and lost. I was the only officer of any rank that spent the whole day out there and made sure I could qualify expert. All the others showed up to barely qualify and left.
“My first sergeant has more information to brief at the quarterly training briefs than I do because ‘training is run by the 1SG and briefed to the CSM.’ I didn’t even bother to fight that one because my commander listened to the CSM over his commanders.
“And the list goes on. The NCO Corps has become as corrupted and political as the Officer Corps. Senior NCOs have to back stab for the next promotion just like senior officers. And the worst part of the whole thing, coming from the officer side, is that we are not only allowing it but in most cases promoting this type thinking.
“I don’t blame this lieutenant for his comments. His whole Army life he has been told by senior NCOs and mentor officers to defer to his NCOs. Let them run the operations, they are the experts.
“I was fed that same load of crap in all my pre-commissioning classes also; I just didn’t buy into the lie.
“I blame the senior officers and NCOs that are so focused on their own career and ‘toeing the line’ that they won’t step up and make people do their job no matter what that job is.
“Or maybe I am just a captain the times have left behind.”
Now, I have been around the block enough times to know that I would receive some strongly worded responses and was not disappointed. I was surprised, however, that the responses were a) personal attacks lacking much in the way of substance and b) completely and totally missing the point of the original article and my response.
I normally bow out when name-calling starts because nothing constructive is added to the argument at that point. But I will make an exception to my rule in this instance because each of these responses perfectly exemplifies a major problem with our army.
In “Some in Senior NCO Ranks Lean to ‘Self-Promoting Rubbish’, ” MSG V actually listened and contemplated before writing his response and offered some solutions.
“I have to agree with some of the comments about my own Senior NCO Corps. Couple of quick questions to the field;
“1) When or how did these so-called ‘Change of Responsibility’ ceremonies come about? I don’t recall any of those coming up thru the ranks these past 20 odd years. Seems like another example of self-promoting rubbish that the E9 corps likes lately.
“2) When doing some research into our Sister Services' Senior NCO Academies, I was surprised how short the courses were. Then it struck me, why on earth's name is the U.S. Army's SGM Academy course so long? What does a senior E8 or E9 need to know that it takes another nine months in class? Waste of time and money.
“3) If I see one more senior NCO, or Officer for that matter, shy away from the APFT I shall puke. What happened to leading from the front?
“Quick Idea: Let a team (hand picked) go around the National Guard and Army Reserve and give the APFT to standard on any random unit. I thought that's what inspections really were, not some ‘advanced notice. CIP that everyone finger drills.
By the way I am brigade AGR Training NCO in a Reserve unit.”
And being the only one to agree with me a little, I unfortunately have to disagree with the solution presented in “Senior NCO Ranks.” We don’t need another non-deployable group of crossed “t” and dotted “i” inspection organizations. We need to hold leaders accountable for “everything their unit does or fails to do.”
We need much less top-down regulatory minutiae inspections and much more bottom-up, mission performance evaluation to determine worth. I didn’t “go by the book” and flag an overweight soldier in my unit once. I caught grief for it because of an upcoming inspection but wouldn’t sign the paperwork. Why?
This soldier was the best in the unit in MOS proficiency, could drag me, unconscious, out of a burning truck, always shot 40/40, always looked good in uniform, never had disciplinary issues, busted his butt at PT and always scored above 220 on the APFT. But he busted tape because he was a 5’4” Samoan built like a fireplug.
Thankfully he never had to save my life but I am absolutely positive he could have saved mine or anyone else’s in any situation and that is worth more to me than Army wide inspections. Was I right? You can judge for yourself, but I sleep well at night because I know I put what is important first.
In “Degraders Should Look for Another Line of Work,” Maj. Nicholson responded as follows.
“As a professional Soldier and combat arms officer I am continually amazed by the attitudes displayed in some of the letters submitted to the ‘Your Feedback’ column addressing NCO/Officer Corps relations.
“Apparently writers of letters that denigrate or somehow try to downplay the importance of either ranks require a little more maturity. When I read these types of articles I am glad that throughout my career I have served among warriors of all ranks who exhibit the highest professional standards. My Non-Commissioned and Commissioned Officer role models both played a vital role in my education and development into a leader.
“Every Soldier, Sailor, Airman, and Marine at each rank in every MOS serves a vital function towards accomplishing the U.S. military's mission -- in war and peace.
“For those who think otherwise, this team sport we call Soldiering may be the wrong line of work.”
And to the major from “Degraders” I say “I am, sir.” But not for the reason you are all thinking of right now. You will find the reason later if you actually read and consider what I am saying. And your response aids my reasoning with these quotes: “Every Soldier, Sailor, Airman, and Marine at each rank in every MOS serves a vital function” and “My Non-Commissioned and Commissioned Officer role models…” and “As a professional Soldier and combat arms officer…” Thank you.
I bet the E7 from “A Load of Crap” (I will get to him next) thinks I am about to say the major is wrong because of something like “those enlisted guys aren’t as important as the officers” or that “this major shouldn’t have NCOs as a role models” or something ridiculous like that.
He will be disappointed when I don’t fit into his stereotype by saying those enlisted guys are much more critical to mission accomplishment than any officer above the company grade could ever be (in the current Army). And how about the fact that most of my role models are NCOs -- not because they are NCOs but because they are mission accomplishing, no BS kind of guys. But I will address the points from “A Load of Crap” later.
Back to “Degraders.” Do you really believe there is nothing wrong, we are as good as we can get, and everything is great when we all just get along -– like in his units? And who could disagree with his talking points (quoted above) that are heard from every “going places” four-star through O6 I have ever heard talk. I do and will. If we, as a military, can’t critically examine shortcomings within our own organization we will never find solutions and we can never move on. We can’t, we aren’t, and it is getting worse.
Look at recent history. Pointing out shortcomings is not good for a career. Gen. (ret) Shinseki (of whom I am not a huge admirer for numerous other reasons) perfectly proves my point. He critically examined and then voiced his reservations about the ability of the military to pacify a post war Iraq with current troop numbers in a clear, concise, well thought out way. He was rapidly and less than ceremoniously removed. And he was right.
Or you can go the other way. No one who has been to Iraq can say the picture is all roses. I think I can remember about five cycles of Fallujah being a hot spot, becoming a major operational target, being “pacified” and then becoming a hot spot again since the war began. That is not progress. That is repeating old mistakes hoping for a different result. But it is acceptable because every commander wants to be the one who rooted the insurgents out of Fallujah, not the one to report that all the terrorists he rooted out moved back in six months later and will have to be rooted out again by the next guy.
And now I will digress for a short time. If you want to get ahead, today’s officers and CSMs take every mission they are given, ask for more, say it is possible because their unit is great (because of them of course) and ride the soldiers into the ground because they don’t have enough assets for the mission they scraped and clawed to get. But the officer of NCO will get a great evaluation out of it and the damage won’t be felt until after they get their LOM and move on.
The dedication of your soldiers will carry you through and they won’t reach the breaking point until they have to perform the same missions again, with the next commander or CSM and lose more of their friends (because the first time they didn’t have the assets to do accomplish the long term mission versus just achieving short term success) while being micromanaged by their commanders from an air-conditioned tent miles away.
That is what a large portion of the Officer Corps and senior NCO Corps has become. It is unacceptable for them to critically examine a mission and say a bridge too far is too far. Instead they say the bridge too far is perfect and let me take the one past that.
Here is my example. The 82nd at Normandy was expected to capture and hold critical infrastructure. The mission could still be accomplished taking the 75% expected casualties. So, with 25% manpower they could hold the bridges for up to two days (if memory serves). The mission (very difficult), the risk (hopefully casualties would be less than 75%), and an outcome (the analysis proved very close to true and the bridge held).
Now imagine a mission of securing a Middle East city, patrolling to protect the citizens, searching to find weapons, providing for infrastructure projects, helping build a city government, training the police force and securing the routes in and out of the city. Let’s say this is a city of the size that the mission could be handled by an augmented infantry battalion maxing out its resources because casualties were expected to be less than 5%. So, 95% of the Battalion strength could accomplish the mission.
But, now imagine that infantry battalion commander being given the mission for this city and requesting the mission for the eight that surround it for 15 months without relief. Or looking at it another way, the 82nd commander accepting the Normandy mission, requesting the 101st mission and offering to help the Rangers’ mission and you will get the idea. The mission (not physically possible), the risk (the mission couldn’t be performed at 200% strength let alone with combat power degraded by a variety of factors) and the outcome (one city is controlled and the others are not followed by the cycle seen in Fallujah).
But I am off track. I get so mad because the soldiers are taking the brunt of these problems. The same soldiers we ask the most of. But back to the responses.
Lastly, in “Whining About NCO Corps ‘A Load of Crap’ ” SFC Burgess took the cake with this obviously impassioned reply.
“The reason I am compelled to write you at this time is that I just can't take what I am reading from some of the “Soldiers, Sailors and Airmen” who have been writing to you about the sorry state of the NCO Corps in the US Army.
“It's all pretty much a load of crap.
“I am just days away from hitting the 19-year mark and Lord knows I could write a book about the sorry ass-ed NCOs I have known. But, I could write volumes about the good, hard working, devoted, professional, disciplined, elite and patriotic NCOs I have had the honor of serving with.
“The US Army has, bar none, the finest NCO Corps of any force the world has ever known. No other NCO Corps has ever been as dedicated, educated or well trained in the history of warfare.
“To the young and obviously disgruntled Captain that wrote,
“No Difference in Corruption between Officer Corps and NCO Corps”
“I would have to say “BULL****, SIR.”
“He is clearly only telling one side of the story. He needs to understand that the reason NCOs are put in charge is because the average O-3 has about as much time in the Army as I have in the chow line. Most company commanders couldn't find their asses with both hands without an NCO to draw them a map.
“Really, just try to imagine a company commander that didn't take advice and guidance from his/her 1SG. They wouldn't be in command for very damn long. In combat, they wouldn't be alive for very long, and neither would the rest of the company.
“Let me also assure everyone that NCOs are not even in the same arena when it comes to being power hungry, ladder climbers.
“If you don't believe me, just look at a recent DOD pay scale. Let the young captain ask himself this: “If NCOs are the ones being consistently put in charge of everything, then why are the officers making all the money?"
“Who's really got a right to *****? His battalion commander had a very good reason for placing an NCO in charge. He wanted to be successful.
“As long as we're checking the DOD active duty pay scales, let's also check the historical data of officers vs senior NCO promotions. See if anyone can find out what percentage of captains were NOT picked up on the last major's board. I'll go ahead and tell you. 3%. That's right...3% were NOT picked up. 97% of the eligible captains were promoted. I guess that was because they are all so damn good. Riiiiight.
“It's really very simple. NCOs most definitely do run the Army. However, they do it within the regulations set forth by the officers appointed over them. NCOs don't make policy, they enforce it. Anyone who thinks otherwise is a bloody fool.
“So, anyway, I feel better now. Keep up the good work and thanks so much for looking out for us.”
WOW! You missed the point. The officer corps is, in my mind, virtually unsalvageable above the company level. There are some good ones but not enough to make a difference. My entire response was to voice a warning that many of the cancers that have stricken the officer corps are beginning to infect the NCO corps. And once again you prove my point.
I just about guarantee you were once burned or almost burned by an un-listening, self-serving officer. But that is beside the point. It is in the past, you haven’t gotten passed it, and it is causing you to be part of the problem. That being said, I have to say WOW again.
Please, don’t even bother with the pay thing or promotion thing. If you want to get paid more, go to OCS, or better yet, get out and be a doctor or something. If an O5 that is only along for the ride in MY convoy and is screwed up, I will tell him exactly what to do because I am responsible for the lives of my guys on my convoy and he is endangering them. Same way that if an E8 (or E2 for that matter), who is along for the ride in my convoy, is endangering my guys will be put in his place. THIS HAS NOTHING TO DO WITH PAY OR PROMOTION RATES. GET OVER IT! You can have every bit of my pay and bust me to E-nothing when the E2 or E8 or O5 or anyone else doesn’t get killed on my watch despite their own stupidity. And it is my proudest achievement that no one did.
And, did you have to resort to the old clichés. “You were in diapers when I was in the jungles of ‘Nam (or Iraqi sand, or Panama or wherever)…” “I have more time in the chow line (or PX or latrine or deployed or whatever)…” And I love the same old sorry “an NCO’s job is to keep everyone alive despite the bumbling officer” crap -- didn’t I see that in an Oliver Stone movie somewhere.
I didn’t think finer points of the story where I described how the convoy team I trained and always hand picked after they met my standard, was constantly requested by the Commander, CSM, and 1SG. Yes, my guys were that good (and yes, the NCOs wanted me to run their convoys). I didn’t think that was relevant. I figured it would be enough to describe how the E8 that was added by a clueless major was endangering the lives of the people in my convoy by sleeping through Fallujah and Ramadi. Obviously I should have clarified. Thank you, I learned, and am better for it.
But, I didn’t say what I did to him because I was an officer and he was enlisted. I said and did it because it was the right thing to do. And if I was an E2 I would have said the same thing to him because he was endangering my guys. I would expect any soldier (which is what I consider myself -- not an officer or NCO or anything else but a soldier) in charge to do the same thing.
If you have to work to keep anyone in your unit alive in addition to performing your mission, you have failed as a leader in the Army at any level. And a soldier at any level can be a leader, so don’t go there. If an NCO has to work to keep an officer alive, or the opposite, the person doing the work is as much or more a failure than the other. And if even one soldier has to work to keep their NCO and officer alive because the two can’t work together, shame on us (the Non-Commissioned and Commissioned Officer leadership) as a group.
My number one rule is that I am a success if I help the people around me to be successful regardless of rank, ability, time in service, APFT score, MOS, service or any other reason.
To make everyone successful is to cash in on everyone’s strengths, work on their weaknesses together and most of all DEVELOP AS A TEAM-each member of the team performing their critical role. I have striven for that with each and every one of my soldiers, NCOs and officers, sometimes with success and sometimes without but always with effort. But either way, they have improved my weaknesses and I have tried everything I could to improved theirs.
“Never bring up a problem without suggesting a solution” so here it is.
NCOs, you have a specific mission and it is no fail. At the platoon level and below you teach soldiers and advise your officers, while at the company level and above you advise your commander. When you are required to fill “check the block” staff billets, develop training plans for QTB, manage the actions of the NCOs within subordinate units (yes, 1SG and CSMs, you) like a separate chain of command, and attend schooling that emphasized minutiae and paperwork (instead of training soldiers), you are taken away from and not allowed to develop in your primary mission of training soldiers and/or advising commanders. But these unimportant things are the things that get you that next promotion so a growing number of you are focusing all your attention on them. And the cancer spreads.
Don’t let the cancer that has withered the officer corps I was so proud to join (based on stories from my enlisted, NCO and Officer Grandfather) continue to spread. If I seem hard on NCOs, it is like the terminally ill lung cancer patient telling the young smoker to quit. “Change now or you will end up like me.” NCOs, change now or you may very well end up like the Officer Corps.
Officers, we have a specific mission and it is also no fail. The officer corps used to lead by a) learning to perform the mission b) proving they knew it to the soldiers by performing it from the front and c) once that was accomplished, learning how to best accomplish the mission in the big picture by study and experience.
Now the officer corps a) spends half their life in schooling or staff jobs where they only learn PowerPoint, not skills b) focuses on looking good to the boss instead of working with the troops and c) refusing to ask the tough questions about how to best accomplish the big picture mission and standing up for what is right. And this is because obedience is valued over ability and being a “yes man” is esteemed way above “learning your job.” And with the good ones giving up or getting out and the other “going places” ones moving up, we are not going in the right direction
.
We, the Army, need to address these issues and moreover, figure out how to solve them and move along. But the responses I have referred to here are perfect examples of what, more often than not, comes out when addressing real problems. And that is why I am getting out. I do not think we, as an Army, have the ability to critically address the problems (the “Degraders”) and come to mission focused solutions (in the “Senior NCO Ranks”) without resorting to name calling and pointless arguments that just end up throwing (“A Load of Crap”) around with no value added.
Thank you all for helping make my points.
But I am just a disgruntled, know-nothing officer that has to be drawn a map by my NCOs, and cavalry trooper (not listed in the Major’s “vital function” list). Maybe it is more productive to keep arguing about pay, APFTs and maturity used when voicing problems (I don’t even know what that means) instead defining the problem, assessing possible solutions, implementing the best solution and getting better as an organization.
Eric Olsen, Cpt., CAV
Ellie