Reevaluating America's Arsenal

[thedrifter]

Reevaluating America's Arsenal

(Part One of Two)

Tom Ordeman, Jr.

Author's Note: This is the first in a two-part series evaluating the equipment supplied to American ground forces. This piece deals with the problematic history of the M-16/M-4 assault rifle; the follow-up piece will address concerns about the new generation of utility uniforms.

Americans may not agree with one another on American involvement in Iraq and Afghanistan, but nearly all Americans agree that they love their men and women in uniform. Because Americans love and value service personnel and the sacrifices they make, American's warriors should receive the best equipment possible – both for their own benefit, and also because their work directly impacts the very freedoms that Americans cherish.

No one contests that America has produced the greatest military hardware in the history of the world – as a case in point, the U.S. Navy's beloved, but obsolete, F-14 Tomcats must be completely destroyed, just to prevent their spare parts from falling into Iranian hands. However, Americans seem to have failed in recent years to provide the troops with the finest equipment available for two of their most basic needs on the ground: deadly weaponry and effective uniforms.

The Department of Defense adopted the M-16 assault rifle in the mid-1960s, despite mixed reviews from those who were tasked with testing and evaluating it. The rifle cut its teeth in Vietnam as the first fully automatic rifle ever fielded to American troops. Reliability issues, coupled with instances of poor fire discipline (which resulted in quickly expended magazines, leaving troops without ammunition) led to problems on the ground; some anecdotes detail the massacre of entire platoons, after which the M-14 rifles were found to have expended every round while each and every M-16 rifle had jammed. This resulted in the quick development of improved variants of the M-16 that addressed both reliability and fire discipline (the latter being addressed by reducing the rifles from fully-automatic to having a three-round burst capability), as well as specially targeted cleaning manuals aimed at familiarizing troops with the extra maintenance measures required for the weapon.

In addition, numerous complaints have emerged over the years, from Vietnam to Somalia to Afghanistan and Iraq, that the 5.56mm NATO round has markedly less lethality than the 7.62mm round it replaced. The smaller round has several benefits, most notably allowing troops to carry more rounds for the same weight. However, one need look no further than Mark Bowden's best-selling book about the Battle of Mogadishu, “Black Hawk Down”, for stories of 5.56mm rounds requiring four or five shots to knock down an enemy combatant, while Delta Force operators using 7.62mm rounds were able to kill attackers with a single round.

America's warriors continue to give mixed reviews for the current variant of the M-16, the M-16A4 (the standard rifle of the Marine Corps, also used by the other services), and the derivative M-4 carbine (the standard rifle of the Army, also used by the other services). Some report that they encountered no issues with their M-16 and M-4 rifles in Iraq and Afghanistan; others report fouling and malfunctions, caused by the fine sand found in both countries, which were severe enough to take them out of the fight. In addition, reliability issues have placed American heroes in danger in Iraq and Afghanistan. These issues are notably absent in the infamous AK-47, well-known for its reliability even when fouled or corroded.

The question of the reliability and superiority of the M-4 was raised in 2007 when Congressional leaders, most notably Senator Tom Coburn (R-OK), challenged the Army to field the M-4 in sand tests against several competitors. Special forces operators, well known for using the best possible equipment available, have adopted a wide range of weaponry, notably the MK16 SCAR. Coburn and other leaders thus called into question whether the M-4, which is used less and less by the highly selective special forces troops, was really the most lethal weapon in America's arsenal.

The 5.56mm M-16/M-4 is an excellent rifle under some conditions, and it has been notably more reliable than other rifles such as the problematic British SA80. However, its problematic history is evidenced by the fact that the 7.62mm M-14 rifle that it replaced has seen a dramatic reintroduction in the Iraqi theater. The M-16/M-4 isn't the only American weapon whose superiority to its predecessor has been challenged: the M9 Beretta 9mm pistol, the standard sidearm, is seeing increasing competition from the Colt 1911, the .45 caliber handgun that it replaced in the early 1990s.

The justification behind adopting such weapons as the M-16 and the M9, at the cost of the M-14 and Colt 1911, was admirable: it allowed American troops to carry more rounds, while simultaneously fielding a round that was more likely to leave the enemy wounded but alive. The M-16 is also remarkably accurate compared to its primary global competitor, the 7.62mm AK-47. In fact, the differences between the M-16 and the AK-47 demonstrate the difference in philosophy between the Cold War entities of NATO and the Warsaw Pact: the design of the M-16 and the 5.56mm round show a determined valuation of both allied and enemy life. In contrast, the features of the AK-47 show that the priorities of its Communist producers were based less in reliability and survivability of the soldier, and more in the preservation of the rifle itself – after all, young conscripts were more expendable than rifles and rifle magazines.

However, the experiment with 5.56mm ammunition and the M-16 system has been varied, and is proving lethal in theaters of war – not for terrorists and insurgents, but for an outgunned generation of American fighting men and women. The fallout from the Cold War has led to enemies such as the Viet Cong, the Taliban, al Qaeda, and various other enemy forces that value their own lives far less than they value their mission of killing and wounding American and allied troops. Given this growing trend, Americans should undertake a fundamental reevaluation of how the troops are equipped their current deployments, as well as likely future deployments.

Ellie

[thedrifter]

Reevaluating America's Arsenal

(Part Two of Two)

Tom Ordeman, Jr.



Author's Note: This is the conclusion of a two-part series evaluating the equipment supplied to American ground forces. The first part dealt with continuing issues with the M-16/M-4 rifle. The conclusion addresses shortfalls with new field uniforms and overarching questions regarding the equipment supplied to America's fighting forces.

The most basic item in a soldier's inventory is the utility uniform. History's armies have employed many types of uniforms, all of them designed to accommodate the type of warfare they practiced. As warfare itself has evolved, so have the uniforms. Just as the red tunics worn by Roman legionnaires gave them a psychological advantage (and their enemies a disadvantage) by masking the blood stains when they were wounded, America's uniforms offer advantages in both utility and camouflage.

Through the onset of the Iraq War, all American military units used the same basic utility uniforms, with minor exceptions in design (such as differently shaped headwear for the Navy/Marine Corps team) and wear (such as blousing of cuffs over boots for Marines, versus tucking of cuffs into boots for soldiers). To the uneducated bystander, personnel of different services wearing utility uniforms were nearly indistinguishable.

In 2003, the Marine Corps began fielding a uniform design known as MARPAT, shorthand for "Marine Pattern." MARPAT utilities offered improvements in basic layout that reflected changes in American equipment since the "pickle suit" design of the Vietnam Era. However, the most revolutionary aspect of the new uniform was the color scheme: a pixelated pattern that was more effective at camouflaging a Marine in combat than the multicolored splotches of the existing multi-service uniforms. The Marine Corps adopted a woodland pattern and a desert pattern, and Marines deploying to Iraq and Afghanistan began operating in these uniforms. MARPAT was designed to provide effective uniforms for Marines while simultaneously highlighting the independence and individuality that remains a hallmark of the Marine Corps ethos.

Eager to improve their own uniforms, while simultaneously following the Marines' lead in adopting a digital camouflage system, each of the other three services began work in earnest on their own service-specific uniforms. The first of these was the Army, which began fielding the Army Combat Uniform (ACU) in early 2005. At the time of this writing, the Army has essentially completed full implementation of the ACU in combat theaters, while certain items of the woodland Battle Dress Uniform (BDU) and Desert Camouflage Uniform (DCU) remain to be phased out of domestic arsenals.

While the Marines have been overwhelmingly pleased with their MARPAT designs, the ACU has demonstrated severe limitations as a field uniform. Nearly all aspects of the uniform have created problems, not solutions, to challenges faced by soldiers in the field. Writing for *************, U.S. Army officer Eric Coulson wrote a considerable list of ACU shortfalls; the shortfalls noted by Coulson are representative of the complaints expressed by many soldiers.

In an effort to lower the cost of alterations to the uniform, the ACU employs Velcro for pocket closures, name and rank devices, and insignia patches. Unfortunately, this has made it easier for removable items (such as name tapes and patches) to fall off, as well as causing soldiers to lose items in pockets that were previously closed with buttons. In addition, the Velcro gets clogged with sand and mud, making it even less effective in the rugged field environments that soldiers find themselves in on a regular basis.

Many soldiers initially praised the light weight of the ACU material, both for overall comfort and because it holds in less heat in hot climates. Some soldiers have gone as far as to say that wearing the ACU felt "like wearing pajamas." Unfortunately, when not in garrison, these lightweight uniforms have a greater tendency to rip, with many soldiers complaining that the crotch in particular is poorly reinforced against tearing.

The ACU color scheme has also proven to be largely ineffective. Whereas other uniforms (both the BDU/ACU system and the new MARPAT) have prevailing patterns that were designed to blend into either the forest or the desert (but not both), the ACU uses "universal camouflage," designed to be equally effective in forest, desert, and urban conditions. Unfortunately, the viability of this pattern is extremely limited. The combination of tan, sage green and grey results in a predominately grey appearance that gives no improvement over the BDU uniform in woodland settings; under desert conditions, the ACU is ineffective in daylight, moderately effective at dusk, and ineffective at night. For various reasons, the ACU provides little advantage in urban settings – not surprising, as multicolored clothing tends to highlight itself against solid-colored buildings.

Although the ACU system is plagued with issues, several advantages are worth noting. Soldiers praise the overall layout of the uniform, which makes some improvements over the MARPAT uniforms; these include additional pockets on the chest and lower legs, and pen slots on the left sleeve. The ACU also eliminated the black combat boots in favor of an unpolished, sand-colored suede boot similar to the boots now used by the Marines. Overall, though, the Army's efforts to simplify uniform designs and costs by fielding a single uniform have been stifled by the cost of replacements caused by frail material; and the desire to field a universally effective camouflage pattern has resulted in a pattern that is equally ineffective in the multiple environments that soldiers find themselves operating in.

What is even more disconcerting is that the color scheme for the ACU was chosen over a pattern that offered much better camouflage in both desert and woodland settings. The Army's Natick Soldier Research Center teamed with Crye Associates (now Crye Precision) to investigate the feasibility of a universal camouflage pattern, under the theory that "good camouflage for where you are might be better than perfect camouflage for somewhere else.” The result was a pattern that was dubbed "Multicam." Multicam utilizes a gradient effect that works superbly in desert and plains environments, and its efficacy is comparable to the BDU design in forest environments. Multicam even offers blending advantages in some urban environments. Although the Army continues to use Multicam in demonstrations of its Future Force Warrior program, the ACU color scheme was fielded in lieu of Multicam.

Although one might think that the other services would learn from the problems with the ACU, the new Air Force utilities, the Airman Battle Uniform (ABU), employs the same basic color scheme. Having debated the benefits of a pixelated camouflage pattern versus a derivative of the popular Vietnam-era "tiger stripe" pattern, the Air Force decided to choose both, creating a half-tiger, half-pixilated pattern. Instead of the universally approved sand-colored boots used under both the MARPAT and ACU systems, the ABU uses green suede boots (although sand-colored boots are optional). The Air Force learned from a few of the Army's mistakes: for example, the ABU eschews Velcro in favor of the traditional buttons and sewn-on patches; however, the popular upper-sleeve pockets are eliminated. The ABU began fielding to Air Force personnel in late 2007, and although it's too soon to tell whether the new uniform will be as ineffective as the ACU, one issue has already come to light: airmen in desert theaters have taken to cutting out the ABU's internal map pocket in order to stay cool. The necessity of these map pockets is questionable, as the majority of personnel (and airmen in particular) do not carry maps on a regular basis.

While the Navy is also developing the new Navy Working Uniform (NWU), Navy spokesmen have made it clear from the beginning that this uniform is designed to meet the needs of sailors aboard ships, and is not meant to be a camouflage uniform. Those sailors deployed ashore (SEAL teams, Explosive Ordnance Disposal, chaplains, corpsmen, and the like) will be supplied with camouflage patterns appropriate to the conditions in which they are serving. Navy personnel who work regularly with Marines already wear Navy substitutions of the MARPAT uniforms.

The Navy and Marine Corps notwithstanding, the limited effectiveness of the ACU and ABU is troubling, particularly when patterns such as Multicam, desert tiger stripe, MARPAT derivatives, and comparable patterns are available for desert conditions, with numerous additional options for woodland settings. Given the sacrifices, and the level of responsibility that we expect of warriors as young as 18 years old, they deserve the most effective field uniforms possible.

And, as an addendum to the introductory portion of this article, the sand test that was cited left the M-4 carbine dead last when competing against the XM-8, the MK-16 combat assault rifle, and the HK-416 carbine.

Comparatively speaking, America does better at equipping soldiers, sailors, Marines, and airmen than any other nation on the planet. As problematic as the M-4, the ACU, and the ABU may be, these are better than their equivalents in many foreign armies – this is evident in footage of and testimonials from members of the elite British Special Air Service, who typically use the M-16/M-4 instead of the British SA80. Even so, the shortfalls of these items, particularly when compared to the strengths of their rivals (like Multicam) or predecessors (like the M14), give ample proof not only that America can do better, but that it has done better in the past.

As military leaders continue to look toward transformation, Americans both in and out of uniform should be reminded that although possible high tech challenges from strategic rivals may emerge, the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq have proven that no substitute exists that can replace the infantryman on the ground. Americans are right to develop technological solutions to emerging strategic problems, but this should not come at the cost of lethal, survivable, reliable rifles and durable, effective camouflage utility uniforms for young American patriots who commit to sacrifice their safety by defending liberty on foreign and domestic shores. The bottom line is that America's investment in equipment of high quality, appropriate to the challenges they face, is an investment in freedom – and on both counts, Americans should expect to get their money's worth.

Ellie

[Dave Coup]

<TABLE id=HB_Mail_Container height="100%" cellSpacing=0 cellPadding=0 width="100%" border=0 UNSELECTABLE="on"><TBODY><TR height="100%" UNSELECTABLE="on" width="100%"><TD id=HB_Focus_Element vAlign=top width="100%" background="" height=250 UNSELECTABLE="off"></TD></TR><TR UNSELECTABLE="on" hb_tag="1"><TD style="FONT-SIZE: 1pt" height=1 UNSELECTABLE="on">
</TD></TR></TBODY></TABLE><TABLE id=HB_Mail_Container height="100%" cellSpacing=0 cellPadding=0 width="100%" border=0 UNSELECTABLE="on"><TBODY><TR height="100%" UNSELECTABLE="on" width="100%"><TD id=HB_Focus_Element vAlign=top width="100%" background="" height=250 UNSELECTABLE="off">Great post Ellie! I'm not familiar with the newer rifles that the troops use but I know that the good ole M-14 beats the chit out od that POS Mattel MFer
hands down. As to uniforms just look at all the sojers walking the streets wearing Utilities.. I rest my case on that. I also refuse to call them cammies they are Utilities :mad:

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